Can't Beat an Insurgency Without Intelligence

"Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster has solid credentials as a military thinker and leader at the operational level of war, and he is perfectly correct in writing that political leaders can best reward patriots who fight for the country by ensuring that the outcome is a victory, not a defeat ("Honor Veterans by Having the Will to Win a War," op-ed, Nov. 11).

But I fear that Mr. McMaster errs irremediably in his tacit premise that the U.S. armed forces, as they now exist, can win wars such as the one recently lost in Afghanistan. I refer to wars against insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists or bandits, indistinguishable from the local population at large, who do not require military equipment too large to be concealed.

 

The U.S. armed forces perform very well against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable mass formations or enemies that rely on high-contrast airfields, military bases, battle tanks, warships, etc. Conversely, the U.S. cannot fight low-contrast enemies who cannot be spotted and targeted remotely. To do that, human intelligence is needed: CIA or other field officers who speak local languages well enough to pass, can physically blend in, identify insurgents, uncover their gatherings and direct attacks on them.

 

Such people exist in the movies. In real life, U.S. intelligence officers -- unlike their relevant foreign counterparts -- simply refuse to learn foreign languages and are not compelled to do so by their superiors. They also insist on remaining very safely "under official cover" within U.S. diplomatic missions or military installations. Most CIA officers don't even do that, remaining in the agency's vast stateside facilities. It is not for them to live like a local in Tehran or undercover in Beijing. That is for those other intelligence services that get by on 1% of the CIA's budget or less.

 

Without people on the ground, the U.S. cannot defeat insurgents. With Afghanistan, the entire edifice of "counterinsurgency warfare" has now been exposed as a nullity. The CIA failed even to report that the Afghan "army" was nothing but a form of outdoor relief, operated by racketeers in the guise of Afghan officials, right up to the presidential level. U.S. generals had testified that it was imperative to continue spending $3 billion a year in Afghanistan on U.S. trainers alone. They were not contradicted by U.S. intelligence on the ground because there was none." [1]

Lithuanian officials also participated in the waste of money in Afghanistan. Lithuanian intelligence did not exist there either, although the Russians taught us how to conduct intelligence among the locals. It is unwise for us to conflict with the Arabs, the Belorussians and the Russians, with an intelligence that has proved zero efficiency over the years in Afghanistan. 

1. Can't Beat an Insurgency Without Intelligence
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 15 Nov 2021: A.18.