Kaip karai nusileidžia į visuomenių sunaikinimą

    „Visko pabaiga

     Autorius Viktoras Davisas Hansonas

     Basic, 352 puslapiai, 32 doleriai

 

     Šiuolaikinio pasaulio nėra. 

 

Nepaisant technologijų, žmogaus prigimtis išlieka tokia pati. 

 

Iš tiesų, technologijų žygis gali sukelti moralinį regresą, nes turtas ir laisvalaikis ėsdina individų ir tautų charakterį, atveda sunaikinimą. 

 

Tai yra pagrindinė Hooverio instituto klasiko Viktoro Daviso Hansono žinutė savo knygoje „Visko pabaiga: kaip karai nusileidžia į sunaikinimą“.

 

     Ponas Hansonas išreiškia jo mintį, pasakodamas apie keturias valstybes ir civilizacijas, kurias visiškai sunaikino karas ir jų pačių pasipūtimas bei naivumas: graikų Tėbų, Pūnų Kartaginos, Ortodoksų krikščionių Bizantijos ir Actekų Tenočtitlano. 

 

Kiekvienu atveju nedaugelis matė, kad tai ateina. „Čia to negali nutikti“, – likus akimirkai iki skerdimo murma aukos. 

 

Labiausiai šiurpinantis žodis šioje knygoje yra „ištrintas“, kuris daug kartų buvo ne mažiau išaukštintas, nei mūsų kultūrų likimas. Pagalvojama apie Ozymandias, karalių karalių, Shelley eilėraštyje, kurio „kolosalūs“ kūriniai išnyko, o juos pakeitė „vieniši ir lygūs smėlynai“.

 

     „Visko pabaiga“ koncentruojasi tik į „žmogaus sukurtus Armagedonus“, o ne į „prarastas civilizacijas“, kaip antai Mikėnų (apie 1200 m. pr. Kr.) ar Majų (apie 900 m. po Kr.), nei į „mažesnius išnykimus“, pavyzdžiui, Atėnų. 

 

Melos sunaikinimas (416 m. pr. Kr.), išgarsintas Tukidido Meliano dialogu. Čia nėra vidinio irimo ar dingimo pavyzdžių. Šioje knygoje kalbama apie klestinčias civilizacijas, išnaikintas jėgomis, dažnai santykinai mažai perspėjančiomis ir turinčiomis didžiulių geopolitinių pasekmių. Aleksandro Makedoniečio sunaikintas Tėbas 335 m. iš esmės užbaigė miesto-valstybės sistemą Graikijos archipelage. Galutinis Romos atliktas Kartaginos sunaikinimas 146 m. pakeitė Viduržemio jūrą iš dvipolio pasaulio į vienpolį. Osmanų turkų užgrobimas graikų Konstantinopolyje 1453 m. oficialiai nutraukė stačiatikių krikščionių imperiją rytinėje Viduržemio jūros dalyje. Ispanijos actekų Tenočtitlano užkariavimas 1521 m. užbaigė Mesoamerikos miesto ir valstybės sistemą ir nuvedė istoriją į šiaurę, į vidutinio klimato platumas, kurios galiausiai taps JAV. Šiandienos atitikmuo (skaitytojas negali negalvoti apie tai) būtų branduolinis karas, didžiosios valstybės žlugimas, karinis vienos didžiosios valstybės sunaikinimas kitos arba, tarkime, pasaulinis karas su Kinija. Kaip kartoja autorius, nesakykite „mums taip negali nutikti“, nes taip gali.

 

     Tėbai, rašo ponas Hansonas, „buvo švenčiausia iš miestų-valstybių“, mitiniai didvyrių ir dievų, tokių kaip Heraklis ir Dionisas, namai, vieta, sinonimas graikų tragedijos archetipams: Antigonei, Edipui, Teirezijai. 

 

Tačiau tai nepadėjo prieš karines naujoves, kurias naudojo 21 metų makedonietis Aleksandras, kuris kartu su jo tėvu Pilypu II Makedonijos kariuomenę iš kaimiškos jėgos pavertę tuo, ką autorius vadina „žudikų simfonija“.

 

     Ponas Hansonas Aleksandro išnaikinimą Tėbų falangoje, kuri turėjo didžiulę reputaciją, lygina su Prancūzijos kariuomenės žlugimu Pirmajame pasauliniame kare. Tėbai, girti nuo praeities užkariavimų ir romantiškos sampratos apie save, tikėjosi visuotinio sukilimo tarp sąjungininkų visoje Graikijoje; jų istorija apie tai, kaip per didelis išdidumas ir aukšti idealai gali nužudyti ištisas visuomenes. Tiesą sakant, Tėbai buvo nugalėti vos per vieną dieną. Tada prasidėjo pykinantis vyrų, moterų ir vaikų skerdimas, kurį vykdė Aleksandro trakiški samdiniai. Karo nusikaltimai yra sena istorija, o aukos visada yra silpnieji ir neapsaugoti, iš kurių buvo atimtos atgrasymo priemonės. 

 

Ponas Hansonas daro visa tai aktualiu šiuolaikiniam skaitytojui, derindamas detalumą su didelės nuotraukos analize ir išskirdamas prasmę iš detalių įvaldymo.

 

     Istorija, kurią jis pasakoja apie Romos Kartaginos sunaikinimą, taip pat verianti širdį. Kartaginos ištrynimas turėjo didesnių pasekmių, nei Tėbų: jos gyventojų skaičius buvo 10 kartų didesnis, o miestas buvo visoje Viduržemio jūroje išsiplėtusios civilizacijos centras. Trys pūnų karai tarp Romos ir Kartaginos nuo III amžiaus vidurio prieš Kristų iki antrojo amžiaus vidurio prieš Kristų, kurių kiekvienas truko metus ar dešimtmečius, iš tikrųjų buvo pasauliniai karai, apėmę Viduržemio jūros baseino centrą.

 

     Iki 149 m.pr.Kr. Roma jau du kartus nugalėjo Kartaginą, smarkiai sumažindama jos galią ir didingumą, todėl Šiaurės Afrikos imperija buvo tik savo buvusio savęs likutis. Nepaisant sąjungininkų ir prekybos partnerių, ji nebekėlė grėsmės Romai ir vykdė visus Romos reikalavimus. Vis dėlto žmogaus prigimtis gali būti iškrypusi, o Roma vis dar bjaurėjosi civilizacija, kurią jau buvo pažeminusi, puoselėdama skausmingą atminimą apie Hanibalo išdegintos žemės siautėjimą per Italiją Antrojo Pūnų karo metu prieš pusę amžiaus.

 

     Taigi Roma ne tik nugalėjo Kartaginą trečią (ir nereikalingą) kartą, bet ir toliau žudė Kartaginos civilius gyventojus ir pradėjo  ir sulyginti Kartaginos pastatus iki žemės – senovinė Hirosimos versija. „Žudymo išsekinti legionieriai privalėjo dirbti pamainomis“, – rašo autorius; groteskiškas darbas išnaikinti tiek daug kūnų kirtikliais ir kirviais „užvilkino galutinį užkariavimą“. Kartaginos išžudymas ir sunaikinimas buvo Romos Respublikos aukščiausio vandens ženklas, nes vėliau ji nusileido į nuosmukį ir virto imperatoriškuoju žmogumi. Tačiau nieko gero neduoda didelio masto nekovotojų skerdimas, ir net senovės rašytojai nepateisino, kad Roma išžudė tiek kartaginiečių.

 

     Viduramžių Konstantinopolio graikai, panašiai, kaip tėbiečiai ir kartaginiečiai, tikėjo jų kultūriniu likimu. Jie tikėjo, kad stačiatikių krikščionių dievas, sužadintas didžiosios Sofijos katedros architektūrinėje ir dvasinėje didybėje, juos išgelbės. Galbūt, dar niekada istorijoje nebuvo tokio politinės galios ir mistinės religijos susiliejimo kaip Bizantijos imperijoje, kuri iki lemtingos Osmanų apgulties 1453 m. jau truko tūkstančiu metų ilgiau, nei Vakarų Romos pirmtakė.

 

     Atrodė, kad joje yra kažkas amžino. Bet ne tokia amžina, kad galėtų įveikti prastą jos įtvirtinimų būklę. Arba didžiulių apgulties patrankų, kurias naudojo osmanai. Tokie nuobodūs faktai, kaip šie, nugalėjo tai, kas, be abejonės, buvo didžiausia viduramžių civilizacija, kalbant apie meną ir architektūrą.

 

     Sunaikinus Konstantinopolį, baigėsi beveik tris tūkstantmečius trukusi suvereni graikų civilizacija Mažojoje Azijoje. 

 

Musulmonų laimėjimas prieš graikus rytuose sukrėtė Vakarų krikščionybę iki širdies gelmių. Staiga, atrodė, Balkanuose ir Mažojoje Azijoje atsirado turkų, kurie nukrypo į vakarus. Europos galios iš dalies išgyventų, pasukdamos į Naująjį pasaulį už Atlanto, tam tikru laipsniu skatinamos naujai atrastos Rytų baimės.

 

     Ispanijos konkistadoro Hernano Korteso actekų miesto-valstybės Tenočtitlano „sunaikinimas“ XVI amžiaus pradžioje dar labiau, nei šie kiti sunaikinimai rodo beveik absurdišką jėgų disbalansą, parodantį, kaip labai nedaug gali prireikti, norint sunaikinti labai daug. Prireikė maždaug 1500 ispanų kareivių, padedamų puikios ginkluotės ir raupų epidemijos, kad nugalėtų šią Vidurio Veneciją su nuostabiais kanalais ir keturių milijonų gyventojų skaičiumi imperijoje, kuri išplito centrinėje ir pietų Meksikoje. Actekų lyderis Montezuma II, pirmą kartą pasveikinęs Kortesą, baisiausiuose košmaruose negalėjo įsivaizduoti tokio sunaikinimo.

 

     Žudynių mastas prilygo 1916 m. Verdūno 10 mėnesių, rašo J. Hansonas, dar labiau pablogindamas „raumenų įtūžį“, reikalingą tūkstančiams išskersti amžiuje be šiuolaikinių technologijų. Kaip ir bizantiečiai, kurie įnirtingai šaukėsi pagalbos iš Vakarų krikščionybės, ir tėbiečiai, manę, kad jų kaimynai susirinks pas juos, actekai kvietėsi jų tariamus sąjungininkus. Tačiau tai buvo veltui, nes kiti vietiniai nahua stojo į Korteso pusę ir iš tikrųjų kovojo prieš actekus kartu su Kortesu, matydami jį, kaip galimybę nuversti jų žudančius actekų varžovus. Didysis miestas-valstybė Naujojo pasaulio širdyje buvo visiškai sunaikinta. Ispanai statydavo nuostabias bažnyčias ant išlygintų piramidžių, vietinę žmonių aukojimo kultūrą pakeisdami krikščionių dievo kultūra, kurios gynėjai buvo savaip žiaurūs. Viena civilizacija staiga pakeitė kitą.

 

     Nors šios gilios knygos autorius to nemini, šiose keturiose istorijose išsiskiria laiko veikimas. Tikime, kad tai, ką sukūrėme, yra tokia didinga, kad turi tęstis amžinai. Bet tada ji išnaikinama, ir pasaulis nesibaigia. Tik mūsų pasaulis taip padarė. Kitas statomas jo vietoje ir eina be galo į ateitį, kad mes taptume senoliais. Šiame kontekste reikia galvoti apie JAV ir Vakarų likimą ir kaip – ir ar – jis baigsis: ar dėl vidinio nuosmukio, ar dėl staigaus kataklizmo. Užuot sakę, kad tai negali atsitikti su mumis, mūsų savigynos sumetimais visada turėtume pagalvoti, kad taip gali būti.

     ---

     Ponas Kaplanas užima geopolitikos katedrą Užsienio politikos tyrimų institute ir yra neseniai knygos „Laiko staklės: tarp imperijos ir anarchijos, nuo Viduržemio jūros iki Kinijos“ autorius."  [1]

 

1. REVIEW --- Books: A History Of Vanished Histories. Kaplan, Robert D.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 11 May 2024: C.7.

How Wars Descend Into Annihilation

 

"The End of Everything

By Victor Davis Hanson

Basic, 352 pages, $32

There is no modern world. Despite technology, human nature remains the same. Indeed, the march of technology can lead to moral regression, as affluence and leisure corrode the character of individuals and nations, tempting destruction. That is the underlying message of the Hoover Institution classicist Victor Davis Hanson in his book, "The End of Everything: How Wars Descend Into Annihilation."

Mr. Hanson makes his point by telling the story of four states and civilizations that were completely obliterated by war and by their own hubris and naivete: Greek Thebes, Punic Carthage, Orthodox Christian Byzantium and Aztec Tenochtitlan. In each case, few saw it coming. "It cannot happen here," murmur the victims, moments before they are slaughtered. The most chilling word in this book is "erased," which has many times been the fate of cultures no less exalted than our own. One thinks of Ozymandias, King of Kings, in Shelley's poem, whose "colossal" works have vanished, replaced by "lone and level sands."

"The End of Everything" focuses only on "man-made Armageddons," not "lost civilizations" like those of the Mycenaeans (ca. 1200 B.C.) or Mayans (ca. A.D. 900), nor "smaller extinctions" such as the Athenian destruction of Melos (416 B.C.), made famous by Thucydides' Melian Dialogue. There are no examples of internal decay or disappearances here. This book is about flourishing civilizations cut down in their prime, often with relatively little warning, with vast geopolitical consequences. Alexander the Great's destruction of Thebes in 335 B.C. essentially ended the city-state system in the Greek archipelago. Rome's final destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. changed the Mediterranean from a bipolar world to a unipolar one. The Ottoman Turkish sack of Greek Constantinople in 1453 formally ended an Orthodox Christian imperium in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Spanish conquest in 1521 of Aztec Tenochtitlan ended the city-state system of Mesoamerica and led history north into the temperate latitudes of what would eventually become the United States. The equivalent today (the reader can't help thinking about this) would be a nuclear war, the implosion of a great power, the military decimation of one great power by another, or, say, a war with China that goes global. As the author repeats, don't say "it cannot happen to us," because it can.

Thebes, Mr. Hanson writes, "was the most hallowed of the city-states," the mythical home of heroes and gods like Herakles and Dionysus, a place synonymous with the archetypes of Greek tragedy: Antigone, Oedipus, Teiresias. But that didn't help it against the military innovations employed by the 21-year-old Macedonian Alexander, who together with his father, Philip II, had turned the Macedonian army from a rustic force into what the author calls "a symphony of killers."

Mr. Hanson compares Alexander's rout of the Theban phalanx, which had a formidable reputation, to the collapse of the French army in World War I. The Thebans, reputationally drunk on past conquests and a romantic conception of themselves, had expected a general uprising of allies throughout Greece; theirs is a story about how excessive pride and high ideals can get a whole people killed. In fact, the Thebans were defeated in just one day. Then began the sickening slaughter of men, women and children at the hands of Alexander's Thracian mercenaries. War crimes are an old story in history, and the victims are always the weak and defenseless who have been stripped of the means of deterrence. Mr. Hanson makes all of this relevant to the modern reader by combining granularity with big-picture analysis and teasing out meaning from a mastery of details.

The story he tells of Rome's destruction of Carthage is equally heart-rending. The erasure of Carthage had greater consequences than that of Thebes: Its population was 10 times as large, and the city was the center of a civilization that extended throughout the Mediterranean. The three Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage from the mid-third century B.C. to the mid-second century B.C., each lasting years or decades, were in actuality world wars that engulfed the center of the Mediterranean basin.

By 149 B.C. Rome had already twice defeated Carthage, dramatically reducing its power and majesty, so that the North African empire was a mere remnant of its former self. Despite its allies and trading partners, it was no longer a threat to Rome and was complying with all of Rome's demands. Yet human nature can be perverse, and Rome still loathed the civilization it had already laid low, nursing the painful memory of Hannibal's scorched-earth rampage through Italy in the Second Punic War a half-century earlier.

So Rome not only defeated Carthage a third (and superfluous) time, it went on to massacre Carthage's civilian population and to level its buildings down to the ground -- an ancient version of Hiroshima. "The killing required the exhausted legionaries to work in shifts," the author writes; the grotesque job of clearing away so many bodies with pickaxes and hatchets "delayed the final conquest." The slaughter and destruction of Carthage was the high-water mark of the Roman Republic, as it afterward descended into decadence and transformed into an imperial juggernaut. But nothing good comes from the large-scale slaughter of noncombatants, and not even ancient writers justified Rome's slaughter of the Carthaginians.

The Greeks of medieval Constantinople, much like the Thebans and Carthaginians, believed in their cultural destiny. They believed that the Orthodox Christian god evoked in the architectural and spiritual majesty of the great cathedral Hagia Sophia would save them. Perhaps never before in history had there been such a fusion of political power and mystical religion as in the Byzantine Empire, which by the time of the fateful Ottoman siege in 1453 had already lasted a thousand years longer than its western Roman predecessor.

There seemed to be something eternal about it. But not so eternal that it could overcome the poor state of its fortifications. Or the enormous siege cannons employed by the Ottomans. Dull facts on the ground like these defeated what was arguably, in terms of its arts and architecture, the greatest medieval civilization.

With the destruction of Constantinople came the end of virtually three millennia of sovereign Greek civilization in Asia Minor. The Muslim defeat of the Greeks in the east shook Western Christendom to the core. Suddenly, it seemed, there were Turks in the Balkans and Asia Minor who were turning their eyes west. European powers would survive partly by turning toward a New World across the Atlantic, to some degree driven by a newfound fear of the East.

The Spanish conquistador Hernan Cortes's "obliteration" of the Aztec city-state of Tenochtitlan in the early 16th century manifests, even more than these other destructions, an almost absurd imbalance of forces, showing how very little may be required to annihilate very much. It took some 1,500 Spanish soldiers, aided by superior weaponry and a smallpox epidemic, to defeat this inland-Venice with its fabulous canals and population of four million, in an empire that spread over central and southern Mexico. The Aztec leader Montezuma II, when he first greeted Cortes, could never in his worst nightmares have imagined such annihilation.

The scale of killing rivaled the 10 months of Verdun in 1916, Mr. Hanson writes, made worse by the "muscular fury" required to slaughter thousands in an age without modern technology. Like the Byzantines, who made frantic calls for help to Western Christendom, and the Thebans who thought their neighbors would rally to them, the Aztecs called on their supposed allies. But it was in vain, as the other indigenous Nahua sided -- and in fact fought with -- Cortes, seeing him as an opportunity to topple their murderous Aztec rivals. A great city-state in the heart of the New World was destroyed utterly. The Spanish would build magnificent churches atop its flattened pyramids, replacing a native culture of human sacrifice with that of a Christian god, whose defenders were cruel in their own way. One civilization would abruptly replace another.

Though the author of this profound book doesn't mention it, what stands out in these four accounts is the working of time. We believe that what we have built is so magnificent it must go on forever. But then it is eradicated, and the world does not come to an end. Only our own world has done so. Another is built in its place and goes on endlessly into the future, so that we become the ancients. In this context, one has to think of the fate of the U.S. and the West, and how -- and if -- it will come to an end: whether by internal decay or by a sudden cataclysm. Rather than saying it can't happen to us, for the sake of our own self-defense we should always contemplate that it very well might.

---

Mr. Kaplan holds the geopolitics chair at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and is the author, most recently, of "The Loom of Time: Between Empire and Anarchy, From the Mediterranean to China."" [1]

1. REVIEW --- Books: A History Of Vanished Histories. Kaplan, Robert D.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 11 May 2024: C.7.

 

What disaster happened in the Lithuanian presidential election in 2024?

The political strategy of conservatives and liberals has burned.

 

No, it wasn't Kubilius' thick strategy books that burned. The strategy was simple. To induce nationalistic hysteria of an inevitable war in Lithuania and to take all the power in Lithuania on the white horse of the saviors. After that, milk us all with taxes to your heart's content.

 

It didn't come out. We didn't believe it. Šimonytė's result is even worse than in the penultimate presidential election.

 

Sorry about that. You will have to look for another job.

Kokia nelaimė atsitiko prezidento rinkimuose 2024 metais?

Sudegė konservatorių ir liberalų politinė strategija.

Ne, ne storos Kubiliaus strategijos knygos sudegė. Strategija buvo paprasta. Sukelti nacionalistinę neišvengiamo karo isteriją ir ant balto gelbėtojų žirgo užimti visą valdžią Lietuvoje. Po to melžti mus visus mokesčiais, kiek širdis geidžia.

Neišėjo. Nepatikėjome. Šimonytės rezultatas dar blogesnis, negu priešpaskutiniuose prezidento rinkimuose.

Užuojauta. Teks ieškoti kito darbo. 

The doggie barks, the caravan moves on - in the British media - sharp questions and ridicule for G. Landsbergis: "Such talk is a spiral leading to Armageddon, which is avoided by all who make real decisions"

"Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis has a funny diplomatic voice in the international arena, despite the fact that he represents one of the smallest European states - the minister is fiercely seeking greater support for Ukraine, supporting Taiwan, angering China. 

 

Although the minister himself calls it "values-based foreign policy", the interview in the BBC program "HARDtalk", the British journalist Stephen Sackur questioned whether the policy implemented by G. Landsbergis is really supported by the leaders of the USA and Europe and among the Lithuanian people themselves.

 

  - You have very openly expressed your deep concern about what might happen in 2024. What are you so worried about?

 

- I think that there is not enough understanding of what is at stake if Ukraine is not able to expel Russia from the territory of its country. We see that Russia is constantly mobilizing troops, despite the fact that it is not officially declared. We see that Russia is arming itself, entering a conflict economy, producing weapons, receiving weapons from Iran and North Korea.

 

- Russia is also gaining momentum on the Eastern Ukrainian front.

 

- Exactly, and we are faltering, stumbling. When the leaders of the Baltic or Eastern flank countries speak like this, it is not only because we feel that defending Ukraine is morally right, but we see it as an existential issue. This means that if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will continue its move, because it is very difficult to stop a machine of this size - it cannot be stopped simply by good wishes. It must be stopped by military means.

 

- Would you say that 60 billion was finally accepted in the USA? Will the dollar support package for Ukraine be a factor that changes the course of the conflict? Or are you still afraid that Joe Biden's administration, even while sending new weapons to Ukraine, is constrained by the desire not to escalate the situation with Putin?

 

  - From the very beginning, when the West formulated its strategy in the conflict with Ukraine, it was more about the red lines that we set for ourselves. We sent messages to V. Putin that we will not do this or that. All of these messages are about the fact that we are not part of this conflict. I think it hindered the decision-making process, it hindered us from explaining the situation to the voters.

 

- You use the past tense.

 

- This, of course, continues. But we've changed over the years: at first we said we wouldn't send certain ammunition or equipment, but now we do. However, I don't think we understood the very concept - that we need to draw red lines not for ourselves, but for V. Putin. We must discourage him from continuing his actions. Because now he knows that we hold ourselves back because there are things we don't intend to do. And with nuclear threats, it is he who "dissuades" us. He tells us - if you support Ukraine up to a certain level, I can do something.

 

  "Then what is your message?" In the past 48 hours, we've seen Putin order his military to deploy a tactical nuclear weapon for yet another military exercise, all of which will be quite close to the Ukrainian border. When he does, will your message to your Western partners be "oh, ignore it, it's just a bluff. Forget that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear weapon states. It doesn't matter because he'll never really use it”? Will this be your message?

 

- I would ask the following question: can we count how many times he has threatened in the past as well? Countless times, it was always a bluff. He would gain nothing from it, he can only lose.

 

Some countries are now on Russia's side. China obviously supports Russia, Russians have partners in Africa, Latin America.

 

He would lose it all in an instant if these threats came true.

 

- However, you seem to be failing to convince people like national security adviser Jake Sullivan in Washington, D.C., because he is clearly concerned about the threat of escalation. You also fail to convince some European leaders, such as Olaf Scholz, who has repeatedly emphasized his desire to avoid dangerous escalation. They believe in the concept of de-escalation.

 

- Yes, but the only way, if we follow this strategy, leads to the destruction of the country, to a conflict outside of Ukraine, in which other countries may be involved. Because we are sending a very clear signal to V. Putin: if you threaten us, we back off. So now we have to ask the question: If he attacked another country and threatened a tactical nuclear weapon, what would we do? This is the biggest problem we have. Therefore, it is necessary to push back - to show that if you try something like this, the response will be ten times worse than what you expect now.

 

- Talk like this is, frankly, a spiral leading to Armageddon. You are Lithuanian foreign minister and, with all due respect, you are from a fairly small European country. Politicians in Washington, Berlin, London and, of course, Moscow have to assess strategic reality very carefully, but living in Vilnius, you may be a little removed from real responsibility.

 

  - But we are not separated from reality.

 

- This is true.

 

- We are a border state - we are the NATO state that is closest to the conflict, so we tend to weigh our words and believe that giving in to an intimidation leads to even greater intimidation. That's where we started - why are we so concerned about the current situation, why does it disturb us so much? Because we believe that we do not put up any barriers for Russia to move forward. To be honest, I do not believe that this US support for Ukraine is the factor that can change the course of the conflict. One gets the impression that when Congress approved the aid package, the West calmed down. It's like "well, we dodged a bullet once, so maybe we should reconsider now, let's take some time." Time is our enemy. Russia digs in, moves forward. Logistics take time, and the support package itself is not delivered immediately.

 

- Do you feel that support is slow?

 

- I know that preparations are underway, some elements are already moving towards Ukraine - at least this is the information we have from the Ukrainians. But it's far from the whole package. Finally, the support will reach Ukraine, but we have to understand that the other side is not waiting and will not give us time until we get everything we need to feel comfortable. They will take advantage of the moment when Ukraine is most vulnerable. And this is where we must rise.

 

- We talked a lot about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the strategies behind countermeasures to V. Putin's threats to use this weapon. But you're talking more broadly - that we need to eliminate our own red lines. This is partly reflected by President Emmanuel Macron's thoughts expressed a few days ago about the possibility of sending troops not only from France, but also from NATO partners to Ukraine. Do you believe this possibility is serious? 

 

And would you in Lithuania be ready to send your own men and women to fight in Ukraine?

 

- I think that we cannot completely rule out such a possibility. 

 

That's why I was very open from the beginning - that Lithuania would be part of any coalition that would help Ukraine win. With our limited opportunities, with our limited resources, we understand the size of our country. But, again, as soon as concrete solutions are proposed, when they are discussed, there is always a "no" at the table. It doesn't help us. We cannot create a united front if there will always be some country that says "this is too much". This is why we supported France and the French president.

 

- You supported France, but obviously most of the others did not. Germans, Americans did not support.

 

- But there was no such expectation.

 

- However, when you talk the way you are talking to me now, there is a real danger that you will simply expose the very deep differences of the Western Alliance regarding the support of Ukraine. Those different positions are very deep, and very real.

 

- But those differences are already public. And I don't think it's a very big problem. 

 

- Don't you think that V. Putin could listen to our conversation and be happy that the words you uttered would never have been said in Berlin or Washington.

 

  - I have no doubt that V. Putin knows that there are certain countries that do not send long-range missiles to Ukraine. But there are also countries that say we can do it. And we are one of those countries. And there are countries that say their technology cannot be used against targets in Russia, while there are other countries, like ourselves now, that say you can do that with the weapons we supply. In this case, there is no unity either, but it provides a strategic opportunity for Ukraine. They can use what they get - they get certain technologies that they wouldn't have gotten if we had stuck to the lowest possible denominator. Then this conversation wouldn't exist at all, and Ukraine might not even exist anymore.

 

  - You firmly believe that Ukraine can win and take back every inch of its territory, including Crimea. But there are many people, even in the countries of the NATO Alliance, who, speaking privately, do not believe it at all.

 

- But it depends on us. Conflict requires two things: one is political will, the other is logistics.

 

- There is still realism. And openness.

 

  - Ukrainians clearly show that they have political will - more than enough.

 

- Now there is a really big problem in Ukraine, convincing young men that joining the country's armed forces is good for them. Mobilization is a big problem.

 

- It is very difficult to mobilize people when they are not provided with ammunition. Again, it's our fault. If I had to look for the culprits of the problem, I would put up a very big mirror, sit in front of it and ask questions - not to Ukrainians, but to our own leaders. where are we Are you serious about this? Do we understand the consequences if Ukraine is not able to win?

 

To be honest, I have already participated in such conversations, I have heard the arguments, but I have never heard a real answer, so how do you imagine when V. Putin will stop? Will such a person as V. Putin stop at all? What leverage do you expect to have? Do you expect to call him? And why should he stop?

 

  - You are very strongly, like a hawk, involved in the fight for greater aid to Ukraine, for its victory in the conflict. 

 

But you are also sending a message to your own people and to the people of Europe and the United States that your country is also under great threat from Russia. It seems that you can imagine Russia attacking Lithuania very soon. What evidence do you have to support this?

 

- Already at the beginning of the conversation, in response to the first question, I said that supporting Ukraine is correct not only in a moral sense - it is also an existential question.

 

"But don't you sow fear among your people?" Fears that you don't really have a basis for. Even your country's president suggested you "sit down and calm down" last year when you said it was only a matter of time before Russia sent in troops.

 

- But I'm not the only one who says so. You probably know that a large number of the leaders of the Eastern Flank states speak similarly. Even Germany's defense minister is saying the same thing as he seeks to reform the country's military.

 

- He spoke about the period from 5 to 8 years, and you are talking about a much shorter period. Even your country's military commander said that the probability of a Russia-NATO war starting this year or next is very low.

 

  - I am not quoted correctly. My assessments do not differ from the assessments of other countries in the region. However, the situation may change depending on how Ukraine holds up. If Ukraine manages to win, push the front, then we will be in a completely different strategic position. If they fail to do so, if the situation deteriorates very suddenly, then there are many dangers.

 

- We talked a lot about your disappointment with the level of support for Ukraine. What about military support for the Baltic countries from NATO? For example, the Germans undertook to deploy a brigade specially dedicated to the security of Lithuania. True, as I understand it, these forces will not be fully prepared and deployed in place until 2027. In addition, Germany is still debating how many soldiers will actually be sent to Lithuania and how many will remain in Germany.

 

- No, such a discussion has already been completed - a full combat-ready brigade, about 5,000 soldiers, will be deployed, all in our territory.

 

- How do you think the Russians will respond to this?

 

 - Well, it's not our biggest concern at the moment.

 

- Shouldn't it be?

 

  - We are reacting to what the Russians are already doing.

 

- We are back to that spiral where each side accuses the other of escalating actions.

 

Not so long ago, NATO promised that there would be no permanent NATO bases in the Baltic states.

 

Now you say you will have 5000 German troops. I also noticed that the Polish president even advocated the deployment of nuclear weapons on his country's territory."

 

"Yes, and even that may not be enough." I'm not talking about Polish decisions, but about 5,000 soldiers. We would expect even more troops in the Baltic states. The same is happening in Latvia with the deployed Canadian brigade. We are talking about a universal call that has not yet been decided. But we have to keep our eyes wide open, watching what's happening next to our borders."