Pivot to the Pacific? That Misses the Point.

"Should the U.S. give Asia priority over Europe? According to some national-security experts, the answer is increasingly yes. America's resources are finite and its military capacity limited, the argument goes, so it should direct them to the Pacific theater, where China appears poised to attack Taiwan. Meantime, the Europeans can handle Vladimir Putin.

This argument ignores what should be the military's primary focus: rebuilding its war-fighting capabilities. America needs to be able to respond wherever its interests are threatened -- be it in the Atlantic or the Pacific, whose theaters are inextricably linked.

Since the end of the Cold War, our national-security community has increasingly conceived of war as a series of controllable conflicts. This mindset has come in large part from the military's experience of fighting for two decades on 18th-century battlefields with 21st-century weapons. In its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. has controlled the airspace, managed secure communication and control nodes, and enjoyed largely unchallenged logistics systems.

This dominance over time led our defense establishment to accept a false sense of security. As successive administrations sought to capitalize on the "peace dividend," they pursued domestic policy at the expense of the military, leaving the Defense Department with a significantly smaller Joint Force. After 9/11, the military was reformatted for expeditionary operations, specializing in "just in time" efficiency capabilities for weapons and munitions production. Though Washington thought this transformation was wise, it has since left our military unprepared for direct conflict against our two pre-eminent competitors.

The American military lacks the resources to contend with mobilizing Russian and Chinese forces. The U.S. Army came up 15,000 soldiers short -- or 25% -- on recruitment targets last year. A senior Army official told Congress last month that the service is projected to miss its target again for 2023. Many European armies are similarly underequipped, especially the U.K., France and Germany. The only North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries that have seriously begun to rearm -- Finland, the Baltic states, Romania and especially Poland -- are on Europe's eastern flank. This comes as Moscow has announced it will increase its military to 1.5 million personnel by 2026 and as China continues to enhance its navy, which is already larger than America's.

Meantime, over the past 30 years the U.S. defense industry has consolidated from 51 to five aerospace and prime defense contractors. This mismatch has led to multiyear delays for weapons and munitions deliveries to our forces and allies. As a result, our military isn't positioned to fight simultaneous and potentially uncontrollable conflicts on the horizon -- a problem that no amount of strategic finessing, rebalancing between theaters, or technological sophistication can resolve.

There's a way forward, but it will require that we invest in expanding the military and the defense industrial base. The U.S. Navy, for instance, operates more-capable ships than the Chinese navy. Yet numbers matter, as even the most sophisticated ship can't be in two places at once. American munitions may be orders of magnitude more precise than what the Chinese or the Russians can bring to the fight, but if U.S. stocks are insufficient, they will run dry while the enemy keeps firing.

The events in Ukraine offer a useful real-time example. According to U.S. estimates, the Ukrainian forces last year fired roughly 3,000 artillery rounds a day. America has responded to that demand and plans to boost its production of its 155mm artillery shell "from 14,000 a month to over 24,000 later this year" -- reaching 85,000 a month by 2028. That's a significant improvement, but such production and stockpiling, for the U.S. and its allies alike, needs to be ramped up across a series of weapons if the military is to be prepared for long-term battles against its two determined adversaries.

Instead of debating whether we should "pivot" to the Pacific, we should focus on enhancing U.S and European war-fighting capacities. In so doing, we must move from a fixation on "just in time" efficiencies to a "just in case" approach that puts a premium on stockpiling weapons and ammunition. Our national-security policy makers should abandon the assumption that future battles will resemble those of the past. When fighting a near-peer or peer adversary, the U.S. will need to have excess defense industrial capacity to respond should its logistical chain suffer from enemy attacks.

When it comes to national defense, the U.S. needs sufficient weapons and ammunition to deter its adversaries -- and, if needed, to defend itself and its allies in Europe and Asia. Rebuilding its defense industrial base should be the top priority. No amount of strategic finessing can substitute for the real hard power the U.S. military must bring to the fight.

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Mr. Michta is dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security." [1]

Mr. Michta does not discuss how to survive a nuclear World War III. That is fatal omission if our opponents are not goatherds in Afghanistan.

1. Pivot to the Pacific? That Misses the Point. Michta, Andrew A. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 24 June 2023: A.13.

 

Pasukti į Ramųjį vandenyną? Tai praleidžia esmę

"Ar JAV turėtų teikti Azijai pirmenybę prieš Europą? Pasak kai kurių nacionalinio saugumo ekspertų, atsakymas vis dažniau yra teigiamas. Amerikos ištekliai yra riboti ir kariniai pajėgumai riboti, teigia argumentai, todėl turėtų nukreipti juos į Ramiojo vandenyno teatrą, kur Kinija atrodo pasiruošus pulti Taivaną. Tuo tarpu europiečiai gali susidoroti su Vladimiru Putinu.

 

     Šis argumentas ignoruoja tai, kas turėtų būti pagrindinis kariuomenės dėmesys: karinių pajėgumų atkūrimas. Amerika turi sugebėti reaguoti visur, kur jos interesams kyla grėsmė – ar tai būtų Atlanto vandenynas, ar Ramusis vandenynas, kurių teatrai yra neatsiejamai susiję.

 

     Pasibaigus Šaltajam karui, mūsų nacionalinio saugumo bendruomenė karą vis labiau suvokė kaip valdomų konfliktų seriją. Šis požiūris didžiąja dalimi kilo iš kariuomenės patirties, kurią du dešimtmečius kovojo 18-ojo amžiaus mūšio laukuose su XXI amžiaus ginklais. Vykdydamos kovos su terorizmu ir sukilėliais operacijas, JAV kontroliavo oro erdvę, valdė saugaus ryšio ir valdymo mazgus ir mėgavosi iš esmės nenugalimomis logistikos sistemomis.

 

     Šis dominavimas, laikui bėgant, paskatino mūsų gynybos institucijas priimti klaidingą saugumo jausmą. Kadangi viena po kitos einančios administracijos siekė pasinaudoti „taikos dividendu“, jos vykdė vidaus politiką kariuomenės sąskaita, todėl Gynybos departamentas turėjo žymiai mažesnes jungtines pajėgas. Po rugsėjo 11 d. kariuomenė buvo suformatuota ekspedicinėms operacijoms, kurios specializavosi „kaip laiku“ efektyvumo pajėgumuose, skirtuose ginklų ir amunicijos gamybai. Nors Vašingtonas manė, kad ši pertvarka buvo išmintinga, nuo to laiko mūsų kariškiai nepasiruošė tiesioginiam konfliktui su mūsų dviem iškiliais konkurentais.

 

     Amerikos kariuomenei trūksta resursų kovoti su Rusijos ir Kinijos pajėgų mobilizavimu. Praėjusiais metais JAV armijai pritrūko 15 000 karių, arba 25 proc. Vienas aukšto rango armijos pareigūnas praėjusį mėnesį Kongresui sakė, kad prognozuojama, kad 2023 m. tarnyba vėl nepasieks savo tikslo. Daugelis Europos armijų yra taip pat nepakankamai aprūpintos, ypač JK, Prancūzija ir Vokietija. Vienintelės Šiaurės Atlanto sutarties organizacijos šalys, rimtai pradėjusios persiginkluoti – Suomija, Baltijos šalys, Rumunija ir ypač Lenkija – yra Europos rytiniame flange. Tai įvyko po to, kai Maskva paskelbė, kad iki 2026 m. padidins savo karinių pajėgų skaičių iki 1,5 mln., o Kinija toliau stiprina savo karinį jūrų laivyną, kuris jau yra didesnis, nei Amerikos.

 

     Tuo tarpu per pastaruosius 30 metų JAV gynybos pramonė susijungė nuo 51 iki penkių aviacijos ir kosmoso bei gynybos rangovų. Dėl šio neatitikimo ginklų ir amunicijos pristatymas mūsų pajėgoms ir sąjungininkams buvo atidėtas kelerius metus. Dėl to mūsų kariuomenė nėra pasirengusi kovoti su vienu metu vykstančiais ir galimai nekontroliuojamais konfliktais horizonte – problemos, kurios negali išspręsti joks strateginis rafinavimas, teatrų pusiausvyros atstatymas ar technologinis sudėtingumas.

 

     Yra kelias į priekį, bet tam reikės investuoti į karinės ir gynybinės pramonės bazės plėtrą. Pavyzdžiui, JAV karinis jūrų laivynas eksploatuoja pajėgesnius laivus, nei Kinijos laivynas. Tačiau skaičiai yra svarbūs, nes net ir pats moderniausias laivas negali būti dviejose vietose vienu metu. Amerikietiška amunicija gali būti daug tikslesnė, nei kinai ar rusai gali atnešti į kovą, tačiau jei JAV atsargų nepakaks, jos išseks, kol priešas toliau šaudys.

 

     Įvykiai Ukrainoje yra naudingas realiojo laiko pavyzdys. JAV skaičiavimais, pernai Ukrainos pajėgos per dieną iššaudavo apie 3000 artilerijos šovinių. Amerika atsiliepė į šį poreikį ir planuoja padidinti savo 155 mm artilerijos sviedinių gamybą „nuo 14 000 per mėnesį iki daugiau nei 24 000 vėliau šiais metais“ – iki 2028 m. pasieks 85 000 per mėnesį. Tai reikšmingas patobulinimas, tačiau tokia gamyba ir atsargų kaupimas JAV ir jos sąjungininkės turi būti sustiprintos, naudojant daugybę ginklų, jei norime, kad kariuomenė būtų pasirengusi ilgalaikėms kovoms su dviem ryžtingais priešais.

 

     Užuot svarstydami, ar turėtume „pasisukti“ prie Ramiojo vandenyno, turėtume sutelkti dėmesį į JAV ir Europos karinių pajėgumų didinimą. Tai darydami, turime pereiti nuo veiksmingumo „tik laiku“ prie „dėl visa ko“ požiūrio, kuris padidina ginklų ir šaudmenų kaupimą. Mūsų nacionalinio saugumo politikos formuotojai turėtų atsisakyti prielaidos, kad ateities mūšiai bus panašūs į praeitį. Kovodama su artimu ar lygiaverčiu priešu, JAV turės turėti perteklinius gynybos pramonės pajėgumus, kad galėtų reaguoti, jei jos logistinė grandinė nukentėtų nuo priešo atakų.

 

     Kalbant apie nacionalinę gynybą, JAV reikia pakankamai ginklų ir amunicijos, kad atgrasytų savo priešus ir, jei reikia, apgintų save ir savo sąjungininkus Europoje ir Azijoje. Pagrindinis prioritetas turėtų būti gynybos pramonės bazės atkūrimas. Nedidelė strateginė smulkmena negali pakeisti tikrąją sunkią jėgą, kurią JAV kariuomenė turi atnešti į kovą.

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P. Michta yra Tarptautinių ir saugumo studijų kolegijos dekanas George C. Marshall Europos saugumo studijų centre Garmiše (Vokietija) ir Atlanto tarybos Skovkrofto strategijos ir saugumo centro vyresnysis bendradarbis nerezidentas.“ [1]

 

P. Michta nediskutuoja, kaip išgyventi per branduolinį Trečiąjį pasaulinį karą. Tai lemtingas praleidimas, jei mūsų oponentai nėra ožkų ganytojai Afganistane.

 

1. Pivot to the Pacific? That Misses the Point. Michta, Andrew A. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 24 June 2023: A.13.

NATO Allies Split on Membership Path For Ukraine, Fearing an Escalation of Conflict.

"BRUSSELS -- Ukraine and its allies in the country's conflict with Russia are fighting among themselves about how explicitly to mark out Kyiv's future path to NATO membership.

Differences about how much alliance members will pledge to Ukraine at their coming summit are so wide that some diplomats fear the dispute will overshadow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's annual meeting. NATO has invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to attend the two-day gathering in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11, hoping for a robust show of unity.

Some allies fear that a specific membership pledge to Ukraine could escalate the conflict by angering Russia and reduce the political space for a negotiated settlement. The Biden administration has long resisted any move that could lead Washington and its European allies into a direct conflict with Russia.

NATO leaders will gather against the background of a Ukrainian offensive that is proving slower and bloodier in dislodging Russian troops than Kyiv's more optimistic supporters had hoped. Ukrainian forces' struggles against Russian land mines and attack helicopters have raised questions of whether NATO members have done enough to support Kyiv militarily. Explicit political support in Vilnius might offset that, while a statement that Ukrainians see as hollow rhetoric could further hurt relations.

The gap between views on Ukraine has stalled work on drafting summit conclusions, say diplomats, and some see little potential for compromise on the core issues. Others say it isn't unusual to see divergence three weeks out from a NATO summit and that the consensus-driven alliance will strike a compromise when leaders assemble in Vilnius.

NATO members at a 2008 summit in Bucharest, Romania, promised Ukraine eventual membership, a pledge advocated most fervently by the U.S. Amid European opposition to the move, NATO gave Ukraine no timeline or specifics for joining.

The U.S. has swung to putting the brakes on Ukraine's alliance integration while conflict with Russia rages, prompting some allies to fear a rift at the summit. Ukrainian officials have warned the Lithuanian hosts that with the offensive moving painfully, Zelensky can't afford to attend a NATO summit where, like in Bucharest, Kyiv is kept at arm's length, and so he may stay away.

Zelensky recently told The Wall Street Journal that he sees "no point for Ukraine to be at this summit" if it doesn't get the signal it seeks.

Alliance members agree that Ukraine won't join as long as the conflict with Russia continues, and Zelensky has publicly acknowledged that. Debates are focused instead on how long after the conflict Ukraine might join, and whether to offer detailed, achievable criteria for Kyiv to qualify.

Ukraine has pushed for specifics on timing and milestones.

The U.S., Germany and some other NATO members have said that rather than debating hypothetical future conditions, efforts are better spent ensuring that Ukraine succeeds in defeating Russian forces.

"We have the Bucharest decision," German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at a press conference with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Berlin on Monday. "We need to focus on the task at hand. We need to support Ukraine to defend its country, its integrity and sovereignty."

Ultimately, diplomats say, the U.S., as the alliance's most powerful member, will be the arbiter of what to offer Ukraine. European diplomats involved in negotiations say they have received mixed messages from Washington over the Biden administration's flexibility to move much beyond the Bucharest formula.

One compromise under discussion is eliminating Ukraine's need for a Membership Action Plan, a program of assistance and practical support that NATO provides aspiring members with less-developed political systems and economies.

Whether waiving the need for a MAP would satisfy Zelensky remains unclear.

Members who are hesitant about giving Kyiv explicit promises on membership are instead proposing what some refer to as "Bucharest-plus," or wording that enhances the 2008 pledge." [1]

1. World News: NATO Allies Split on Membership Path For Ukraine, Fearing an Escalation of Conflict. Norman, Laurence; Michaels, Daniel. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 24 June 2023: A.7.