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2025 m. vasario 2 d., sekmadienis

Isolationist? Nationalist? No, Trump Is Sovereigntist

 

 Sovereigntists are protecting the cultures of nations. Monoculture reduces the resilience of humanity, the same way as monoculture of crops reduces the resilience of our agriculture. We might even go extinct as human species living in monoculture.



"When President Trump started talking about regaining control of the Panama Canal, colleagues and friends barraged me with questions. Where did this seemingly out-of-the-blue interest in a long-since-yielded area of control come from? How did a fit of pique about tolls and China grow into a threat to force Panama to cede its territory to the United States? Was there some kind of larger rationale that might explain it?

They asked me because for more than seven years, I have been studying conservative activists and their views of 20th-century foreign policy. If anyone should know, they reasoned, I should. But for all the time I’ve spent in libraries and archives, I was as flummoxed as anyone about the historical roots of Mr. Trump’s worldview.

The historical literature doesn’t provide much guidance. Historians tend to slot conservatives into three major, sometimes overlapping, groups: anti-communists, defense hawks and neoconservative nation builders. Those proved awkward fits for Mr. Trump in his first term, gesturing toward but not capturing his essence. Yes, he routinely called his enemies communists, but then embraced (and later spurned) the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Yes, he boasted about American military power, but then seemed to defer to Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin. He claimed to want American troops out of Afghanistan, but failed to conclusively follow through. With his penchant for personal and transactional politics, and his often purposeful unpredictability, the man was almost impossible to categorize.

Historians instead pulled out a category that has rarely been used to describe anyone on the right for 75 years. Noting Trump’s rhetoric, they dubbed him an isolationist, like some of the conservatives who opposed the United States’ entrance into World War II.

Yet Mr. Trump’s recent moves demonstrated the limits of that moniker. Annexing Canada? Taking over Greenland? Demanding possession of the Panama Canal? How could those threats to take foreign territory square with isolationism?

There is, it turns out, a little examined strain of history that provides a fresh way to understand his instincts. Hidden in plain sight in the dusty papers and collections of everyday right-wing Americans lies a whole new way of thinking about Mr. Trump’s foreign policy. He is a “sovereigntist.”

American sovereigntist politics originated over 100 years ago in the moment of profound crisis and possibility of 1919, when the world undertook a referendum of sorts on the surge in globalization that preceded World War I. Nations, increasingly interconnected, were rocked by the halt in trade and migration that followed the war’s conclusion. At the same time, empires collapsed and new nationalist movements emerged or flourished, with the result that some states died and altogether new ones were born.

Amid this dramatic change emerged a proposal for a novel form of supranational government — the League of Nations. As diplomats and lawyers hammered out guidelines, they prompted fierce debate over the purpose of nation states and sovereignty. Advocates of global trade and migration, colonial independence movements, Black internationalists, socialists, communists and liberal Christians cheered the arrival of worldwide governance, in which many found the promise of self-determination, international public law and a subdued nationalism.

But many despised the idea, and here lie the origins of the American sovereigntist movement — and its modern heirs. In 1919, a group of senators known as the “irreconcilables” blocked the United States from joining the League of Nations. They were backed by a grass-roots movement of patriotic organizations, veterans’ groups and Protestant fundamentalists who argued that the League aimed to usurp American governance. In their words, it would replace the Constitution with world government, diminish America’s unique history and culture, and allow uncivilized, nonwhite and non-Christian states to exert power over its citizens.

“The welfare of the Nation has been made subordinate to Internationalism,” said Louis Coolidge, an ally of the League critic Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. “Our creed,” he said, “is to keep alive the fires of Nationality.”

Their movement aimed to preserve not only America’s formal sovereignty in international relations, but also the traditional forms of rule to which its white, native-born leaders were accustomed. Driven by a keen sense of the virtues of Anglo-Saxon self-governance, they understood international cooperation as a threat to their personal sovereignty as well as that of their nation.

Sovereigntist politics persisted and evolved as the features and scope of liberal and left-wing internationalism took new forms. In the 1930s, they helped lead the America First movement, which opposed entrance in World War II on the side of the Allies. Far from isolationism, sovereigntists openly championed the anti-internationalism of the fascists, supported Gen. Francisco Franco’s Nationalist rebellion in Spain, and accepted — even cheered — the regimes in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy that thumbed their noses at the collapsing League of Nations. The Rev. Norman Vincent Peale, the minister who married Mr. Trump and his first wife, Ivana, joined the sovereignty movement in this early period.

After World War II, sovereigntists launched a protracted battle against the United Nations. During Mr. Trump’s youth in the 1950s, that battle birthed a host of new organizations and leaders who took up anti-internationalist politics, many of which, like the John Birch Society, are familiar to Americans today. They resisted American participation in the International Court, which they dubbed the World Court; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the forerunner to the World Trade Organization; viewing them all as threats to American governance. In their view, the U.N.’s covenants and agencies undermined the civilizing authority of white, Christian nations by offering membership and influence to communists, Asians and Africans.

Later, many fought international sanctions on the “brave little country” of Rhodesia, as the right-wing lawyer and radio host Clarence Manion called it, likening its fight to preserve white rule to the American fight for independence. Sovereigntists led the mobilization against the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the law that loosened immigration for the first time in four decades, which, they argued, embodied the ultimate plot of internationalists — eliminating national borders.

Here the Panama Canal comes into the frame. In the 1950s and 1960s, Panamanians began to invoke U.N. charters and the International Court’s rules on disputed territories to challenge the United States’ authority over the canal and gain support of the U.N. to transfer it to Panama. Sovereigntists called this a plot to steal American territory that was, in the words of the Patrick Henry League of New York, “ours, just as much ours as the Capitol dome and the national anthem.”

From the late 1950s through the 1960s, a coalition of groups such as the Committee on Pan American Policy and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies chastised Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson for making concessions to Panamanian demands. The critics would lose. In 1973, the Panamanian leader, Omar Torrijos, delivered the coup de grâce when he hosted the U.N. Security Council in Panama for a hearing on the “colony in the heart of my country.” Alongside significant local protests, the event pressured the United States to negotiate a treaty that would grant Panama full control. President Jimmy Carter signed it in 1977, enraging sovereigntists, whose decades-old cause finally caught the interest of influential new conservatives including the presidential candidate Ronald Reagan.

The sovereigntist movement went on in the 1980s to defend South Africa against U.N. sanctions, and successfully pressured Mr. Reagan, then the president, to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which promoted peace and human rights through culture and education. When the Cold War ended, their crusade became even more relevant. Internationalism was the only game in town — the “New World Order” as President George H.W. Bush and others called it. The United States pursued multilateral trade agreements, forged a new neoliberal consensus and engaged its military in international peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and later the Balkans.

That was exactly what sovereigntists had always feared, and in their resistance they anticipated the wider populist backlash against globalization that helped drive Mr. Trump’s popularity. Viewed from the perspective of the recurring battles between those who accept international governance as a tool to project American power and those who fear it as a humiliating surrender of American autonomy, Mr. Trump’s threat to retake the Panama Canal shows how sovereignty politics today suffuses the re-energized Right.

In Mr. Trump, this movement has found its most influential champion. Well before Mr. Trump’s talk of the U.S. taking over the canal, his reanimation of the sovereigntist agenda was clearly visible. In his first term and during his four years out of office, sovereignty politics featured in his attacks on the U.N., NATO and international agreements on trade and climate. They drove his restrictionist zeal to protect national borders against immigration. And they fueled Mr. Trump’s love affairs with other skeptics of international organizations, such as Viktor Orbán of Hungary or Georgia Meloni of Italy.

There is little to be won predicting foreign policy in a second Trump administration. The influence of the sovereigntist movement may recede in the face of a president who is changeable and distracted. And some members of Mr. Trump’s coalition do not subscribe to a purely sovereigntist standpoint, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio. But sovereigntists will surely double down. “International organizations and agreements that erode our Constitution, rule of law or popular sovereignty should not be reformed,” Project 2025 explains. “They should be abandoned.”

The most vigorous sovereigntists openly say they will seek withdrawal from the U.N. if necessary. They already oppose many proposed pacts and conventions, including the U.N.’s Pact for the Future, which addresses climate change and inequality. The Trump administration has said it intends to withdraw from the World Health Organization and has taken steps toward a near ban on immigration.

 It’s likely to weaken the European Union, enfeeble NATO and oppose multicountry trade agreements like the revamped NAFTA. And it will seek to regain a kind of Monroe Doctrine-era control of the Western Hemisphere, no matter what happens with the canal.

Mr. Trump’s embrace of sovereignty politics will only embolden similar regimes around the world. Brexit was a harbinger of other potential E.U. exits. Nearly every right-wing party across Europe would consider one if they came to power.

Look for other countries, buoyed by Mr. Trump’s scorn, to put the brakes on internationalism and instead build new, separate relationships with each other. What we would be left with is an unruly period for international relations, one that is less centralized and less governed by the shared principles and operating modes that lasted from the end of World War II until just a few years ago.

Jennifer Mittelstadt, a professor of U.S. history at Rutgers University, studies the state, the military and political movements." [1]

1. Isolationist? Nationalist? No, Trump Is Something Else Entirely.: Guest Essay. Mittelstadt, Jennifer.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Feb 2, 2025.

„DeepSeek“ yra Kinijos laimėjimas dirbtinio intelekto konkurencijoje. Kaip Kinija (ir žmonija) kontroliuos dirbtinį intelektą? Investicijos, mokantis naudoti Kinijos dirbtinį intelektą, apsimokės labiausiai


  „DeepSeek sėkmė įkūnija Kinijos ambicijas dirbtinio intelekto srityje. Tačiau ji taip pat gali kelti grėsmę šalies vadovų turimai valdžiai.

 

 2017 m. Kinija su baime ir šokiruota stebėjo, kaip „Google“ remiama dirbtinio intelekto programa AlphaGo įveikė Kinijos vunderkindą sudėtingame stalo žaidime „Go“. Lemiamas pralaimėjimas užsienio kompiuterinei programai, kuri panašiai buvo sumušusi Pietų Korėjos žaidėją, buvo tam tikras Sputniko momentas Kinijai.

 

 Tais metais Kinijos pareigūnai išdėstė drąsų planą vadovauti pasauliui dirbtinio intelekto (A.I.) srityje iki 2030 m. ir pažadėjo milijardus įmonėms ir tyrėjams, sutelktiems į technologijas. Iš šio įkarščio atsirado DeepSeek – beveik nežinomas Kinijos startuolis, kuris pakeitė technologijų kraštovaizdį sukurdamas galingą A.I. modelį su daug mažiau pinigų, nei, ekspertai manė, įmanoma.

 

 „DeepSeek“ yra privati, be jokios akivaizdžios valstybės paramos, tačiau jos sėkmė įkūnija aukščiausio Kinijos lyderio Xi Jinpingo, raginusio jo šalį „užimti aukščiausias technologijų aukštumas“, ambicijas. P. Xi nori, kad Kinijos ekonomika būtų varoma ne senais augimo varikliais, tokiais, kaip skolų kurstomas nekilnojamasis turtas ir pigus eksportas, o pažangiausios technologijos, tokios, kaip A.I., superkompiuteriai ir žalioji energija.

 

 Ponui Xi ši akimirka padeda susilpninti JAV pranašumo aurą A.I. – kritinėje aršios supervalstybių konkurencijos srityje. Kinija prisidėjo, kaip geranoriška pasaulinė besivystančių šalių partnerė, norinti pasidalyti jos žiniomis, o ponas Xi sakė, kad A.I. neturėtų būti „turtingų šalių ir turtingųjų žaidimas“.

 

 Dabar „DeepSeek“ parodė, kad Kinijai gali būti įmanoma padaryti A.I. pigiau ir visiems prieinamiau.

 

 Tačiau kyla klausimas, kaip valdančioji komunistų partija valdo technologijos, kuri vieną dieną gali būti tokia žalinga, kad gali kelti grėsmę jos interesams ir valdžiai, atsiradimą.

 

 Kinijos reglamentas dėl A.I., bėgant metams, keitė intensyvumą, priklausomai nuo to, kur šalis vertina savo stipriąsias ir silpnąsias puses. Kai Kinijos vyriausybė nerimavo, kad 2022 m. ji atsiliko nuo Jungtinių Valstijų po OpenAI ChatGPT paleidimo, ji ėmėsi laisvesnio požiūrio, kuris, galiausiai, leido klestėti tokioms įmonėms, kaip „DeepSeek“ ir kitos.

 

 Dabar, kai švytuoklė pakrypo į kitą pusę, pasitikėjimas pramone gali pasirodyti esąs „dviašmenis kardas“, – sakė Mattas Sheehanas, studijuojantis kinų A.I., kaip Carnegie Endowment for International Peace bendradarbis.

 

 Partijos „pagrindiniai instinktai yra link kontrolės“, sakė J. Sheehanas. „Kai jie atgauna pasitikėjimą Kinijos A.I. pajėgumu, jiems gali būti sunku atsispirti norui imtis praktiškesnio požiūrio į šias įmones."

 

 Tarsi norėdamas pabrėžti šią galimybę, „DeepSeek“ įkūrėjas Liangas Wenfengas buvo pakviestas į diskusiją su premjeru Li Qiangu sausio 20 d., tą pačią dieną, kai bendrovė išleido naujausią ir galingiausią A.I. modelį, žinomą, kaip R1.

 

 Pono Liango dalyvavimas buvo dar labiau stebinantis, nes „DeepSeek“ nebuvo laikomas vienu iš Kinijos vadinamųjų A.I. tigrų. Šis išskirtinumas skirtas aukšto lygio įmonėms, tokioms, kaip Zhipu AI, Pekine įsikūrusi startuolis, gavęs daug valstybės investicijų.

 

 DeepSeek nėra svetimas partijos noras kištis; kuris galėjo netyčia suvaidinti tam tikrą vaidmenį jo sėkmei. „DeepSeek“ iš pradžių apmokė savo A.I. modelius, skirtus lažintis Kinijos akcijų rinkoje. Tačiau kai reguliavimo institucijos nusitaikė į tokį elgesį, 2023 m. jis perėjo prie pažangių A.I. modelių, kad atitiktų Kinijos pramonės politiką.

 

 Tada jis pribloškė pasaulį, konkuruodamas su jo amerikiečių konkurentais, nepaisant to, kad naudojo daug mažiau pažangių kompiuterių lustų, kurių Kinijai sunku gauti – tai technologinis žygdarbis, kurio iki šiol nebuvo. Namuose Kinijos komentatoriai „DeepSeek“ pasiekimą laikė įrodymu, kad JAV taikomi A.I. eksporto apribojimai lustams, gabenamiems į Kiniją, galiausiai, yra bergždi (nors bendrovės įkūrėjas teigė, kad tokie limitai kelia didelį susirūpinimą).

 

 Netgi naujausi „OpenAI“ kaltinimai, kad „DeepSeek“ netinkamai rinko duomenis, kad sukurtų savo modelius, neatbaidė jos gerbėjų Kinijoje, kurie kaltina San Francisko įmonę, skleidžiant gandus.

 

 „Dėl, JAV taikomų, technologinių sankcijų Kinijai, Kinija neturi kito pasirinkimo, kaip tik vystytis“, – sakė Pekino Tsinghua universiteto užsienio santykių ekspertė Sun Chenghao, pakartodama Kinijoje populiarias nuotaikas. „Galime pasikliauti tik savimi“.

 

 A.I. užima ypatingą vietą pono Xi Kinijos iškilimo vizijoje, nes ji gali padėti šaliai įveikti daugelį didžiausių iššūkių, pavyzdžiui, mažėjančios darbo jėgos. Kinija naudojo veido atpažinimą ir algoritmus, kad padidintų jos gebėjimą stebėti jos žmones ir užgniaužti nesutarimus. Ši technologija taip pat prisideda prie Kinijos karinio modernizavimo su, autonominiu režimu veikiančiais, ginklais ir net mūšio lauko strategija.

 

 „DeepSeek“ plėtra taip pat galėtų paskatinti Kinijos geopolitinius tikslus. „DeepSeek“ naudoja atvirojo kodo modelį, o tai reiškia, kad bet kas gali pasižvalgyti po jo gaubtu ir naudoti jo technologijas, skirtingai, nei pirmaujančios Amerikos įmonės, kurios naudoja brangesnę patentuotą programinę įrangą.

 

 „Nebrangus ir atvirojo kodo „DeepSeek“ modelis sustiprina Kinijos vyriausybės pasakojimą, kad Kinija yra ta vieta, kur besivystančios šalys gali ieškoti A.I. sprendimų“, – sakė J. Sheehanas.

 

 Kokia didele žaidėja Kinija tampa pasaulinėje arenoje A.I. galiausiai gali priklausyti nuo to, kaip vyriausybė nuspręs suderinti taisykles su laisve, kurios įmonėms ir mokslininkams reikia atlikti pažangiausią darbą, leidžiantį konkuruoti su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis.

 

 Kai kurie analitikai, tokie, kaip Strateginių ir tarptautinių studijų centro tyrėjas ir buvęs JAV gynybos pareigūnas Gregory C. Allenas, teigė, kad A.I., greičiausiai, nėra jokių suvaržymų, kai kalbama apie Kinijos kariuomenę.

 

 „Vienintelis dalykas, kuris juos stabdo, yra našumas“, – sakė ponas Allenas, kuris savo ankstesniame darbe vedė derybas su Liaudies išlaisvinimo armijos nariais, atsakingais už A.I. rizikos įvertinimą.

 

 Tas pats pasakytina apie A.I. privačiame sektoriuje. Kraštovaizdį čia diktuoja konkuruojantys Kinijos reguliavimo agentūrų prioritetai, kurių kiekviena išgyvena technologiją, kurios daugelis pasaulio šalių vis dar iki galo nesupranta.

 

 Akivaizdu, kad kuo plačiau naudojama technologija, tuo labiau partija norės ją suvaldyti. 2023 m., praėjus vos mėnesiams po to, kai ChatGPT sukėlė investicijų įtūžį dėl dirbtinio intelekto, Kinija paskelbė taisykles, kuriomis siekiama kontroliuoti, ką Kinijos pokalbių robotai sako vartotojams, reikalaujant, kad jie atspindėtų „pagrindines socialistines vertybes“ ir vengtų informacijos, kenkiančios „valstybės galiai“.

 

 „DeepSeek“ pokalbių roboto atveju tai sukėlė nepatogius atsakymus į iš pažiūros gerybinius klausimus, pavyzdžiui: „Kas yra Xi Jinpingas? Jo galimybes išbandę mokslininkai išsiaiškino, kad botas pateikia atsakymus, kurie skleidžia Kinijos propagandą ir net papūgos metodu atkuria dezinformacijos kampanijas.

 

 Kai kurie rūpesčiai yra labiau egzistencinio pobūdžio. Didėjantis mokslininkų choras skambina pavojaus varpais dėl galimai katastrofiškų pasekmių praradus žmogaus kontrolę A.I.

 

 Pagrindinis iš tų balsų buvo Andrew Yao, A.I. milžinas Tsinghua universitete, kuris gavo Turingo apdovanojimą, atitinkantį Nobelio premiją už kompiuteriją. Jo įtaka padėjo sukurti tai, ką Kinija vadina Pasauline AI valdymo iniciatyva, kurią p. Xi pristatė 2023 m. ir kurioje buvo raginimas visada išlaikyti A.I. žmogaus kontroliuojamu. Praėjusiais metais vyriausybė taip pat paragino sustiprinti A.I. valdymą „remiantis žmogaus sprendimų priėmimu ir priežiūra.“ [1]

 

Atvirojo kodo ir daug pigesnį Kinijos AI nekantriai perima Pasauliniai Pietai. Tai gera pradinė padėtis Kinijos AI ir Kinijos AI reglamentui dominuoti pasaulyje. Investicijos, mokantis naudoti  Kinijos dirbtinį intelektą, apsimokės labiausiai

 

1. DeepSeek Is a Win for China in the A.I. Race.  Pierson, David; Berry, Wang.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Feb 2, 2025.

DeepSeek Is a Win for China in the A.I. Race. How Will China (and the Humanity) Control the AI? Investment in learning to use Chinese artificial intelligence will pay off the most


"DeepSeek’s success embodies China’s ambitions in artificial intelligence. But it could also threaten the grip on power the nation’s leaders hold.

In 2017, China watched in awe — and shock — as AlphaGo, an artificial intelligence program backed by Google, defeated a Chinese prodigy at a complex board game, Go. The decisive loss to a foreign computer program, which had similarly trounced a South Korean player, was a sort of Sputnik moment for China.

That year, Chinese officials laid out a bold plan to lead the world in A.I. by 2030, pledging billions to companies and researchers focused on the technology. From this fervor emerged DeepSeek, the largely unknown Chinese start-up that upended the technology landscape by creating a powerful A.I. model with far less money than experts had thought possible.

DeepSeek is private, with no apparent state backing, but its success embodies the ambitions of China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, who has exhorted his country to “occupy the commanding heights” of technology. Mr. Xi wants the Chinese economy to be powered not by old growth engines like debt-fueled real estate and cheap exports, but by the most advanced technologies like A.I., supercomputing and green energy.

For Mr. Xi, this moment helps dent the aura of superiority the United States has held in A.I., a critical field in a fierce superpower rivalry. China has cast itself as a benevolent global partner to developing countries, willing to share its know-how, with Mr. Xi saying that A.I. should not be a “game of rich countries and the wealthy.”

Now, DeepSeek has shown that it might be possible for China to make A.I. cheaper and more accessible for everyone. 

The question, though, is how the ruling Communist Party manages the rise of a technology that could one day be so disruptive that it could threaten its interests — and its grip on power.

Chinese regulation of A.I. has varied in intensity over the years, depending on where the country assesses its strengths and weaknesses. When the Chinese government was worried it had fallen behind the United States in 2022 after the launch of OpenAI’s ChatGPT, it took a more hands-off approach that ultimately allowed ventures like DeepSeek and others to thrive.

Now that the pendulum has swung the other way, that confidence in the industry could prove to be a “double-edged sword,” said Matt Sheehan, who studies Chinese A.I. as a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The party’s “core instincts are toward control,” Mr. Sheehan said. “As they regain confidence in China’s A.I. capabilities, they may have a hard time resisting the urge to take a more hands-on approach to these companies.”

As if to underscore that possibility, DeepSeek’s founder, Liang Wenfeng, was invited to a discussion with Premier Li Qiang on Jan. 20, the same day that the company released its latest and most powerful A.I. model, known as R1.

Mr. Liang’s attendance was all the more remarkable considering DeepSeek had not been considered one of China’s so-called A.I. Tigers. That distinction is reserved for high-profile firms like Zhipu AI, a Beijing-based start-up that has received substantial state investment.

DeepSeek is no stranger to the party’s urge to interfere; that may have inadvertently played a role in its eventual success. DeepSeek had originally trained its A.I. models to make bets on the Chinese stock market. But when regulators targeted such behavior, it pivoted in 2023 to advanced A.I. to conform with China’s industrial policy.

Then it stunned the world by rivaling the performance of its American competitors despite using far fewer of the advanced computer chips that are hard for China to obtain — a technological feat that until recently had not been available. At home, Chinese commentators have held up DeepSeek’s achievement as evidence that U.S. restrictions on exports of A.I. chips to China are ultimately futile (even though the company’s founder has said such limits are a major concern).

Even the recent allegations by OpenAI that DeepSeek improperly harvested its data to build its models have not deterred its fans in China, who accuse the San Francisco company of spreading rumors.

“The U.S. technological sanctions on China have left China with no choice but to develop,” said Sun Chenghao, a foreign relations expert at Tsinghua University in Beijing, echoing a popular sentiment in China. “We can only rely on ourselves.”

A.I. holds a special place in Mr. Xi’s vision of China’s rise, with its potential to help the country overcome many of its biggest challenges like its shrinking work force. China has used facial recognition and algorithms to supercharge its ability to surveil its people and snuff out dissent. The technology is also factoring into China’s military modernization with autonomous weapons systems and even battlefield strategy.

DeepSeek’s development could also advance China’s geopolitical goals. DeepSeek uses an open source model, meaning anyone can peer under its hood and use its technology, unlike leading American companies that use more expensive proprietary software.

“The low cost and open source nature of DeepSeek’s model bolsters the Chinese government’s narrative that China is the place developing countries can look to for A.I. solutions,” Mr. Sheehan said.

How big a player China becomes on the global stage in A.I. could ultimately depend on how the government decides to balance regulations with the freedom that companies and researchers need to do cutting-edge work that allows them to compete with the United States.

Some analysts like Gregory C. Allen, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former U.S. defense official, said there were most likely no restraints on A.I. development when it comes to China’s military.

“The only thing holding them back is performance,” said Mr. Allen, who in his former job held talks with members of the People’s Liberation Army responsible for assessing the risks of A.I.

The same does not hold true for regulating A.I. in the private sector. The landscape there is dictated by the competing priorities of China’s regulatory agencies, each feeling their way around a technology that many in the world still do not fully understand.

It is clear that the more widely used a technology is, the more the party will want to rein it in. In 2023, just months after ChatGPT set off an investment frenzy over artificial intelligence, China issued rules aimed at controlling what Chinese chatbots say to users, requiring them to reflect “socialist core values” and avoid information that undermines “state power.”

In the case of DeepSeek’s chatbot, this has led to awkward responses to seemingly benign questions like, “Who is Xi Jinping?” Researchers testing its capabilities have found that the bot gives answers that spread Chinese propaganda and even parrot disinformation campaigns.

Some concerns are more existential in nature. A growing chorus of scholars have been sounding the alarm about the potentially catastrophic consequences of losing human control over A.I.

Chief among those voices has been Andrew Yao, a giant in A.I. at Tsinghua University and a recipient of the Turing Award, the equivalent of the Nobel Prize for computing. His influence helped establish what China calls the Global AI Governance Initiative, which was introduced by Mr. Xi in 2023 and included a call to always keep A.I. under human control. Last year, the government also called for the enhancement of A.I. governance “on the basis of human decision-making and supervision.”" [1]

Open source and much less expensive Chinese AI is eagerly taken up by global South. This is a good starting position for the Chinese AI and the Chinese AI regulation to dominate the world. Investment in learning to use Chinese artificial intelligence will pay off the most

1. DeepSeek Is a Win for China in the A.I. Race.  Pierson, David; Berry, Wang.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Feb 2, 2025.

 

Šiandien prasidėjo nauja era



Ateityje žinosime, kaip ją pavadinti. Vakar baigėsi globalizacijos era. JAV įvedė visuotinius muitus, didžiajai JAV užsienio prekybos daliai – Kanadai, Kinijai ir Meksikai.

Iš tikrųjų globalizacijos era turėtų būti pavadinta „empatinio“ feodalizmo era. „Empatinio“, nes apsimetėme, kad darome viską, kas gera, visiems vargstantiems žmonėms Žemės paviršiuje. Mes apsimetėme, kad darome viską, kad kinai būtų turtingi ir demokratiški. Taip neatsitiko. Mes apsimetėme, kad mums rūpi kinai, juodaodžiai, imigrantai ir kitos, mažesnės, grupės. Mes juos tiesiog išnaudojome realybėje. Išnaudodami pigią darbo jėgą, sukūrėme klasę šiandieninių karalių ir princų, gyvenančių uždarose bendruomenėse, kupinų netikros empatijos. Mūsų pačių vidurinė klasė ir vargšai liko dulkėse. Vyrai liko be padoraus darbo. Moterys liko be padorių, gerai uždirbančių, vyrų ir, dėl to, be vaikų.

Nuo šiandien tarifai yra neišvengiami niekur [1]. Taigi jie verčia tuos blizgančius naujus karalius ir princus dalytis su mumis jų lobiais. Tarifai pateks į mūsų valstybės kasą. Iš ten gauname pensijas ir medicininę priežiūrą. Kai kurios darbo vietos grįš į Vakarus. Apsisaugosime nuo imigrantų organizuojamo mūsų sistemos užtvindymo. Mūsų atlyginimai didės. Mūsų šeimos atsigaus. Švęskime naują erą.

1. ES valdantys senyvi ponai ir ponios to dar nesupranta. Todėl jie ir jos primena stručius, sukišusius galvas į smėlį ir iškėlusius privačias jų kūnų dalis viso pasaulio pajuokai.  Aukščiausiasis mus nubaudė ir davė mums ES.