Mes lipame į spąstus: jei Kinija imsis lyderystės pasaulinėje dirbtinio intelekto plėtroje, ypač transporto ir pramonės srityse, Amerikos dirbtinio intelekto įmonės patirs didžiulių nuostolių – dirbtinio intelekto pakilimas kelia paslėptą ekonominę riziką

 

Daugelis nerimauja dėl galimo neigiamo poveikio Amerikos dirbtinio intelekto įmonėms, jei Kinija imsis lyderystės pasaulinėje dirbtinio intelekto plėtroje, ypač transporto ir pramonės sektoriuose.

 

Yra realus susirūpinimas, kad jei Kinija imsis lyderystės pasaulinėje dirbtinio intelekto plėtroje, ypač tokiose srityse kaip transportas ir pramonė, Amerikos dirbtinio intelekto įmonės gali patirti didelių nuostolių ir iššūkių.

 

Štai kodėl ir kokie JAV ir Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto konkurencijos aspektai prisideda prie šio galimo rezultato:

 

Rinkos dalis ir pasaulinis pritaikymas: Kinija aktyviai siekia savo dirbtinio intelekto modelių ir sistemų pasaulinio pritaikymo, ypač besivystančiose šalyse, įgyvendindama tokias iniciatyvas kaip „Skaitmeninis šilko kelias“ ir „Vienos juostos ir kelio“ iniciatyva. Jei Kinijai pavyks įdiegti savo dirbtinio intelekto technologijas kaip standartą šiuose regionuose, tai gali reikšti prarastą rinkos dalį ir pajamas Amerikos įmonėms.

 

Vyriausybės parama ir pramonės politika: Kinijos centralizuota vyriausybės strategija tvirtai remia vidaus dirbtinio intelekto plėtrą, įskaitant subsidijas, mokslinių tyrimų finansavimą ir dėmesį dirbtinio intelekto integravimui į įvairius sektorius, tokius kaip gamyba, sveikatos apsauga ir autonominės transporto priemonės. Tai prieštarauja JAV požiūriui, kuris, anot „Forbes“, labiau remiasi privačiojo sektoriaus inovacijomis ir mažiau kišasi į vyriausybę. Šis vyriausybės paramos skirtumas galėtų suteikti Kinijos įmonėms konkurencinį pranašumą plečiant ir diegiant, ypač besivystančiose rinkose.

 

Talentai ir skaičiavimo infrastruktūra: Tiek JAV, tiek Kinija pripažįsta talentų ir skaičiavimo galios svarbą dirbtinio intelekto lyderystei. Kinija investuoja į pasaulinių talentų pritraukimą ir tvirtos skaičiavimo infrastruktūros, įskaitant Nacionalinį integruotą skaičiavimo tinklą, kūrimą. Nors JAV šiuo metu pirmauja didelio masto dirbtinio intelekto kūrimo ir prieigos prie pažangiausių skaičiavimo technologijų srityje, Kinijos pastangos panaikinti šią spragą sparčiai plečiasi.

 

Alternatyvi dirbtinio intelekto strategija ir atvirojo kodo modeliai: Kinija taip pat ieško alternatyvių dirbtinio intelekto kūrimo strategijų, įskaitant atvirojo kodo dirbtinio intelekto modelių taikymą. Nors JAV tradiciškai daugiausia dėmesio skyrė uždaroms, griežtai kontroliuojamoms dirbtinio intelekto sistemoms, Kinijos atvirojo kodo požiūris kartu su tokių įmonių kaip „DeepSeek“ pastangomis kurti efektyvius ir prieinamus modelius galėtų padaryti Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto sprendimus patrauklesnius visame pasaulyje, ypač šalims, kurios baiminasi JAV apribojimų arba ieško ekonomiškai efektyvių alternatyvų.

 

Poveikis pasaulinėms tiekimo grandinėms: Dirbtinis intelektas gali reikšmingai pakeisti pasaulines tiekimo grandines ir prekybą. Jei Kinija pirmaus kurdama ir diegdama dirbtinio intelekto valdomus logistikos ir gamybos sprendimus, jos įmonės galėtų įgyti pranašumą pasaulinėje prekyboje, o tai gali turėti įtakos Amerikos įmonėms, veikiančioms šiuose sektoriuose.

 

Švelninantys veiksniai ir JAV strategija

Nepaisant galimų nuostolių, svarbu atsižvelgti į kai kuriuos švelninančius veiksnius ir JAV pastangas išlaikyti savo lyderystę dirbtinio intelekto srityje:

 

JAV pirmauja kuriant fundamentinius dirbtinio intelekto modelius: JAV šiuo metu pirmauja kuriant didelio masto, pažangiausius dirbtinio intelekto modelius, o 2024 m. jų modelių skaičius bus didesnis nei Kinijos.

 

Dėmesys inovacijoms ir moksliniams tyrimams: JAV ir toliau pabrėžia inovacijas ir mokslinius tyrimus dirbtinio intelekto srityje, siekdamos išlaikyti savo technologinį pranašumą.

 

Tarptautinis bendradarbiavimas ir standartai: JAV siekia bendradarbiauti su Kinija dirbtinio intelekto projektuose, kartu bendradarbiaudamos su demokratiniais sąjungininkais ir partneriais, kad sukurtų tvirtas dirbtinio intelekto normas ir standartus, siekdamos formuoti dirbtinio intelekto valdymo ir diegimo ateitį.

 

Iššūkių sprendimas ir ekosistemos stiprinimas: JAV vyriausybė daugiausia dėmesio skiria tokių iššūkių sprendimui kaip talentų ugdymas, pakankamo energijos tiekimo duomenų centrams užtikrinimas ir universitetų bei startuolių prieigos prie didelio našumo dirbtinio intelekto skaičiavimo skatinimas.

 

Išvada

Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto lyderystės transporto ir pramonės srityse potencialas neigiamai paveikti Amerikos dirbtinio intelekto bendroves kelia didelį susirūpinimą. Kinijos strateginis požiūris, įskaitant vyriausybės paramą, dėmesį praktiniam pritaikymui ir pasaulinę veiklą, gali kelti rimtą iššūkį JAV dominavimui dirbtinio intelekto srityje. Tačiau JAV aktyviai stengiasi išlaikyti savo lyderystę diegdamos inovacijas, ugdydamos talentus ir bendradarbiaudamos tarptautiniu mastu.

 

Galiausiai, pasaulinės dirbtinio intelekto aplinkos ateitis priklausys nuo to, kaip JAV ir Kinija įveiks šią sudėtingą ir daugialypę konkurenciją, subalansuodamos inovacijas, konkurenciją ir galimą bendradarbiavimą, kad formuotų dirbtinio intelekto plėtros ateitį ir jos poveikį pasauliui.

 

„Per pastarąsias dvi savaites viena po kitos didelės technologijų bendrovės pranešė apie stulbinančius pelnus, kai dirbtinis intelektas tapo plačiai paplitęs.

 

Pažvelgus atidžiau, išryškėja ir labiau nerimą kelianti dirbtinio intelekto bumo pusė. Visos išlaidos lustams, duomenų centrams ir kitai dirbtinio intelekto infrastruktūrai sekina Amerikos korporacijų pinigus.

 

Tai pabrėžia paslėptą dirbtinio intelekto bumo riziką. Neabejotina, kad jis ilgainiui gali padidinti ekonomikos augimą ir produktyvumą. Tačiau šio pakilimo finansavimas kelia įtampą įmonėms ir kapitalo rinkoms.

 

Nuo 2023 m. pirmojo ketvirčio investicijos į informacijos apdorojimo įrangą išaugo 23 %, atmetus infliaciją, o bendras bendrasis vidaus produktas išaugo tik 6 %. Pirmąjį pusmetį investicijos į informacijos apdorojimą sudarė daugiau nei pusę lėto 1,2 % bendro augimo tempo. Iš esmės, dirbtinio intelekto išlaidos rėmė ekonomiką, o vartotojų išlaidos stagnavo.

 

Didžiąją dalį šių investicijų sudaro grafikos apdorojimo įrenginiai, atminties lustai, serveriai ir tinklo įranga, skirti apmokyti ir paleisti didelius kalbos modelius, kurie yra pakilimo centre. O visai šiai skaičiavimo galiai reikia pastatų, žemės ir elektros energijos gamybos.

 

Tai keičia didžiųjų technologijų įmonių verslo modelius.

 

Daugelį metų investuotojai mylėjo šias įmones, nes jos buvo „neturtingos turto“, uždirbančios pelną iš nematerialiojo turto, pavyzdžiui, intelektinės nuosavybės, programinės įrangos ir skaitmeninių platformų su „tinklo efektais“. Vartotojai plūdo į „Facebook“, „Google“, „iPhone“ ir „Windows“, nes tai darė ir kiti vartotojai. Pajamų didinimui nereikėjo beveik jokių naujų pastatų ir įrangos, todėl jie tapo pinigus generuojančiomis mašinomis.

 

Tai matyti iš laisvo pinigų srauto, maždaug iš veiklos atėmus kapitalo išlaidas.

 

Tai, ko gero, yra gryniausias verslo pagrindinio pinigus generuojančio potencialo matas. Pavyzdžiui, „Amazon.com“ investuotojams sako: „Mūsų finansinis dėmesys sutelktas į ilgalaikį, tvarų laisvo pinigų srauto augimą.“

 

Nuo 2016 iki 2023 m. „Alphabet“, „Amazon“, „Meta Platforms“ ir „Microsoft“ laisvas pinigų srautas ir grynasis pelnas augo maždaug vienodai. Tačiau nuo 2023 m. šių dviejų bendrovių rodikliai skyrėsi.

 

Remiantis „FactSet“ duomenimis, antrąjį ketvirtį keturių bendrovių bendros grynosios pajamos, palyginti su dvejais metais anksčiau, padidėjo 73 % iki 91 mlrd. JAV dolerių, o laisvas pinigų srautas sumažėjo 30 % iki 40 mlrd. JAV dolerių.

 

Nepaisant akivaizdaus dirbtinio intelekto ekonominio potencialo, finansinė grąža išlieka klaustukas. „OpenAI“ ir „Anthropic“, dvi pagrindinės savarankiškos didelių kalbų modelių kūrėjos, nors ir sparčiai auga, patiria nuostolių.

 

Daugelio didžiųjų technologijų bendrovių naujausio pelno duomenys atspindi jų nusistovėjusias franšizes: reklamos išlaidos „Meta“ ir „Alphabet“, „iPhone“ – „Apple“. Kalbant apie tai, kada jų dirbtinio intelekto įranga atsipirks, jos pataria kantrybės.

 

„Meta“ pranešė, kad antrąjį ketvirtį pelnas išaugo 36 %, tačiau laisvas pinigų srautas sumažėjo 22 %. „Amazon“ per pastaruosius metus padidino investicijas į „Amazon Web Services“, kuri talpina duomenis ir valdo dirbtinio intelekto modelius išorės klientams, o laisvas pinigų srautas, palyginti su praėjusiais metais, sumažėjo dviem trečdaliais.

 

Kol kas investuotojai didžiąsias technologijų bendroves vertina taip, tarsi jų turtu turtingas verslas būtų toks pat pelningas, kaip ir jų turtu mažai turtingi modeliai.

 

„Dotcom“ stiliaus griūtis atrodo neįtikėtina. Didelės dirbtinio intelekto išlaidos yra brandžios ir pelningos, o skaičiavimo galios paklausa viršija pasiūlą. Tačiau jei jų pajamų ir pelno prielaidos pasirodys pernelyg optimistiškos, jų kapitalo išlaidų tempą bus sunku išlaikyti.

 

Po pasaulinės finansų krizės didžiosios technologijų bendrovės buvo ir mažų palūkanų normų naudos gavėjos, ir priežastis. Šios įmonės iš veiklos generavo penkis–aštuonis kartus daugiau pinigų, nei investavo, ir šios laisvos lėšos buvo grąžintos į finansų sistemą, skaičiuoja Jasonas Thomasas, „Carlyle Group“ tyrimų vadovas. Tai padėjo išlaikyti žemas ilgalaikes palūkanų normas, kaip ir infliacija, nukritusi žemiau Federalinio rezervo 2 % tikslo, bei FED pirko obligacijas. Savo ruožtu žemos palūkanų normos privertė investuotojus dar labiau vertinti šių įmonių būsimą pelną.

 

Šiandien vyriausybės deficitas yra didesnis, infliacija viršija 2 %, o FED mažina savo obligacijų portfelį. Tuo tarpu korporacijos susiduria su dideliais investicijų poreikiais, kad galėtų išnaudoti dirbtinį intelektą ir perkelti gamybą į kitas šalis, kad išvengtų tarifų.

 

Thomasas skaičiuoja, kad nuo 2020 m. jų bendras laisvas pinigų srautas, palyginti su BVP, buvo 78 % mažesnis nei tuo pačiu laikotarpiu po 2009 m.

 

Visa tai rodo, kad ateinančiais metais palūkanų normos turi būti gerokai didesnės nei metais iki pandemijos. Tai dar viena rizika ekonomikai ir šioms įmonėms, kurios investuotojai gali iki galo neįvertinti.” [1]

 

1. U.S. News -- Capital Account: Boom in AI Carries Hidden Economic Risk. Ip, Greg.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 05 Aug 2025: A2. 

We Are Stepping Into a Trap: If China Will Take Leadership in World AI Development, Particularly in Transport and Industry, American AI Companies Will Have Huge Loses - Boom in AI Carries Hidden Economic Risk

 

Many are concerned about the potential negative impact on American AI companies if China takes the lead in global AI development, particularly in the transport and industry sectors.

 

There is a realistic concern that if China takes the lead in global AI development, particularly in areas like transportation and industry, American AI companies could face substantial losses and challenges.

Here's why and what aspects of the US-China AI competition contribute to this potential outcome:

 

    Market Share and Global Adoption: China is actively pursuing the global adoption of its AI models and systems, particularly in developing nations, through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road and its Belt and Road Initiative. If China succeeds in embedding its AI technologies as the standard in these regions, it could mean lost market share and earnings for American firms.

    Government Support and Industrial Policy: China's centralized government strategy strongly supports domestic AI development, including subsidies, research funding, and a focus on integrating AI into various sectors like manufacturing, healthcare, and autonomous vehicles. This contrasts with the US's approach, which is more reliant on private sector innovation with less government intervention, according to Forbes. This difference in government support could give Chinese companies a competitive edge in scaling and deployment, particularly in emerging markets.

    Talent and Compute Infrastructure: Both the US and China recognize the importance of talent and computing power for AI leadership. China is investing in attracting global talent and building robust computing infrastructure, including its National Integrated Computing Network. While the US currently leads in large-scale AI development and access to cutting-edge computing, China's efforts to close the gap are rapidly expanding.

    Alternative AI Strategy and Open-Source Models: China is also exploring alternative AI development strategies, including embracing open-source AI models. While the US has traditionally focused on closed, tightly controlled AI systems, China's open-source approach, combined with the efforts of companies like DeepSeek to create efficient and accessible models, could make Chinese AI solutions more attractive globally, particularly to countries wary of US restrictions or seeking cost-effective alternatives.

    Impact on Global Supply Chains: AI can significantly transform global supply chains and trade. If China leads in developing and implementing AI-driven solutions for logistics and manufacturing, its companies could gain an advantage in global trade, potentially impacting American companies involved in these sectors.

 

Mitigating factors and US strategy

Despite the potential for losses, it's important to consider some mitigating factors and the US's efforts to maintain its lead in AI:

 

    US Lead in Foundational AI Models: The US currently maintains a lead in developing large-scale, cutting-edge AI models, with more notable models than China in 2024.

    Focus on Innovation and Research: The US continues to emphasize innovation and research in AI, aiming to maintain its technological edge.

    International Cooperation and Standards: The US is seeking to engage with China on AI projects while also working with democratic allies and partners to develop robust AI norms and standards, aiming to shape the future of AI governance and deployment.

    Addressing Challenges and Strengthening the Ecosystem: The US government is focused on addressing challenges like talent development, ensuring adequate energy supply for data centers, and fostering university and startup access to high-performance AI compute.

 

Conclusion

The potential for China's AI leadership in transport and industry to negatively impact American AI companies is a significant concern. China's strategic approach, including government support, focus on practical applications, and global outreach, could pose a serious challenge to US dominance in the AI landscape. However, the US is actively working to maintain its lead through innovation, talent development, and international collaboration.

Ultimately, the future of the global AI landscape will depend on how the US and China navigate this complex and multifaceted competition, balancing innovation, competition, and potential collaboration to shape the future of AI development and its impact on the world.

 

“In the past two weeks one big tech company after another reported blowout earnings amid a wholesale embrace of artificial intelligence.

 

Look a little closer, and a more unsettling side to the AI boom emerges. All the spending on chips, data centers and other AI infrastructure is draining American corporations of cash.

 

This underscores the hidden risks from the AI boom. No one doubts its potential to raise growth and productivity in the long run. But financing that boom is straining the companies and capital markets.

 

Since the first quarter of 2023, investment in information processing equipment has expanded 23%, after inflation, while total gross domestic product has expanded just 6%. In the first half of the year, information processing investment contributed more than half the sluggish 1.2% overall growth rate. In effect, AI spending propped up the economy while consumer spending stagnated.

 

Much of that investment consists of the graphics-processing units, memory chips, servers and networking gear to train and run the large language models at the heart of the boom. And all that computing power needs buildings, land and power generation.

 

This is transforming big tech's business models.

 

For years, investors loved those companies because they were "asset-light," earning profits on intangible assets such as intellectual property, software and digital platforms with "network effects." Users flocked to Facebook, Google, the iPhone, and Windows because other users did. Adding revenue required little in the way of more buildings and equipment, making them cash-generating machines.

 

This can be seen in free cash flow, roughly cash flow from operations minus capital expenditures.

 

This is arguably the purest measure of a business's underlying cash-generating potential. Amazon.com, for example, tells investors: "Our financial focus is on long-term, sustainable growth in free cash flow."

 

From 2016 through 2023, free cash flow and net earnings of Alphabet, Amazon, Meta Platforms and Microsoft grew roughly in tandem. But since 2023, the two have diverged.

 

The four companies' combined net income is up 73%, to $91 billion, in the second quarter from two years earlier, while free cash flow is down 30% to $40 billion, according to FactSet data.

 

For all of AI's obvious economic potential, the financial return remains a question mark. OpenAI and Anthropic, the two leading stand-alone developers of large language models, though growing fast, are losing money.

 

Much of big tech companies' latest profits reflect their established franchises: ad spending for Meta and Alphabet, the iPhone for Apple. As to when their AI hardware will pay off, they counsel patience.

 

Meta reported a 36% rise in earnings for the second quarter, but a 22% drop in free cash flow. Amazon in the past year has ramped up investment in Amazon Web Services, which hosts data and runs AI models for outside clients, and free cash flow is down by two-thirds from the previous year.

 

For now, investors are pricing big tech as if their asset-heavy business will be as profitable as their asset-light models.

 

A dot-com-style bust looks far-fetched. AI's big spenders are mature and profitable, and the demand for computing power exceeds the supply. But if their revenue and profit assumptions prove too optimistic, their pace of capital spending will be hard to sustain.

 

After the global financial crisis, big tech was both a beneficiary of low interest rates, and a cause. These companies were generating five to eight times as much cash from operations as they invested, and that spare cash was recycled back into the financial system, Jason Thomas, head of research at Carlyle Group, estimates. It helped hold down long-term interest rates, as did inflation below the Federal Reserve's 2% target and the Fed buying bonds. Low interest rates, in turn, made investors value these companies' future profits even more.

 

Today, government deficits are larger, inflation is above 2% and the Fed has been shrinking its bondholdings. Meanwhile, corporations face steep investment needs to exploit AI and reshore production to avoid tariffs.

 

Thomas estimates that since 2020, their cumulative free cash flow has been 78% lower, relative to GDP, than in the equivalent period following 2009.

 

All this suggests interest rates need to be substantially higher in the years ahead than in the years before the pandemic. That is another risk to the economy and these companies that investors may not fully appreciate.” [1]

 

1. U.S. News -- Capital Account: Boom in AI Carries Hidden Economic Risk. Ip, Greg.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 05 Aug 2025: A2. 

Global South Gets Rich Enough, and Frees Itself from Dependency on Rich Global West: China Stood Up to Trump, and It’s Not Giving Europe an Inch, Either

 

“Beijing is betting that economic pressure and diplomatic defiance will force concessions, but its stance could put more strain on its ties with Europe at a crucial time.

 

Having forced the Trump administration into a trade truce through economic pressure and strategic defiance, China now appears to be playing the same kind of hardball with Europe.

 

It has retaliated against trade curbs, accused Europe of protectionism, slowed exports of critical minerals and further embraced Russia, with China’s top leader himself pledging support for Moscow just days before a summit of European Union leaders that China is scheduled to host this week.

 

The moves are part of a tough posture that Beijing is taking in its trade and geopolitical disputes with Brussels. China wants Europe to lift heavy tariffs that it has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles and refrain from further restrictions on trade.

 

E.U. leaders see Beijing as effectively supporting Russia in Ukraine, and are also concerned that China is dumping artificially cheap products that could undermine local industries.

 

Beijing has learned that it has leverage it can use against outside pressure. It stood up to the Trump administration’s punishing trade war by demonstrating how dependent global industry was on China for its supply of critical minerals.

 

And Beijing likely assesses that it is in a stronger position because Western unity is fracturing, analysts say, with President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy weakening the historical bonds between Europe and the United States.

 

“Beijing perceives that the global order is in flux,” said Simona Grano, a China expert at the University of Zurich. “From its perspective, the United States is overstretched and preoccupied with multiple conflicts around the world and domestic polarization.”

 

“And with signs of division or fatigue within the trans-Atlantic alliance, the Chinese leadership sees more room to assert its interests, not least in trade, tech and security,” Ms. Grano said.

 

That calculation has been evident in China’s approach to the summit talks on Thursday, which will include its top leader, Xi Jinping, and Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, as well as other senior European leaders. The two sides will be commemorating 50 years of diplomatic ties — the type of anniversary that ordinarily would be a chance for Beijing to showcase its partnerships.

 

Yet each detail of the meeting appears to underscore China’s view of the power dynamic. The summit is being held in Beijing even though it was Brussels’s turn to host the rotating event. The meeting will only last one day, according to the European Union, despite having been billed earlier as a two-day affair. Expectations for any concrete results from the summit are low.

 

The 27-nation European bloc is caught between wanting to cut a trade deal with the United States, which is putting pressure on the region to commit to taking a harder line on China, and the need to maintain stable ties with China.

 

But Brussels has grown more confrontational with Beijing in recent years about a massive trade imbalance that amounted to over $350 billion last year, as well as Beijing’s alignment with Russia.

 

In a speech this month in the European Parliament, Ms. von der Leyen accused China of “flooding global markets with cheap, subsidized goods, to wipe out competitors,” and of discriminating against European companies doing business in China. She also warned that China’s support for Moscow in Ukraine was creating instability in Europe.

 

She said she planned to raise these concerns with Chinese officials at the meeting in Beijing. China is unlikely to be accommodating of such criticisms at the summit, if its recent muscle flexing is any indication.

 

Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry, fired back at Ms. von der Leyen, saying it was the European Union’s “mind-set” that needed “rebalancing,” not China’s trade relationship with Europe.

 

Earlier this year, China slowed exports of rare earth minerals to Europe, sounding alarms at high-tech firms across Europe and triggering a temporary shutdown of production lines at European auto parts manufacturers. And this month, China hit back at European Union curbs on government purchases of Chinese medical devices by imposing similar government procurement restrictions on European medical equipment.

 

Despite its combative stance, Beijing cannot afford to push Europe too far. China needs European markets to absorb the glut of electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels its factories are making. Domestically, huge price wars have shrunk profits, prompting even Mr. Xi and other leaders to warn companies against engaging in “disorderly and low-price competition.” And Europe’s importance has only grown as the Trump administration tries to close off other markets to China.

 

“Europe remains an indispensable economic partner for China. But if Beijing overplays its hand, it could find itself more isolated,” Ms. Grano said.

 

Still, China has remained defiant when it comes to its close relationship with Russia — which Beijing considers an invaluable partner in counterbalancing the West. Europe has long complained that Beijing’s purchases of Russian oil and its supplying of dual-use technologies has enabled the Kremlin to prolong its action in Ukraine.

 

China claims neutrality over the conflict, a position that has been met with deep skepticism in the West, in part because of the closeness of China and Russia. Mr. Xi called for Beijing and Moscow to “deepen” their ties and “safeguard” their “security interests” when he met Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in Beijing last week.

 

And earlier this month, China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, privately told European Union officials in Brussels that it was not in Beijing’s interests for the conflict to end because it might shift U.S. attention toward Asia, according to a European official briefed on the talks, who spoke to The New York Times on condition of anonymity to share details of remarks made in a closed-door meeting. Mr. Wang’s remarks were first reported by the South China Morning Post.

 

China has not commented on what Mr. Wang reportedly said.

 

But Victor Gao, a former Chinese diplomat and vice president of the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based think tank, argued that the assertion attributed to Mr. Wang did not make sense because China believes the United States is able to project its influence in both Asia and over the fate of Ukraine at the same time.

 

Mr. Gao was dismissive of European criticisms of China’s relationship with Russia, saying that the region should essentially mind its own business and focus on improving the lives of its people.

 

“From the Chinese perspective, they are not qualified as a geopolitical rival,” he said. “They think too much of themselves.”

 

China’s strategy toward Europe is essentially to divide and conquer. It saw the European Union as hawkish and sought to minimize the impact of its policies while courting Europe’s leading businesses, namely from Germany and France, Mr. Gao said.

 

Hopes that Beijing will ever help Europe pressure the Kremlin have “faded away,” said Philippe Le Corre, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, who is no more optimistic that Brussels and Beijing will compromise on trade.

 

“There is no trust between the two sides,” he said.” [1]

 

Who is to blame? Start with Nixon and those who, helped by his and his successors' policies, transferred global industry to China. Now we need to learn to work with China and Russia as a strong force. 

 

1. Global South Gets Rich Enough, and Frees Itself from Dependency on Rich Global West: China Stood Up to Trump, and It’s Not Giving Europe an Inch, Either. Pierson, David; Berry, Wang.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jul 21, 2025.