Palestine-Induced Situation: Rich Jewish Americans Are Trying to Organize Poor Blacks and Latinx in Order to Stop Changes in American Democratic Party. --- Is the Democratic Party Facing Its Own Tea Party Moment?

The Class and Coalition Friction: Grassroots alignment between young activists, Black/Latinx organizers, and pro-Palestinian groups has strained traditional coalition structures, prompting counter-efforts by centrist and pro-Israel donor networks to retain traditional party anchors. The New York Times is a voice for them:

“A movement of young, progressive outsiders has stormed Democratic politics this year, sparking a wave of contentious primary contests across the country and fueling a fraught debate over whether these new, left-wing candidates are remaking the party in their image.

 

But as primary season winds to a close, the results reveal not only the strength but also the potential limitations of this insurgent movement.

 

In Minnesota last week, Peggy Flanagan, the lieutenant governor, won a Senate primary by a double-digit margin, pressing a fiercely progressive message to defeat a more moderate opponent. Just a week earlier, Dr. Abdul El-Sayed, a left-leaning Democrat, won a Senate primary in Michigan despite being vastly outspent. And Francesca Hong, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America, came close to winning a primary for governor in Wisconsin, falling short by less than one percentage point.

 

The results marked a new level of political strength for candidates affiliated with a resurgent, activist left, showing that their movement can be competitive in statewide primaries, well beyond deep-blue House districts.

 

Yet while a vocal group of strategists, activists and college-educated voters have raced to embrace these pugnacious, boldly liberal — and in some cases untested — candidates, some of the voters who have historically been most crucial to the party’s fortunes remain skeptical.

 

In Michigan and Wisconsin, both pivotal battleground states, the progressive candidates appeared to have struggled to sway voters who have long been the backbone of the party — including Black, more moderate and older Americans who vote reliably.

 

As left-wing candidates have notched victories in primary after primary, many progressives hope they will be able to move the Democratic Party further to the left — mirroring, in some ways, how the rise of the Tea Party movement nearly two decades ago pushed the Republican Party much further to the right.

 

But the results raise questions about whether these candidates can piece together a broad enough coalition of Democrats, independents and moderates to win general elections in swing states that could determine whether Democrats are able to regain power in Congress and, eventually, the White House.

 

“Would I put a D.S.A. member up for governor in New York or Massachusetts?” said Chris Walton, the former chairman of the Democratic Party of Milwaukee County. “Sure, we can take a chance. But it makes it harder in a state like Wisconsin, where you’re starting out at the 48-yard line and have to figure out how to get to 50.”

 

The next major tests for the left will come this fall in a smattering of battleground House districts, and as Dr. El-Sayed and Troy Jackson, a progressive former state senator in Maine, fight to win seats that Democrats need to capture control of the Senate.

 

The primary results indicate that to win, some of those nominees must not only persuade independent voters, but also shore up their own bases.

 

In Michigan, Dr. El-Sayed trailed in majority-Black townships across the state. While he was popular with younger voters, there were signs that he was weaker than his Democratic primary opponent, Representative Haley Stevens, among older voters, who vote more reliably.

 

In Wisconsin, Ms. Hong, who had been the heavy favorite in polling, lost her primary to David Crowley, the Milwaukee County executive who would be the state’s first Black governor, in a shock upset. Mr. Crowley had an edge in metro Milwaukee and in rural counties, while Ms. Hong showed strength in smaller cities and suburbs, as well as counties that are home to college towns.

 

Senator Bernie Sanders, the Vermont independent who championed progressive candidates across the country including Dr. El-Sayed and Ms. Flanagan, said he is confident that Democrats, as well as independents, will rally behind the nominees in the fall.

 

“If our candidates keep talking about the issues that are relevant to ordinary people — the issues of affordability, the issues of health care, the issues of education, housing, basic necessities of life, protecting Social Security — against Republicans who want to cut Social Security, you know what?” said Mr. Sanders. “Our guys are gonna win, and they’ll win big.”

 

But even in some of the most heavily Democratic neighborhoods in America, there are signs of fissures. In New York, Black and Latino leaders have expressed alarm over democratic socialist victories in gentrifying neighborhoods, worrying that the day-to-day concerns of longtime residents will be overlooked.

 

Representative Adriano Espaillat, a New York Democrat and chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, lost his primary earlier this summer to a far-left challenger, Darializa Avila Chevalier, a democratic socialist who had voiced support for abolishing the police, borders and prisons and seizing property from landlords.

 

In an interview, he nodded to precinct-level data showing that while his opponent did better in whiter, younger, and higher-income areas, he was strong across many older and majority-Hispanic areas.

 

“They claim to have the agenda of the working class, but that’s not what the people in those communities feel,” Mr. Espaillat said. “Those neighborhoods, I believe, are concerned about affordability, but they’re also concerned about public safety. You know, they’re also concerned about the types of issues that D.S.A. may have a different position on than they do.”

 

The growth of a new insurgent left was supercharged by the Democrats’ loss in the 2024 presidential race, which created a fresh opening for a new kind of politician who could channel Democratic anger with what they saw as a sclerotic party establishment.

 

The following year, Zohran Mamdani — fueled by an activist, progressive left that was animated by the Palestinian cause and fury toward billionaires — won a surprise victory in the New York City race for mayor, prompting a new class of Democratic candidates to embrace a similar bold vision.

 

The candidates share some unifying principles: Support for “Medicare for all,” opposition to A.I. data centers, a commitment to ending corporate money in politics and a view that opposition to American support for Israel is a moral litmus test, fueled by a belief that the Gaza war amounted to a genocide.

 

But beneath that broad platform, there are real differences among the candidates.

 

“There is a wide range of candidates who have been able to position themselves as either progressive or populist or even under the D.S.A.,” said Matt Barreto, a Democratic pollster who worked with former President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s campaign. “It’s way looser ideologically than people think.”

 

Ms. Hong, a state lawmaker, is a member of the D.S.A., which is not officially part of the Democratic Party.

 

Dr. El-Sayed, who calls himself a “capitalist,” is not a D.S.A. member, nor was he endorsed by the group. He does have a yearslong relationship with the organization, speaking at several local events during the first Trump administration.

 

And in Minnesota, Ms. Flanagan eagerly embraced progressive policies and allies like Mr. Sanders but is a lifetime member of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, the Democratic Party’s engine in the state, which endorsed her bid.

 

Ms. Flanagan, who defeated Representative Angie Craig by 20 percentage points, said she focused on organizing support in every corner of her home state.

 

“The coalition that we have built is faith, labor, young people, folks in greater Minnesota, farmers,” she said in an interview. “When you build relationships with people, even if you don’t see eye to eye on everything, I think that’s the way that we won this election.”

 

Still, despite the differences, all three races illustrated how Democratic views of what makes a candidate electable has shifted — within some limits.

 

In both Minnesota and Michigan, voters rejected an argument made by Democratic leaders that the more moderate candidates — Ms. Craig and Ms. Stevens — were better positioned to win statewide.

 

But in Wisconsin, Ms. Hong’s baggage from pandemic-era statements that she struggled to explain — including one in which she suggested canceling Thanksgiving and another describing her young biracial son as offering her “proximity to whiteness” — appeared to be too much for voters.

 

“People are less willing to trust the political class and what we think is electable,” said Lauren Hitt, a Democratic strategist who has worked for candidates across the ideological spectrum. “They’re looking for people who break the mold, but if you break the mold so much that you’re eccentric, that’s not the solution either.”

 

Charles Franklin, the director of the Marquette Law School poll in Wisconsin, said that since the rise of Mr. Mamdani, it has been “maybe easy to be caught up in just how strong democratic socialists were doing.”

 

But now, he added, “when you go to statewide races with that more heterogeneous electorate, I think you’re seeing some limits on that, even within Democratic primaries.”” [1]

 

1. Is the Democratic Party Facing Its Own Tea Party Moment? Lerer, Lisa; Glueck, Katie.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

Irano karui virstant ekonominiu mūšiu, nauja JAV strategija primena senąsias

„Jungtinės Valstijos ir Iranas yra pasirengusios viršyti terminą, kurį jos pačios sau buvo nusistačiusios derėtis dėl taikos ir Irano branduolinės programos sąlygų.

 

Birželio mėnesį prezidento Trumpo sudarytos paliaubos su Iranu numatė platesnį susitarimą, kuriuo būtų užbaigtas karas ir suvaldyta šalies branduolinė programa, visa tai būtų suderėta per 60 dienų.

 

Tačiau šis terminas, kuris turėjo baigtis pirmadienį, iš esmės buvo atmestas, o karas virto valios ir ekonominės ištvermės kova, kuriai nematyti pabaigos.

 

Nuo liepos pabaigos viešai nepranešta apie jokius JAV smūgius Irano taikiniams. Tačiau faktinis susitarimo žlugimas pabrėžia, kaip ponui Trumpui sekėsi užbaigti karą, kurį jis pradėjo vasarį kartu su Izraeliu, ir kaip toli jis tebėra nuo birželio mėnesio susitarimo ambicijų, įskaitant visišką Hormūzo sąsiaurio, svarbaus vandens kelio, kuriuo Iranas nuo pat kovų pradžios užblokavo naftos ir dujų gabenimą, atidarymą.

 

Baltuosiuose rūmuose esantys asmenys puikiai žino, kad jie viršys pirmadienio terminą ir kad konfliktas iš esmės virto ekonominio karo forma, teigia du amerikiečiai, susipažinę su derybomis.

 

Dabartinė strategija labai panaši į ankstesnius, daugelį metų trukusius JAV bandymus izoliuoti Iraną, tikintis priversti jį atsisakyti savo branduolinių ambicijų. Ši politika davė prieštaringų rezultatų, ir kai kurie analitikai skeptiškai vertina tai, kad net ir didelis ekonominis spaudimas privers Iraną pakeisti kursą. Juk būtent tokį požiūrį D. Trumpas bandė taikyti per savo pirmąją kadenciją, nors jo iždo sekretorius Scottas Bessentas praėjusią savaitę pareiškė, kad ketina skirti dar nematytas finansines baudas.

 

Birželio mėnesio susitarimo memorandumas buvo plačiai laikomas Irano palaima, suteikiančia režimui labai reikalingą sankcijų sušvelninimą, net ir tuo metu, kai derybos dėl griežtų nuolaidų, tokių kaip branduolinis sodrinimas, buvo atidėtos vėlesniam laikui. Tačiau Irano lyderiai nusprendė vėl eskaluoti, o ne įtvirtinti savo laimėjimus iš susitarimo, teigia Nate'as Swansonas, Irano ekspertas Vašingtone įsikūrusioje tyrimų grupėje „Atlantic Council“.

 

Prieš karą laivai galėjo laisvai plaukti Hormūzo sąsiauriu.

 

Prieš karą Irano tvirtinimas, kad neaiški susitarimo formuluotė šiuo klausimu suteikė jam galimybę kontroliuoti vandens kelią, lėmė susitarimą. griūva.

 

Iranas pradėjo šaudyti į laivus, kurie plaukė kanalais už Irano vandenų ribų, o Amerikos pajėgos atsakė bombarduodamos pietų Iraną, sukeldamos atakų ir kontratakų ciklą visame Artimuosiuose Rytuose.

 

Dabar Iranas atsisako atverti sąsiaurį, kol Jungtinės Valstijos neįvykdys savo įsipareigojimų pagal paliaubas, pavyzdžiui, negrąžins įšaldyto Irano turto užsienyje. Trumpo administracija nori, kad Iranas pirmiausia nutrauktų blokadą, sakė Ali Vaezas, Irano ekspertas iš Tarptautinės krizių grupės, tyrimų instituto.

 

„Nei viena pusė nėra tikrai pasirengusi sudaryti susitarimo. Abi mano, kad po kelių dienų ar savaičių kita pusė labiau norės susitarimo, todėl galės iš jo gauti daugiau naudos“, – sakė p. Vaezas. „Štai kodėl mes vėl esame įstrigę šiame ištvermės žaidime.“

 

Šeštadienį Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų valstybinė naftos bendrovė paskelbė, kad dar vienas jos laivas buvo užpultas vandens kelyje. Bendrovė nenurodė, kas už tai atsakingas, tačiau anksčiau dėl išpuolių prieš jos laivus kaltino Iraną.

 

Sąsiaurio atidarymas vis labiau tampa pagrindiniu pono Trumpo tikslu konflikte, nors iš pradžių jis teigė, kad karas buvo skirtas suteikti Irano žmonėms galių nuversti esamą režimą, smarkiai sumažinti jo raketų pajėgumus ir neleisti Teheranui įsigyti branduolinio ginklo.

 

Nėra jokių požymių, kad Iranas ir Jungtinės Valstijos nuo birželio mėnesio paliaubų būtų išsamiai aptarusios Irano branduolinę programą, jau nekalbant apie susitarimo, kuris tenkintų abi puses, sudarymą.

 

Irano užsienio reikalų ministras Abbasas Araghchi savaitgalį pareiškė, kad Iranas dar nenusprendė, ar atnaujinti derybas su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis. Tačiau 60 dienų terminas nebeaktualus, pridūrė jis, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad birželio mėnesio susitarimas iš esmės nebegalioja.

 

„Neturėjome paliaubų, kurias dabar reikia pratęsti“, – sakė ponas Araghchi. „Karas baigėsi, ir dabar jis įgavo naują statusą.“

 

Buvę JAV pareigūnai, dirbę su Iranu, teigia, kad naujo branduolinio susitarimo tarp Jungtinių Valstijų ir Irano per 60 dienų perspektyva visada buvo menka, nors susitarime buvo numatyti pratęsimai. Ankstesnis, Obamos eros susitarimas užtruko apie dvejus metus trukusias subtilias derybas. Ponas Trumpas pasitraukė iš šio susitarimo, vadinamo Bendru išsamiu veiksmų planu, 2018 m.

 

Trumpo administracija tikėjosi, kad birželio mėnesio susitarimas bent jau atvers Hormūzo sąsiaurį. Tačiau, kad susitarimas būtų pasiektas, jie rėmėsi neaiškia formuluote, kuri suteikė patikimumo Irano teiginiui dominuoti būsimoje laivyboje šiuo vandens keliu, teigė analitikai.

 

„Tai buvo ydingas dokumentas; jis buvo skubotas, kai dar nebuvo paruoštas geriausiam laikui. Jie neišsprendė svarbiausio trumpalaikio klausimo – sąsiaurio.“

 

Vietoj to, atrodo, kad Jungtinės Valstijos ir Iranas dabar ruošiasi neapibrėžtai kovai – nei visiškam karui, nei apibrėžtai taikai. Siekdama priversti Iraną sutikti su JAV sąlygomis, Trumpo administracija atnaujino sankcijas Irano naftai ir atnaujino jūrų blokadą, kurios abi buvo laikinai atšauktos susitarimu.

 

Įtempta Irano ekonomika, dėl kurios kilo masiniai protestai, kurie šių metų pradžioje buvo žiauriai numalšinti, yra svarbus Irano sprendimų priėmėjų rūpestis. Tačiau ponas Swansonas teigė, kad dabartinė aklavietė labiau pastūmės Iraną eskalacijos, o ne susitaikymo link.

 

Nors susitarime numatytų įsipareigojimų srityje padaryta nedidelė pažanga, ponas Trumpas ir jo kolegos iš Irano toliau keičiasi žodžių karu.

 

Penktadienį Garden Sityje, Niujorke, vykusiame renginyje D. Trumpas, regis, vėl norėjo pakeisti naratyvą, pareikšdamas, kad netrukus „paskelbs Hormūzo sąsiaurį Jungtinių Valstijų teritorija“.

 

Nebuvo aišku, kiek rimtas buvo D. Trumpo pasiūlymas. Tačiau tai galėtų reikšti karių dislokavimą sausumoje ir beveik neabejotinai pareikalautų ilgalaikio karinio jūrų laivyno buvimo – žingsniai, prieštaraujantys D. Trumpo šalininkų, norinčių užbaigti užsitęsusius karinius konfliktus užsienyje, vertybėms „Pirmiausia Amerika“.

 

D. Trumpas taip pat žinomas dėl to, kad svaidėsi neapgalvotomis idėjomis apie užsienio politiką, siekdamas nukreipti dėmesį ir nukreipti kontrolę, pavyzdžiui, praėjusiais metais šokiravo pasaulį pasiūlydamas JAV perimti Gazos Ruožą – idėją, kuri niekada neišsipildė.

 

Baltieji rūmai šeštadienį neatsakė į klausimus, ar administracija parengė realius planus perimti Hormūzo sąsiaurio kontrolę. D. Trumpo padėjėjai taip pat neatsakė į klausimus apie artėjantį pirmadienio terminą.

 

Irano pareigūnai savo ruožtu nepakluso ponui Trumpui, reikšdami savo reikalavimus, įskaitant ir vieną, kurio nebuvo iškėlę prieš karą.

 

„Kartą ir visiems laikams susitaikykite su realybe. Iki šiol patyrėte didelių strateginių pralaimėjimų“, – socialiniuose tinkluose rašė Irano užsienio reikalų viceministras Kazemas Gharibabadi. „Hormūzo sąsiauris buvo Irano, yra Irano ir liks Irano.“ [1]

 

Jei Iraną sunaikintų sausumos pajėgos, Irano tikslių dronų ir raketų spiečiai sunaikintų daug šių pajėgų ir Saudo Arabiją kartu su kitomis Amerikos bazėmis regione. Elektros energijos gamybos ir gėlinimo įrenginiai yra labai reikalingi šioje dykumos zonoje.

 

Sausumos invazija į Iraną susidurtų su niokojančiu asimetriniu atsakomuoju smūgiu. Dideli Irano tikslių balistinių raketų ir besisukiojančių šaudmenų arsenalai galėtų perpildyti regioninę oro gynybą. Tai padarytų katastrofišką žalą kritinei infrastruktūrai, įskaitant Saudo Arabijos naftos įrenginius ir gyvybiškai svarbias Persijos įlankos gėlinimo ir elektrines.

 

Strateginiai sausumos konflikto iššūkiai

• Pažeidžiama infrastruktūra: gėlinimo įrenginiai ir elektros tinklai Persijos įlankoje yra lengvi taikiniai su ribotu dubliavimu.

• Raketų ir dronų spiečiai: Pigūs, didelio tikslumo dronų tinklai gali apeiti tradicines radarų sistemas.

• Geografinis mastas: Iranas yra nelygus ir kalnuotas, todėl jam reikia daug daugiau sausumos pajėgų nei ankstesnėms regioninėms intervencijoms.

 

• Ekonominės pasekmės: Regiono energijos ir vandens gamybos sunaikinimas sukeltų tiesioginę pasaulinę ekonomikos krizę. Taigi, naujasis ekonominis karas atnešė naują, milžinišką, riziką visam pasauliui. Trumpas tai supranta, todėl sėdi tyliai ir laido juokelius. Vieninteliai, tai nesuprantantys, yra vokiečių elito atstovai. Jie tiesiog nežino, kad šiandien ekonomika neveikia be iškastinio kuro, kad be iškastinio kuro nebūtų Vokietijos, o būtų tik Afrikos kolonija.

 

1. As Iran War Turns Into Economic Battle, a New U.S. Strategy Recalls Old Ones. Boxerman, Aaron; Kanno-Youngs, Zolan; Sanger, David E.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

As Iran War Turns Into Economic Battle, a New U.S. Strategy Recalls Old Ones

“The United States and Iran are poised to blow past a deadline they had set themselves to broker terms on peace and Iran’s nuclear program.

 

President Trump’s cease-fire with Iran in June envisioned a broader deal to end the war and rein in the country’s nuclear program, all negotiated within 60 days.

 

But that deadline, set to pass on Monday, has been essentially abandoned, and the war has transformed into a contest of willpower and economic endurance that has no end in sight.

 

There have been no publicly reported U.S. strikes on Iranian targets since late July. Yet the effective collapse of the agreement underscores how Mr. Trump has struggled to end the war he started in February alongside Israel, and how far he remains from the ambitions of the June deal, including fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway where Iran has choked off oil and gas shipping since the fighting began.

 

Those inside the White House are well aware that they will blow past Monday’s deadline and that the conflict has largely morphed into one of economic warfare, according to two Americans familiar with the negotiations.

 

The current strategy bears a striking resemblance to previous, yearslong U.S. attempts to isolate Iran in the hopes of compelling it to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The policy had mixed results, and some analysts are skeptical that even severe economic pressure on its own will force Iran to change course. After all, that was the approach Mr. Trump attempted in his first term, even though his Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, said last week that he was about to impose financial penalties unlike any seen before.

 

The June memorandum of understanding was widely seen as a boon for Iran, granting the regime badly needed sanctions relief even as talks over tough concessions like nuclear enrichment were postponed for later. But Iranian leaders opted to escalate again rather than consolidate their gains from the deal, according to Nate Swanson, an Iran expert at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based research group.

 

Ships could move through the Strait of Hormuz freely before the war.

 

Iran’s insistence that the deal’s vague language on the issue gave it control over the waterway led to the deal falling apart.

 

Iran began firing on ships that transited in channels outside Iranian waters, and American forces retaliated by bombing southern Iran, prompting a cycle of attacks and counterattacks across the Middle East.

 

Now, Iran refuses to reopen the strait until the United States follows through on its commitments from the cease-fire, like releasing frozen Iranian assets abroad. The Trump administration wants Iran to first end the blockade, said Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group, a research institute.

 

“Neither side is really ready to finalize a deal. They both think that in a matter of days or weeks, the other side will be more desperate for a deal, so they’ll be able to get more out of it,” Mr. Vaez said. “This is why we are locked into this game of endurance again.”

 

On Saturday, the United Arab Emirates’ state-owned oil company announced that another of its vessels had come under attack in the waterway. It did not say who was responsible, but it has previously blamed Iran for attacks on its ships.

 

Reopening the strait has increasingly become Mr. Trump’s main focus in the conflict, even though he initially said the war was meant to empower the Iranian people to overthrow the existing regime, severely degrade its missile capability and stop Tehran from getting a nuclear weapon.

 

There has been little indication that Iran and the United States have extensively discussed the Iranian nuclear program since the cease-fire in June, let alone formulated a deal that could satisfy both sides.

 

Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, said over the weekend that Iran had yet to decide whether to resume talks with the United States. But the 60-day timeline was no longer relevant, he added, given that the June agreement was essentially defunct.

 

“We did not have a cease-fire that now needs to be extended,” Mr. Araghchi said. “We had an end to the war, which has now taken on a new status.”

 

Former U.S. officials who worked on Iran say the prospect of a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran within 60 days was always remote, although the agreement provided for extensions. A previous, Obama-era, agreement took about two years of delicate talks to negotiate. Mr. Trump withdrew from that deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2018.

 

The Trump administration hoped that the June agreement would, at the very least, open the Strait of Hormuz. But to get the deal over the line, they relied on vague language that lent credibility to Iran’s claim to dominate future shipping in the waterway, analysts said.

 

“It was a flawed document; it was hurried out when it wasn’t ready for prime time,” said Mr. Swanson, the Iran expert. “And they didn’t resolve the most important short-term issue, which was the strait.”

 

Instead, the United States and Iran now seem to be settling in for an indefinite struggle, neither at all-out war nor in a defined peace. Seeking to force Iran to accept U.S. terms, the Trump administration has brought back sanctions on Iranian oil and reinstated a naval blockade, both of which were temporarily canceled by the agreement.

 

Iran’s strained economy, which prompted mass protests that were brutally crushed early this year, is a major consideration for Iranian decision makers. But Mr. Swanson argued that the current stalemate was more likely to push Iran toward escalation than toward conciliation.

 

While there has been little progress on the commitments outlined in the agreement, Mr. Trump and his Iranian counterparts have continued to exchange a war of words.

 

During an event in Garden City, N.Y., on Friday, Mr. Trump appeared once again intent on changing the narrative, saying he would soon be “declaring the Hormuz Strait a territory of the United States.”

 

It was not clear how serious Mr. Trump’s proposal was. But doing so could involve deploying boots on the ground and almost certainly would require a prolonged Navy presence — moves antithetical to the “America First” values of Trump supporters who want an end to prolonged military conflicts overseas.

 

Mr. Trump has also been known to toss out half-baked ideas on foreign policy to redirect attention and scrutiny, like when he shocked the world last year by proposing a U.S. takeover of the Gaza Strip, an idea that never materialized.

 

The White House on Saturday did not respond to questions over whether the administration had developed actual plans to take control of the Strait of Hormuz. Mr. Trump’s aides also did not respond to questions over the approaching Monday deadline.

 

Iranian officials, in turn, have defied Mr. Trump as they push their own demands — including one that they had not made before war.

 

“Accept reality once and for all. So far, you have suffered major strategic defeats,” Kazem Gharibabadi, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, said on social media. “The Strait of Hormuz has been Iranian, is Iranian, and will remain Iranian.”” [1]

 

If Iran would be taken out by the boots on the ground, Iranian swarms of precise drones and missiles would take out a lot of the boots and Saudi Arabia together with other American bases in the region. Electricity production and desalination plants are badly needed in that desert area.

 

A ground invasion of Iran would face devastating asymmetric retaliation. Iran's vast arsenals of precision ballistic missiles and loitering munitions could overwhelm regional air defenses. This would inflict catastrophic damage on critical infrastructure, including Saudi oil facilities and vital Gulf desalination and power plants.

Strategic Challenges of a Ground Conflict

•           Vulnerable Infrastructure: Desalination plants and power grids in the Gulf are soft targets with limited redundancy.

•           Missile and Drone Swarms: Low-cost, high-precision drone networks can bypass traditional radar systems.

•           Geographic Scale: Iran is rugged and mountainous, requiring vastly more ground forces than previous regional interventions.

 

•           Economic Fallout: Knocking out regional energy and water production would cause an immediate global economic crisis. So, the new economic war has brought a new, enormous risk to the whole world. Trump understands this, so he sits quietly and makes jokes. The only ones who don't understand this are the German elite. They simply don't know that today the economy doesn't work without fossil fuels, that without fossil fuels there would be no Germany, but only an African colony.

 

1. As Iran War Turns Into Economic Battle, a New U.S. Strategy Recalls Old Ones. Boxerman, Aaron; Kanno-Youngs, Zolan; Sanger, David E.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

“If Jogaila Had Not Given Us Over to the Poles, We Would Now Be the United States of America”: shows what today’s Lithuanian elite thinks about Lithuanians. And how else would they think, having taken away from the Poles, the best lands in Vilnius, city, that the Russians presented to us?

 

The Union of Jogaila: The Treaty of Krėva in 1385 and the baptism of Lithuania saved the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from constant attacks by the Teutonic Order and political isolation, although later rapprochement with Poland led to long dynastic and political disputes. “Vilnius is ours, and we are Russians,” – the joke of the Smetona era still quietly rings in Lithuania. We are still full of frog dreams in our moor-covered pond:

 

“Summer will be full of historical events, such as the coronation of Mindaugas, the Battle of Grunwald, the Baltic Way and others. Most of these dates characterize a Lithuanian as a rebel, a freedom-seeking fighter, not giving in to oppression and able to survive even at the Laptev Sea.

 

What is Lithuanian identity? How do we differ from other nations in our search for identity? How do we maintain Lithuanian identity in a global world? The Deputy Chancellor of the Academy of Education of Vytautas Magnus University, historian Mindaugas Nefas (hereinafter – M. N.) and historian and politician Valdas Rakutis (hereinafter – V. R.) discussed this with a journalist from “Žinių radijas”.

 

– Valdas, what are the characteristics of Lithuanian identity?

 

– V. R.: We can find connecting threads that change little, but if we look at Lithuania in different periods of life, we would see a rather different picture and self-assessment. Whatever Lithuanians dominated at that time, that is how they were. And later another layer could dominate, which was not known in the previous era. Such actions are also reflected in our lives. Let us remember what Lithuanians looked like in 1991 and what they look like today. 35 years have passed, and the difference is significant.

 

– What is different now?

 

– V. R.: We found ourselves in a zone of other influences, we were rebels of the Soviet Union, but we were still influenced by that system. Now we are influenced by the liberal world and we want to become one ourselves. Our directions are changing, society is strongly influenced by liberal ideas and that influence leaves its mark. At the end of the 19th century, society was dark, Catholic, lived in the countryside and certainly did not dominate in the cities. And now we have our own state, which is influenced by international influence. This changes us a little. A serious question is whether we experience changes consciously or simply swim downstream. This can be understood during travels, comparing us with other nations. They change, but not as much as we do. We are experiencing a great change.

– Is courage inherent in Lithuanian identity?

 

– M. N.: I agree with Valdas that each era has its own characteristics. Naturally, the political system can have a very strong impact. Various transformations change social structures, the economy, and along with all political events, they form a certain identity.

 

At one event, I spoke about the fact that our society is a land society, but one person said that we are a nation of warriors. And I would like to say that Lithuanians were only warriors, but history does not provide such facts. The last long Soviet occupation has greatly changed our relations and perspectives. Every era has certain aspects, and the search for one slogan or another, attempts to make sense of the statement about Lithuania as a state are marketing matters. In my opinion, they have no greater meaning.

 

– What would happen if we took away Mindaugas’ or Vytautas’ Lithuania? Once we were big, and now we are the smallest. Belarusians, Poles and Ukrainians are bigger. What image would it have then?

 

– M. N.: In my opinion, deep down in our subconscious we feel an inferiority complex and want to push everything back. That is why we write in tourist books for foreigners that Vilnius Old Town is one of the oldest in Eastern Europe, that Lithuania lights the tallest Christmas tree every year and we add certain things everywhere. This is not bad, but we want to say that we are important because we are smaller in terms of territory. That is why we are more active in the international space, in political and educational projects. We want to do more than others, because we are trying to say that we are important and capable of creating certain things. History textbooks like to emphasize that Lithuania was once large, bigger than France. These are old stereotypes of thinking, that a powerful state is one that has a large territory.

 

– We were a large, warrior state, but today we have difficulty dictating fashion in Europe and the world. What happened? Why did we give up our territories so easily?

 

– V. R.: I think that we did not give up territories calmly. What is important is not the territory itself, but what its size gives. This gives the nucleus the opportunity to grow and develop. If anyone walks back and forth through your land, who falls, then you are an object of other nations and they decide what to do with you. Then you cannot create anything good, because you are a serf. And we were basically the ones who managed ourselves.

 

What happened to us is what happens anywhere today. People give up our identity, thinking that someone else will do it better. This happened when our rulers went to Poland. In my opinion, this fact is not discussed enough. The ruler is good, he creates innovations, power and other things. When the ruler leaves, values ​​are created elsewhere. Over time, Poland clearly became the main, titular nation. It so happened that Poland began to call us its province. A transformation of identity took place.

 

– Could it be that due to the influence of serfdom, we still want strong-arm politics today? Is this relevant to Lithuanian identity?

 

– M. N.: Yes, it probably had a great influence. It should be clarified how much serfdom had an influence, and how much other social, social and economic processes. A few years ago, Mažvydas Jastramskis’s study “Do We Need a Leader?” was published as a separate book. The book says that, from the people’s point of view, a good president is strict and has his own opinion. Gitanas Nausėda is often accused of being spineless, having no opinion of his own and unable to speak out more firmly. The principle of a firm hand is important for Lithuanians.

 

– If a ruler strikes with his fist and tells people what to do, doesn’t that close the debate?

 

– M. N.: Not necessarily, it is also a question of strategy. Sometimes issues that sensitize society are not raised. For example, the attitude towards people of non-traditional sexual orientation. Both Dalia Grybauskaitė and G. Nausėda avoid these issues because they know that revealing a more pronounced opinion would provoke negative reactions. Attention is focused on issues that do not arouse such great attention. It is convenient for the President to say that the Seimas and the Government must find measures to increase the income of the population. He himself does not need to do anything, and the public hears a signal that the President has spoken out firmly and categorically.

 

– What do Poles think of us? How do we appear to the world?

 

– V. R.: Poles have the image that Lithuanians were once normal people, normal Poles, but something happened to them, the Germans, Russians or Bolsheviks reeducated them and now they are in no way returning to the path of virtue. This is the official line that the Poles have. In any government institution, morals will be deducted for the schools of the Trakai district. This is obviously staged and controlled from one center.

 

– Did we bow our heads to the Poles out of fear that they would get angry and we would no longer have any connection with them?

 

– V. R.: No, this is simply a lack of knowledge of the Poles. Internally, they are a very competitive nation, accustomed to respecting others according to their strength. They really compete. You need to be both strong and friendly and notice, evaluate, praise. Understanding the Polish way of thinking helps Lithuanians a lot. Ambassadors who know how to take such a position achieve a lot. If you are your own person, you have to behave the way they behave internally, according to their concept.

 

– What have you heard about Lithuanians during your travels?

 

– M. N.: It depends on who you communicate with. People at conferences try to identify Lithuania through certain people from Lithuania whom they know or remember from their stay in Lithuania, what they liked there.

 

I remember an internship in Krakow during my undergraduate studies. In Vilnius, it was popular among history students to joke about whose Vilnius is. We also made fun of local Poles. However, when we asked this question to Krakow students, they did not understand the context. We explained it to them, but they said that our jokes were not very funny.

 

The attitude towards Lithuanians is good. I have not identified any exceptional things that foreign partners would broadcast about Lithuania, but maybe there are some. I feel that partners from Western countries want to work with us. It’s not like it was 10-15 years ago, when we had to ask to be accepted to carry out joint projects. Of course, there are certain phenomena and symbols that foreigners associate with Lithuania. Although basketball is not winning these days, it is associated with Lithuania in a significant part of the world. People don’t necessarily know what Lithuania is, but they know Arvydas Sabonis. It’s quite interesting. We have popularized a kind of brand.”

 

 

 

„Jeigu Jogaila nebūtų mūsų atidavęs valdyti lenkams, tai mes dabar būtume Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos“: atskleidė, ką apie lietuvius galvoja šiandieninis Lietuvos elitas. O kaip kitaip galvosi, atėmęs iš lenkų geriausias žemes, rusų padovanotame mums, Vilniuje?

Jogailos unija: 1385 m. Krėvos sutartis ir Lietuvos krikštas išgelbėjo LDK nuo nuolatinių Vokiečių ordino puldinėjimų ir politinės izoliacijos, nors vėliau suartėjimas su Lenkija sukėlė ilgų dinastinių bei politinių ginčų. „Vilnius mūsų, o mes rusų,” – Smetonos laikų juokelis dar tyliai skamba Lietuvoje. Mes vis dar pilni varliuko svajonių mūsų maurais apžėlusioje baloje:

 

“Vasara gausi istorinių įvykių, tokių kaip Mindaugo karūnavimas, Žalgirio mūšis, Baltijos kelias ir kiti. Dauguma šių datų lietuvį charakterizuoja kaip maištininką, laisvės siekiantį kovotoją, nepasiduodantį priespaudai ir sugebantį išgyventi net prie Laptevų jūros.

 

Kas yra ta lietuviškoji tapatybė? Kuo tapatybės paieškose skiriamės nuo kitų tautų? Kaip lietuviškąją tapatybę išlaikome globaliame pasaulyje? Apie tai su „Žinių radijo“ žurnalistu diskutavo Vytauto Didžiojo universiteto Švietimo akademijos kanclerio pavaduotojas, istorikas Mindaugas Nefas (toliau – M. N.) ir istorikas bei politikas Valdas Rakutis (toliau – V. R.).

 

– Valdai, kokie yra lietuviškos tapatybės požymiai?

 

– V. R.: Galime rasti jungiančių gijų, kurios kinta nedaug, bet jei pažvelgtume į Lietuvą skirtingais gyvenimo laikotarpiais, matytume gana skirtingą vaizdą ir savęs vertinimą. Kokie lietuviai dominavo tuo metu, tokie jie ir buvo. O vėliau galėjo dominuoti kitas sluoksnis, kuris ankstesnėje epochoje nebuvo žinomas. Tokie veiksmai virsta ir mūsų gyvenime. Prisiminkime, kaip lietuviai atrodė 1991-aisiais ir kaip atrodo šiandien. Praėjo 35 metai, o skirtumas yra didelis.

 

– Kas skiriasi dabar?

 

– V. R.: Mes atsidūrėme kitų įtakų zonoje, buvome Sovietų Sąjungos maištininkai, tačiau mus vis tiek paveikė ta sistema. Dabar esame veikiami liberaliojo pasaulio ir patys norime tokiais tapti. Keičiasi mūsų kryptys, visuomenė yra stipriai paveikta liberalių idėjų ir ta įtaka palieka pėdsaką. XIX a. pabaigos visuomenė buvo tamsi, katalikiška, gyveno kaime ir tikrai nedominavo miestuose. O dabar turime savo valstybę, kurią veikia tarptautinė įtaka. Tai mus šiek tiek keičiasi. Rimtas klausimas, ar pokyčius išgyvename sąmoningai, ar tiesiog plaukiame pasroviui. Tai galima suprasti kelionių metu, palyginant mus su kitomis tautomis. Jos keičiasi, bet ne taip smarkiai, kaip mes. Mes išgyvename didelį pokytį.

– Ar lietuviškai tapatybei būdinga drąsa?

 

– M. N.: Pritariu Valdui, kad kiekviena epocha turi jai būdingus bruožus. Natūralu, kad politinė sistema gali paveikti labai stipriai. Įvairūs pertvarkymai keičia socialines struktūras, ekonomiką, o šalia visų politinių įvykių formuoja tam tikrą tapatybę.

 

Viename renginyje kalbėjau apie tai, kad mūsų visuomenė yra žemės visuomenė, bet vienas žmogus pasakė, kad esame karių tauta. Ir aš norėčiau sakyti, kad lietuviai buvo tik kariai, bet istorija neduoda tokių faktų. Paskutinė ilgoji sovietinė okupacija labai stipriai pakeitė mūsų santykius ir požiūrio kampus. Kiekvienas laikmetis pasižymi tam tikrais aspektais, o vienokio ar kitokio šūkio paieškos, mėginimai įprasminti teiginį apie Lietuvą kaip apie valstybę yra marketinginiai dalykai. Jie, mano galva, didesnės prasmės neturi.

 

– Kas būtų, jei nuimtume Mindaugo arba Vytauto Lietuvą? Kažkada buvome dideli, o dabar esame patys mažiausi. Baltarusiai, lenkai ir ukrainiečiai yra didesni. Koks įvaizdis būtų tuomet?

 

– M. N.: Mano galva, giliai pasąmonėje mes jaučiame nepilnavertiškumo kompleksą ir norime viską atlošti atgal. Todėl turistinėse knygose užsieniečiams rašome, kad Vilniaus senamiestis yra vienas seniausių Rytų Europoje, kad Lietuvoje kasmet įžiebiama aukščiausia Kalėdų eglutė ir visur pridedame tam tikrus dalykus. Tai nėra blogai, bet mes norime pasakyti, kad esame svarbūs, nes teritorijos prasme esame mažesni. Todėl esame aktyvesni tarptautinėje erdvėje, politiniuose ir švietimo projektuose. Norime padaryti daugiau nei kiti, nes bandome pasakyti, kad esame svarbūs ir gebantys kurti tam tikrus dalykus. Istorijos vadovėliuose mėgstama pabrėžti, kad Lietuva kadaise buvo didelė, didesnė nei Prancūzija. Tai yra seni mąstymo stereotipai, kad galinga valstybė yra ta, kuri turi didelę teritoriją.

 

– Buvome didelė, karžygių valstybė, bet šiandien sunkiai diktuojame madas Europoje ir pasaulyje. Kas nutiko? Kodėl mes taip lengvai atsisakėme savo teritorijų?

 

– V. R.: Manau, kad teritorijų ramiai neatsisakėme. Svarbi yra ne pati teritorija, o tai, ką jos dydis duoda. Tai duoda branduoliui galimybę augti ir vystytis. Jei per tavo kraštą pirmyn ir atgal vaikšto bet kas, kas papuola, tuomet tu esi kitų tautų objektas ir jie sprendžia, ką su tavimi daryti. Tada tu negali sukurti nieko gero, nes esi baudžiauninkas. O mes iš esmės buvome tie, kurie tvarkėsi patys.

 

Su mumis atsitiko tai, kas ir šiandien atsitinka bet kurioje vietoje. Žmonės atsisako savasties, manydami, kad kažkas kitas padarys geriau. Taip atsitiko tada, kai mūsų valdovai nuvažiavo į Lenkiją. Mano supratimu, šis faktas yra per mažai aptariamas. Valdovas yra gėris, jis sukuria naujoves, galią ir kitus dalykus. Kai valdovas išvažiuoja, vertybės kuriasi kitur. Ilgainiui pagrindine, tituline tauta akivaizdžiai tapo Lenkija. Nutiko taip, kad Lenkija pradėjo mus vadinti savo provincija. Įvyko tapatybės transformacija.

 

– Ar gali būti, kad dėl baudžiavos įtakos mums ir šiandien norisi stiprios rankos politikos? Ar tai aktualu lietuvių tapatybei?

 

– M. N.: Taip, tikriausiai yra padaryta didelė įtaka. Reikėtų pasiaiškinti, kiek įtakos turėjo baudžiava, o kiek kiti visuomeniniai, socialiniai ir ekonominiai procesai. Prieš keletą metų pasirodė atskira knyga išleistas Mažvydo Jastramskio tyrimas „Mums reikia vado?“. Knygoje rašoma, kad, žmonių požiūriu, geras prezidentas – griežtas ir turintis savo nuomonę. Dažnai Gitanui Nausėdai yra prikišama, kad jis bestuburis, neturi savo nuomonės ir negali tvirčiau pasisakyti. Tvirtos rankos principas lietuviams yra svarbus.

 

– Jei valdovas trenkia kumščiu ir nurodo, ką daryti, ar tai neuždaro diskusijų?

 

– M. N.: Nebūtinai, tai irgi yra strategijos klausimas. Kartais klausimai, kurie jautrina visuomenę, nėra keliami. Pavyzdžiui, požiūris į netradicinės seksualinės orientacijos žmones. Tiek Dalia Grybauskaitė, tiek G. Nausėda vengia šių klausimų, nes žino, kad ryškesnės nuomonės atskleidimas iššauktų negatyvias reakcijas. Sukoncentruojamas dėmesys į klausimus, kurie neiššaukia tokio didelio dėmesio. Prezidentui patogu pasakyti, kad Seimas ir Vyriausybė turi rasti priemonių padidinti gyventojų pajamas. Pačiam jam nereikia kažko daryti, o visuomenė girdi signalą, kad prezidentas griežtai ir kategoriškai pasisakė.

 

– Ką apie mus galvoja lenkai? Kaip mes atrodome pasauliui?

 

– V. R.: Lenkai turi įvaizdį, kad lietuviai kažkada buvo normalūs žmonės, normalūs lenkai, bet jiems kažkas atsitiko, vokiečiai, rusai ar bolševikai juos perauklėjo ir dabar jie niekaip negrįžta į doros kelią. Tai yra oficiali linija, kurią turi lenkai. Bet kurioje valdžios institucijoje bus atskaitytas moralas už Trakų rajono mokyklas. Tai yra akivaizdžiai surežisuota ir valdoma iš vieno centro.

 

– Ar mes nulenkėme galvą prieš lenkus iš baimės, kad jie supyks ir nebeturėsime su jais jokio ryšio?

 

– V. R.: Ne, tai tiesiog yra lenkų pažinimo trūkumas. Viduje jie yra labai konkuruojanti tauta, įpratusi gerbti kitus pagal jų stiprybę. Jie tikrai konkuruoja. Reikia būti ir stipriems, ir draugiškiems bei pastebėti, įvertinti, pagirti. Lenkų mąstymo suvokimas labai padeda lietuviams. Ambasadoriai, kurie moka užimti tokią poziciją, daug pasiekia. Jei esi savas, turi elgtis taip, kaip jie elgiasi viduje, pagal jų sampratą.

 

– Ką kelionėse esate girdėję apie lietuvius?

 

– M. N.: Tai priklauso nuo to, su kuo bendrauji. Žmonės konferencijose bando identifikuoti Lietuvą per tam tikrus asmenis iš Lietuvos, kuriuos pažįsta arba prisimena savo buvimą Lietuvoje, tai, kas jiems ten patiko.

 

Prisimenu stažuotę Krokuvoje savo bakalauro studijų metu. Vilniuje tarp istorijos studentų buvo populiaru juokauti apie tai, kieno yra Vilnius. Mes pašiepdavome ir vietinius lenkus. Tačiau kai uždavėme šį klausimą Krokuvos studentams, jie nesuprato konteksto. Mes jiems paaiškinome, bet jie pasakė, kad mūsų juokeliai nelabai juokingi.

 

Požiūris į lietuvius yra geras. Nesu identifikavęs išskirtinių dalykų, kuriuos užsienio partneriai transliuotų apie Lietuvą, bet gal jų ir yra. Jaučiu, kad Vakarų valstybių partneriai nori su mumis dirbti. Nebėra taip, kaip buvo prieš 10–15 metų, kai turėdavome prašyti priimti mus vykdyti bendrus projektus. Be abejo, yra tam tikri reiškiniai ir simboliai, kurie užsieniečiams kelia asociacijas su Lietuva. Nors krepšinis šiais laikais nėra pergalingas, jis asocijuojasi su Lietuva nemažoje pasaulio dalyje. Žmonės nebūtinai žino, kas yra Lietuva, bet žino Arvydą Sabonį. Tai yra pakankamai įdomu. Esame išpopuliarinę savotišką prekės ženklą.”