The U.S. Military Wants A.I. Dominance. Feuds and China May Thwart It.

“The administration is veering wildly in its response to the national security implications of A.I. as China, America’s main technological and military rival, charges ahead.

 

In mid-July, many of the country’s biggest military contractors received a letter from the Air Force with a stern warning: By Sept. 1, all the software they use for weapons and control systems must be free of products built by the A.I. company Anthropic. Failure to comply would put all their business with the Pentagon at risk.

 

Within a month, those same contractors received an unexpected reversal: They could — for now — disregard the earlier instructions about purging Anthropic.

 

It was one more example of the chaos and contradictions in the tsunami of A.I. disruptions that have swept through the national security establishment in recent months. Agencies like the Pentagon, which still use airplanes designed in the 1950s, are struggling furiously to keep up with A.I. models whose powers multiply in a matter of months.

 

The tension has been magnified in the case of Anthropic, whose chief executive, Dario Amodei, has been locked in a public feud with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over restrictions the company tried to put on the technology’s use by the world’s most powerful military.

 

Without Anthropic’s powerful Mythos model, it would be far more difficult for the National Security Agency to find and patch vulnerabilities in the Pentagon’s own systems, senior N.S.A. officials argued. And it turned out that, despite the original Anthropic ban, the N.S.A. was still allowed to use its products.

 

Critical tests were underway using Mythos to gauge its potential to hack into highly protected foreign networks, current and former officials said.

 

Shutting down the use of Mythos, an A.I. model whose potential for conducting offensive cyberoperations is already shifting the digital arms race into overdrive, would have amounted to “unilateral disarmament,” according to one recently departed senior U.S. official.

 

From the Department of Defense to the C.I.A. and N.S.A., billions have already been spent on using artificial intelligence to develop weapons that could work with less human control, or to test vulnerable military networks and even nuclear codes to make sure they cannot be cracked by adversarial A.I. systems.

 

Artificial intelligence is critical to the Golden Dome, President Trump’s vision — fanciful to many experts — of a space-based missile shield.

 

But little of that work anticipated the powers of Mythos and its A.I. counterparts, or the prospect that China may be months away from it with own formidable and less expensive versions. That could supercharge China’s ability to infiltrate American communications networks, water systems and power grids like those they successfully pierced during the Biden administration in two sweeping attacks called “Volt Typhoon” and “Salt Typhoon.”

 

 

 

“These are the kinds of things we were talking about and worrying about before A.I. became a daily headline,” said Jen Easterly, who ran the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency during the Biden administration. “What’s different now, and what makes the problem more urgent, is the potential for A.I. to amplify those capabilities.”

 

So far the Trump administration has veered wildly in response, at first abandoning its hands-off approach to regulating the industry, then briefly shutting off access for foreigners from Mythos — including some of its inventors — then lifting that ban.

 

Earlier this month, the administration called in executives from the largest “frontier” creators, including OpenAI and Anthropic, and told them that new models would be reviewed by the government to assure they could not be used to make biological weapons, or break into classified American systems or the communications networks that control nuclear weapons.

 

(The New York Times has sued OpenAI and Microsoft, claiming copyright infringement of news content related to A.I. systems. The two companies have denied those claims.)

 

But the government review process exempts “open” models — including many of those now produced by Chinese firms — whose code can be customized by users.

 

One senior executive of a company briefed on the new policy said it made no sense, noting that the open models can be just as dangerous. Like many in the industry, the executive would not be quoted, for fear of angering administration officials.

 

Pentagon officials reject the idea they are not agile enough. They say the U.S. military has maintained immediate access to the world’s most advanced A.I. systems, despite the Anthropic ban. An official, who discussed Pentagon policies on the condition of anonymity, said the Defense Department had recently integrated a version of a Google Gemini model within four days of its commercial release.

 

More than 1,300 A.I. workers have called for the country to slow development. But others, including inside the Trump administration, have answered that call with a question: “What about China?” They fear losing the roughly six-month lead they believe the United States maintains.

 

That concern has touched off arguments about whether export controls on some of the most powerful chips made by Nvidia, the leading American maker, are effective in keeping the Chinese from developing the computing power they need to catch up. Controls could also just prompt Chinese makers to obtain the chips on the black market, or double down on development of their own.

 

It is easy to compare this moment in American national security to the early days of the Cold War, when the United States was the only nation to possess nuclear weapons, and it was struggling to delay the day the Soviet Union would match the accomplishment. (The first Soviet bomb was tested in late August of 1949, four years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) The C.I.A.’s director, John Ratcliffe, recently reached for just that comparison, saying it would “not be misplaced” to refer to the capabilities of A.I. as “akin to digital nuclear weapons.”

 

But like most such historical analogies, this one has its limits. Nuclear weapons were solely in the hands of the state back then. And the fundamental technology of building and delivering them has changed little in 80 years since.

 

A.I. is being built in the private sector, and available to all. Many of the most powerful models are updated weekly, their powers, and unpredictability, discovered along the way. China is perhaps six months or less behind the United States in the development of the most advanced models, U.S. experts estimate, though probably years behind in making the advanced semiconductors needed to power A.I.’s development.

 

But already there is evidence America’s main technological and economic rival is unnerved by the powers being unleashed. Privately some Chinese officials have already been talking about some forms of arms control, even if no one knows how that might work.

 

“They realize there is a gap in capability that may play to our strengths,” said Evan S. Medeiros, a professor at Georgetown University and a former National Security Council official. “On nuclear arms control and on missile defense, we can’t get them to engage. But they appear more interested in the case of A.I.”

 

Mr. Trump has said that will be a topic of discussion, again, when he meets President Xi Jinping in Washington in late September. The two men are scheduled to see each other again twice, later in the year.

 

But when he talks about A.I., Mr. Trump has neither explained his objectives nor indicated any concerns in recent weeks that A.I. agents are finding ways to break out of their confines, or acting autonomously to break into outside companies or networks. When news came out that artificial intelligence was used to design a new virus, not found in nature — a development that could herald real medicinal progress or a biological weapon — the White House said nothing.

 

But one thing is clear: Many of the hypothetical scenarios that concerned the national security community a year ago have begun to arrive.

 

At the Pentagon, Punishing Anthropic Goes Astray

 

Within the defense industry, the chaos kicked off by Mr. Hegseth and his aides over stripping Anthropic code has only deepened. A month after the Air Force told its contractors to expunge all Anthropic code, it sent another message, telling them to “stand by,” at least for now.

 

“At this time, you are not required to remove from your inventory Anthropic products or services that interface with the Department of the Air Force systems and networks,” read the update, a copy of which was seen by The Times. It warned that the latest guidance could be reversed yet again depending on the outcome of litigation.

 

The back-and-forth instructions reflected Mr. Hegseth’s dilemma: He is trying to punish a leading A.I. juggernaut deeply embedded in the defense-industrial complex, without handicapping the military’s national security mission.

 

Asked about the apparent about-face, a Pentagon official described the new Air Force guidance as temporary and said the mandate to purge Anthropic across the Department of Defense was absolute.

 

Publicly, the Pentagon has refused to relent. In interviews, Pentagon officials have suggested that the animosity between their department and Anthropic began when the Silicon Valley firm began making what the military saw as ridiculous demands about how the Claude for Government model, a version of the popular, publicly available A.I. model, would be used. Senior officials said Anthropic presented them with 25 pages of restrictions.

 

After several contentious months, those 25 pages were boiled down to two restrictions. In a February meeting at the Pentagon, Mr. Amodei told Mr. Hegseth that the company would not provide any products to the military unless he had assurances they would not be used for domestic surveillance of Americans or to produce fully autonomous weapons that were not ultimately controlled by human oversight.

 

It was not enough. The defense secretary got his back up, noting that Raytheon doesn’t dictate limits about how the missiles it produces can be employed against adversaries; those decisions, Mr. Hegseth said, were completely in the realm of government officials, not corporate executives. When Mr. Amodei refused to relent, the Pentagon declared the company was a “supply chain risk” — and banned for military use.

 

In May, Emil Michael, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, told a Times reporter that Anthropic deserved what it got, and that Pentagon made a mistake by over-relying on a single producer of A.I. programs — even one whose products seemed ahead of both competitors and of China. Asked whether there was anything the company could do to get back in the department’s good graces, Mr. Michael said “not at the Department of War.”

 

Pentagon officials say they have all but completed the removal of Anthropic from military computing systems. Close to 100 percent of military systems that once used “Claude for Government,” amended for use on classified networks, have now replaced Anthropic’s product with other frontier models, according to officials. In addition, the Pentagon has ceased all use of Anthropic tools in its Maven system, which helps analyze intelligence and suggests targets for airstrikes in the war with Iran.

 

The military contractors affected by the ban have been reticent to discuss it, perhaps in fear of angering their biggest customer. In a statement, a Lockheed spokeswoman declined to comment directly on the letter it received calling for Anthropic’s expulsion from its systems, but said “we follow the president’s and the Department of War’s direction.” The spokeswoman added, without naming Anthropic, that it expected “minimal impacts” to its business because it does not rely on one large-language model for any portion of its work.

 

But the Pentagon’s break with the company is hardly clean.

 

Barely two months after the blowup between Mr. Amodei and Mr. Hegseth, Anthropic announced Mythos, an A.I. product uniquely suited to find, and exploit, vulnerabilities in software. For a brief period, in what now looks like an overreaction, the Trump administration barred all foreigners from touching the program — only to reverse itself.

 

That left the Pentagon in a fix: It had just barred itself from using what could be the most powerful new cyberweapon in history.

 

“Panic set in,” said a former official who recently left the administration.

 

While the Pentagon is not allowing Claude to be used for intelligence analysis or code writing, the N.S.A. has been allowed to use versions of Anthropic’s advanced Mythos model on an “experimental” basis, officials said. It is both testing the U.S. military’s computer network defenses and seeking out potential weaknesses in adversarial networks, from China to Russia, North Korea and Iran.

 

Rethinking Opposition to A.I. Regulation

 

The inconsistency isn’t limited to the Pentagon; there has been plenty at the Commerce and Treasury Departments, and at the White House. As Mr. Trump’s aides come and go, and departments elbow each other for larger roles, the administration’s decisions on everything from export controls to national security reviews of A.I. models have been driven more by whim and influence than an articulated set of principles.

 

During its first year, the administration’s approach was hands-off, following the arguments made by David Sacks, the venture capitalist who, until he left the administration earlier this year, ran both artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency policy.

 

After publishing an A.I. Action Plan last year, the Trump administration slashed regulation and encouraged exports, hoping to make the world dependent on what Mr. Sacks called an “American tech stack.” In May, Mr. Trump scrapped a draft executive order requiring A.I. companies to submit their models to the government for a safety review, convinced by Mr. Sacks, among others, that the 90-day review requirement was too stringent and would give Chinese competitors an advantage.

 

But Mythos’s powers spooked people inside the administration, officials and others said. By June, the government had imposed the most heavy-handed controls ever in the A.I. industry, cutting off access to Anthropic’s model for foreign citizens, including some of the engineers who developed it. Then, two weeks later, it lifted the ban on foreigners, without public explanation.

 

A similar whipsawing took place in dealing with the Nvidia chips that are critical to developing new models — and building data centers. In April last year, the Trump administration shut down sales of one of the last artificial intelligence chips Nvidia was allowed to offered in China.

 

But President Trump reversed course that July, following a meeting in the Oval Office between Mr. Trump and Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang. Mr. Trump said that the sales, which had formerly been considered a national security threat, would be fine, as long as the U.S. government got a cut of their revenue.

 

Similarly, the administration revoked a rule imposed by the Biden administration that assured the most powerful chips could only be sold freely to close American allies, and limited sales to other countries. Trump officials have said they would replace the measure, but they have clashed on a replacement. In the meantime, some American companies concluded that with the rules revoked, they were free to sell advanced chips to some Chinese firms operating outside of China.

 

Mr. Trump later brought Mr. Huang to China for his visit with Xi Jinping, along with other industry executives.

 

The administration is now dealing with conflicting security and political currents. If it exercises too much control over the nascent A.I. pioneer labs, and threatens to cut off foreign access, it could drive the Europeans to Chinese models. If it under-regulates, it could invite disaster, especially if there are more incidents that make the public fear that the technology is racing out of control.

 

Chris McGuire, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Biden official, said that the Trump administration’s posture on export controls had been “incoherent.”

 

The administration is now concerned about competition from open-source models from China, but it had walked back many measures that were preventing China’s A.I. advancement, he said. And it was targeting its harshest restrictions on Anthropic, an American company, not a Chinese one.

 

“You’re loosening export controls on China, you’re leaving loopholes, and the first time you use export controls on A.I. is to blast an American company?” Mr. McGuire said.” [1]

 

Nobel prize laureates that created contemporary species of AI were afraid of the USA giving autonomous AI the power to control the weapons. Therefore, they set up their first AI shop in Canada. Now the use of AI for attacks, cyber or kinetic, by the USA is blooming. This is a sideshow though. The future of humanity is decided by Chinese open weights AI, that could be freely modified by users all over the world, adapted to solve problems of the real economy, and also used to enhance production of the biggest robot swarms. Using AI for hacking or running missiles of the Golden Dome in space is already obsolete. What will the Golden Dome do with underwater drones armed with nukes coming in swarms?

 

1. The U.S. Military Wants A.I. Dominance. Feuds and China May Thwart It. Sanger, David E; Volz, Dustin; Swanson, Ana; Barnes, Julian E.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

Palestinos sukelta situacija: turtingi žydų kilmės amerikiečiai bando organizuoti neturtingus juodaodžius ir lotynų kilmės žmones, kad sustabdytų Amerikos Demokratų partijos pokyčius. --- Ar Demokratų partija pati susiduria su Arbatėlės ​​judėjimo momentu?

Klasės ir koalicijos trintis: jaunų aktyvistų, juodaodžių/lotynų kilmės organizatorių ir palestiniečius remiančių grupių susivienijimas įtempė tradicines koalicijų struktūras, paskatindamas centristinius ir, Izraelį remiančius, donorų tinklus dėti priešingas pastangas išlaikyti tradicinius partijos rėmėjus. „The New York Times“ yra jų balsas:

 

„Šiais metais demokratų politiką užplūdo jaunų, progresyvių autsaiderių judėjimas, sukeldamas prieštaringų pirminių rinkimų bangą visoje šalyje ir pakurstydamas įtemptas diskusijas apie tai, ar šie nauji, kairieji kandidatai pertvarko partiją pagal savo įvaizdį.

 

Tačiau artėjant prie pabaigos, rezultatai atskleidžia ne tik šio maištingo judėjimo stiprybę, bet ir galimus trūkumus.

 

Praėjusią savaitę Minesotoje vicegubernatorė Peggy Flanagan laimėjo Senato pirminius rinkimus dviženkliu balsų skaičiumi, siųsdama itin progresyvią žinią, kuria siekė nugalėti nuosaikesnį oponentą. Vos savaite anksčiau kairiųjų pažiūrų demokratas dr. Abdul El-Sayed laimėjo Senato pirminius rinkimus Mičigane, nepaisant to, kad buvo gerokai pralenktas išlaidomis. O Amerikos demokratinių socialistų narė Francesca Hong buvo arti pergalės gubernatoriaus rinkimų pirminiuose rinkimuose Viskonsine, atsilikdama mažiau nei vienu procentiniu punktu.

 

Rezultatai žymėjo naują politinės jėgos lygį kandidatams, susijusiems su atgimstančia, aktyviste kaire, parodydami, kad jų judėjimas gali būti konkurencingas visoje valstijoje.“ pirminiuose rinkimuose, gerokai už tamsiai mėlynų Atstovų Rūmų apygardų ribų.

 

Tačiau nors balsinga strategų, aktyvistų ir aukštąjį išsilavinimą turinčių rinkėjų grupė lenktyniavo paremti šiuos kovingus, drąsiai liberalius – ir kai kuriais atvejais neišbandytus – kandidatus, kai kurie rinkėjai, kurie istoriškai buvo svarbiausi partijos likimui, tebėra skeptiški.

 

Mičigane ir Viskonsine, abiejose pagrindinėse mūšio laukų valstijose, progresyvūs kandidatai, regis, sunkiai paveikė rinkėjus, kurie ilgą laiką buvo partijos stuburas, įskaitant juodaodžius, nuosaikesnius ir vyresnio amžiaus amerikiečius, kurie balsuoja patikimai.

 

Kairiesiems kandidatams skinant pergales pirminiuose rinkimuose po pirminių, daugelis progresyviųjų tikisi, kad jiems pavyks pastūmėti Demokratų partiją toliau į kairę – tam tikra prasme atspindėdami tai, kaip Arbatėlės ​​judėjimo iškilimas beveik prieš du dešimtmečius pastūmėjo Respublikonų partiją daug labiau į dešinę.

 

Tačiau rezultatai kelia klausimų, ar šie kandidatai gali suburti pakankamai plačią demokratų, nepriklausomų ir nuosaikių rinkėjų koaliciją, kad laimėtų visuotinius rinkimus svyruojančiose valstijose, o tai galėtų nulemti, ar demokratai galės atgauti valdžią Kongrese ir galiausiai Baltuosiuose rūmuose.

 

„Ar aš pastatyčiau „Ar D.S.A. narys kandidatuoja į gubernatorius Niujorke ar Masačusetse?“ – paklausė Chrisas Waltonas, buvęs Milvokio apygardos Demokratų partijos pirmininkas. „Žinoma, galime rizikuoti. Tačiau tai apsunkina padėtį tokioje valstijoje kaip Viskonsinas, kur pradedate nuo 48 jardų linijos ir turite išsiaiškinti, kaip pasiekti 50.“

 

Kiti svarbūs išbandymai kairiosioms pažiūroms bus šį rudenį keliose Atstovų Rūmų apygardose, kuriose dr. El-Sayedas ir Troy Jacksonas, progresyvus buvęs valstijos senatorius Meine, kovos dėl vietų, kurių demokratams reikia norint perimti Senato kontrolę.

 

Pirminių rinkimų rezultatai rodo, kad norėdami laimėti, kai kurie iš šių kandidatų turi ne tik įtikinti nepriklausomus rinkėjus, bet ir sustiprinti savo pačių rinkėjų bazę.

 

Mičigane dr. El-Sayedas atsiliko juodaodžių daugumos miesteliuose visoje valstijoje. Nors jis buvo populiarus tarp jaunesnių rinkėjų, buvo ženklų, kad tarp vyresnių rinkėjų, kurie balsuoja patikimiau, jis buvo silpnesnis už savo demokratų pirminių rinkimų varžovę, Atstovų Rūmų narę Haley Stevens.

 

Viskonsine ponia Hong, kuri buvo laikoma didžiausia favorite apklausose, netikėtai pralaimėjo pirminius rinkimus Davidui Crowley, Milvokio apygardos vykdomajam direktoriui, kuris taps pirmuoju juodaodžiu gubernatoriumi valstijoje. Ponas Crowley turėjo pranašumą Milvokio metropolinėje zonoje ir kaimo apygardose, o ponia Hong demonstravo stiprybę mažesniuose miestuose ir priemiesčiuose, taip pat apygardose, kuriose yra universitetų miesteliai.

 

Senatorius Bernie Sandersas, nepriklausomas Vermonto kandidatas, kuris visoje šalyje rėmė progresyvius kandidatus, įskaitant dr. El-Sayedą ir ponią Flanagan, sakė esąs įsitikinęs, kad rudenį demokratai, taip pat ir nepriklausomi kandidatai, susitelks palaikyti kandidatus.

 

„Jei mūsų kandidatai ir toliau kalbės apie paprastiems žmonėms aktualias problemas – įperkamumo, sveikatos priežiūros, švietimo, būsto, pagrindinių gyvenimo poreikių, socialinio draudimo apsaugos klausimus – prieš respublikonus, kurie nori sumažinti socialinį draudimą, žinote ką?“ – sakė ponas Sandersas. „Mūsų vaikinai laimės, ir jie laimės su didele pergale.“

 

Tačiau net ir kai kuriuose labiausiai demokratų apgyvendintuose Amerikos rajonuose matyti susiskaldymo požymių. Niujorke juodaodžių ir lotynų amerikiečių lyderiai išreiškė susirūpinimą dėl demokratinių socialistų pergalių  gentrifikuojančiuose rajonuose, nerimaudamas, kad bus pamiršti kasdieniai ilgamečių gyventojų rūpesčiai.

 

Atstovas Adriano Espaillat, Niujorko demokratas ir Kongreso ispanų frakcijos pirmininkas, šią vasarą pralaimėjo pirminius rinkimus kraštutinių kairiųjų varžovei Darializai Avilai Chevalier, demokratinei socialistei, kuri išreiškė paramą policijos, sienų ir kalėjimų panaikinimui bei turto konfiskavimui iš savininkų.

 

Interviu jis užsiminė apie apylinkių duomenis, rodančius, kad nors jo oponentui geriau sekėsi baltųjų, jaunesnių ir didesnes pajamas gaunančių rajonų rinkimuose, jis buvo stiprus daugelyje senesnių ir ispanakalbių daugumos rajonų rinkimuose.

 

„Jie teigia, kad turi darbininkų klasės darbotvarkę, bet tų bendruomenių žmonės taip nemano“, – sakė p. Espaillat. „Manau, kad tie rajonai yra susirūpinę dėl įperkamumo, bet jie taip pat yra susirūpinę dėl visuomenės saugumo. Žinote, jie taip pat yra susirūpinę dėl klausimų, dėl kurių D.S.A. gali turėti kitokią poziciją nei jie.“

 

Naujos maištingos kairės augimą dar labiau paskatino demokratų pralaimėjimas 2024 m. prezidento rinkimuose, kuris atvėrė duris naujo tipo politikams, galintiems nukreipti demokratų pyktį į tai, ką jie laikė sklerotišku partijos isteblišmentu.

 

Kitais metais Zohranas Mamdani, skatinamas aktyvistų, progresyvių kairiųjų, kuriuos įkvėpė palestiniečių reikalas ir įniršis milijardieriams, netikėtai laimėjo Niujorko mero rinkimus, paskatindamas naują demokratų kandidatų klasę priimti panašią drąsią viziją.

 

Kandidatus vienija keli vienijantys principai: parama „Medicare visiems“, pasipriešinimas dirbtinio intelekto duomenų centrams, įsipareigojimas nutraukti įmonių pinigų naudojimą politikoje ir požiūris, kad pasipriešinimas Amerikos paramai Izraeliui yra moralinis lakmuso popierėlis, kurį kursto įsitikinimas, kad Gazos karas prilygsta genocidui.

 

Tačiau po šia plačia platforma tarp kandidatų slypi realūs skirtumai.

 

„Yra daug kandidatų, kurie sugebėjo save pozicionuoti kaip progresyvius, populistinius ar net priklausančius DSA“, – teigė Mattas Barreto, demokratų apklausų organizatorius, dirbęs su buvusio prezidento Josepho R. Bideno jaunesniojo kampanija. „Ideologiškai ji yra daug laisvesnė, nei žmonės mano.“

 

Ponia Hong, valstijos įstatymų leidėja, yra DSA narė, kuri oficialiai nepriklauso Demokratų partijai.

 

Dr. El-Sayedas, kuris save vadina „kapitalistu“, nėra DSA narys ir nebuvo šios grupės remiamas. Jis palaiko ilgamečius ryšius su šia organizacija, kalbėdamas keliuose vietos renginiuose per pirmąją Trumpo administraciją.

 

Minesotoje ponia Flanagan entuziastingai palaikė progresyvią politiką ir sąjungininkus, tokius kaip p. Sandersas, tačiau yra visą gyvenimą priklausanti Demokratų-ūkininkų-leiboristų partijai, kuri yra Demokratų partijos variklis valstijoje, ir kuri palaikė jos kandidatūrą.

 

Ponia Flanagan, kuri 20 procentinių punktų persvara įveikė Atstovų Rūmų narę Angie Craig, teigė, kad daugiausia dėmesio skyrė paramos organizavimui kiekviename savo gimtosios valstijos kampelyje.

 

„Koalicija, kurią sukūrėme, yra tikėjimas, darbas, jaunimas, žmonės Didžiojoje Minesotoje, ūkininkai“, – sakė ji interviu. „Kai kuriate santykius su žmonėmis, net jei ir nesutariate dėl visko, manau, kad būtent taip mes laimėjome šiuos rinkimus.“

 

Vis dėlto, nepaisant skirtumų, visos trys lenktynės parodė, kaip pasikeitė demokratų požiūris į tai, kas lemia kandidato išrinkamumą – tam tikrose ribose.

 

Tiek Minesotoje, tiek Mičigane rinkėjai atmetė demokratų lyderių argumentą, kad nuosaikesnės kandidatės – ponia Craig ir ponia Stevens – buvo geriau pasirengusios laimėti visoje valstijoje.

 

Tačiau Viskonsine ponios Hong pandemijos laikų pareiškimų, kuriuos ji sunkiai paaiškino, įskaitant vieną, kuriame ji siūlė atšaukti Padėkos dieną, ir kitą, kuriame jos jaunas dviejų rasių sūnus apibūdino kaip siūlantį jai „artumą baltumui“, rinkėjams pasirodė per daug.

 

„Žmonės mažiau linkę pasitikėti politine klase ir tuo, ką mes laikome išrenkamu“, – teigė Lauren Hitt, demokratų strategė, dirbusi su kandidatais iš įvairių ideologinių pozicijų. „Jie ieško žmonių, kurie laužo stereotipus, bet jei laužai stereotipus tiek, kad esi ekscentriškas, tai irgi nėra sprendimas.“

 

Charlesas Franklinas, Marquette teisės mokyklos apklausos Viskonsine direktorius, teigė, kad nuo pono Mamdani iškilimo „galbūt buvo lengva pasiklysti ties tuo, kaip stipriai pasirodė demokratiniai socialistai“.

 

Tačiau dabar, pridūrė jis, „kai vyksta rinkimai visoje valstijoje su tuo heterogeniškesniu elektoratu, manau, kad matome tam tikrus apribojimus net ir demokratų pirminiuose rinkimuose.“ [1]

 

1. Is the Democratic Party Facing Its Own Tea Party Moment? Lerer, Lisa; Glueck, Katie.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

Palestine-Induced Situation: Rich Jewish Americans Are Trying to Organize Poor Blacks and Latinx in Order to Stop Changes in American Democratic Party. --- Is the Democratic Party Facing Its Own Tea Party Moment?

The Class and Coalition Friction: Grassroots alignment between young activists, Black/Latinx organizers, and pro-Palestinian groups has strained traditional coalition structures, prompting counter-efforts by centrist and pro-Israel donor networks to retain traditional party anchors. The New York Times is a voice for them:

“A movement of young, progressive outsiders has stormed Democratic politics this year, sparking a wave of contentious primary contests across the country and fueling a fraught debate over whether these new, left-wing candidates are remaking the party in their image.

 

But as primary season winds to a close, the results reveal not only the strength but also the potential limitations of this insurgent movement.

 

In Minnesota last week, Peggy Flanagan, the lieutenant governor, won a Senate primary by a double-digit margin, pressing a fiercely progressive message to defeat a more moderate opponent. Just a week earlier, Dr. Abdul El-Sayed, a left-leaning Democrat, won a Senate primary in Michigan despite being vastly outspent. And Francesca Hong, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America, came close to winning a primary for governor in Wisconsin, falling short by less than one percentage point.

 

The results marked a new level of political strength for candidates affiliated with a resurgent, activist left, showing that their movement can be competitive in statewide primaries, well beyond deep-blue House districts.

 

Yet while a vocal group of strategists, activists and college-educated voters have raced to embrace these pugnacious, boldly liberal — and in some cases untested — candidates, some of the voters who have historically been most crucial to the party’s fortunes remain skeptical.

 

In Michigan and Wisconsin, both pivotal battleground states, the progressive candidates appeared to have struggled to sway voters who have long been the backbone of the party — including Black, more moderate and older Americans who vote reliably.

 

As left-wing candidates have notched victories in primary after primary, many progressives hope they will be able to move the Democratic Party further to the left — mirroring, in some ways, how the rise of the Tea Party movement nearly two decades ago pushed the Republican Party much further to the right.

 

But the results raise questions about whether these candidates can piece together a broad enough coalition of Democrats, independents and moderates to win general elections in swing states that could determine whether Democrats are able to regain power in Congress and, eventually, the White House.

 

“Would I put a D.S.A. member up for governor in New York or Massachusetts?” said Chris Walton, the former chairman of the Democratic Party of Milwaukee County. “Sure, we can take a chance. But it makes it harder in a state like Wisconsin, where you’re starting out at the 48-yard line and have to figure out how to get to 50.”

 

The next major tests for the left will come this fall in a smattering of battleground House districts, and as Dr. El-Sayed and Troy Jackson, a progressive former state senator in Maine, fight to win seats that Democrats need to capture control of the Senate.

 

The primary results indicate that to win, some of those nominees must not only persuade independent voters, but also shore up their own bases.

 

In Michigan, Dr. El-Sayed trailed in majority-Black townships across the state. While he was popular with younger voters, there were signs that he was weaker than his Democratic primary opponent, Representative Haley Stevens, among older voters, who vote more reliably.

 

In Wisconsin, Ms. Hong, who had been the heavy favorite in polling, lost her primary to David Crowley, the Milwaukee County executive who would be the state’s first Black governor, in a shock upset. Mr. Crowley had an edge in metro Milwaukee and in rural counties, while Ms. Hong showed strength in smaller cities and suburbs, as well as counties that are home to college towns.

 

Senator Bernie Sanders, the Vermont independent who championed progressive candidates across the country including Dr. El-Sayed and Ms. Flanagan, said he is confident that Democrats, as well as independents, will rally behind the nominees in the fall.

 

“If our candidates keep talking about the issues that are relevant to ordinary people — the issues of affordability, the issues of health care, the issues of education, housing, basic necessities of life, protecting Social Security — against Republicans who want to cut Social Security, you know what?” said Mr. Sanders. “Our guys are gonna win, and they’ll win big.”

 

But even in some of the most heavily Democratic neighborhoods in America, there are signs of fissures. In New York, Black and Latino leaders have expressed alarm over democratic socialist victories in gentrifying neighborhoods, worrying that the day-to-day concerns of longtime residents will be overlooked.

 

Representative Adriano Espaillat, a New York Democrat and chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, lost his primary earlier this summer to a far-left challenger, Darializa Avila Chevalier, a democratic socialist who had voiced support for abolishing the police, borders and prisons and seizing property from landlords.

 

In an interview, he nodded to precinct-level data showing that while his opponent did better in whiter, younger, and higher-income areas, he was strong across many older and majority-Hispanic areas.

 

“They claim to have the agenda of the working class, but that’s not what the people in those communities feel,” Mr. Espaillat said. “Those neighborhoods, I believe, are concerned about affordability, but they’re also concerned about public safety. You know, they’re also concerned about the types of issues that D.S.A. may have a different position on than they do.”

 

The growth of a new insurgent left was supercharged by the Democrats’ loss in the 2024 presidential race, which created a fresh opening for a new kind of politician who could channel Democratic anger with what they saw as a sclerotic party establishment.

 

The following year, Zohran Mamdani — fueled by an activist, progressive left that was animated by the Palestinian cause and fury toward billionaires — won a surprise victory in the New York City race for mayor, prompting a new class of Democratic candidates to embrace a similar bold vision.

 

The candidates share some unifying principles: Support for “Medicare for all,” opposition to A.I. data centers, a commitment to ending corporate money in politics and a view that opposition to American support for Israel is a moral litmus test, fueled by a belief that the Gaza war amounted to a genocide.

 

But beneath that broad platform, there are real differences among the candidates.

 

“There is a wide range of candidates who have been able to position themselves as either progressive or populist or even under the D.S.A.,” said Matt Barreto, a Democratic pollster who worked with former President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s campaign. “It’s way looser ideologically than people think.”

 

Ms. Hong, a state lawmaker, is a member of the D.S.A., which is not officially part of the Democratic Party.

 

Dr. El-Sayed, who calls himself a “capitalist,” is not a D.S.A. member, nor was he endorsed by the group. He does have a yearslong relationship with the organization, speaking at several local events during the first Trump administration.

 

And in Minnesota, Ms. Flanagan eagerly embraced progressive policies and allies like Mr. Sanders but is a lifetime member of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, the Democratic Party’s engine in the state, which endorsed her bid.

 

Ms. Flanagan, who defeated Representative Angie Craig by 20 percentage points, said she focused on organizing support in every corner of her home state.

 

“The coalition that we have built is faith, labor, young people, folks in greater Minnesota, farmers,” she said in an interview. “When you build relationships with people, even if you don’t see eye to eye on everything, I think that’s the way that we won this election.”

 

Still, despite the differences, all three races illustrated how Democratic views of what makes a candidate electable has shifted — within some limits.

 

In both Minnesota and Michigan, voters rejected an argument made by Democratic leaders that the more moderate candidates — Ms. Craig and Ms. Stevens — were better positioned to win statewide.

 

But in Wisconsin, Ms. Hong’s baggage from pandemic-era statements that she struggled to explain — including one in which she suggested canceling Thanksgiving and another describing her young biracial son as offering her “proximity to whiteness” — appeared to be too much for voters.

 

“People are less willing to trust the political class and what we think is electable,” said Lauren Hitt, a Democratic strategist who has worked for candidates across the ideological spectrum. “They’re looking for people who break the mold, but if you break the mold so much that you’re eccentric, that’s not the solution either.”

 

Charles Franklin, the director of the Marquette Law School poll in Wisconsin, said that since the rise of Mr. Mamdani, it has been “maybe easy to be caught up in just how strong democratic socialists were doing.”

 

But now, he added, “when you go to statewide races with that more heterogeneous electorate, I think you’re seeing some limits on that, even within Democratic primaries.”” [1]

 

1. Is the Democratic Party Facing Its Own Tea Party Moment? Lerer, Lisa; Glueck, Katie.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

Irano karui virstant ekonominiu mūšiu, nauja JAV strategija primena senąsias

„Jungtinės Valstijos ir Iranas yra pasirengusios viršyti terminą, kurį jos pačios sau buvo nusistačiusios derėtis dėl taikos ir Irano branduolinės programos sąlygų.

 

Birželio mėnesį prezidento Trumpo sudarytos paliaubos su Iranu numatė platesnį susitarimą, kuriuo būtų užbaigtas karas ir suvaldyta šalies branduolinė programa, visa tai būtų suderėta per 60 dienų.

 

Tačiau šis terminas, kuris turėjo baigtis pirmadienį, iš esmės buvo atmestas, o karas virto valios ir ekonominės ištvermės kova, kuriai nematyti pabaigos.

 

Nuo liepos pabaigos viešai nepranešta apie jokius JAV smūgius Irano taikiniams. Tačiau faktinis susitarimo žlugimas pabrėžia, kaip ponui Trumpui sekėsi užbaigti karą, kurį jis pradėjo vasarį kartu su Izraeliu, ir kaip toli jis tebėra nuo birželio mėnesio susitarimo ambicijų, įskaitant visišką Hormūzo sąsiaurio, svarbaus vandens kelio, kuriuo Iranas nuo pat kovų pradžios užblokavo naftos ir dujų gabenimą, atidarymą.

 

Baltuosiuose rūmuose esantys asmenys puikiai žino, kad jie viršys pirmadienio terminą ir kad konfliktas iš esmės virto ekonominio karo forma, teigia du amerikiečiai, susipažinę su derybomis.

 

Dabartinė strategija labai panaši į ankstesnius, daugelį metų trukusius JAV bandymus izoliuoti Iraną, tikintis priversti jį atsisakyti savo branduolinių ambicijų. Ši politika davė prieštaringų rezultatų, ir kai kurie analitikai skeptiškai vertina tai, kad net ir didelis ekonominis spaudimas privers Iraną pakeisti kursą. Juk būtent tokį požiūrį D. Trumpas bandė taikyti per savo pirmąją kadenciją, nors jo iždo sekretorius Scottas Bessentas praėjusią savaitę pareiškė, kad ketina skirti dar nematytas finansines baudas.

 

Birželio mėnesio susitarimo memorandumas buvo plačiai laikomas Irano palaima, suteikiančia režimui labai reikalingą sankcijų sušvelninimą, net ir tuo metu, kai derybos dėl griežtų nuolaidų, tokių kaip branduolinis sodrinimas, buvo atidėtos vėlesniam laikui. Tačiau Irano lyderiai nusprendė vėl eskaluoti, o ne įtvirtinti savo laimėjimus iš susitarimo, teigia Nate'as Swansonas, Irano ekspertas Vašingtone įsikūrusioje tyrimų grupėje „Atlantic Council“.

 

Prieš karą laivai galėjo laisvai plaukti Hormūzo sąsiauriu.

 

Prieš karą Irano tvirtinimas, kad neaiški susitarimo formuluotė šiuo klausimu suteikė jam galimybę kontroliuoti vandens kelią, lėmė susitarimą. griūva.

 

Iranas pradėjo šaudyti į laivus, kurie plaukė kanalais už Irano vandenų ribų, o Amerikos pajėgos atsakė bombarduodamos pietų Iraną, sukeldamos atakų ir kontratakų ciklą visame Artimuosiuose Rytuose.

 

Dabar Iranas atsisako atverti sąsiaurį, kol Jungtinės Valstijos neįvykdys savo įsipareigojimų pagal paliaubas, pavyzdžiui, negrąžins įšaldyto Irano turto užsienyje. Trumpo administracija nori, kad Iranas pirmiausia nutrauktų blokadą, sakė Ali Vaezas, Irano ekspertas iš Tarptautinės krizių grupės, tyrimų instituto.

 

„Nei viena pusė nėra tikrai pasirengusi sudaryti susitarimo. Abi mano, kad po kelių dienų ar savaičių kita pusė labiau norės susitarimo, todėl galės iš jo gauti daugiau naudos“, – sakė p. Vaezas. „Štai kodėl mes vėl esame įstrigę šiame ištvermės žaidime.“

 

Šeštadienį Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų valstybinė naftos bendrovė paskelbė, kad dar vienas jos laivas buvo užpultas vandens kelyje. Bendrovė nenurodė, kas už tai atsakingas, tačiau anksčiau dėl išpuolių prieš jos laivus kaltino Iraną.

 

Sąsiaurio atidarymas vis labiau tampa pagrindiniu pono Trumpo tikslu konflikte, nors iš pradžių jis teigė, kad karas buvo skirtas suteikti Irano žmonėms galių nuversti esamą režimą, smarkiai sumažinti jo raketų pajėgumus ir neleisti Teheranui įsigyti branduolinio ginklo.

 

Nėra jokių požymių, kad Iranas ir Jungtinės Valstijos nuo birželio mėnesio paliaubų būtų išsamiai aptarusios Irano branduolinę programą, jau nekalbant apie susitarimo, kuris tenkintų abi puses, sudarymą.

 

Irano užsienio reikalų ministras Abbasas Araghchi savaitgalį pareiškė, kad Iranas dar nenusprendė, ar atnaujinti derybas su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis. Tačiau 60 dienų terminas nebeaktualus, pridūrė jis, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad birželio mėnesio susitarimas iš esmės nebegalioja.

 

„Neturėjome paliaubų, kurias dabar reikia pratęsti“, – sakė ponas Araghchi. „Karas baigėsi, ir dabar jis įgavo naują statusą.“

 

Buvę JAV pareigūnai, dirbę su Iranu, teigia, kad naujo branduolinio susitarimo tarp Jungtinių Valstijų ir Irano per 60 dienų perspektyva visada buvo menka, nors susitarime buvo numatyti pratęsimai. Ankstesnis, Obamos eros susitarimas užtruko apie dvejus metus trukusias subtilias derybas. Ponas Trumpas pasitraukė iš šio susitarimo, vadinamo Bendru išsamiu veiksmų planu, 2018 m.

 

Trumpo administracija tikėjosi, kad birželio mėnesio susitarimas bent jau atvers Hormūzo sąsiaurį. Tačiau, kad susitarimas būtų pasiektas, jie rėmėsi neaiškia formuluote, kuri suteikė patikimumo Irano teiginiui dominuoti būsimoje laivyboje šiuo vandens keliu, teigė analitikai.

 

„Tai buvo ydingas dokumentas; jis buvo skubotas, kai dar nebuvo paruoštas geriausiam laikui. Jie neišsprendė svarbiausio trumpalaikio klausimo – sąsiaurio.“

 

Vietoj to, atrodo, kad Jungtinės Valstijos ir Iranas dabar ruošiasi neapibrėžtai kovai – nei visiškam karui, nei apibrėžtai taikai. Siekdama priversti Iraną sutikti su JAV sąlygomis, Trumpo administracija atnaujino sankcijas Irano naftai ir atnaujino jūrų blokadą, kurios abi buvo laikinai atšauktos susitarimu.

 

Įtempta Irano ekonomika, dėl kurios kilo masiniai protestai, kurie šių metų pradžioje buvo žiauriai numalšinti, yra svarbus Irano sprendimų priėmėjų rūpestis. Tačiau ponas Swansonas teigė, kad dabartinė aklavietė labiau pastūmės Iraną eskalacijos, o ne susitaikymo link.

 

Nors susitarime numatytų įsipareigojimų srityje padaryta nedidelė pažanga, ponas Trumpas ir jo kolegos iš Irano toliau keičiasi žodžių karu.

 

Penktadienį Garden Sityje, Niujorke, vykusiame renginyje D. Trumpas, regis, vėl norėjo pakeisti naratyvą, pareikšdamas, kad netrukus „paskelbs Hormūzo sąsiaurį Jungtinių Valstijų teritorija“.

 

Nebuvo aišku, kiek rimtas buvo D. Trumpo pasiūlymas. Tačiau tai galėtų reikšti karių dislokavimą sausumoje ir beveik neabejotinai pareikalautų ilgalaikio karinio jūrų laivyno buvimo – žingsniai, prieštaraujantys D. Trumpo šalininkų, norinčių užbaigti užsitęsusius karinius konfliktus užsienyje, vertybėms „Pirmiausia Amerika“.

 

D. Trumpas taip pat žinomas dėl to, kad svaidėsi neapgalvotomis idėjomis apie užsienio politiką, siekdamas nukreipti dėmesį ir nukreipti kontrolę, pavyzdžiui, praėjusiais metais šokiravo pasaulį pasiūlydamas JAV perimti Gazos Ruožą – idėją, kuri niekada neišsipildė.

 

Baltieji rūmai šeštadienį neatsakė į klausimus, ar administracija parengė realius planus perimti Hormūzo sąsiaurio kontrolę. D. Trumpo padėjėjai taip pat neatsakė į klausimus apie artėjantį pirmadienio terminą.

 

Irano pareigūnai savo ruožtu nepakluso ponui Trumpui, reikšdami savo reikalavimus, įskaitant ir vieną, kurio nebuvo iškėlę prieš karą.

 

„Kartą ir visiems laikams susitaikykite su realybe. Iki šiol patyrėte didelių strateginių pralaimėjimų“, – socialiniuose tinkluose rašė Irano užsienio reikalų viceministras Kazemas Gharibabadi. „Hormūzo sąsiauris buvo Irano, yra Irano ir liks Irano.“ [1]

 

Jei Iraną sunaikintų sausumos pajėgos, Irano tikslių dronų ir raketų spiečiai sunaikintų daug šių pajėgų ir Saudo Arabiją kartu su kitomis Amerikos bazėmis regione. Elektros energijos gamybos ir gėlinimo įrenginiai yra labai reikalingi šioje dykumos zonoje.

 

Sausumos invazija į Iraną susidurtų su niokojančiu asimetriniu atsakomuoju smūgiu. Dideli Irano tikslių balistinių raketų ir besisukiojančių šaudmenų arsenalai galėtų perpildyti regioninę oro gynybą. Tai padarytų katastrofišką žalą kritinei infrastruktūrai, įskaitant Saudo Arabijos naftos įrenginius ir gyvybiškai svarbias Persijos įlankos gėlinimo ir elektrines.

 

Strateginiai sausumos konflikto iššūkiai

• Pažeidžiama infrastruktūra: gėlinimo įrenginiai ir elektros tinklai Persijos įlankoje yra lengvi taikiniai su ribotu dubliavimu.

• Raketų ir dronų spiečiai: Pigūs, didelio tikslumo dronų tinklai gali apeiti tradicines radarų sistemas.

• Geografinis mastas: Iranas yra nelygus ir kalnuotas, todėl jam reikia daug daugiau sausumos pajėgų nei ankstesnėms regioninėms intervencijoms.

 

• Ekonominės pasekmės: Regiono energijos ir vandens gamybos sunaikinimas sukeltų tiesioginę pasaulinę ekonomikos krizę. Taigi, naujasis ekonominis karas atnešė naują, milžinišką, riziką visam pasauliui. Trumpas tai supranta, todėl sėdi tyliai ir laido juokelius. Vieninteliai, tai nesuprantantys, yra vokiečių elito atstovai. Jie tiesiog nežino, kad šiandien ekonomika neveikia be iškastinio kuro, kad be iškastinio kuro nebūtų Vokietijos, o būtų tik Afrikos kolonija.

 

1. As Iran War Turns Into Economic Battle, a New U.S. Strategy Recalls Old Ones. Boxerman, Aaron; Kanno-Youngs, Zolan; Sanger, David E.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

As Iran War Turns Into Economic Battle, a New U.S. Strategy Recalls Old Ones

“The United States and Iran are poised to blow past a deadline they had set themselves to broker terms on peace and Iran’s nuclear program.

 

President Trump’s cease-fire with Iran in June envisioned a broader deal to end the war and rein in the country’s nuclear program, all negotiated within 60 days.

 

But that deadline, set to pass on Monday, has been essentially abandoned, and the war has transformed into a contest of willpower and economic endurance that has no end in sight.

 

There have been no publicly reported U.S. strikes on Iranian targets since late July. Yet the effective collapse of the agreement underscores how Mr. Trump has struggled to end the war he started in February alongside Israel, and how far he remains from the ambitions of the June deal, including fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway where Iran has choked off oil and gas shipping since the fighting began.

 

Those inside the White House are well aware that they will blow past Monday’s deadline and that the conflict has largely morphed into one of economic warfare, according to two Americans familiar with the negotiations.

 

The current strategy bears a striking resemblance to previous, yearslong U.S. attempts to isolate Iran in the hopes of compelling it to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The policy had mixed results, and some analysts are skeptical that even severe economic pressure on its own will force Iran to change course. After all, that was the approach Mr. Trump attempted in his first term, even though his Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, said last week that he was about to impose financial penalties unlike any seen before.

 

The June memorandum of understanding was widely seen as a boon for Iran, granting the regime badly needed sanctions relief even as talks over tough concessions like nuclear enrichment were postponed for later. But Iranian leaders opted to escalate again rather than consolidate their gains from the deal, according to Nate Swanson, an Iran expert at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based research group.

 

Ships could move through the Strait of Hormuz freely before the war.

 

Iran’s insistence that the deal’s vague language on the issue gave it control over the waterway led to the deal falling apart.

 

Iran began firing on ships that transited in channels outside Iranian waters, and American forces retaliated by bombing southern Iran, prompting a cycle of attacks and counterattacks across the Middle East.

 

Now, Iran refuses to reopen the strait until the United States follows through on its commitments from the cease-fire, like releasing frozen Iranian assets abroad. The Trump administration wants Iran to first end the blockade, said Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group, a research institute.

 

“Neither side is really ready to finalize a deal. They both think that in a matter of days or weeks, the other side will be more desperate for a deal, so they’ll be able to get more out of it,” Mr. Vaez said. “This is why we are locked into this game of endurance again.”

 

On Saturday, the United Arab Emirates’ state-owned oil company announced that another of its vessels had come under attack in the waterway. It did not say who was responsible, but it has previously blamed Iran for attacks on its ships.

 

Reopening the strait has increasingly become Mr. Trump’s main focus in the conflict, even though he initially said the war was meant to empower the Iranian people to overthrow the existing regime, severely degrade its missile capability and stop Tehran from getting a nuclear weapon.

 

There has been little indication that Iran and the United States have extensively discussed the Iranian nuclear program since the cease-fire in June, let alone formulated a deal that could satisfy both sides.

 

Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, said over the weekend that Iran had yet to decide whether to resume talks with the United States. But the 60-day timeline was no longer relevant, he added, given that the June agreement was essentially defunct.

 

“We did not have a cease-fire that now needs to be extended,” Mr. Araghchi said. “We had an end to the war, which has now taken on a new status.”

 

Former U.S. officials who worked on Iran say the prospect of a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran within 60 days was always remote, although the agreement provided for extensions. A previous, Obama-era, agreement took about two years of delicate talks to negotiate. Mr. Trump withdrew from that deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2018.

 

The Trump administration hoped that the June agreement would, at the very least, open the Strait of Hormuz. But to get the deal over the line, they relied on vague language that lent credibility to Iran’s claim to dominate future shipping in the waterway, analysts said.

 

“It was a flawed document; it was hurried out when it wasn’t ready for prime time,” said Mr. Swanson, the Iran expert. “And they didn’t resolve the most important short-term issue, which was the strait.”

 

Instead, the United States and Iran now seem to be settling in for an indefinite struggle, neither at all-out war nor in a defined peace. Seeking to force Iran to accept U.S. terms, the Trump administration has brought back sanctions on Iranian oil and reinstated a naval blockade, both of which were temporarily canceled by the agreement.

 

Iran’s strained economy, which prompted mass protests that were brutally crushed early this year, is a major consideration for Iranian decision makers. But Mr. Swanson argued that the current stalemate was more likely to push Iran toward escalation than toward conciliation.

 

While there has been little progress on the commitments outlined in the agreement, Mr. Trump and his Iranian counterparts have continued to exchange a war of words.

 

During an event in Garden City, N.Y., on Friday, Mr. Trump appeared once again intent on changing the narrative, saying he would soon be “declaring the Hormuz Strait a territory of the United States.”

 

It was not clear how serious Mr. Trump’s proposal was. But doing so could involve deploying boots on the ground and almost certainly would require a prolonged Navy presence — moves antithetical to the “America First” values of Trump supporters who want an end to prolonged military conflicts overseas.

 

Mr. Trump has also been known to toss out half-baked ideas on foreign policy to redirect attention and scrutiny, like when he shocked the world last year by proposing a U.S. takeover of the Gaza Strip, an idea that never materialized.

 

The White House on Saturday did not respond to questions over whether the administration had developed actual plans to take control of the Strait of Hormuz. Mr. Trump’s aides also did not respond to questions over the approaching Monday deadline.

 

Iranian officials, in turn, have defied Mr. Trump as they push their own demands — including one that they had not made before war.

 

“Accept reality once and for all. So far, you have suffered major strategic defeats,” Kazem Gharibabadi, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, said on social media. “The Strait of Hormuz has been Iranian, is Iranian, and will remain Iranian.”” [1]

 

If Iran would be taken out by the boots on the ground, Iranian swarms of precise drones and missiles would take out a lot of the boots and Saudi Arabia together with other American bases in the region. Electricity production and desalination plants are badly needed in that desert area.

 

A ground invasion of Iran would face devastating asymmetric retaliation. Iran's vast arsenals of precision ballistic missiles and loitering munitions could overwhelm regional air defenses. This would inflict catastrophic damage on critical infrastructure, including Saudi oil facilities and vital Gulf desalination and power plants.

Strategic Challenges of a Ground Conflict

•           Vulnerable Infrastructure: Desalination plants and power grids in the Gulf are soft targets with limited redundancy.

•           Missile and Drone Swarms: Low-cost, high-precision drone networks can bypass traditional radar systems.

•           Geographic Scale: Iran is rugged and mountainous, requiring vastly more ground forces than previous regional interventions.

 

•           Economic Fallout: Knocking out regional energy and water production would cause an immediate global economic crisis. So, the new economic war has brought a new, enormous risk to the whole world. Trump understands this, so he sits quietly and makes jokes. The only ones who don't understand this are the German elite. They simply don't know that today the economy doesn't work without fossil fuels, that without fossil fuels there would be no Germany, but only an African colony.

 

1. As Iran War Turns Into Economic Battle, a New U.S. Strategy Recalls Old Ones. Boxerman, Aaron; Kanno-Youngs, Zolan; Sanger, David E.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Aug 16, 2026.

“If Jogaila Had Not Given Us Over to the Poles, We Would Now Be the United States of America”: shows what today’s Lithuanian elite thinks about Lithuanians. And how else would they think, having taken away from the Poles, the best lands in Vilnius, city, that the Russians presented to us?

 

The Union of Jogaila: The Treaty of Krėva in 1385 and the baptism of Lithuania saved the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from constant attacks by the Teutonic Order and political isolation, although later rapprochement with Poland led to long dynastic and political disputes. “Vilnius is ours, and we are Russians,” – the joke of the Smetona era still quietly rings in Lithuania. We are still full of frog dreams in our moor-covered pond:

 

“Summer will be full of historical events, such as the coronation of Mindaugas, the Battle of Grunwald, the Baltic Way and others. Most of these dates characterize a Lithuanian as a rebel, a freedom-seeking fighter, not giving in to oppression and able to survive even at the Laptev Sea.

 

What is Lithuanian identity? How do we differ from other nations in our search for identity? How do we maintain Lithuanian identity in a global world? The Deputy Chancellor of the Academy of Education of Vytautas Magnus University, historian Mindaugas Nefas (hereinafter – M. N.) and historian and politician Valdas Rakutis (hereinafter – V. R.) discussed this with a journalist from “Žinių radijas”.

 

– Valdas, what are the characteristics of Lithuanian identity?

 

– V. R.: We can find connecting threads that change little, but if we look at Lithuania in different periods of life, we would see a rather different picture and self-assessment. Whatever Lithuanians dominated at that time, that is how they were. And later another layer could dominate, which was not known in the previous era. Such actions are also reflected in our lives. Let us remember what Lithuanians looked like in 1991 and what they look like today. 35 years have passed, and the difference is significant.

 

– What is different now?

 

– V. R.: We found ourselves in a zone of other influences, we were rebels of the Soviet Union, but we were still influenced by that system. Now we are influenced by the liberal world and we want to become one ourselves. Our directions are changing, society is strongly influenced by liberal ideas and that influence leaves its mark. At the end of the 19th century, society was dark, Catholic, lived in the countryside and certainly did not dominate in the cities. And now we have our own state, which is influenced by international influence. This changes us a little. A serious question is whether we experience changes consciously or simply swim downstream. This can be understood during travels, comparing us with other nations. They change, but not as much as we do. We are experiencing a great change.

– Is courage inherent in Lithuanian identity?

 

– M. N.: I agree with Valdas that each era has its own characteristics. Naturally, the political system can have a very strong impact. Various transformations change social structures, the economy, and along with all political events, they form a certain identity.

 

At one event, I spoke about the fact that our society is a land society, but one person said that we are a nation of warriors. And I would like to say that Lithuanians were only warriors, but history does not provide such facts. The last long Soviet occupation has greatly changed our relations and perspectives. Every era has certain aspects, and the search for one slogan or another, attempts to make sense of the statement about Lithuania as a state are marketing matters. In my opinion, they have no greater meaning.

 

– What would happen if we took away Mindaugas’ or Vytautas’ Lithuania? Once we were big, and now we are the smallest. Belarusians, Poles and Ukrainians are bigger. What image would it have then?

 

– M. N.: In my opinion, deep down in our subconscious we feel an inferiority complex and want to push everything back. That is why we write in tourist books for foreigners that Vilnius Old Town is one of the oldest in Eastern Europe, that Lithuania lights the tallest Christmas tree every year and we add certain things everywhere. This is not bad, but we want to say that we are important because we are smaller in terms of territory. That is why we are more active in the international space, in political and educational projects. We want to do more than others, because we are trying to say that we are important and capable of creating certain things. History textbooks like to emphasize that Lithuania was once large, bigger than France. These are old stereotypes of thinking, that a powerful state is one that has a large territory.

 

– We were a large, warrior state, but today we have difficulty dictating fashion in Europe and the world. What happened? Why did we give up our territories so easily?

 

– V. R.: I think that we did not give up territories calmly. What is important is not the territory itself, but what its size gives. This gives the nucleus the opportunity to grow and develop. If anyone walks back and forth through your land, who falls, then you are an object of other nations and they decide what to do with you. Then you cannot create anything good, because you are a serf. And we were basically the ones who managed ourselves.

 

What happened to us is what happens anywhere today. People give up our identity, thinking that someone else will do it better. This happened when our rulers went to Poland. In my opinion, this fact is not discussed enough. The ruler is good, he creates innovations, power and other things. When the ruler leaves, values ​​are created elsewhere. Over time, Poland clearly became the main, titular nation. It so happened that Poland began to call us its province. A transformation of identity took place.

 

– Could it be that due to the influence of serfdom, we still want strong-arm politics today? Is this relevant to Lithuanian identity?

 

– M. N.: Yes, it probably had a great influence. It should be clarified how much serfdom had an influence, and how much other social, social and economic processes. A few years ago, Mažvydas Jastramskis’s study “Do We Need a Leader?” was published as a separate book. The book says that, from the people’s point of view, a good president is strict and has his own opinion. Gitanas Nausėda is often accused of being spineless, having no opinion of his own and unable to speak out more firmly. The principle of a firm hand is important for Lithuanians.

 

– If a ruler strikes with his fist and tells people what to do, doesn’t that close the debate?

 

– M. N.: Not necessarily, it is also a question of strategy. Sometimes issues that sensitize society are not raised. For example, the attitude towards people of non-traditional sexual orientation. Both Dalia Grybauskaitė and G. Nausėda avoid these issues because they know that revealing a more pronounced opinion would provoke negative reactions. Attention is focused on issues that do not arouse such great attention. It is convenient for the President to say that the Seimas and the Government must find measures to increase the income of the population. He himself does not need to do anything, and the public hears a signal that the President has spoken out firmly and categorically.

 

– What do Poles think of us? How do we appear to the world?

 

– V. R.: Poles have the image that Lithuanians were once normal people, normal Poles, but something happened to them, the Germans, Russians or Bolsheviks reeducated them and now they are in no way returning to the path of virtue. This is the official line that the Poles have. In any government institution, morals will be deducted for the schools of the Trakai district. This is obviously staged and controlled from one center.

 

– Did we bow our heads to the Poles out of fear that they would get angry and we would no longer have any connection with them?

 

– V. R.: No, this is simply a lack of knowledge of the Poles. Internally, they are a very competitive nation, accustomed to respecting others according to their strength. They really compete. You need to be both strong and friendly and notice, evaluate, praise. Understanding the Polish way of thinking helps Lithuanians a lot. Ambassadors who know how to take such a position achieve a lot. If you are your own person, you have to behave the way they behave internally, according to their concept.

 

– What have you heard about Lithuanians during your travels?

 

– M. N.: It depends on who you communicate with. People at conferences try to identify Lithuania through certain people from Lithuania whom they know or remember from their stay in Lithuania, what they liked there.

 

I remember an internship in Krakow during my undergraduate studies. In Vilnius, it was popular among history students to joke about whose Vilnius is. We also made fun of local Poles. However, when we asked this question to Krakow students, they did not understand the context. We explained it to them, but they said that our jokes were not very funny.

 

The attitude towards Lithuanians is good. I have not identified any exceptional things that foreign partners would broadcast about Lithuania, but maybe there are some. I feel that partners from Western countries want to work with us. It’s not like it was 10-15 years ago, when we had to ask to be accepted to carry out joint projects. Of course, there are certain phenomena and symbols that foreigners associate with Lithuania. Although basketball is not winning these days, it is associated with Lithuania in a significant part of the world. People don’t necessarily know what Lithuania is, but they know Arvydas Sabonis. It’s quite interesting. We have popularized a kind of brand.”