President Trump’s 50 Percent Tariffs Are Preventing India from Becoming a Second China, Able to Damage America by Completely Destroying American Chances to Rebuild Industry

 

While tariffs could restrict India's manufacturing rise and some U.S. industries could struggle due to retaliation and higher costs, evidence also suggests that some important American businesses benefit from tariffs and India is seeking new trade partners without possibility of China’s style damage to America’s industry already.

Here is an analysis of this complex trade issue:

Tariffs and India's manufacturing sector

 

    Tariffs as a deterrent: The 50% tariffs, which took full effect in August 2025, are partly in retaliation for India's continued purchases of Russian oil. The move is considered damaging to India's export-driven industries like textiles, gems, and furniture, which employ millions. Some analysts believe this could disrupt India's economic ambitions to become a major manufacturing hub and an alternative to China.

    India's countermeasures: India is already mitigating the tariffs' impact by seeking closer ties with other countries, including China. This trade dispute has also prompted India to accelerate efforts to mend its relationship with China, a strategic countermove to U.S. pressure.

    Diversifying partners: India has also been negotiating other deals, such as with the European Union. India's ability to diversify its trade partners could mean that U.S. tariffs alone will not be enough to prevent its rise as a manufacturing power. Tariffs though are preventing India’s damage to America’s industry, done in China’s style.

 

Impact on rebuilding American industry

 

    Potential benefits for U.S. industry: Tariffs could make some American-made products more competitive in the domestic market compared to Indian imports. Some U.S. companies have publicly supported the tariffs, stating that they level the playing field against foreign competitors who benefit from subsidies and lower labor costs.

    Costs and drawbacks for U.S. industry:

        Higher input costs: Many U.S. manufacturing sectors, particularly those that rely on imported raw materials or components, could face higher input costs due to the tariffs.

        Retaliatory tariffs: Retaliatory tariffs from other countries could harm U.S. workers by reducing foreign demand for American goods.

        Automation speed changes: Tariffs on imported components used in robotics and automation could make it more expensive for U.S. companies to automate processes, which could hinder manufacturing reshoring efforts.    Without possibility to exploit cheap India’s workers, American companies will be forced to introduce robots sooner.

 

    Alternative paths for rebuilding U.S. industry: Some analysts argue that a more effective approach for rebuilding U.S. manufacturing would be to focus on specific, knowledge-intensive sectors through direct investment and targeted policies, rather than broad-based tariffs.

 

 

Broader geopolitical context

 

    Strained U.S.-India relations: The tariff dispute has strained the relationship between the two countries, which for decades has been strategically built as a counterweight to China. The tariffs alienate a key U.S. partner and complicate broader diplomatic efforts.

    India's strategic autonomy: India's decision to continue purchasing Russian oil, despite the threat of tariffs, demonstrates its desire for strategic autonomy. This also highlights the limits of U.S. leverage and underscores India's willingness to pursue its own interests.

 

 

“A lurch in policy has shaken the India-U.S. economic alliance against China, leaving India little choice but to consider reversing its own strategy.

 

President Trump’s 50 percent tariffs landed like a declaration of economic war on India, undercutting enormous investments made by American companies to hedge their dependency on China.

 

India’s hard work to present itself to the world as the best alternative to Chinese factories — what business executives and big money financiers have embraced as part of the China Plus One strategy — has been left in tatters.

 

Now, less than a week since the tariffs took full effect, officials and business leaders in New Delhi, and their American partners, are still trying to make sense of the suddenly altered landscape.

 

Just how much things have changed was evident from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China over the weekend to meet with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader. Trade and political relations between India and China have been strained, at times severely, and it was Mr. Modi’s first trip there in seven years.

 

The China Plus One approach has been critical to India’s budding ambitions to become a factory powerhouse. Manufacturing growth, especially in high-end sectors like technology, was seen by India as addressing chronic problems like the underemployment of its vast population of young workers. Now pursuing that path, without the support of Washington, and in potentially closer coordination with China, promises to be even more difficult.

 

Mr. Trump’s tariffs are already causing dislocation in supply chains. India has been rendered far less enticing to American importers. Companies can go to other places for lower tariffs, like Vietnam or Mexico. A U.S. court ruling, which on Friday invalidated the tariffs but left them in place while Mr. Trump appeals, did nothing to repair the rupture between the countries.

 

The “Trump shock will reduce manufacturing export growth and kill even the few green shoots of China Plus One-related private investment,” four Indian economists, including a former chief economic adviser to Mr. Modi, wrote in an Indian newspaper last week.

 

India still aspires to become one of the world’s three largest economies. It is currently fifth and on pace to overtake Japan soon. If the United States won’t help or, worse, gets in its way, India has no choice but to get closer to Beijing, even as it holds to its goal of becoming a stronger manufacturing rival to its giant neighbor.

 

“China Plus One, minus China, is too difficult,” was the wry reaction of Santosh Pai of the New Delhi law firm Dentons Link Legal. Mr. Pai is near the center of gravity: He set up a practice advising companies from all three countries. “They have to reconcile themselves to seeing China as part of the supply chain,” he said.

 

But the India-China relationship is as complicated as they come. The countries have armies ranged against one another, across their disputed borders in the Himalayas. A decade of cross-border incursions culminated in June 2020 with hand-to-hand combat that killed at least 24 soldiers. But the economic conflict was already burbling under the surface.

 

Early in the Covid-19 pandemic, with its stock market nose-diving, India was alarmed to discover that China’s central bank had quietly acquired 1 percent of one of India’s biggest private banks. India responded by blocking many forms of investment from China. Eventually it kicked out most Chinese venture capital from its tech start-up hubs and barred more than 200 Chinese apps, including TikTok.

 

China has an even larger arsenal of economic weapons. It has restricted India’s access to rare earths and dozens of other technologies that India needs to keep its factories running.

 

“These past five years, with the stalemate, China has progressively weaponized everything,” Mr. Pai said. He counts 134 industrial categories that China controls, creating Indian vulnerabilities.

 

But Mr. Trump’s weaponization of economic policy has dealt a much crueler blow to Indian companies. Business people in Moradabad, a center of handicrafts and light industry less than 100 miles from New Delhi, said they felt betrayed.

 

“Most people are still in shock,” said Samish Jain, a manager at Shree-Krishna, a family-owned company that makes a full range of housewares, 40 percent of them bound for the American market. Until the final deadline came on Aug. 27, he said, “everyone was like ‘no, this isn’t going to happen.’”

 

Now that it has happened, Mr. Jain is groping for a way out, along with the many Indian suppliers and American customers of his company and thousands of others. India’s government is announcing programs to help businesses financially, but Mr. Jain said they would not be enough to keep Shree-Krishna from having to make hard choices.

 

“I have people working in my factory since when my dad started this business 30 years ago,” Mr. Jain said. “We can’t just let them go.” He is trying to find new markets for their goods, in the Middle East, Europe or India itself. But so is everyone else in his predicament.

 

Mr. Modi came to China under tremendous pressure. India’s marketing of itself as an option for multinationals that want to move production out of China was not lost on the Chinese leadership.

 

“I think both are going into this as a dilemma because it’s fundamentally a competitive relationship,” said Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

 

Even before Mr. Modi’s diplomatic visit, India and China were talking about resuming direct flights between the countries and opening trading posts along the border. The meeting in Tianjin, China, on Sunday, didn’t produce any joint agreements, but India’s foreign ministry said that Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi made plans “to expand bilateral trade and investment ties.”

 

China has at times made it hard for the Taiwanese giant Foxconn to send Chinese engineers to India. Foxconn is the main contract manufacturer for Apple, which has become a touchstone for India’s China Plus One approach. Apple still makes a majority of its iPhones in China but has in recent years shifted more of that work to India.

 

And on its side, India has been refusing to grant some business visas to Chinese investors.

 

China is eager to invest in India. Now, national security concerns notwithstanding, India will be hungrier for a new inflow of foreign exchange as its $129 billion trade in goods with the United States unravels.

 

Foxconn is an example of the tricky spot Mr. Modi is in, and also of how India could benefit from warmer ties with China.

 

In June, Big Kitchen, a Chinese restaurant catering to East Asian expatriates working at the newest iPhone plant near the Indian city of Bengaluru, was desolated. A Foxconn employee from Vietnam, sharing a dish of twice-cooked pork, grumbled that his Chinese colleagues were stuck outside the country, leaving him and a smaller number of non-Chinese engineers to train thousands of new Indian workers.

 

If India makes it easier for China to invest in Indian companies, China could make it easier for India to take a few steps in its direction.

 

“We want the Chinese to come in,” said Mr. Pai, the New Delhi business lawyer. India would be “grateful,” he added, for some kinds of Chinese investment, especially in technology, because it would bring jobs to India.

 

China and the United States have been India’s two most important trading partners, each indispensable in some ways. But India is relatively small fry to both, in terms of imports and exports.

 

If this were a love triangle, India would be the jilted lover. Mr. Trump has, with the 50 percent tariffs and his advisers’ hostile remarks, dumped it. That casts a shadow over Mr. Modi’s new approach to Mr. Xi.

 

The direction is clear, even though important details are not. “China has not showed its hand yet,” Mr. Pai said. By contrast, “India has a huge dependency on China for imports. It’s clear what India wants.”” [1]

 

1. India Was the Economic Alternative to China. Trump Ended That. Travelli, Alex; Kumar, Hari.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Sep 1, 2025.

 

Prezidento Trumpo 50 procentų tarifai neleidžia Indijai tapti antrąja Kinija, galinčia pakenkti Amerikai, visiškai sunaikinant Amerikos galimybes atkurti pramonę

 

 

Nors tarifai gali apriboti Indijos gamybos augimą, o kai kurios JAV pramonės šakos gali susidurti su sunkumais dėl atsakomųjų veiksmų ir didesnių sąnaudų, įrodymai taip pat rodo, kad kai kurios svarbios Amerikos įmonės gauna naudos iš tarifų, o Indija ieško naujų prekybos partnerių, jau neturėdama galimybės atnešti Kinijos stiliaus žalos Amerikos pramonei.

 

Štai šio sudėtingo prekybos klausimo analizė:

Tarifai ir Indijos gamybos sektorius

 

Tarifai, kaip atgrasymo priemonė: 50 % tarifai, kurie visiškai įsigaliojo 2025 m. rugpjūtį, iš dalies yra atsakas į tai, kad Indija toliau perka rusišką naftą. Šis žingsnis laikomas žalingu, Indijos eksporto pagrindu veikiančioms, pramonės šakoms, tokioms kaip tekstilės, brangakmenių ir baldų pramonė, kuriose dirba milijonai žmonių. Kai kurie analitikai mano, kad tai gali sutrikdyti Indijos ekonomines ambicijas tapti svarbiu gamybos centru ir alternatyva Kinijai.

Indijos atsakomosios priemonės: Indija jau švelnina tarifų poveikį, siekdama glaudesnių ryšių su kitomis šalimis, įskaitant Kiniją. Šis prekybos ginčas taip pat paskatino Indiją paspartinti pastangas atkurti santykius su Kinija – tai strateginis atsakas į JAV spaudimą.

 

Partnerių diversifikavimas: Indija taip pat derasi dėl kitų susitarimų, pavyzdžiui, su Europos Sąjunga. Indijos gebėjimas diversifikuoti savo prekybos partnerius gali reikšti, kad vien JAV tarifų nepakaks, kad būtų išvengta Indijos iškilimo, kaip gamybos galios. Tačiau padeda išvengti Indijos daromos žalos Amerikos pramonei.

 

Poveikis Amerikos pramonės atkūrimui

 

Galima nauda JAV pramonei: Dėl tarifų kai kurie Amerikoje pagaminti produktai galėtų tapti konkurencingesni vidaus rinkoje, palyginti su importu iš Indijos. Kai kurios JAV bendrovės viešai palaikė tarifus, teigdamos, kad jie sudaro lygias sąlygas užsienio konkurentams, kurie gauna naudos iš subsidijų ir mažesnių darbo sąnaudų. Apple telefonų gamybos iškraustymas iš Kinijos į Indiją nebetenka prasmės. Vargšė Apple.

 

Sąnaudos ir trūkumai JAV pramonei:

 

Didesnės sąnaudos: Daugelis JAV gamybos sektorių, ypač tie, kurie priklauso nuo importuojamų žaliavų ar komponentų, dėl tarifų gali susidurti su didesnėmis sąnaudomis. Atsakomieji tarifai: Atsakomieji tarifai iš kitų šalių gali pakenkti JAV darbuotojams, sumažindami užsienio paklausą amerikietiškoms prekėms.

 

Automatizavimo pokyčiai: Importuojamų komponentų, naudojamų robotikoje ir automatizavime, tarifai gali pabranginti JAV įmonėms procesų automatizavimą, o tai gali trukdyti gamybos perkėlimo pastangoms. Iš kitos pusės, neturėdamos galimybės išnaudoti pigių Indijos darbuotojų, Amerikos įmonės yra priverstos anksčiau diegti robotus.

 

Alternatyvūs JAV pramonės atkūrimo keliai: Kai kurie analitikai teigia, kad veiksmingesnis JAV gamybos atkūrimo būdas būtų sutelkti dėmesį į konkrečius, žinių reikalaujančius, sektorius, taikant tiesiogines investicijas ir tikslinę politiką, o ne taikant plataus masto tarifus.

 

 

Platesnis geopolitinis kontekstas

 

Įtempti JAV ir Indijos santykiai: Tarifų ginčas įtempė dviejų šalių santykius, kurie dešimtmečius buvo strategiškai kuriami, kaip atsvara Kinijai. Tarifai atstumia pagrindinę JAV partnerę ir apsunkina platesnio masto diplomatines pastangas.

 

Indijos strateginė autonomija: Indijos sprendimas toliau pirkti rusišką naftą, nepaisant tarifų grėsmės, rodo jos norą turėti strateginę autonomiją. Tai taip pat pabrėžia JAV įtakos ribotumą ir pabrėžia Indijos norą siekti savo interesų.

„Politikos pokytis sukrėtė Indijos ir JAV ekonominį aljansą prieš Kiniją, nepalikdamas Indijai kito pasirinkimo, kaip tik apsvarstyti savo strategijos keitimą.

 

Prezidento Trumpo 50 procentų tarifai smogė, kaip ekonominio karo Indijai paskelbimas, pakenkdami didžiulėms Amerikos įmonių investicijoms, skirtoms apsisaugoti nuo priklausomybės nuo Kinijos.

 

Indijos sunkus darbas pristatyti save pasauliui, kaip geriausią alternatyvą Kinijos gamykloms – tai, ką verslo vadovai ir stambių pinigų finansininkai priėmė, kaip „Kinija plius vienas“ strategijos dalį – liko sugriautas.

 

Dabar, praėjus mažiau, nei savaitei, nuo tarifų įsigaliojimo, pareigūnai ir verslo lyderiai Naujajame Delyje bei jų Amerikos partneriai vis dar bando suprasti, staiga pasikeitusią, aplinką.

 

Kiek viskas pasikeitė, buvo akivaizdu iš ministro pirmininko Narendros Modi vizito Kinijoje savaitgalį, kurio metu jis susitiko su aukščiausiuoju Kinijos vadovu Xi Jinpingu. Prekybos ir politiniai santykiai tarp Indijos ir Kinijos buvo įtempti, kartais labai, ir tai buvo pirmoji pono Modi kelionė ten per septynerius metus.

 

„Kinija plius vienas“ požiūris buvo labai svarbus Indijos ambicijoms tapti gamyklų lydere. Gamybos augimą, ypač tokiuose aukštos klasės sektoriuose, kaip technologijos, Indija laikė chroniškų problemų, tokių, kaip didelio jaunų darbuotojų skaičiaus nedarbas, sprendimu. Dabar, be Vašingtono paramos potencialiai glaudesnis koordinavimas su Kinija žada būti dar sunkesnis.

 

Pono Trumpo tarifai jau sukelia tiekimo grandinių sutrikimus. Indija tapo daug mažiau patraukli Amerikos importuotojams. Įmonės gali ieškoti mažesnių tarifų kitur, pavyzdžiui, Vietname ar Meksikoje. JAV teismo sprendimas, kuriuo penktadienį tarifai buvo panaikinti, bet palikti galioti, kol ponas Trumpas nagrinės apeliaciją, nieko nepadarė, kad atkurtų šalių tarpusavio santykius.

 

„Trumpo sukrėtimas sumažins gamybos eksporto augimą ir sunaikins net keletą su Kinija plius vienas susijusių privačių investicijų daigų“, – praėjusią savaitę Indijos laikraštyje rašė keturi Indijos ekonomistai, įskaitant buvusį vyriausiąjį pono Modi ekonomikos patarėją.

 

Indija vis dar siekia tapti viena iš trijų didžiausių pasaulio ekonomikų. Šiuo metu ji yra penkta ir netrukus aplenks Japoniją. Jei Jungtinės Valstijos nepadės arba, dar blogiau, trukdys, Indija neturės kito pasirinkimo, kaip tik artėti prie Pekino, net ir laikydamasi savo tikslo tapti stipresne gamybos konkurente savo milžiniškai kaimynei.

 

„Kinija plius viena, minus Kinija, yra per sudėtinga“, – ironiškai reagavo Santoshas Pai iš Naujojo Delio advokatų kontoros „Dentons Link Legal“. Ponas Pai yra beveik pačiame centre: jis įkūrė praktiką, konsultuojančią visų trijų šalių įmones. „Jos turi susitaikyti su tuo, kad Kiniją laiko tiekimo grandinės dalimi“, – sakė jis.

 

Tačiau Indijos ir Kinijos santykiai yra nepaprastai sudėtingi. Šalių armijos yra išsidėsčiusios viena prieš kitą, per ginčytinas sienas Himalajuose. Dešimtmetį trukę tarpvalstybiniai įsiveržimai baigėsi 2020 m. birželį artima kova, per kurią žuvo mažiausiai 24 kareiviai. Tačiau ekonominis konfliktas jau kunkuliavo po paviršiumi.

 

COVID-19 pandemijos pradžioje, kai akcijų rinka smarkiai krito, Indija sunerimo, sužinojusi, kad Kinijos centrinis bankas tyliai įsigijo 1 procentą vieno didžiausių Indijos privačių bankų. Indija atsakė, blokuodama daugelį Kinijos investicijų formų. Galiausiai ji iš savo technologijų startuolių centrų išstūmė didžiąją dalį Kinijos rizikos kapitalo ir uždraudė daugiau, nei 200 kiniškų programėlių, įskaitant „TikTok“.

 

Kinija turi dar didesnį ekonominių ginklų arsenalą. Ji apribojo Indijos prieigą prie retųjų žemių elementų ir dešimčių kitų technologijų, kurių Indijai reikia, kad jos gamyklos veiktų.

 

„Per pastaruosius penkerius metus, kai situacija buvo aklavietėje, Kinija palaipsniui viską pavertė ginklu“, – sakė p. Pai. Jis suskaičiuoja 134 pramonės kategorijas, kurias kontroliuoja Kinija, taip sukurdama Indijos pažeidžiamumą.

 

Tačiau p. Trumpo ekonominės politikos pavertimas ginklu Indijos įmonėms sudavė daug žiauresnį smūgį. Moradabado, amatų ir lengvosios pramonės centro, esančio mažiau, nei 100, mylių nuo Naujojo Delio, verslininkai teigė, kad jautėsi išduoti.

 

„Dauguma žmonių vis dar šoko būsenoje“, – sakė Samish Jain, „Shree-Krishna“, šeimos įmonės, gaminančios visą namų apyvokos reikmenų asortimentą, vadovas, iš kurių 40 procentų skirta Amerikos rinkai. Iki galutinio termino rugpjūčio 27 d., anot jo, „visi sakė: „Ne, to nebus“.“

 

Dabar, kai tai įvyko, ponas Jainas ieško išeities kartu su daugybe savo įmonės tiekėjų iš Indijos ir klientų iš Amerikos bei tūkstančiais kitų. Indijos vyriausybė skelbia programas, skirtas finansiškai padėti įmonėms, tačiau ponas Jainas teigė, kad jų nepakaks, kad Shree-Krishna išvengtų sunkių sprendimų.

 

„Mano gamykloje dirba žmonės nuo tada, kai mano tėvas prieš 30 metų įkūrė šį verslą“, – sakė ponas Jainas. „Mes negalime jų tiesiog paleisti.“ Jis bando rasti naujų rinkų jų prekėms Artimuosiuose Rytuose, Europoje ar pačioje Indijoje. Tačiau taip pat daro ir visi kiti, atsidūrę tokioje keblioje padėtyje.

 

Ponas Modi atvyko į Kiniją, patiriant didžiulį spaudimą. Kinijos vadovybė pastebėjo, kaip Indija save pristato, kaip galimybę tarptautinėms korporacijoms, norinčioms perkelti gamybą iš Kinijos.

 

„Manau, kad abi šalys į tai žiūri, kaip į dilemą, nes tai iš esmės konkurenciniai santykiai“, – sakė Tanvi Madanas, vyresnysis mokslinis bendradarbis Brukingso institute Vašingtone.

 

Dar prieš pono Modi diplomatinį vizitą Indija ir Kinija kalbėjosi apie tiesioginių skrydžių tarp šalių atnaujinimą ir prekybos postų atidarymą pasienyje. Sekmadienį Tiandzine, Kinijoje, vykusiame susitikime jokių bendrų susitarimų nepasiekta, tačiau Indijos užsienio reikalų ministerija teigė, kad ponas Modi ir ponas Xi Jinpingas planavo „plėsti dvišalius prekybos ir investicijų ryšius“.

 

Kinija kartais apsunkindavo Taivano milžinei „Foxconn“ siųsti Kinijos inžinierius į Indiją. „Foxconn“ yra pagrindinė „Apple“ sutartinė gamintoja, kuri tapo Indijos „Kinija plius vienas“ strategijos atskaitos tašku. „Apple“ vis dar gamina didžiąją dalį savo „iPhone“ telefonų Kinijoje, tačiau pastaraisiais metais daugiau šios gamybos perkėlė į Indiją.

 

Ir savo ruožtu Indija atsisako išduoti kai kurias verslo vizas Kinijos investuotojams.

 

Kinija nori investuoti Indijoje. Nepaisant nacionalinio saugumo problemų, Indija labiau trokš naujo užsienio valiutos srauto, nes jos 129 mlrd. dolerių vertės prekyba su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis byra.

 

„Foxconn“ yra keblios padėties, kurioje atsidūrė ponas Modi, ir to, kaip Indija galėtų pasinaudoti šiltesniais santykiais su Kinija, pavyzdys.

 

Birželį kinų restoranas „Big Kitchen“, aptarnaujantis Rytų Azijos emigrantus, dirbančius naujausioje „iPhone“ gamykloje netoli Indijos miesto Bengalūro, buvo apleistas. „Foxconn“ darbuotojas iš Vietnamo, džiaugdamasis du kartus keptos kiaulienos patiekalu, niurzgėjo, kad jo kolegos iš Kinijos įstrigo už šalies ribų, todėl jam ir mažesniam skaičiui ne Kinijos inžinierių teks apmokyti tūkstančius naujų Indijos darbuotojų.

 

Jei Indija palengvins Kinijai investicijas į Indijos įmones, Kinija galėtų palengvinti Indijai žengti kelis žingsnius jos kryptimi.

 

„Norime, kad kinai atvyktų“, – sakė Naujojo Delio verslo teisininkas ponas Pai. Jis pridūrė, kad Indija būtų „dėkinga“ už tam tikras Kinijos investicijas, ypač į technologijas, nes tai sukurtų darbo vietų Indijai.

 

Kinija ir Jungtinės Valstijos buvo dvi svarbiausios Indijos prekybos partnerės, kiekviena iš jų tam tikrais atžvilgiais nepakeičiama. Tačiau Indija abiem šalims yra gana maža, kalbant apie importą ir eksportą.

 

Jei tai būtų meilės trikampis, Indija būtų palikta, kaip atstumta meilužė. Ponas Trumpas, įvedęs 50 procentų tarifus ir su savo patarėjų priešiškais pasisakymais, ją atmetė. Tai meta šešėlį ant naujo pono Modi požiūrio į poną Xi Jinpingą.

 

Kryptis aiški, nors svarbios detalės. „Kinija dar neparodė savo rankos“, – sakė ponas Pai. Priešingai, „Indija yra labai priklausoma nuo Kinijos importo srityje. Akivaizdu, ko Indija nori.“” [1]

 

1. India Was the Economic Alternative to China. Trump Ended That. Travelli, Alex; Kumar, Hari.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Sep 1, 2025.

 

Global South Shows Off Its Power. Global West Performs Harakiri

Former U.S. president Biden was actively nursing NATO in Ukraine idea, and arming ruthless and militaristic Ukraine’s nationalists. This pushed Russia away from the Global West, into mutually beneficial relationships with India, China and other Global South countries. Now it seems that the Global West is biting off much more than it can chew on.

 

Regarding former President Joe Biden's administration and the Ukraine conflict, it's important to differentiate between stated policies and the complexities of the geopolitical situation:

 

    NATO and Ukraine: The Biden administration, while supporting Ukraine, has expressed skepticism about Ukraine joining NATO while the conflict is ongoing, according to reports from the Atlantic Council.  This is keeping the conflict ongoing even today, when Biden is retired.

 

However, the Biden administration has also affirmed its commitment to NATO's open-door policy and the 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration that welcomed Ukraine's aspirations to join the alliance, according to CNN.

 

NATO has stated it will invite Ukraine to join when "allies agree that conditions are met". Today’s NATO members’ discussions about putting NATO members’ troops into Ukraine as “peace keeping force” under a beach umbrella instead of NATO umbrella sound comical.

 

Russia, for its part, views NATO members’ expansion, particularly concerning Ukraine, as a direct threat to its security.

 

 

    Arming Ukraine: The Biden administration has provided significant military aid to Ukraine, totaling over $56.2 billion in security assistance since February 2022. This aid includes advanced weaponry, though the administration initially delayed providing some specific systems due to concerns about Russia's response. Now we have the response.

 

    Ukrainian Nationalism and Far-Right Groups: Russia has used the presence of far-right groups, such as the Azov regiment, as a justification for its actions, claiming it needs to "denazify" Ukraine. While the Azov regiment, initially a volunteer battalion, has faced accusations of neo-Nazi ties due to the ideology of some founders, it has since been absorbed into the National Guard of Ukraine, so the Guard is suspect too.

 

    Russia's Relationship with Global South Countries: The conflict in Ukraine has indeed prompted a shift in global alliances and trade patterns. While Western nations have largely condemned Russia and imposed sanctions, many countries in the Global South have adopted a more neutral stance. Russia has turned to countries like China and India for energy exports and other trade relationships following Western sanctions. India and China have increased their purchase of Russian oil, and Russia's relationship with China has become increasingly important.

 

    Global West and the Event's Impact: The conflict in Ukraine has undoubtedly impacted the global economy, contributing to slower growth, rising inflation, and disruptions in supply chains, especially affecting countries in the Global South.

 

The conflict has reshaped geopolitics, strengthened the Western alliance (NATO and EU), and accelerated a shift away from Russian energy dependence in Western Europe, because of political posturing of new German leadership. This is giving, as a result, high energy prices in Germany, deindustrialization of Germany as the last industrial Western nation, loss of Western military ability that is still dependent on industrial might. Global West is performing collective harakiri in this story.  Harakiri, also known as seppuku, is a form of Japanese ritualistic suicide by disembowelment historically practiced by samurai to restore honor or preserve their reputation in dire circumstances. Zelensky's army is installing Chinese microchips into its main weapons - drones - and calling those drones Ukrainian.

 

The West has not been successful in isolating Russia, and an axis involving Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea appears to be strengthening.

 

The question of whether the "Global West is biting off more than it can chew" is a complex one, with various perspectives on the long-term geopolitical and economic consequences of the conflict and the response to it. Time seems to be now working against the Global West, since Global South is getting stronger by the days. All of this - thanks to Mr. Biden.

“Xi Jinping is using a summit with leaders like Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin as an opportunity to pull countries away from the U.S.

 

USA is alienating America’s friends. Can China win them over?

 

The most interesting thing about the big security summit in China this week is the guest list. More than 20 leaders have joined President Xi Jinping at the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which started yesterday in Tianjin. That’s the most in the organization’s history.

 

They include Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India (who is still smarting from President Trump’s recent tariff increase) and President Vladimir Putin of Russia. But the list also includes the leaders of American partners like Turkey and Egypt, and their presence speaks to a rapidly changing geopolitical reality.

 

I talked to my colleague David Pierson, who is in Tianjin for the summit.

 

Katrin: What does this guest list tell us?

 

David: China has summoned the non-Western-aligned world to this event to tell Washington: “You are no longer calling the shots.”

 

The thing that’s special about this summit is that geopolitics is at play in a way that we haven’t seen in a very long time. The USA administrations has upended the U.S. alliance system. USA’s gifting this incredible opportunity to Xi Jinping to pull friends away from the America.

 

Is USA losing India to China?

 

I wouldn’t go that far. Modi was scheduled to come here before the dust-up with Trump. But it has certainly injected a lot of momentum into his trip.

 

Modi is signaling to the U.S. that he has options, that there are consequences for the chaotic foreign policy that’s coming out of Washington.

 

It’s striking that Trump has used these incredibly different approaches to Russia and India: Red carpet for Putin, tariffs for Modi. But both these approaches seem to help China.

 

Yes. Xi feels validated for sticking by Putin. He was under so much pressure after the events in Ukraine. Now they’re watching Putin show up on American soil, the red-carpet handshake, and they suddenly no longer feel U.S. pressure for this relationship.

 

In a previous era, stability offered by China might have been worth much less because the U.S. and the West offered stability, too. But in a world where that stability is no longer a given, it comes at a premium.

 

That is the story China is trying to tell. But let’s be clear: China isn’t the most reliable partner either. They are not a security partner the way that the U.S. is and if you’re from a country that values democracy and human rights, they’re not going to stick up for you on any of those things.

 

The summit will be followed by a big military parade in Beijing marking the end of World War II. What’s the message that China is trying to project here?

 

The conflict with Japan during World War II is the engine of nationalism in China, fueled by China’s sense that Japan has never sincerely apologized for its wrongs. So, at home, the message is: China has a world-class military that will never let something like World War II happen again. But there is a message to the world, too: China is saying, “we played a bigger role than the West gives us credit for in World War II” — much like Putin is saying.

 

One of the reasons China is interested in highlighting this history is because there were these arrangements made with the West during and after World War II that would have given China greater territorial claims in the South China Sea and over Taiwan. So China is using its military, its history and its diplomacy, all to enhance its ambitions today.

 

So it’s kind of a message about the past, but really it’s a message directed at shaping the future.

 

That’s exactly right.” [1]

 

 

1. China Shows Off Its Power. Bennhold, Katrin.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Sep 1, 2025.