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2022 m. rugsėjo 15 d., ketvirtadienis

Can ‘the Merge’ Save Crypto?

"Many fans think it will. But it might end up creating some new problems.

Crypto could use a bit of good news these days. And on Wednesday, it got some.

Ethereum, the most popular crypto platform, appears to have successfully upgraded its software architecture from a type of blockchain known as “proof of work,” which it has run since its inception in 2015, to a type of blockchain known as “proof of stake.”

This upgrade, which came to be called, simply, “the merge,” is already being heralded as a watershed moment in the history of crypto.

Early Thursday, as the first proof-of-stake transactions were verified, dozens of Ethereum developers gathered on a celebratory Zoom call hosted by the Ethereum Foundation.

“This is the first step in Ethereum’s big journey towards being a very mature system,” Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum’s founder, told the group. “To me, the merge symbolizes the difference between early stage Ethereum and the Ethereum we’ve always wanted.”

And many crypto fans hope that it will turn things around for the crypto movement, which has been besieged in the past year by trillions of dollars in losses, a string of major scams and hacks, and a new wave of regulatory scrutiny.

I’m not so sure it will. But before I tell you why, let’s review some of the reasons that crypto supporters are celebrating.

First, it was far from a given that the merge would work. Switching a blockchain’s so-called consensus mechanism — the way that it processes and verifies new transactions — is terrifyingly complex. (Some crypto developers have compared it to swapping out a spaceship’s engine midflight.) Before the merge, nobody had tried such a maneuver on a crypto platform anywhere near Ethereum’s size, and it took years of testing and research (and many, many delays) for developers to get confident enough to attempt one. Ethereum, which is open source, hosts hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency transactions, NFT collections and DeFi protocols, all of which could have been irreparably broken if the merge hadn’t gone according to plan.

Something could still break in the coming days. But the merge appears to have gone as smoothly as Ethereum fans could have hoped.

The second reason crypto fans are happy about the merge is that the new Ethereum blockchain is much more environmentally friendly than the old one. Ethereum used to be secured by a network of high-powered computers that competed against one another to solve cryptographic puzzles, burning vast amounts of energy in the process.

Now, it will be secured by a process known as “staking,” which involves investors agreeing to deposit their crypto coins in a shared pool in exchange for a chance to earn financial rewards. (Staking means investors can freeze up their tokens for some time to receive a profit. (K))

There are other benefits to the merge — it’s expected to make Ethereum faster and more efficient in the long run — but the environmental footprint is the big, immediate improvement.

According to crypto researchers, the new Ethereum blockchain will consume 99.95 percent less energy than the old one. That’s a huge change — comparable to the entire nation of Portugal going off the grid, according to Digiconomist, a website that tracks crypto's energy consumption. And it should help industry advocates make the case that crypto can be green.

Third, many crypto fans are optimistic that the merge will be good for the value of Ether, Ethereum’s native cryptocurrency. For reasons that are too complicated to get into here, running the Ethereum blockchain requires destroying (or “burning”) billions of dollars’ worth of Ether every year. The new Ethereum blockchain will still burn Ether, but it won’t need to create as much new Ether to pay out rewards to participants. That means that the overall supply of Ether could shrink, increasing the value of existing coins. In addition, miners — the people who ran those giant, energy-guzzling server farms under the old proof-of-work system — will no longer be forced to sell some of their Ether to pay their electricity bills, which could result in more stable prices.

I’ve talked to a number of crypto industry leaders about the merge, and the general feeling they express is one of cautious optimism. It’s been a brutal year in crypto, but now that Ethereum has neutralized one of the most common objections to crypto — the enormous environmental toll — they hope that at least some skeptics will come around. Regulators won’t object as strenuously to Ethereum 2.0, they believe, and companies that experiment with NFTs and other Ethereum-based technologies won’t face as much backlash.

But I’m doubtful that the merge will solve crypto’s problems overnight — and it may introduce some even thornier ones.

For starters, it’s not clear to me that Ethereum’s energy use was the biggest obstacle to mainstream crypto adoption. It’s true that a lot of people who are opposed to crypto on principle tend to cite environmental concerns as a strike against it. But these days, a lot of people are skeptical of crypto for reasons that have nothing to do with energy. Maybe they know someone who lost a fortune betting on Dogecoin or Luna. Maybe all the stories of hacks and scams have scared them away. Maybe they’re intimidated by crypto’s complexity, or put off by the lack of obvious uses for it. Or maybe they’re just philosophically opposed to a new form of money that doesn’t have the backing of a government.

Right now, the biggest threat to crypto — in the United States, at least — is that the people who are in charge of regulating the industry seem to want to ban it. These regulators are worried about stablecoins, Ponzi schemes, state-sponsored ransomware attacks and investors losing their money to opaque crypto-lending schemes.

The merge doesn’t address any of that. And while you might be able to change some politicians’ minds about crypto by telling them that Ethereum now uses 99.95 percent less energy, I’m not sure it will move the needle at all with the people whose opinions matter most. For example, Gary Gensler, the head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, didn’t mention environmental concerns at all in an opinion essay he wrote for The Wall Street Journal last month about why the crypto industry should be more tightly regulated.

The merge could also stoke internecine tensions within the crypto community. Already, there are some Bitcoin fans — “maxis” — who believe that Ethereum’s switch to a proof-of-stake algorithm was a calculated P.R. move designed to make Ethereum look good while throwing Bitcoin under the bus. (Bitcoin, which runs on a proof-of-work system, has no plans to switch to a new consensus mechanism, so its energy consumption is likely to stay high, at least for the foreseeable future.)

Because it is secured by investors staking large pools of Ether, rather than by networks of puzzle-solving computers, the new Ethereum could also increase the crypto industry’s overall centralization, giving more power to large firms like Coinbase, Kraken and Lido — and potentially making it easier for governments to crack down on Ethereum itself, by pressuring those firms to censor certain transactions. (Coinbase’s chief executive, Brian Armstrong, has already said he will shut down the company’s Ethereum-staking business rather than comply with government censorship requests, if it comes to that.)

And, of course, the merge won’t put money-losing crypto investors back in the black or recover the assets lost by investors in failed crypto projects like Luna and Celsius Network.

Make no mistake, the merge was a technological marvel, a genuine boon to the environment and a testament to the power of cooperative open-source development. I’m glad that it happened, and the developers who toiled away for years to make it work should feel proud of how smoothly it went.

But crypto will need more than a successful merge to turn its fortunes around. Sorry to take the fizz out of the champagne."

 

More importantly, transactions will be processed faster. Convenience will appear, more small transactions will be possible, and users will like it. And in capitalism, the opinion of consumers is more important than the opinion of any power-hungry bureaucrats.


Napoleono Nemezis

    "Kutuzovas

    Aleksandras Mikaberidzė

    Oksfordas, 789 puslapiai, 34,95 doleriai

    Neseniai atliktoje apklausoje, kurioje buvo vertinamos geriausios pasaulio istorinės asmenybės, rusai Michailą Kutuzovą išrinko 15-u numeriu, atsiliekant nuo jo priešo Napoleono (14-as) ir keliomis vietomis lenkiant Michailą Gorbačiovą (20-as). Kutuzovas buvo generolas, kuris 1812 m. nugalėjo Napoleono Grande Armee; Vakaruose jis daugiausia žinomas dėl Levo Tolstojaus charakterizuoto vaidmens filme „Karas ir taika“. Iš čia ir atsirado žavingos Aleksandro Mikaberidzės paantraštė „Kutuzovas: gyvenimas kare ir taikoje“.

 

    1805 m. Austerlico mūšio išvakarėse karo taryboje užsnūsta prieš sąjungininkų vadus Kutuzovas. P. Mikaberidzė atskleidžia, kaip romano vaizdavimas „metė šešėlį, kuris ištveria“, ir rašo, kad nori pakelti Kutuzovą. „iš Tolstojaus romano“ ir „įdėkite jį į pasaulį, kurį jis padėjo suformuoti“. Ir taip jis daro. Skaitytojas mato Rusiją, besisukančią pro šalį, nes Kutuzovas visada stovi centre.

 

    Michailas Illarionovičius Golenischevas-Kutuzovas gimė 1747 m. bajorų šeimoje, tikriausiai, šeimos dvare Pskovo srityje Rusijos šiaurės vakaruose. Jo tėvas buvo inžinierius ir nusipelnęs karys. Jaunasis Michailas savo ankstyvuosius metus praleido tarp Ivano Turgenevo vadinamų „džentelmenų lizdų“ ir jam buvo lemta atlikti karinę tarnybą: šeimos herbe pavaizduotas skydas ir erelis, įsikibęs į nagus kardą.

 

    Luizianos valstijos universiteto Shreveport istorijos profesorius P. Mikaberidzė išleido trilogiją apie Napoleono invaziją į Rusiją, taip pat „Napoleono karai: pasaulinė istorija“, kuri pelnė du karinės istorijos apdovanojimus. „Kutuzove“ jis mikliai sutvarko milžiniškus pirminės medžiagos kiekius, kad nubrėžtų savo subjekto kelią į šlovę.

 

    Kutuzovas buvo 15 metų, ką tik baigęs mokslus, kai Petras III neteko sosto per perversmą, kuriam vadovavo jo žmona Kotryna. Kaip generolas – imperatorienės Kotrynos meilužis Grigalius Potiomkinas palaikė paaukštinimą – Kutuzovas iš Rusijos ir Osmanų karų tapo šešis kartus apdovanotu didvyriu. Jis buvo du kartus sunkiai sužeistas, vieną kartą muškietos rutuliui įsirėžus į jo kaukolę. Pirmoji didelės P. ​​Mikaberidzės apimties dalis užbaigia šiuos karus, tačiau Kutuzovui tai nebuvo Turkijos pabaiga. 1772 m. Kotryna nusiuntė jį į „Sublime Porte“ ambasadoriumi. Jo daugiau nei 600 palydoj buvo 24 dainininkai ir penki batsiuviai.

 

    Kotrynai mirus 1796 m., į sostą įžengė jos sūnus Paulius. Naujasis imperatorius buvo vieno iš Kutuzovo anūkų krikštatėvis; jaunesnioji iš penkių generolo dukterų buvo dvaro garbės tarnaitės. 1801 m. Paulius buvo nužudytas, o jo 23 metų sūnus Aleksandras tapo caru. Ar Kutuzovas dalyvavo žmogžudystės sąmoksle? P. Mikaberidzė daro išvadą tik tiek, kad „turėjo ką nors matyti ar girdėti“. Šio imperinio perėjimo pasakojimas yra patrauklus.

 

    Tada pirmyn ir aukštyn, bet su nesėkmėmis. Staiga atleistas iš Sankt Peterburgo karinio gubernatoriaus pareigų 1802 m., besisukančio naujojo caro dvaro nestabilumo metu, Kutuzovas trejus metus praleido tremtyje savo valdose Vakarų Ukrainoje. Jam priklausė 15 000 baudžiauninkų ir nuolat, savo laiškuose, dejavo apie pinigus („Mane persekioja baimė praleisti senatvę varge ir nepritekliuose“).

 

    Napoleonas, mėgaujantis emocinga knygos šerdimi, maždaug amžių sandūroje įžengia į trečiąją dalį, kai Kutuzovas, tuomet eidamas Lietuvos generalgubernatoriaus pareigas, Vilniuje šoko mazurką „kol suskaudo galvą“. (Galėjote pagalvoti, kad tai jo kojos turėjo skaudėti.)

 

1805 m. Aleksandras pasirinko Kutuzovą vadovauti Pirmajai armijai gresiančio karo prieš Prancūziją metu. Tolstojus vaizduoja Kutuzovą po Napoleono pergalės Ulme su raukšlėmis, kurios „perbėgo per veidą, kaip banga“. Garsioji kampanija yra jaudinanti – traukiasi, skerdynės ir kavalerijos išpuoliai, kai tamsa nusileidžia. Pralaimėjimas Austerlice meta ilgą šešėlį. (Ponas Mikaberidzė rodo, kad Kutuzovas nenorėjo kautis mūšyje.) Ketvirtoji dalis prasideda tuo, kad Kutuzovas ėjo Kijevo karinio gubernatoriaus pareigas „Dykumos metais, 1806–1808“. „Aš čia nelaimingas“, – rašo jis namo.

 

    Autorius savo vyrą vadina „įkyriu moteriškių kavalieriumi“. 1811 m. Bukarešte vienas amžininkas pranešė, kad labai jauna mergina dažnai sėdėdavo jam ant kelių ir „žaisdavo su jo aiguilletėmis“. Jo žmona Catherine retkarčiais atgyja per jos laiškus, tačiau apskritai išlieka neaiški figūra. P. Mikaberidzė mini depresijas ir nuovargį, tačiau vidinis Kutuzovas šiuose puslapiuose niekada neatgyja. Būtų daug ko tikėtis. Tai labiau karo istorijos kūrinys, kurio centre Kutuzovas, nei biografija. Proza yra aiški, o pasakojimo polėkis niekada nesulėtėja net ir kovoje.

 

    1812 m. gegužę Kutuzovas derėjosi dėl taikos sutarties su osmanais, o po trijų mėnesių Džonas Kvinsis Adamsas, tuometinis Amerikos ambasadorius Rusijoje, stebėjo, kaip caras pagerbė generolą Kazanės katedroje. Penktoji dalis atidaroma 1812 m. birželį, kai Napoleonas apžiūri savo vyrus, žygiuojančius per Nieman upę. Aleksandras paskiria 65 m. Kutuzovą, kad jis būtų (dabar „daug stambesnis“) vyriausiasis Rusijos ginkluotųjų pajėgų vadas. Borodino vilioja puikioje kulminacijoje. Pasakų mūšis nėra Rusijos pergalė, tačiau prancūzai nepasiekia rezultato, kurio jie tikėjosi, o P. Mikaberidzė, niuansuotai vertindamas, Borodiną laiko svarbiu žingsniu kelyje į Napoleono pralaimėjimą. Vėlesnis Kutuzovo sprendimas pasitraukti iš Maskvos ir pasiruošti kariauti išsekimo karą yra vienas kontroversiškiausių kada nors priimtų karinių sprendimų ir šiuose puslapiuose vaizdingai aprašytas.

 

    P. Mikaberidzė yra didžiulis tyrinėtojas. Nedaugelis kada nors atitiks jo stipendiją srityje, kurią jis sukūrė, kaip savo. Jis iškasė gausius Kutozovo popierius, amžininkų dienoraščius ir korespondenciją, archyvus Lietuvoje ir Prancūzijoje. Mūšių ir gynybos schemos ir žemėlapiai padeda nukreipti skaitytoją į karo miglą, kai daliniai ir batalionai išformuoja ir reformuojasi, keičiasi teatrai ir painioja chroniškas logistikos problemas.

 

    Jis erzina istorinę tiesą iš mitų kūrimo ir meta iššūkį Tolstojaus tradiciniam Kutuzovo, kaip niūraus ir pasyvaus istorinių įvykių stebėtojo, įvaizdžiui. Amžininkai dažnai manydavo, kad Kutuzovas nuo pašaliečių apsisaugodavo nedideliu karininkų ratu, ir daugelis manė, kad jis praleido progas nugalėti Napoleoną. Kita vertus, sovietų istoriografai jį lionizavo. Mums sakoma, kad Stalinas „padėjo sustiprinti Kutuzovo legendą“. Jis buvo sovietinės propagandos įrankis, ypač Antrojo pasaulinio karo metais.

 

    Autorius visada greitai gina savo temą. Kutuzovas „teigė, kad padarė viską, kad sutramdytų plėšimus“ per Izmailo šturmą – pergalę, kuri „suteikė karinės šlovės aurą, lydinčią jį visą likusį gyvenimą“. P. Mikaberidzė pripažįsta, kad teiginiuose, kad Kutuzovo amžius ir prasta sveikata „užtemdė jo nuomonę“ ir kad jis „bijojo susidurti su Napoleonu“, yra „šiek tiek tiesos“. Tačiau tik viena dešimtoji 600 000 Grande Armee išgyveno, kad 1812 m. gruodį perplauktų Niemaną.

 

    Netrukus Kutuzovas mirė savo lovoje, 1813 m. balandį. Dauguma rusų tuo metu jį gyrė, kaip „tautos Gelbėtoją“. Kiti senąjį kareivį suvokė, kaip „praėjusios eros reliktą“. Šioje knygoje pateikiamas išsamus pakartotinis įvertinimas.

    ---

    P. Wheeler yra naujausios knygos „Purvas ir žvaigždės: kelionės po Rusiją su Puškinu, Tolstojumi ir kitais aukso amžiaus genijais“ autorė [1].

1. REVIEW --- Books: Napoleon's Nemesis
Wheeler, Sara. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 27 Aug 2022: C.9.

 

Napoleon's Nemesis

"Kutuzov

By Alexander Mikaberidze

Oxford, 789 pages, $34.95

In a recent poll ranking the world's top historical figures, Russians voted Mikhail Kutuzov No. 15, behind his enemy Napoleon (No. 14) and several places ahead of Mikhail Gorbachev (No. 20). Kutuzov was the general who saw off Napoleon's Grande Armee in 1812; in the West, he is chiefly known through Leo Tolstoy's portrayal in "War and Peace." Hence the subtitle of Alexander Mikaberidze's enthralling "Kutuzov: A Life in War and Peace."

Tolstoy's blubbery Kutuzov falls asleep in front of the allied commander at the council of war on the eve of the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805. Mr. Mikaberidze reveals how the novel's portrayal "cast a shadow that endures" and writes that he wishes to lift Kutuzov "out of Tolstoy's novel" and "place him in the world he helped to shape." And so he does. The reader sees Russia spooling by as Kutuzov stands, always, center stage.

Mikhail Illarionovich Golenischev-Kutuzov was born into nobility in 1747, probably on the family estate in the Pskov region of Russia's northwest. His father was an engineer and distinguished soldier. Young Mikhail passed his early years among what Ivan Turgenev calls "nests of gentlefolk," and was destined for military service: the family coat of arms depicts a shield and an eagle clasping a sword in its claws.

Mr. Mikaberidze, a professor of history at Louisiana State University Shreveport, has published a trilogy on Napoleon's invasion of Russia, as well as "The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History," which won two military-history awards. In "Kutuzov" he deftly marshals colossal amounts of primary material to chart his subject's path to glory.

Kutuzov was a 15-year-old freshly graduated ensign when Peter III lost his throne in a coup led by his wife, Catherine. As a general -- Gregory Potemkin, Empress Catherine's lover, supported the promotion -- Kutuzov emerged from the Russo-Ottoman wars a six-time decorated hero. He was twice seriously wounded, once when a musket ball smashed through his skull. Part One of Mr. Mikaberidze's substantial volume closes these wars, but it was not the end of Turkey for Kutuzov. In 1772 Catherine sent him to the Sublime Porte as ambassador. His entourage of more than 600 included 24 singers and five cobblers.

Upon Catherine's death in 1796, her son Paul ascended the throne. The new emperor was godfather to one of Kutuzov's grandsons; the younger of the general's five daughters were maids of honor at court. In 1801 Paul was assassinated, and his 23-year-old son Alexander became czar. Had Kutuzov been in on the murder plot? Mr. Mikaberidze concludes only that he "must have seen or heard something." The account of this imperial transition is gripping.

Onward and upward then, but with setbacks. Abruptly relieved of his command as military governor of St. Petersburg in 1802, amid the swirling instability of the new czar's court, Kutuzov spent three years in exile on his estates in western Ukraine. He owned 15,000 serfs and moaned constantly, in his letters, about money ("I am haunted by the fear of spending my old age in penury and want").

Napoleon, who glowers at the emotional heart of the book, enters around the turn of the century in Part Three as Kutuzov, by then serving as governor general of Lithuania, danced the mazurka in Vilna "till [his] head hurt." (You would have thought it would be his feet.) In 1805 Alexander selected Kutuzov to head the First Army in the looming war against France. Tolstoy depicts Kutuzov, after Napoleon's victory at Ulm, with wrinkles that "ran over his face like a wave." The famous campaign is thrilling, with its retreats, carnage and cavalry attacks as darkness descends. Defeat at Austerlitz casts a long shadow. (Mr. Mikaberidze shows that Kutuzov had not wanted to fight the battle.) Part Four begins with Kutuzov serving as the military governor of Kyiv during "The Wilderness Years, 1806-1808." "I am not happy here," he writes home.

The author calls his man "an inveterate womanizer." In Bucharest in 1811 a contemporary reported that a very young girl often sat on his lap "playing with his aiguillettes." His wife, Catherine, comes to life occasionally through her letters, but on the whole remains an indistinct figure. Mr. Mikaberidze mentions depressions and lassitude, but the inner Kutuzov never comes alive in these pages. It would be a lot to expect. This is more a work of military history, with Kutuzov at its center, than it is a biography. The prose is clear and the narrative drive never slows even when the fighting does.

Kutuzov negotiated a peace treaty with the Ottomans in May 1812, and three months later John Quincy Adams, then America's ambassador to Russia, watched as the czar honored the general at Kazan Cathedral. Part Five opens in June 1812, as Napoleon surveys his men marching across the Nieman River. Alexander appoints the 65-year-old Kutuzov ("much stouter" now) supreme commander of Russia's armed forces. Borodino beckons in a superb climax. The fabled battle does not constitute a Russian victory, but the French fail to achieve the outcome they had hoped for, and Mr. Mikaberidze, in a nuanced assessment, casts Borodino as an important step on the road to Napoleonic defeat. Kutuzov's subsequent decision to withdraw from Moscow and prepare to fight a war of attrition is among the most controversial military decisions ever made, and is described vividly in these pages.

Mr. Mikaberidze is a formidable researcher. Few will ever match his scholarship in a field he has made his own. He has mined Kutozov's voluminous papers, the diaries and correspondence of contemporaries, and archives in Lithuania and France. Diagrams and maps of battles and defenses help guide the reader through the fog of war as units and battalions disband and reform, theaters shift and chronic problems of logistics confound.

He teases historical truth from mythmaking and challenges Tolstoy's traditional image of Kutuzov as a morose and passive observer of historic events. Contemporaries often reckoned that Kutuzov shielded himself from outsiders with a small circle of officers, and many felt he had missed opportunities to defeat Napoleon outright. Soviet historiographers, on the other hand, lionized him. Stalin, we are told, "was instrumental in the amplification of the Kutuzovian legend." He was a tool of Soviet propaganda, notably during World War II.

The author is always quick to defend his subject. Kutuzov "was said to have done his best to rein in the pillaging" at the storming of Izmail, a victory that "conferred an aura of martial glory that followed him for the rest of his life." Mr. Mikaberidze concedes that there is "some truth" in the claims that Kutuzov's age and poor health "clouded his judgement" and that he "feared confronting Napoleon." But only one-tenth of a Grande Armee of 600,000 survived to recross the Nieman in December 1812.

Kutuzov died in his bed soon after, in April 1813. Most Russians at the time hailed him as "the Savior of the Nation." Others perceived the old soldier as "a relic of a bygone era." This book presents a thorough reassessment.

---

Ms. Wheeler is the author, most recently, of "Mud and Stars: Travels in Russia With Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Other Geniuses of the Golden Age."" [1]

1. REVIEW --- Books: Napoleon's Nemesis
Wheeler, Sara. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 27 Aug 2022: C.9.