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Tehran Still Has Several Ways to Evade U.S. Sanctions and a Possibility to Lash Out Militarily Pushing the World into Great Depression II. This Was Explained by Mr. Trump Himself

 

The threat to the global economy doesn't just stem from Iranian retaliation, but also from the severity of the U.S. response. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently noted that while the U.S. is issuing strict timelines for countries to sever ties with Iran under threat of dollar-system exile, the administration is intentionally rolling out these secondary sanctions with caution. When asked why the U.S. hasn't instantly severed all of Iran's partners from the financial network, Bessent bluntly asked, "Why would I want to blow up the global financial system?" confirming that a heavy-handed, immediate weaponization of the dollar risks accidental de-dollarization and massive economic warfare among major world powers.

 

If American economic war becomes too dangerous for Iran, Iran can use swarms of precise missiles and drones to destroy water supply and energy infrastructure of other countries there. The results would be catastrophic for the West.


“The Trump administration launched "Operation Economic Outcast" to squeeze Iran financially and try to force the regime into concessions to end the conflict in the Middle East.

 

Washington is warning world leaders to stop doing business with Iran and threatening to cut companies from the U.S. financial system should they do so. The U.S. is simultaneously blockading Iranian ports, choking off the regime's primary financial lifeline.

 

Iran, however, has spent years setting up a complex system of oil sales and clandestine shadow banking that it hopes will sustain its economy and military long enough to outlast the economic assault.

 

Here are the ways Tehran seeks to blunt U.S. power:

 

An oil stash

 

The U.S. naval blockade of Iran's ports has reduced Iranian oil exports -- its main revenue source -- to near zero. But Tehran still has millions of barrels of oil stored offshore in oil tankers, mainly in the waters off Malaysia. China buys more than 80% of Iranian oil exports, and although the blockade has limited deliveries, Beijing imported more than 500,000 barrels a day so far in August, according to data firm Kpler.

 

These deliveries rely on a ship-to-ship transfer system, where sanctioned tankers unload crude onto vessels in international waters off Malaysia to mask the fuel's origin. Those tankers then ship the cargo to China, where it is logged as a non-Iranian import. Ship-tracking company Vortexa estimates Iran has 80 million barrels of crude in floating storage.

 

China's currency

 

U.S. sanctions aim to cut off targets from the U.S. financial system, turning them into economic pariahs and threatening companies that trade with them. But sanctions become less effective if U.S. enemies seek to avoid the U.S. financial system and the U.S. dollar.

 

Iran sells most of its oil to China, including $6 billion worth of crude during a brief truce with the U.S. during the summer, and those transactions are increasingly settled in Chinese yuan. Iran then buys goods and services from China or it barters the oil in return for Chinese companies to build infrastructure inside Iran.

 

Crypto

 

Iran's crypto ecosystem has grown rapidly as sanctions have limited the regime's access to regular currencies such as the U.S. dollar. The Iranian regime has used billions of dollars in cryptocurrencies to conduct trades and acquire weapons and commodities, researchers say. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has used crypto exchanges to get paid for oil sales, particularly from China.

 

In response, Washington has placed sanctions on Iranian exchanges and seized more than $1 billion in digital currency from Tehran. That has made it harder for Iran to move money. But policing the market is hard because much of the industry isn't regulated and transactions can be anonymous.

 

Shell companies

 

Iran still needs access to the dollar and other currencies to buy products and weapons and funnel money to its proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, Western officials said. Tehran operates shell companies in hubs including Hong Kong and Dubai controlled by Iranian exchange houses.

 

The U.S. Treasury has used sanctions to target companies and individuals involved in this system. But it remains a game of whack-a-mole.

 

Shadow network

 

Iran's shadow system allows it to buy materials used to create drones, ballistic missiles and other weapons, largely from companies in China that sometimes are unaware of the ultimate buyer.

 

Even if the Chinese firms know that materials are to be delivered to Iran, these firms are often too small to care about U.S. sanctions or are disconnected from the global financial system.” [1]

 

1. Tehran Still Has Several Ways to Evade U.S. Sanctions. Jones, Rory.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 27 Aug 2026: A6. 

Thin Capitalization: A Trap for Investing Businesses

 

“When we talk about attracting investments, economic growth and developing new projects, we usually discuss the availability of financing. However, we pay less attention to the question of what happens where businesses make initial investments with their own funds.

Paradoxically, in Lithuania, an investor financing a new project with their own funds often faces barriers created not even by the market, but by the legal and tax system.

This is especially clearly seen when applying the rules of thin capitalization.

How are new projects financed?

In practice, a new project is usually financed by the shareholder himself. Be it a residential block, a commercial building, a new factory, a logistics center, or another capital-intensive project.

The usual scheme is simple: the shareholder provides a loan, and when the project reaches a certain stage, bank or other external financing appears, which refinances this loan. The shareholder recovers part of the invested funds and can to direct them to other projects. That is why a loan for a new company starting a project is often the most rational form of financing.

An alternative would be to increase the share (authorized) capital, but in Lithuania, capital investment often means that funds are locked up for a long time and bound by legal restrictions. Their recovery depends on complex procedures, creditor protection mechanisms and formal requirements, the economic logic and legal validity of which are not always obvious.

It seems that our Law on Joint Stock Companies is still based on the assumption that formally recorded authorized capital - a specific special line in the balance sheet - in itself says something about the company's financial capacity or provides significant protection for creditors. Practice has long shown that the real stability and solvency of a company are determined and shown by completely different factors and indicators.

The interest rate paradox

Another problem arises when choosing a shareholder loan. Economically, a shareholder invests in the hope of a return on capital: dividends, growth in the company's value or a successful sale of the business in the future. Most often, his goal is is not earned from interest.

However, tax logic requires us to look at such financing as a loan. And not just any loan.

Usually, a loan granted to a company starting its operations, which even has a small authorized capital, is objectively extremely risky. The project is not yet completed, assets are often absent or insufficient, and cash flows are not yet available. Therefore, market principles (which are not relevant for the sole shareholder in this case) dictate that the interest rate for such external financing should be with a significant risk premium.

Let's also add the obligation arising from the corporate income tax law to carry out transactions between related parties under market conditions and we get a situation where the shareholder actually has to accrue significant interest on such an initial investment. He usually does not actually receive this interest, because the company developing the project does not yet have anything to pay for it. Therefore, such interest only accumulates in accounting, but from a tax point of view, it becomes taxable income (profit) of the shareholder.

In short, the investor already has to pay taxes on returns that have not yet been received.

When the same income is taxed twice

The problem of interest does not end there.

Interest accrued in the company developing the project increases costs, reduces equity and increases accounting losses. However, the recognition of these costs for tax purposes usually faces additional restrictions: both the 30% EBITDA rule (which has its own logic and is certainly not the biggest problem) [1], and (at the same time) thin capitalization rules, which additionally limit the deduction of interest paid to related parties from taxable profit.

The result is often paradoxical:

• the shareholder must recognize the interest as income and tax it;

• he does not receive real money;

• the company developing the project cannot fully recognize this interest as allowed deductions;

• in the future, the profit earned by the company implementing the project is taxed again, without assessing all the real costs it would have.

From an economic point of view, this is simply a double taxation of the same income flow taxation. And all this happens before the investment actually starts to pay off.

Do such rules really achieve their goal?

The thin capitalization rules were created for a reason. Their goal is to limit possible manipulations of the capital structure of companies, artificial reduction of profits through loan financing (when interest is paid to foreign shareholders, especially those operating in preferential tax territories), etc.

However, the question arises whether these goals are achieved when the rules are fully applied to imaginary interest calculated only due to legal requirements (which the borrower does not want to pay, and the creditor does not even want to receive), to intermediary financing companies (I borrow in order to lend on), financing is not intended for operating costs, for long-term investments, or simply when the interest is received by the shareholder who pays corporate tax on them in Lithuania.

In such cases, the system begins to fight not against abuse, but against the investment itself.

What could be changed?

First of all, it would be worth reviewing the thin capitalization rules themselves. The possibility that exists today to prove that “the same loan under the same loan conditions would be provided between independent (unrelated) persons” seems logical in theory. In practice, it often becomes almost unfeasible, because the justification requires things that do not exist “in nature”.

The situation in which there is a shareholder financing a business project initiated by him/herself, and the situation in which there is a bank or an investor who does not assume business risks and does not claim the return on the project, are absolutely different. The investor’s interest (and therefore the costs) for a project at such a stage would often be significantly higher if external financing were provided at all. However, on the other hand, when a shareholder (who does not want to receive interest) is still required to declare interest income in accordance with the “arm’s length” principle for the funds provided, we forget that circumstance – the form prevails. The assumption that this is essentially a shareholder’s capital investment (for which interest should not be calculated), only it is formalized as an interest-free loan, is often not even considered: interest must be declared even if the same loan would not be provided under the same loan conditions between independent (unrelated) persons.

Therefore, if self-awareness or will to review the application of transfer pricing requirements is not yet sufficient, it would be worth considering at least clear and actually effective exceptions to the thin capitalization rules, for example:

• allow the deduction of interest paid to a direct shareholder of a legal entity (or at least – assumedly charged by it) without restrictions, if it is effectively taxed at the recipient (creditor) level;

• not to apply restrictions on interest on borrowed and re-borrowed funds that themselves generate interest income;

• to expand the list of exceptions in other identified cases where it is obvious that there is no risk of tax base erosion.

Such changes would not eliminate protective mechanisms, but would allow them to be applied where they are really needed.

It is time to modernize capital regulation as well

Another problem (the current solution?) lies not even in taxes, but in corporate law itself.

In many countries, various forms of informal shareholder contributions have long existed, which are recorded and accounted for as equity (shareholder investment), but can be contributed and returned much more flexibly than authorized capital. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, a model is still dominant, in which capital increases and decreases often become a procedural project in themselves.

Perhaps it would be worth asking ourselves again whether the concept of authorized capital is the most appropriate and basic legal way to assess a company's financial capacity in the 21st century. Does a notarized and registered number really tell you more about a company's solvency than its real assets, cash flows and financial capacity? What does it still tell you about a company and what additional security and clarity do those legal requirements and formalities actually provide (if at all)?

In conclusion

Today, Lithuania needs more investment, more risk capital and more businesses ready to start new projects, and greater turnover of capital itself.

Therefore, it is worth critically assessing whether the current thin capitalization rules and the corporate capital regulation model still serve their original purpose or have already become an obstacle to those who create new economic value.

The fight against abuse and risk management are necessary, but it is no less important that those who invest and want to create are not punished at the same time.

The author of the insight is Dr. Mindaugas Lukas, partner at the law firm "Sorainen"."

 

1. The 30% EBITDA rule (interest deduction limitation) is a procedure established in the Income Tax Law, according to which a company's allowed interest expenses (in excess of interest income) from income may not exceed 30 percent of taxable EBITDA or EUR 3,000,000.

Basic principles

• Upper limit: The amount allowed for deduction may not exceed the higher of the two alternatives: 30% of the company's taxable EBITDA or EUR 3 million. [1]

• Excess: Interest expenses that exceed this limit do not reduce the taxable profit of the current period, but they can be carried forward to other tax periods indefinitely.

• Scope: The limitation applies to all interest expenses (paid to banks, related or unrelated persons), not only internal transactions.