The Geopolitics Of Lying

"A Measure Short of War

By Jill Kastner and William C. Wohlforth

Oxford, 304 pages, $29.99

It is not only politics that may be seen as war by other means. For centuries, governments have sought to demoralize and defeat their enemies without resorting to the battlefield.

In "A Measure Short of War," Jill Kastner and William Wohlforth give a well-researched account of the many ways in which nation-states have conducted information warfare aimed at "subversion" -- with lessons for democracies in our current, war-raging moment.

Ms. Kastner and Mr. Wohlforth -- an independent London-based scholar and a professor of government at Dartmouth, respectively -- distinguish subversion from other forms of covert action, such as sabotage and espionage. Subversion, they say, aims at "undermining accepted authority" in a rival state by reaching into its domestic politics and weakening it or causing it to alter its policies.

In different forms, subversion has long been a tool of statecraft and power competition. Under Louis XIV, the authors note, France spread "propaganda and disinformation" in Habsburg lands. In the 1870s, Otto von Bismarck -- worried that France would reconstitute itself as a monarchy after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War -- "engineered crises" to "spook French elites and citizens into believing that a monarchy in France meant war with Germany."

It's the advent of totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany and (one would argue) Communist China in the 20th century that raised the art of disrupting rival political systems to a dangerous new level. Governments adept at imposing the Big Lie on their own populations will hardly be averse to trying a similar sort of deception on the populations of other states.

Their ideological descendants play an outsize role in "A Measure Short of War," in part to show how America and other democracies have been slow to grasp the ways in which totalitarians take "active measures" (as they call them) against democratic legitimacy and governance.

The U.S. tried its own version of active measures during the Cold War, with the CIA working to manipulate the electoral defeats of Communist parties in France and Italy in the late 1940s. But America's biggest success at information warfare proved to be Radio Free Europe, though hardly a covert operation. The authors point out that RFE and its Soviet-focused partner, Radio Liberty, "came to be classed among the most effective elements of U.S. psychological warfare in the history of the Cold War." Even so, they acted more as a means of harassing the Soviets and their allied regimes -- by providing reliable news and information -- than actively shaping public opinion behind the Iron Curtain.

In fact, Americans were rank amateurs compared with the Soviets. In the mid-1960s, the Soviets launched a campaign -- using planted stories and forged letters -- aimed at convincing black Americans that Martin Luther King Jr. was a puppet of the U.S. government. The Soviets believed, as Ms. Kastner and Mr. Wohlforth explain, that the civil-rights movement had the potential to become more radical and deemed King not radical enough: a leader to be deposed.

The Soviets also supported the nuclear-freeze movement in the early 1980s and, a few years later, spread a rumor that the CIA had created the AIDS virus as part of a biowarfare program. The parallels of that effort with the recent efforts of the Chinese to present Covid-19 as a U.S. Army plot are striking -- and ironic, given that the evidence strongly suggests Covid to be itself a Chinese lab creation.

Strangely, the authors have little to say about China. They make no mention of China's meddling in the 1996 U.S. presidential contest, when operatives Charlie Trie and Johnny Chung helped supply money to the Clinton-Gore campaign. Nor do they mention the strong possibility of China using TikTok as a social-media vehicle for manipulating political and cultural perceptions among its roughly 150 million American users.

One wishes that Ms. Kastner and Mr. Wohlforth had discussed how advanced technologies like artificial intelligence, and large-scale quantum computers, may well increase the subversion threat through "deepfakes" and other forms of state-organized deception. All the same, "A Measure Short of War" is a valuable reminder that subversion is an inevitable part of geopolitics, where all's fair even (or especially) short of war.

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Mr. Herman is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of "1917: Lenin, Wilson, and the Birth of the New World Disorder."" [1]

1. The Geopolitics Of Lying. Herman, Arthur.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 Jan 2025: A15. 

Kodėl Vakarai pralaimi konkurencijoje su „Huawei“ ir kitomis Kinijos technologijų įmonėmis?

 

 „Huawei namai

 

 Parašė Eva Dou

 

 Portfelis, 448 puslapiai, 34 doleriai

 

 2000 m. kovo mėn. kalboje prezidentas Billas Clintonas pasveikino neišvengiamą Kinijos įstojimą į Pasaulio prekybos organizaciją. P. Clintonas buvo ypač sužavėtas Pekino pažadu atverti savo telekomunikacijų rinką užsieniečiams – tai pagrindinis Amerikos reikalavimas PPO derybose. „Naujame amžiuje, – entuziastingai džiaugėsi prezidentas, – laisvė plis mobiliuoju telefonu ir kabeliniu modemu."

 

 Tai buvo aukščiausio lygio noras. Vėlesniais metais „Huawei“, pirmaujanti Kinijos telekomunikacijų įrangos įmonė, sukūrė įrankius, kurie pavertė Liaudies Respubliką pažangiausia pasaulyje stebėjimo valstybe.

 

 „Huawei“ technologijų pažanga ir sparčiai augantys pardavimai užsienyje taip pat kėlė grėsmę Amerikos technologijų viršenybei ir pasaulinei įtakai.

 

 „House of Huawei“ Eva Dou pateikia išsamų ir pamokantį pasakojimą apie įmonės greitą kilimą tapti „galingiausia Kinijos įmone“.

 

 1987 m. Šendženo mieste įkurtą Reno Zhengfei, buvusio Liaudies išlaisvinimo armijos inžinieriaus, „Huawei“ pradėjo rinkti analoginius telefono jungiklius, nukopijuotus iš kito vietinio gamintojo, kaip pasakoja ponia Dou. Kai įmonė pradėjo kurti sudėtingus skaitmeninius jungiklius, vienas Vakarų vadovas pasakė, kad atrodo, kad ji nukopijavo AT&T jungiklį. Vėliau, kaip primena ponia Dou, „Cisco“ ieškinyje pareiškė, kad tam tikros jos maršrutizatorių šaltinio kodo klaidos buvo atkartotos pačios „Huawei“ maršrutizatoriuose. Pakeitus tam tikrą kodą, ieškinys buvo numestas į šalį.

 

 Ne tai, kad „Huawei“ veikla atbaidė Vakarų įmones, trokštančias Kinijos verslo. Dešimtojo dešimtmečio pradžioje Motorola įtraukė Huawei į savo prioritetinių klientų sąrašą. IBM teikė Huawei konsultavimo paslaugas daugiau nei dešimtmetį. Tuo tarpu „Huawei“ įdarbino Vakarų politikos elitą, kad padėtų savo reikalui. Adm. Billas Owensas, buvęs Jungtinio štabo viršininkų vicepirmininkas, atstovavo „Huawei“ 2010 m. siūlant „Sprint“ sutartį. „Huawei“ tapo viena didžiausių lobizmo išlaidų visame pasaulyje šaltiniu. Ji taip pat suviliojo pirmaujančius universitetus, bendradarbiaudama su Oksfordo, Stanfordo ir Kalifornijos Berklio universitetu ir kt.

 

 Kinijos valstybė suvaidino pagrindinį vaidmenį, augant „Huawei“ sėkmei. 2000 m. „Far Eastern Economic Review“ paskelbė straipsnį, kuriame teigiama, kad „Huawei“ atsirado, kaip „karinė įmonė“. Straipsnis pradžioje aprašomas reporterio apsilankymas „Huawei“ būstinėje, kurio metu, kaip rašo ponia Dou, „jis pamatė kelias kambario dydžio perjungimo sistemas, laukiančias pristatymo – su siuntimo etiketėmis, kuriose buvo rašoma, kad jos vyksta į Liaudies Išlaisvinimo Armiją“. Tuo metu bendrovė neigė bet kokius ryšius su Kinijos vyriausybe ar karine organizacija.

 

 Akivaizdu, kad savo istorijos pradžioje Huawei buvo išrinktas nacionaline čempione, kuriant savadarbius telekomunikacijų įrenginius. Tai buvo strateginis prioritetas, kaip puikiai įrodo ponia Dou. Kaip sakė pats J. Renas: „Šalis be savo programomis valdomų jungiklių yra, kaip be kariuomenės“. 1994 m. ponas Ren dažnai susitikdavo su pagrindiniais politinio biuro nariais, įskaitant Komunistų partijos generalinį sekretorių Jiang Zemin. 1996 m. lapkritį apsilankęs įmonėje vicepremjeras Wu Bangguo pažadėjo „Huawei“ skirti lėšų savo mobiliųjų telefonų technologijai sukurti. Wu vėliau gyrė firmą už „Vakarų kompanijų monopolio sulaužymą“. 2007 m. bendrovės vidiniam komunistų partijos komitetui buvo suteikta veto teisė, skiriant vadovus. Ponia Dou pažymi, kad buvusi pirmininkė Sun Yafang, kaip manoma, dirbo Valstybės saugumo ministerijoje.

 

 Sparčią „Huawei“ plėtrą užsienyje lėmė ne tik konkurencinga įrangos kaina, bet ir pigių kreditų suteikimas klientams. Toks pardavėjų finansavimas nebūtų buvęs įmanomas be Kinijos valstybės kontroliuojamų bankų paramos. 2005 m. Kinijos plėtros bankas Huawei plėtrai užsienyje skyrė 10 mlrd. dolerių. Nors paskolos suteikė morką, buvo ir pagaliukas. Kai Kenijos mobiliojo ryšio bendrovė „Safaricom“ siekė nutraukti sutartį su „Huawei“ dėl pavėluoto pristatymo, jos vadovui buvo pranešta, kad Kinijos užsienio pagalbai šaliai iškilo pavojus. Sutartis tęsėsi.

 

 Pasak „Washington Post“ reporterės M. Dou, ponas Renas „Huawei“ įdiegė „vilko kultūrą“, reikalaudamas iš savo darbuotojų nepaprastų aukų. Tyrėjai dirbdavo naktį ir dieną, kai kurie sirgdavo nuo išsekimo. Arabų pavasario metu, pradedant 2011–2012 m., „Huawei“ vadovai liko Libijoje, kai pabėgo kitų užsienio telekomunikacijų tiekėjų darbuotojai.

 

 Ponas Renas pasiūlė greitai paaukštinti darbuotojus, kurie dirbo neramioje Sindziango provincijoje, kur „Huawei“ įranga buvo naudojama, siekiant nuolat stebėti engiamus ir maištingus uigūrų gyventojus.

 

 Agresyvi Huawei kultūra galiausiai sukėlė nemalonumų su Amerikos valdžia. Buvo nustatyta, kad įmonė naudojo fiktyviąsias įmones, tiekdama telekomunikacijų įrangą Šiaurės Korėjai ir Iranui. P. Ren dukters Meng Wanzhou, kuri buvo (ir tebėra) taip pat Huawei vyriausioji finansų pareigūnė, pavardė buvo įtraukta, į Iraną tiekiančios, fiktyvios bendrovės direktorių sąrašą. 2018 m. gruodį p. Meng buvo sulaikyta Vankuverio (Kanada) oro uoste pagal amerikiečių ekstradicijos prašymą dėl sukčiavimo ir sąmokslo sukčiauti. Prasidėjo ilgus metus trukęs teisinis mūšis, pasibaigęs susitarimu, leidusiu jai grįžti į Kiniją.

 

 „Huawei namai“ yra nedaug novatoriškų apreiškimų, tačiau ji yra gerai parašyta ir informatyvi. Tikriausiai, nėra geresnio paaiškinimo apie Kinijos kilimą į ekonominį dominavimą, žiūrint per vienos įmonės prizmę. Neišvengiamai pasakojimas dažnai skaitomas, kaip įspėjamasis pasakojimas.

 

 Amerikiečiai ėmėsi iniciatyvos pašalinti „Huawei“ iš savo telekomunikacijų tinklų dėl to, kad jos įranga gali būti „užpakalinės durys“ Kinijos valstybei. Laikui bėgant, keli JAV sąjungininkai pasekė pavyzdžiu. Bideno administracija siekė sumažinti pažangių lustų ir lustų gamybos įrangos tiekimą Kinijai. Tačiau iki tol „Huawei“ sukūrė savo pažangius 5G puslaidininkius ir išmaniųjų telefonų procesorius. Neaišku, ar sankcijos netrukdys įmonės augimui ateityje. Iš M. Dou pasakojimo aišku, kad „Huawei“ kilimas yra tiek pat vakarietiškos trumparegystės, tiek kinų išradingumo ir korupcijos rezultatas.

 ---

  Ponas Chancelloras yra neseniai knygos „Laiko kaina: tikroji įdomių dalykų istorija“ 

 

1.  The Path To Dominance. Chancellor, Edward.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 15 Jan 2025: A15.

Why is the West losing the competition with Huawei and other Chinese technology companies?

"House of Huawei

By Eva Dou

Portfolio, 448 pages, $34

In a speech in March 2000, President Bill Clinton hailed China's imminent entry into the World Trade Organization. Mr. Clinton was particularly excited about Beijing's promise to open up its telecom market to foreigners, a key American demand in the WTO negotiations. "In the new century," the president enthused, "liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem."

This was wishful thinking of the highest order. Over the following years, Huawei, China's leading telecom-equipment company, developed the tools that transformed the People's Republic into the world's most advanced surveillance state. 

Huawei's technological advances and rapidly expanding foreign sales also threatened America's tech supremacy and global influence. 

In "House of Huawei," Eva Dou provides a comprehensive and instructive account of the firm's rapid ascent to become "China's most powerful company."

Founded in the city of Shenzhen in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a former engineer with the People's Liberation Army, Huawei started out assembling analog telephone switches copied from another domestic manufacturer, as Ms. Dou relates. When the firm launched into sophisticated digital switches, one Western executive said that it appeared to have copied an AT&T switch. Later, as Ms. Dou reminds us, Cisco claimed in a lawsuit that certain bugs in the source code for its routers were replicated in Huawei's own routers. The suit was dropped after certain code was changed.

Not that Huawei's activities put off Western firms eager for Chinese business. In the early 1990s, Motorola placed Huawei on its priority customer list. IBM provided Huawei with consultancy services for more than a decade. Meanwhile, Huawei enlisted Western policy elites to advance its cause. Adm. Bill Owens, a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented Huawei in its 2010 bid for a Sprint contract. Huawei became one of the top lobbying spenders around the world. It also wooed leading universities, partnering with Oxford, Stanford and the University of California, Berkeley, among others.

The Chinese state played a key role in Huawei's success. In 2000 the Far Eastern Economic Review ran an article asserting that Huawei had originated as a "military-backed company." The article opened with a description of the reporter's visit to Huawei's headquarters, during which, as Ms. Dou writes, "he saw several room-sized switching systems waiting to be shipped -- with shipping labels that said they were headed for the People's Liberation Army." At the time, the company denied any connection to any government or military organization in China.

It's clear that early in its history Huawei was selected as a national champion for the development of homemade telecom gear. This was a strategic priority, as Ms. Dou thoroughly demonstrates. As Mr. Ren himself put it: "A country without its own program-controlled switches is like one without an army." Mr. Ren had frequent meetings with leading politburo members, including Jiang Zemin, the Communist Party's general secretary, in 1994. On a company visit in November 1996, Vice Premier Wu Bangguo promised funds for Huawei to develop its own mobile-phone technology. Wu later praised the firm for "breaking the monopoly of Western companies." In 2007 the company's internal Communist Party committee was given veto power over executive appointments. Ms. Dou notes that a former chairwoman, Sun Yafang, is believed to have worked for the Ministry of State Security.

Huawei's rapid overseas expansion was driven not just by the competitive pricing of its gear but also by the provision of cheap credit to customers. Such vendor-financing wouldn't have been possible without the support of China's state-controlled banks. In 2005 the China Development Bank allocated $10 billion for Huawei's overseas expansion, a sum equivalent to twice the firm's annual revenue at the time. While loans provided a carrot, there was also a stick. When Kenya's mobile-network company Safaricom sought to cancel a contract with Huawei because of late delivery, its chief executive was told that Chinese foreign assistance to the country was at risk. The contract went ahead.

According to Ms. Dou, a reporter at the Washington Post, Mr. Ren installed a "wolf culture" in Huawei, demanding extraordinary sacrifices from his employees. Researchers would work night and day, some becoming sick with exhaustion. During the Arab Spring, beginning in 2011-12, Huawei executives stayed on in Libya when the employees of other foreign telecoms suppliers fled. 

Mr. Ren offered rapid promotion for staff members who worked in the troubled province of Xinjiang, where Huawei's equipment was used to keep the oppressed and rebellious Uyghur population under constant surveillance.

Huawei's aggressive culture eventually landed it in trouble with the American authorities. The firm was discovered to have used shell companies to provide telecom equipment to North Korea and Iran. The name of Mr. Ren's daughter Meng Wanzhou, who was (and still is) also Huawei's chief financial officer, appeared on a list of directors of the shell company supplying Iran. In December 2018, Ms. Meng was detained at the airport in Vancouver, Canada, on an American extradition request for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. A yearslong legal battle ensued, ending in an agreement that allowed her to return to China.

"House of Huawei" contains few groundbreaking revelations, but it is well-written and informative. There's probably no better account of China's rise to economic dominance as seen through the prism of a single company. Inevitably, the narrative often reads like a cautionary tale.

The Americans took the lead in excluding Huawei from its telecoms networks on the grounds that its equipment might provide a "back door" for access by the Chinese state. Over time, several U.S. allies followed suit. The Biden administration sought to cut the supply of advanced chips and chip-making equipment to China. By then, however, Huawei had developed its own advanced 5G semiconductors and smartphone processors. It is uncertain whether sanctions will impede the firm's future growth. What is clear from Ms. Dou's account is that Huawei's ascent is as much the product of Western myopia as of Chinese ingenuity and graft.

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Mr. Chancellor is the author, most recently, of "The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest."" [1]

1.  The Path To Dominance. Chancellor, Edward.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 15 Jan 2025: A15.