“What the developments in Ukraine mean for NATO's arsenals.
Between a discount supermarket and a warehouse for bathroom tiles in Swindon, halfway between London and Bristol, a dark gray production hall symbolizes the future of German-British arms cooperation. Starting this spring, it will produce combat drones and remotely controlled boats, which – developed by a German founding team – are already being used in Ukraine. In the future, they are also intended for use by the German Bundeswehr and the British Army. The production company Stark, which also develops the control software for the weapons, plans to start with 100 employees in Swindon and increase its monthly output from three-digit to four-digit figures. Alistair Carns, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, attended the opening of the production facility.
He speaks of the profound change "in the nature of armed conflict," since "drones are causing higher casualties than artillery shells."
In its military aid to Ukraine, the British government is supporting this transformation with all its might. Since July, an agreement has been in place for the joint construction of air defense drones called Octopus, 35,000 of which will be delivered to Ukraine in the coming months; in total, 85,000 drones have been made available to the Ukrainian armed forces with British assistance in the second half of this year.
The armies of the NATO countries are far from being able to keep up with such numbers. A study by the London military research institute RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) reveals that increasing drone production to the extent that the devices are currently being used (and consumed) on the Ukrainian battlefield is hardly possible in the foreseeable future without relying on Chinese raw materials and components.
The author of the study, Robert Tollast, states that Ukraine's daily demand for drones of all types is now around 9,000 units.” The British army has planned procurement orders for 6,000 drones per year (of which Stark hopes to secure some); the annual production of the American manufacturer Lockheed Martin recently stood at 7,000 units per year.
Will the future of military combat be largely determined by "dronification"? The assessments of military personnel and civilian strategists do not yield a clear picture, as Tollast notes. He describes how the shortage of fighter jets and artillery at the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict promoted the use of unmanned aerial vehicles that could be quickly manufactured or converted. Could drones still be replaced today by long-range, precision howitzers and fighter jets, or do they, with their low manufacturing costs and great versatility, represent a military revolution?
Tollast points out that the manufacturing costs of a remote-controlled, single-use attack drone are lower than those of an artillery shell and that current (American) strategy games for defending against a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan rely on the use of massive drone swarms.
At the beginning of the military conflict, Ukrainian developers used a variety of civilian drone technologies; for example, they converted aircraft that had been developed for distributing fertilizer in agriculture into anti-tank drones.
Both Ukraine and, increasingly, Russia have obtained drones primarily from Chinese manufacturers.
While Moscow ordered directly from China, Ukraine was forced to use indirect routes due to Chinese embargoes. In the fall of 2023, 60 percent of the production of the main Chinese drone manufacturer went to Ukraine. Currently, Ukrainian drone manufacturers primarily order components from Chinese suppliers, as the delivery of complete devices is hampered by renewed embargoes and because technological development has promoted new types of devices and a modular design.
Consequently, the military use of unmanned aerial vehicles is constantly expanding. The report continues that this is made possible by the "astonishing creativity of the users," but also by the flexibility of a system to which new components can be added repeatedly. Initially, devices were developed that are controlled via fiber optic cables. These are more difficult to locate and cannot be disrupted by jammers like radio-controlled drones.
Now, the use of artificial intelligence will trigger a new surge in development.
Tollast's RUSI study concludes that if the armies of the NATO partners wanted to create an independently produced drone arsenal modeled on the Ukrainian example, they would have to overcome multiple dependencies on China. This includes the production of the semiconductors required for flight control. The components needed for the drones are essential. They could also be sourced from Taiwanese manufacturers, albeit at higher costs.
Dependencies also exist in the procurement of electric motors and sensors. Both require access to rare earth elements. These are the elements neodymium and germanium, in whose extraction China currently holds a near-monopoly. A competing Western production at market prices is hardly possible in the foreseeable future, the RUSI study concludes.
The drone developer Stark states that its Virtus aircraft does not use any Chinese components.” [1]
While drone developer Stark may ensure no finished Chinese components are used in the Virtus aircraft, excluding Chinese-origin rare earth materials is challenging, as
China controls over 90% of the global rare earth magnet market, including refining and mining. These materials are essential for drone motors and high-performance, compact sensors.
Key Considerations on Rare Earths and Drones:
Supply Chain Dominance: China dominates the upstream manufacturing of critical, high-performance permanent magnets used in military and surveillance drone motors.
Export Restrictions: China has implemented export controls on seven types of rare earth elements, such as samarium and terbium, impacting Western defense industries.
"Mine-to-Magnet" Challenge: The US government and manufacturers are trying to build domestic "mine-to-magnet" supply chains to avoid using Chinese-supplied magnets, but this is a long-term goal not fully realized in all current production.
Industry Reality: While assembly and final production may be done outside China to adhere to military restrictions (like the US "blue list"), the raw materials for motors and electronics often originate from Chinese processors.
Even if a company avoids direct Chinese-made components, it is probable that some rare earth minerals in the supply chain still pass through Chinese processing, as alternatives are limited.
Conclusion: The Western drone developer Stark is lying to get more money. If people lie about making diagnostic equipment that uses a single drop of blood, they spend years in prison. If they lie about making military drones, they make lots and lots of money.
1. Die Drohnisierung des Krieges. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 22 Nov 2025: 10. Von Johannes Leithäuser, London
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