The Great Damage to the West Left by Mr. Biden: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have united to defy Western sanctions

"An axis uniting China, Russia, Iran and North Korea -- dubbed Crink by some Western officials -- has emerged from the conflict in Ukraine, a loose alliance united by a mutual disdain for the U.S.-led world order.

That coalition's cooperation steadily has deepened as the four have exchanged food, oil, arms, diplomatic support and military assistance in a manner designed to remain beyond the reach of Western sanctions.

Now, President Trump's determination to end the conflict creates a moment of truth for the entente. If he brokers a cease-fire, the bonds between the four could loosen.

But a failure to do so -- along with greater U.S. pressure on Iran and China -- could unintentionally deepen it, says John Park, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, who focuses on Indo-Pacific security and economic statecraft.

Cooperation between the four nations isn't new. Russia and Iran allied to support the Assad regime in Syria, while China has long been North Korea's main patron, and the relationship between Beijing and Moscow has been deepening for years.

But the conflict multiplied those ties and helped knit the quartet together. The four are "promoting alternative systems to compete with the United States, primarily in trade, finance and security," according to a recent assessment by U.S. spy agencies.

Russia's need to fuel its conflict effort has put Moscow at the center of the entente. It has turned to Chinese companies for goods critical for making the arms it needs in Ukraine.

North Korea -- itself long under international sanctions -- has sent huge quantities of munitions, as well as more than 12,000 soldiers to help Russia. Ukraine said last month that half of Russia's ammunition now comes from North Korea. That support has helped Russia largely expel Ukrainian troops from its Kursk region. Lately, Pyongyang has engaged diplomatically with Moscow more than it has with Beijing.

Iran has provided Russia with drone expertise, giving it a critical boost in a conflict dominated by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Tehran has sent Shahed drones as well as blueprints and technical assistance for Russia to increase its own drone manufacturing.

Military cooperation has gone hand-in-hand with economic ties. Shut out by the West, Russia has redirected much of its energy exports to China, while Beijing -- which doesn't support the U.S.-led sanctions against Moscow -- has in turn stepped up exports of consumer goods that Russia no longer receives from the West.

As their economies draw closer, China and Russia have increasingly used their own currencies for their trade, shunning the U.S. dollar. That makes them less vulnerable to sanctions, while feeding both nations' ambitions to boost their currencies' influence in world trade.

In return for military support, Russia has allowed in thousands of North Korean workers, who earn valuable hard currency that is sent back to the regime.

Moscow has sent technicians to support Pyongyang's spy-satellite program, South Korean officials said. Russia has also boosted oil shipments to North Korea.

As the world's second-largest economy, China provides the economic ballast for the quartet, making it the indispensable partner for the entente. As a net importer of energy, China is a major market for Iranian and Russian energy. About 90% of Iranian oil goes to China.

China represents more than 98% of North Korea's official trade with the outside world, giving it great leverage over Pyongyang.

"Without China, the coalition is anemic," said Christopher S. Chivvis, a former U.S. national intelligence officer for Europe, now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

An end to the conflict in Ukraine could drain the partnership of its staying power. Russia could try to mend relations with Europe, which would loosen its reliance on China.

China -- which is integrated in the global trading system in a way that the other three aren't -- may decide that supporting the axis isn't worth jeopardizing its relations with the West.

If Moscow backs away from cease-fire talks, Trump has threatened more sanctions and tariffs on Russia.

Washington has also renewed its "maximum pressure" campaign on Tehran, threatening military action if Iran doesn't rein in its nuclear program. U.S.-China relations are also tense.

Trump this past week further increased tariffs on imports from China -- lifting the average rate to around 70%, according to economists.

If left unchecked, the nexus between Russia and North Korea, which both possess nuclear arms, and Iran, which is nearly able to produce an atomic bomb, could prove a serious threat to the West, said Chivvis.

"What we want to avoid is the deepening scenario, where they do actually build on the cooperation that we have seen over the last couple of years," he said.” [1]

1.  World News: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have united to defy Western sanctions. Martin, Timothy W; Li, Ming; Ruiz, Roque.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 05 Apr 2025: A12.  

Trumpo šoko teorijos

 „Yra dvi susijusios teorijos, ką Donaldo Trumpo dramatiška pasaulinės prekybos sistemos peržiūra turi pasiekti.

 

 Pirma, tikslas yra atgaivinti Amerikos gamybą, mūsų pajėgumą kurti namuose ir eksportuoti į pasaulį. Pasaulinė laisvosios prekybos sistema, susiformavusi XX amžiaus pabaigoje, tarnavo Amerikos imperijai ir Amerikos G.D.P. bet ankstesnio Amerikos, kaip gamybos galiūnės, vaidmens sąskaita ir sąskaita to, kad darbo vietos gamyboje buvo toks svarbus vyrų užimtumo šaltinis, todėl darbininkų klasės socialinės struktūros sąskaita.

 

 Tuo tarpu ilgainiui mūsų gamybinė bazė ne tik persikėlė į užsienį, bet ir persikėlė į didžiausios mūsų varžovės – Kinijos Liaudies Respublikos – teritoriją. Taigi, pramonės atstatymas Amerikoje turi du potencialius privalumus, net jei dėl to paaukoti kai kurie pasaulinės prekybos siūlomi veiksmingi reiškiniai. Gamykliniai darbai užpildo tam tikrą socialinę ir ekonominę nišą, kurią užpildė narkotikai, nuosmukis, neviltis. O turėti tikrą gamybinę bazę labai svarbu, jei būsime užrakinti didelėje galios konkurencijoje ateinančius dešimtmečius.

 

 Tačiau pagal šią teoriją atrodytų, kad tarifai būtų efektyviausiai taikomi Kinijai, šalims, esančioms Kinijos artimiausioje ekonominėje orbitoje, ir besivystančioms šalims, kurios yra natūralios išorės paslaugų zonos. Tačiau Trumpo administracija juos panaudojo apskritai prieš lygiavertes ekonomiką ir sąjungininkus.

 

Politika atrodo daug platesnė, nei tikslas, galima žala tiek augimui, tiek pagrindinei tarptautinei bendruomenei atrodo per didelė, kad būtų galima pateisinti kilimą.

 

 Čia atsiranda antrasis argumentas – kad ši politika yra susijusi su fiskaliniu deficitu, o ne tik su prekybos ir gamybos deficitu. Ta pati pasaulinė sistema, kuri pavertė Ameriką grynąja importuotoja, taip pat leido mums skolintis milžiniškas sumas, bet mes pasiekiame tašką, kai toks skolinimasis negali būti tvarus, kai skolos palūkanų normos sutriuškins mūsų politikos formavimo pajėgumus, net jei apskritai nebus nukrypstama nuo dolerio.

 

 Čia tarifai tarnauja keliems tikslams. Paprasčiausiai jie uždirba pajamas, nesudarant tokio didelio sandorio dėl pensininkų sveikatos draudimo Medicare ir mokesčių, sandorio, kurio atveju abi pagrindinės JAV partijos yra per daug susikirtusios. (Vienintelis būdas, kuriuo respublikonų prezidentas gali vadovauti mokesčių didinimui, yra juos įgyvendinti vienašališkai, tuo pačiu reikalaujant, kad juos daugiausia mokėtų užsieniečiai.)

 

 Antra, net jei jie mažina augimą, jie taip pat skatina iždo vekselių saugumą, o tai sumažina vyriausybės skolos palūkanų normą (kas jau vyksta).

 

 Galiausiai, prekybos karas sukuria galimybę plačiau peržiūrėti pasaulinę ekonominę sistemą, kai kitos šalys sutinka iš naujo derėtis dėl JAV skolos sąlygų mainais į palankesnes prekybos sąlygas. (Dažnai minimas pirmtakas yra „Niksono šokas“, Richardo Niksono sprendimas 1971 m. padaryti galą Breton Vudso finansų sistemoje ir sukurti naują finansinę tvarką.)

 

 Šios programos versiją galite rasti 2024 m. pabaigos dokumente „Pasaulinės prekybos sistemos restruktūrizavimo naudotojo vadovas“, kurį sukūrė ekonomistas Stephenas Miranas, kuris dabar neatsitiktinai vadovauja Donaldo Trumpo ekonomikos patarėjų tarybai. Akivaizdu, kad Mirano argumentai nėra ilgalaikio Trumpo susižavėjimo tarifais šaltinis, tačiau jie yra naudingas planas, padedantis suprasti, ką, prezidentą supantys, žmonės mano, kad jie daro taikydami trumpizmą praktikoje.

 

 Dabar apie mano požiūrį. Manau, kad bandymas atkurti tam tikrą gamybą ir atsieti daugiau nuo Kinijos yra prasmingas nacionalinio saugumo požiūriu, net jei tai kažkiek kainuoja G.D.P. ir akcijų rinkai. Naudoti pajamas iš tokio riboto, į Kiniją orientuoto tarifų režimo deficitui sumažinti atrodo visiškai pagrįsta.

 

 Esu skeptiškesnis, kad toks perkėlimas palengvins konkrečias vyrų socialines problemas, nes automatizavimas taip pakeitė pramonės šakas, kad įtariu, kad pirmiausia reikėtų kažkokio socialinio atkūrimo, kad dabartiniai milijonai vyrų, netekusių darbo vietų, būtų labiau įdarbinami.

 

 Ir aš labai skeptiškai žiūriu į bet kokį planą, kuriame prevencinis pasaulinis sutrikimas laikomas raktu, siekiant išvengti deficito krizės. „Sukurkite krizę dabar, kol mūsų padėtis dar tik silpnėja“ - turi prastų rezultatų tikruose karuose – nemanau, kad prekybos karai būtinai skiriasi.

 

 „Niksono šokas“ buvo priverstinas jo buvimo prezidento poste metu tiek, kiek šis šokas nebuvo priverstinas Trumpui – ir prireikė labai sunkaus dešimtmečio, o ne tik kelių sunkių mėnesių, kol JAV ekonomika vėl pradėjo aiškiai kilti. Esant dabartinei aplinkai, labai mažai tikėtina, kad Trumpo prezidentavimas, sukeliantis recesiją ar stagfliaciją, turės įpėdinį, kuris trokštų įgyvendinti Trumpo prekybos politiką. O tuo tarpu Kinija yra pasirengusi priimti tautas, kurios mieliau kovoja prieš mus, o ne susitaria su mumis.

 

 Panašu, kad Miranas savo svarbiame dokumente iš dalies sutiko su mano nepasitenkinimu krize, teigdamas, kad bet kokia plataus masto tarifų sistema turi būti įdiegta laipsniškai, siekiant „sumažinti bet kokias neigiamas pasekmes“ ir galimą „tokios sistemos poveikį pasaulinėms rinkoms“.

 

 Tačiau respublikonų administracija, kaip ir anksčiau, pasirinko šoką ir baimę. Tikiuosi, kad šis lošimas turės geresnę pabaigą." [1]

 

Amerikiečių taip vadinami "draugai" yra tikrai blogesni, negu priešai. Jie visą laiką bando įpainioti JAV į branduolinį karą. Ryškiausias pavyzdys yra Prancūzijos prezidentas Macronas, visą laiką visiems grąsinantis jo suplyšusiu branduoliniu skėčiu, reikalaujantis, kad amerikiečiai jį pridengtų, jei jis lieps prancūzams pradėti šaudyti į rusus. Kinai iš juoko virsta iš klumpių, matydami tokį amerikiečių "draugą". 

1.  The Theories Behind the Trump Shock: Ross Douthat.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 5, 2025.

The Theories Behind the Trump Shock

"There are two related theories of what Donald Trump’s dramatic revision of the global trade system is intended to accomplish.

First, the goal is to revitalize American manufacturing, our capacity to build at home and export to the world. The global free trade system that took shape in the late 20th century served the American empire and American G.D.P. but at the expense of America’s earlier role as a manufacturing powerhouse — and because manufacturing jobs were such an important source of blue-collar male employment, at the expense of the working-class social fabric.

Meanwhile, over time, our manufacturing base didn’t just move overseas, it moved into the territory of our greatest rival, the People’s Republic of China. So rebuilding industry in America has two potential benefits even if it sacrifices some of the efficiencies offered by global trade. Factory jobs fill a particular socioeconomic niche that’s been filled instead by drugs, decline, despair. And having a real manufacturing base is essential if we’re going to be locked into great power competition for decades to come.

Under this theory, though, it would seem like tariffs would be most effectively deployed against China, countries in China’s immediate economic orbit, and developing countries that are natural zones for outsourcing. But the Trump administration has deployed them generally, against peer economies and allies. The policy seems much more sweeping than the goal, the potential damage to both growth and basic international comity too large to justify the upside.

Which is where the second argument comes in — that this policy is about fiscal deficits, not just trade deficits and manufacturing. The same global system that made America a net importer also enabled us to borrow immense sums, but we are reaching the point where that borrowing cannot be sustained, where interest rates on the debt will crush our policymaking capacities even if there isn’t an overall flight from the dollar.

Here tariffs serve several purposes. Most straightforwardly they generate revenue without striking the kind of grand bargain on Medicare and taxes that the two parties are just too polarized to make. (The only way a Republican president can preside over tax increases is to implement them unilaterally while insisting that they will fall mostly on foreigners.)

Secondarily, if they reduce growth, they also encourage a flight to safety in Treasury bills, which reduces the interest rate on government debt (something that’s happening already).

Finally, the trade war creates an opportunity for a larger revision of the global economic system, in which other countries agree to renegotiate the terms of U.S. debt in exchange for more favorable trading terms. (The often-invoked antecedent is the “Nixon Shock,” Richard Nixon’s decision to put an end to the Bretton Woods financial system in 1971 and forge a new financial order.)

You can find a version of this program in a paper from late 2024, “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System,” by the economist Stephen Miran, who not coincidentally now chairs Donald Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers. Miran’s arguments are not the source of Trump’s longstanding tariff fascination, obviously — but they are a useful road map to understanding what the people around the president think they’re doing by putting Trumpism into practice.

Now for my own view. I think trying to reshore some manufacturing and decouple more from China makes sense from a national security standpoint, even if it costs something to G.D.P. and the stock market. Using revenue from such a limited, China-focused tariff regime to pay down the deficit seems entirely reasonable.

I am more skeptical that such reshoring will alleviate specific male blue-collar social ills, because automation has changed the industries so much that I suspect you would need some sort of social restoration first to make the current millions of male work force dropouts more employable.

And I am extremely skeptical of any plan that treats pre-emptive global disruption as the key to avoiding a deficit crisis down the road. The “instigate a crisis now before our position weakens” has a poor track record in real wars — I don’t think trade wars are necessarily different.

The “Nixon shock” was forced upon his presidency to a degree that this shock is not being forced on Trump — and it took a very difficult decade, not just a difficult few months, before the U.S. economy began to clearly rise again. In the current environment, a Trump presidency that produces recession or stagflation is very unlikely to have a successor eager to see Trump’s trade policy through. And meanwhile China stands ready to welcome nations that prefer to bandwagon against us rather than coming to terms.

Miran, in his crucial paper, seemed to partially agree with my aversion to crisis, suggesting that any sweeping tariff system be phased in gradually, with steps to “mitigate any adverse consequences” and potential “impacts of such a system on global markets.”

But the choice has been made, as once before by a Republican administration, for shock and awe instead. I hope this gamble has a better end." [1]

The Americans' so-called "friends" are actually worse than their enemies. They are constantly trying to drag the US into a nuclear war. The most striking example is French President Macron, who is constantly threatening everyone with his broken nuclear umbrella, demanding that the Americans cover him if he orders the French to start shooting at the Russians. The Chinese are rolling with laughter at the sight of such an American "friend."

1.  The Theories Behind the Trump Shock: Ross Douthat.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 5, 2025.