“Let’s assume that I know that a red car has stopped in front of me on the road for no apparent reason. I know this because I see it. Let’s further assume that you, too, know that a red car has stopped in front of you on the road for no apparent reason—for you see it as well; after all, you are driving right alongside me. We both see it and we both know it; in the terminology of the Canadian-American cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker, we possess *private knowledge*. Furthermore, we can assume that we both know that the other person knows that a red car has come to a halt for no apparent reason, since we have both brought our own vehicles to a stop. We possess *reciprocal knowledge*—knowledge of the form ‘I know that you know’—which we infer from the behavior we observe in one another. Reciprocal knowledge, however, does not yet constitute *common knowledge*; for that, one additional cognitive loop is required.
We possess common knowledge only when we can each say: ‘I know that you know that I know.’ As this phrasing reveals, common knowledge possesses a complex structure, for one could append even more loops: ‘I know that you know that I know that you know that I know’—though at this point, we prefer to simply add an ‘etc.’ in order to avoid inducing a certain degree of cognitive vertigo. ‘When everyone knows that everyone knows...’” "..."—such is the title of Pinker’s latest book. Common knowledge is more than just the knowledge we share—I know it, and you know it; it is also more than the knowledge we possess regarding each other’s individual knowledge—I know what you know, and you know what I know. Rather, it is a form of knowledge directed at that specific part of the other person’s knowledge which, in turn, is directed at our own knowledge of their knowledge. One could also phrase it this way: What do you know about what I know regarding your knowledge of my knowledge?
Pinker believes that common knowledge exerts an enormous influence on how we live together. This is made clear by the book’s subtitle: "Common Knowledge and Its Astonishing Impact on Money, Power, and Everyday Life." As a theoretical construct, it serves, on the one hand, to explain numerous phenomena of social life; yet, according to Pinker, it simultaneously unleashes a distinct force within us all, transforming the way we interact with one another. For instance, as drivers in the situation just described, we might use a gesture directed at the other person to communicate that we know that they know that we know that they know—thereby jointly initiating an evasive maneuver. Common knowledge—this is Pinker’s central point—helps us coordinate our actions.
Of course, Pinker does not suggest that we coordinate our everyday actions through excessively complex cascades of thought in the form of "I know that you know that I know, etc." Rather, we possess a wide variety of—and sometimes quite simple—methods for signaling common knowledge to one another, or we simply take it for granted intuitively. Gestures have already been mentioned, but we can also use language to hint that we share common knowledge, or employ a conspicuous laugh to signal to others that we are, for example, mocking the overly self-assured demeanor of a third party. "Laughter," says Pinker, "creates common knowledge that challenges a convention of dominance, status, or prestige."
Thus, what we employ does not merely presuppose common knowledge for the coordination of action; we can also actively *create* it. In this way, Pinker explains the phenomenon of cyberbullying. If, for instance, someone believes that another person has behaved improperly, they may attempt to widely disseminate their "knowledge" across social media. They may also signal that the individual in question ought to be punished for their alleged misconduct. If enough others jump on the bandwagon, a "shitstorm" ensues—one that, as we know, can destroy livelihoods. Cyberbullying thrives on the fact that everyone shares a certain knowledge regarding the knowledge possessed by everyone else: everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows (and so on). Yet this knowledge does not simply exist *a priori*; it must be constructed—and in social media, one possesses a powerful tool for bringing it into being.
This illustrates how Pinker employs the concept of common knowledge. He is firmly convinced that it exerts a force of social coordination that we have yet to fully comprehend. The extent to which he pursues this line of argument is demonstrated in his chapter on "cancel culture"—a chapter which, it must be noted, focuses primarily on *left-wing* cancel culture within universities, while largely overlooking the powerful *right-wing* cancel cultures of the present day. Why do we seek to suppress unpopular opinions? For Pinker, there can be only one reason: "What apparently strikes fear and terror into the hearts of censors and proponents of 'canceling' is not that a 'volatile idea' is conceived—or even expressed—but rather that it might become *common knowledge*." Precisely because common knowledge exerts influence once it is established—or so one must interpret Pinker here—situations may arise in which attempts are made to thwart its dissemination.
Yet, here lies the first weakness of Pinker’s approach. "Volatile ideas" are not knowledge. Let us take one of the ideas Pinker lists—one whose discussion, in his view, is being stifled by academic "canceling": "Do men possess a natural motive to rape?" Those who are unwilling to discuss this question in an academic setting likely have a variety of reasons for their stance. One might consider the premise to be scientifically refuted. One might find the very concept of the "natural" at play here to be problematic, given that naturalistic arguments have, for centuries, served to legitimize the disadvantage and oppression of women. One might question what, precisely, is meant by "motive" in this context. In short, the issue concerns the *epistemic quality* of the research question itself—a question that, in academic contexts, can undoubtedly be put up for discussion. Pinker might perhaps argue that the fear here is that a discussion of this question would bring scientifically valid truths to light. But to make such a claim, he would need to define his concept of "knowledge" far more precisely—for instance, by distinguishing between true knowledge and false knowledge—something he consistently fails to do throughout his work.
He pays a price for this omission; for frequently, his book is not concerned with *common knowledge* at all, but rather with *shared beliefs*—a distinction made evident by his example of cyberbullying. Why does this matter? Because, in light of this distinction, many of his case studies become imprecise. For instance, if I know that you know that I know that you hold a racist worldview, the consequences of that shared awareness remain entirely open to interpretation. Perhaps I will publicly criticize your attitude. A powerfully negative impact can only truly arise if I *share* your attitude and actively seek out further allies—but in that case, what is at issue is a *shared* knowledge of shared beliefs—beliefs which, of course, may themselves be factually incorrect or morally problematic. A precise description, then, is not "I know that you know," but rather "I know that you believe"; and you may know that I know that you believe. At the very least, this specific knowledge can be described as true or appropriate; yet—and this is the crucial point—it cannot yet be characterized as *common knowledge*.
However, the profound impact that Pinker claims common knowledge exerts can often only be realized indirectly—via the mediation of shared beliefs or shared norms. Knowledge, as mere knowledge, does not appear to possess the inherent causal power that Pinker attributes to it. What truly matters is *what* we know about one another, and *how* we relate to that knowledge—not simply the fact that we possess knowledge *about* the other person's knowledge.
Thus, the book fails to convince regarding its central theses in cognitive psychology; Pinker relies too heavily on the persuasive force of his case studies—far too many of which, incidentally, are drawn from the abstract realm of game theory—while neglecting to sufficiently elaborate upon his fundamental systematic assumptions. To put it more positively: The book represents a first step in a debate that deserves to be continued. But nothing more than that.
Steven Pinker: "When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows..." Common Knowledge and Its Astonishing Impact on Money, Power, and Everyday Life.
Translated from the English by M. Wiese. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2025. 416 pp., illus., hardcover, €29.00.” [1]
1. Ich weiß, dass du weißt, dass ich weiß, dass du weißt . . .: Zu steil geratene These: Der Kognitionspsychologe Steven Pinker meint aus gemeinsamem Wissen viel für das soziale Miteinander ableiten zu können. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 10 Jan 2026: 12. MARTIN HARTMANN
Komentarų nėra:
Rašyti komentarą