Even You Can Now Invest in SpaceX. But at What Price? --- An ETF just got its hands on shares of the private company. Good luck figuring out what it's worth.

"Psst! Wanna buy into Elon Musk's SpaceX?

An exchange-traded fund can do that for you.

But if you want to find out whether you're paying a fair price, good luck with that.

This matters not just to people who want to invest in SpaceX, but to anyone who's being pitched nontraded or "alternative" assets through ETFs. The stock and debt of private companies is nowhere near ready for continuous trading in public markets. SpaceX shows why.

On Dec. 3, a little fund called theERShares Private-Public Crossover ETF (ticker: XOVR) announced it had made privately held SpaceX its top holding. Like many outside investors, the ETF bought SpaceX through a special-purpose vehicle. An SPV is a private fund created to hold a specific asset. The fund paid $7.5 million, the equivalent of $135 per SpaceX share, says Joel Shulman, ERShares' founder and chief investment officer.

On Dec. 12, XOVR publicized an additional $10 million purchase, raising its stake in the SpaceX SPV to 12% of the fund's total assets. It paid an "implied" $185 a share on Dec. 11, says Shulman.

"Very fortuitously," he says, SpaceX offered shares to private investors at $185 apiece at almost the same time, valuing the entire company at around $350 billion. XOVR then marked up its SpaceX position to $185, an instantaneous gain of 37%.

Investors desperate to own SpaceX poured more than $90 million into XOVR in December, nearly doubling the ETF's total assets. Mainly thanks to that new money, the fund now manages about $250 million. More than $20 million of that is in SpaceX -- about 8% of the fund's assets, down from the earlier peak of 12%.

Demand for shares in SpaceX is so intense that SPVs holding SpaceX as their sole or main asset may charge fees as high as 25% of any gains. Shulman declined to elaborate on the fees XOVR may pay or how that affects the value of its SpaceX position.

As a private company, SpaceX reports little to no financial information. Figuring out what the stock is worth is a guessing game.

This past week, several online marketplaces that attempt to match buyers and sellers of private companies listed SpaceX at wildly divergent prices.

EquityZen displayed what it called a "highest qualified bid" of $150. Nasdaq Private Market said "the secondary market is currently valued at $182.01," a 2% discount from the $185 a share SpaceX raised in December.

Rainmaker-X, another such marketplace, showed two lots of SpaceX for sale at $207.05 and $209.51 a share -- and five buy orders, one at $115.50 and the others at "best price."

In public markets, even a 1% gap between the bid (or offer to buy) and the ask (or offer to sell) is unusual. The gap between the lowest bid and the highest ask for SpaceX on these private marketplaces this past week was roughly 80%.

Sure, SpaceX is probably worth more than $115.50 a share; that's probably a bid from a bargain hunter hoping to find a panic seller. But is it worth $182.01? $185? $207.05? $209.51? Who knows?

Shulman says he's confident XOVR's valuation of $185 a share is accurate for now. "We're not going to be misrepresentative by putting prices out there that have no basis," he says.

Asked exactly how the fund will figure out what its SpaceX stake is worth, Shulman says many asset managers are scrambling to solve the problem of how to value private assets in a public fund -- and he believes XOVR has developed a combination of methods that can work.

Securities and Exchange Commission rules require mutual funds and ETFs to value their holdings with market prices when those are "readily available." If not -- as with private companies like SpaceX -- funds must arrive at a "fair value" determined in "good faith." How much detail the funds provide about those valuation methods, however, is largely up to them.

Dave Nadig, a veteran ETF analyst, says that XOVR could trade a little of its SpaceX stake at random intervals, then publish the resulting prices for the public market to use as a reference for valuing the private venture.

"We considered this option and it's one of the things we're looking at," says Shulman. "We use multiple ways to evaluate a private company, and that could be one mechanism."

But how big does a trade in a $350 billion company have to be to make a price authoritative? "If somebody trades one share up 100%," asks Nadig, "does that make SpaceX worth $350 billion more than it was one second earlier?"

Another issue: In a market crash, XOVR would have to sell its most liquid holdings, such as Alphabet, Nvidia, Meta Platforms and Oracle, to meet redemptions if investors panicked. That might leave remaining shareholders owning little but SpaceX -- which isn't readily tradable.

A mutual fund can mitigate that risk by shutting out new investors before a flood of money makes the fund so big that it can't handle a sudden exodus. ETFs, by design, can't close to new investors -- even though, in a press release last month, XOVR said it would when it reached $500 million in assets. Shulman says that was "poorly worded" and "wrong," adding that "we meant to imply that at $500 million we would limit further purchase of private equity" such as SpaceX.

How, then, is XOVR managing the risk from a potential run of redemptions? "This is the key question everyone's trying to address," says Shulman, "and we have a proprietary mechanism to handle it" -- which, again, he declines to disclose for competitive reasons.

"We're going to be able to meet the needs of the investors if we need to meet them," he says.

In other words, trust us.

If the investment industry wants to sell private assets to the public, it had better do better than this -- a lot better." [1]

1. EXCHANGE --- The Intelligent Investor: Even You Can Now Invest in SpaceX. But at What Price? --- An ETF just got its hands on shares of the private company. Good luck figuring out what it's worth. Zweig, Jason.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 25 Jan 2025: B2.

Trumpas teisus: Amerikos visuomenė buvo sukurta populizmui, o ne elitizmui

 

 "Politinė, ekonominė ir kultūrinė galia pastaraisiais dešimtmečiais susitelkė. Visuomenės sveikatos pareigūnai, aktyvistai, technologijų vadovai ir kiti kasdien verčia amerikiečius leisti "ekspertams" ir "valdžioms" kontroliuoti sprendimus, turinčius įtakos visai visuomenei. 

 

Technologijos leidžia atlikti, precedento neturintį, stebėjimą ir civilių veiksmų valdymą.

 

 Per visą JAV istoriją buvo periodiškai atsiliepiama prieš potentatus, bandančius kaupti įtaką. 1968 m. kandidatas į prezidentus George'as Wallace'as sakė, kad amerikiečiams atsibodo „pseudointelektualai, viešpataujantys jiems... sakantys, kad amerikiečiai neturi pakankamai proto, kad žinotų, kas geriausia jų vaikams“. Tai laimėjo Wallace'ą beveik 10 milijonų balsų ir šokiravo Bostono-Vašingtono koridoriaus grandus, kurie manė, kad atmetė ginčus dėl to, kas turėtų vadovauti Amerikai.

 

 Ronaldas Reiganas pripažino, kad amerikiečiai kovoja su intelektualiniu autoritarizmu. Jo administracija surinko krūvas įrodymų, kad biurokratinis centrinis planavimas davė pražūtingų rezultatų. Jis stabdė Vašingtono įsakymus ir diskreditavo jo manipuliacijas ekonomika ir kultūra.

 

 Reaganizmas pasirodė esąs veiksmingiausias, kaip ekonominė jėga. Jo kultūrinės pergalės buvo retesnės ir neilgam. Liberalų aktyvistų, teisėjų, pedagogų, pramogautojų ir žiniasklaidos monolitas ir toliau temdė mūsų viešąją aikštę. „Priimtinų“ pasaulėžiūrų diapazonas smarkiai susiaurėjo nuo 1988 iki 2024 m.

 

 Per tuos metus Amerikos jaunuoliai socialistai perėjo nuo ekonominio marksizmo prie kultūrinio marksizmo. Jų naujos priežastys svyravo nuo rasinių nusiskundimų ir aplinkos nerimo iki neapykantos Amerikai ir Vakarams.

 

 Nauji kairiųjų socialiniai mandatai buvo ne tik abstrakti grėsmė laisvei. Jie padarė praktinę žalą Amerikos visuomenei. Kalbant apie kultūrą ir ekonomiką, konsoliduotas sprendimų priėmimas duoda prastesnių rezultatų. Didelius, centralizuotus režimus paprastai lenkia laisvesnės, vietiškesnės, pastangos.

 

 Duomenų mokslininkai jums pasakys, kad net toks įprastas procesas, kaip futbolo stadiono ištuštinimas, kuriame yra 80 000 sirgalių per kelias minutes, yra neįveikiama skaičiavimo problema – jei bandysite ją išspręsti iš meistro pozicijos. Galėtumėte uždengti stadioną technine įranga ir programuotojais, vadovaujančiais gerbėjams, ir niekada negalėtumėte ištuštinti tribūnų taip greitai, kaip sirgaliai susitvarko patys. Tiesiog yra per daug kintamųjų.

 

 Tačiau palikite kiekvieną sau ir jis atidarys jo Chevy duris, kol švieslentės šviesa dar neužges. Jis gali nesuvokti, kad „pasižymi didelio masto adaptyviu intelektu, kai nėra pagrindinės krypties“, kaip sako elgsenos matematikas Artas De Vany, bet taip yra. Net New York Jets gerbėjai gali tai padaryti.

 

 Stanfordo biologė Deborah Gordon daug metų tyrinėjo didelę skruzdžių koloniją Arizonos dykumoje. Jos tikslas buvo išsiaiškinti, kaip šie tūkstančiai būtybių koordinuoja jų darbą, kad būtų atliktos pagrindinės užduotys. Nė viena skruzdėlė ar skruzdėlių grupė neturi jokio supratimo apie visos kolonijos sudėtingumą. Taigi, kas veda šou?

 

 Atsakymas yra: niekas. Kiekviena kolonija „veikia be jokios centrinės ar hierarchinės kontrolės“, praneša M. Gordon. „Joks vabzdys neduoda komandų kitam“. Šios sudėtingos visuomenės yra sukurtos remiantis daugybe paprastų sprendimų, kuriuos priima atskiros skruzdėlės, reaguodamos į vietos poreikius. Šie mikro sprendimai susilieja ir duoda labai efektyvų makroekonominį rezultatą. Ponia Gordon teigia, kad šis sudėtingų problemų modelis, kurį sprendžia maži veikėjai, dirbantys be nurodymų, yra „visur gamtoje“.

 

 Ištuštinti stadionus ir paleisti skruzdžių kolonijas yra paprasta, palyginti su klausimais, kaip turėtų būti struktūrizuota mūsų ekonomika arba kokias mokyklas turėtų lankyti mūsų vaikai. Kaip protingi žmonės gali įsivaizduoti, kad Vašingtone įsitvirtinusi imperatoriškoji klasė tokius klausimus gali spręsti geriau, nei žmonės vietoje?

 

 Daugelis brahmanų, kurie siekia visuomenės valdymo iš viršaus į apačią, pripažįsta savo požiūrio nerangumą. Jie vis tiek tęsia. Kodėl? Nes jiems labiau patinka kontrolės saugumas, o ne laisvė. Paprastas sprendimų priėmimas gali veikti geriau, tačiau jis perduoda galią nesocializuotoms gudrybėms, kurios priešinasi orkestruotei ir skoningiems rezultatams. Tai kiekvieno kunigaikščio košmaras.

 

 Amerikiečiai skeptiškai vertina, intelektualines kastas propaguojančius ir valdžią monopolizuojančius, nostrumus. Iškėlėme į naujas aukštumas autonomijos, vietos nepriklausomybės ir apsisprendimo sąvokas. Per 1780 m. Karaliaus kalno mūšį amerikietis pulkininkas Isaacas Shelby nurodė jo vyrams: "Kai susidursime su priešu, nelaukite įsakymo žodžio. Tegul kiekvienas iš jūsų būna jo karininku." Europiečiai, besilankantys mūsų naujojoje šalyje, nuolat stebėjosi netvarkingu nepriklausomų įmonių ir asociacijų klestėjimu.

 

 Pirmasis XXI amžiaus ketvirtis atnešė politinių vėjų ir techninių priemonių, kurios leido universitetuose indoktrinuotai klasei patraukti precedento neturinčią galią. Bet milijonais daugybė amerikiečių, galiausiai, atsitraukė nuo manipuliavimo iš viršaus. Artėjant mūsų nepriklausomybės 250-osioms metinėms, atsinaujina pasipriešinimas centralizuotai kontrolei ir nuomonių bei veiksmų suvaržymams.

 

 Norėdami susigrąžinti suverenitetą tarp kasdienių piliečių, turėtume suspausti vadovybės institucijas. Tada perduokite daugybę federalinių prerogatyvų privačioms institucijoms, vietos valdžiai, šeimoms ir asmenims. Darykite tai vėl ir vėl, kuo daugiau sektorių. Lyderiai turėtų pasiūlyti amerikiečiams pasirinkimą, o ne įsakus.

 

 Jei mūsų dabartinis populistinis maištas gali atitolinti JAV nuo pasipūtusio valdymo, džiaugsimės nauju klestėjimo ir laisvės pliūpsniu. Nes Amerikos visuomenė buvo puikiai sukurta klestėti be valdovų.

 ---

 Ponas Zinsmeisteris yra knygos „Stuburas: kodėl amerikiečių populizmas turėtų būti sveikinamas, o ne juo baidoma“ autorius. 2006–2009 m. jis dirbo Baltųjų rūmų vyriausiuoju patarėju vidaus politikos klausimais.

 

1. American Society Was Built for Populism, Not Elitism. Zinsmeister, Karl.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 25 Jan 2025: A13.

Trump Is Right: American Society Was Built for Populism, Not Elitism

"Political, economic and cultural power have become concentrated in recent decades. Public-health officials, activists, tech executives and others press everyday Americans to let "experts" and "authorities" control decisions that affect all of society. Technology allows unprecedented monitoring and steering of civilians' actions.

Throughout U.S. history there have been periodic backlashes against potentates attempting to hoard influence. In 1968 presidential candidate George Wallace said Americans were fed up with "pseudointellectuals lording over them . . . telling them they have not got sense enough to know what is best for their children." This won Wallace nearly 10 million votes and shocked grandees of the Boston-Washington corridor who thought they had foreclosed arguments over who should run America.

Ronald Reagan recognized that Americans were chafing against intellectual authoritarianism. His administration collected mounds of evidence that bureaucratic central planning was having disastrous results. He pumped the brakes on impositions from Washington and discredited its manipulations of economy and culture.

Reaganism proved most effective as an economic force. Its cultural victories were rarer and didn't last. A monolith of liberal activists, judges, educators, entertainers and media continued to overshadow our public square. The range of "acceptable" worldviews narrowed dramatically from 1988 to 2024.

During those years, America's budding socialists shifted their efforts from economic Marxism to cultural Marxism. Their new causes ranged from racial grievances and environmental alarmism to hatred for America and the West.

The left's new social mandates weren't only an abstract threat to liberty. They wreaked practical damage on American society. With culture as with economics, consolidated decision-making produces inferior results. Big, centralized regimes are generally surpassed by freer, more local efforts.

Data scientists will tell you that even a process as routine as emptying a football stadium of 80,000 fans in a few minutes is an intractable computational problem -- if you try to solve it from a master position. You could cover the stadium with hardware and programmers directing fans, and you'd never be able to empty the stands as quickly as fans manage on their own. There are simply too many variables.

Yet leave each slob to himself, and he'll be opening the door to his Chevy before the scoreboard lights are cool. He may not realize that he's "exhibiting large-scale adaptive intelligence in the absence of central direction," as behavioral mathematician Art De Vany puts it, but he is. Even New York Jets fans can do it.

Stanford biologist Deborah Gordon spent years studying a large ant colony in Arizona's desert. Her goal was to discover how these thousands of creatures coordinate their work so that essential tasks get done. No one ant or group of ants has any idea of the complexity of the entire colony. So who's running the show?

The answer is nobody. Each colony "operates without any central or hierarchical control," Ms. Gordon reports. "No insect issues commands to another." These complex societies are built on countless simple decisions made by individual ants responding to local needs. These micro-decisions meld together to yield a highly efficient macro-result. This pattern of complex problems being solved by small actors working without direction is, Ms. Gordon states, "ubiquitous throughout nature."

Emptying stadiums and running ant colonies are simple compared with questions of how our economy should be structured or which schools our children should attend. How can smart people imagine that an imperial class ensconced in Washington can decide such matters better than people on the ground?

Many of the Brahmins who push for top-down management of society recognize the clumsiness of their approach. They proceed anyway. Why? Because they prefer the security of control to freedom. Grass-roots decision-making may work better, but it cedes power to unsocialized mavericks who resist orchestration and tasteful outcomes. That's the nightmare of every officious princeling.

Americans are skeptical of nostrums that promote intellectual castes and monopolize authority. We raised to new heights the concepts of autonomy, local independence and self-determination. During the Battle of King's Mountain in 1780, American Col. Isaac Shelby instructed his men, "When we encounter the enemy, don't wait for the word of command. Let each one of you be your own officer." Europeans visiting our new nation were consistently struck by the unordered bloom of independent businesses and associations.

The first quarter of the 21st century has brought political winds and technical tools that allowed a class indoctrinated in universities to grab unprecedented power. But millions of Americans eventually recoiled against manipulation from above. As we approach the 250th anniversary of our independence, there's renewed resistance to centralized control and constrictions of opinion and action.

To recover sovereignty among everyday citizens, we should crimp the institutions of master command. Then hand off a slew of federal prerogatives to private institutions, local governments, families and individuals. Do this over and over, in as many sectors as possible. Leaders should offer Americans choices rather than edicts.

If our current populist rebellion can move the U.S. away from smug superintendence, we will enjoy a new burst of flourishing and freedom. Because American society was brilliantly constructed to thrive without rulers.

---

Mr. Zinsmeister is author of "Backbone: Why American Populism Should Be Welcomed, Not Feared." He served as the White House's chief domestic policy adviser, 2006-09." [1]

1. American Society Was Built for Populism, Not Elitism. Zinsmeister, Karl.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 25 Jan 2025: A13.