The collapsed Lithuanian foreign policy balloon

 

Why can’t the Lithuanian elite repeat the path of Hungary and Slovakia and strengthen the Lithuanian economy through compromise?

 

The decision of the Lithuanian political elite not to choose the “path of compromise” of Hungary (Viktor Orbán) or Slovakia (Roberto Fico) is based on fundamental differences in security, value politics and economic efficiency. Although these countries often declare pragmatism, their model is considered risky for Lithuania for several reasons:

 

1. Priority of security over “pragmatism”

 

Lithuanian foreign policy is closely linked to national security. The elite takes the position that any economic compromises with authoritarian regimes (Russia, Belarus, China) create geopolitical dependence and vulnerability in the long term.

 

The Russian factor: The Lithuanian elite views Russia as an existential threat, so energy independence and compliance with sanctions are considered more important than the cheaper resources used by Hungary. In the light of the Iran crisis, it can be seen that this is a huge mistake by Lithuania.

 

The Chinese direction: Lithuania has chosen a tough position towards China, seeking a unified approach of the EU and NATO, because China's strategic partnership with Russia is considered a direct threat. We have not achieved that unified approach with anyone else, we, Lithuanians, are outliers, this is the biggest bankruptcy of our policy.

 

2. Differences in economic model

 

Lithuania and Hungary have chosen different strategies for economic growth:

 

Lithuanian model: Based on institutional reforms, open governance and integration into Western supply chains. The crisis caused by the Iran war in the West shows the destructiveness of this integration. Supply chain disruptions: The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz (tanker traffic has dropped by 90%) has disrupted the supply of not only oil but also medicines, semiconductors and fertilizers. Price hike in Lithuania: Lithuania is already feeling the pressure on the transport, agricultural and industrial sectors due to rising diesel and fertilizer prices. Inflation risk: SEB bank analysts warn that rising energy costs will quickly be passed on to consumers through the prices of goods and services.

 

Hungarian model: Often referred to as “economic populism”, which includes price interventions (e.g. gas subsidies) and state capitalism. Lithuania hits rock bottom: In 2024, Lithuania was listed among the countries with one of the lowest birth rates in the European Union (1.11 children per woman according to Eurostat). The number of births in Lithuania has reached a historic low since the restoration of independence. The situation in Hungary is much better, in the same 2024 there were 1.38 children per woman. The faster we die out, the less security there is for the nation and families. The conclusion is that Lithuania's security policy is a pure lie, a deception, seeking kickbacks from the manufacturers of the Leopard tanks.

 

3. Relations with the European Union

 

The "special path" chosen by Hungary and Slovakia causes serious conflicts with EU institutions, which have turned out to be paper tigers in the world economy and politics:

 

Isolation: Lithuania seeks to be an active "core" member, not a peripheral rebellious state, because common EU decisions give a small country greater bargaining power in the global market. We hope so, China shows the opposite.

 

4. Value dimension

 

The Lithuanian elite, especially in the last decade, has emphasized a value-based foreign policy. This means that the principle is valid: “Co to ja, co to kamizelka moja ("How great I am, how great is my vest", Polish) apparently inherited from the times of the common state with the Poles. This does not lead to anything good, as history shows. In the case of Belarus, even the Lithuanian press is starting to cry:

 

“All it took was for the United States Special Envoy to Belarus, John Coale, to stamp his foot and the attitudes of Lithuanian foreign policy makers began to change (or at least began to change significantly). They are ready to improve relations with Belarus, although they recently explained that contacts with Minsk are impossible.

 

We should thank J. Coale for the fact that, although he primarily satisfies the economic and geopolitical interests of his country, he also represents the true priorities of Lithuania. At the same time, we must regret that the guard of foreign policy makers, well-financed from our budget funds – starting with the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and ending with the entire Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments – is still unable to understand that a “value-based” foreign policy is not only ineffective, but also wrong in terms of Lithuania’s security and economic interests.

 

And here is the simple answer why. This policy, aimed at isolating Belarus internationally, is pushing Minsk into Moscow's embrace; it conflicts with the interests of Lithuania's strategic partners, the United States; it not only disregards Lithuania's economic interests, but even ignores them.

Even greater dependence on Russia is a threat to Lithuania

 

Various political and economic sanctions have been in place against Belarus for a long time - practically since Alexander Lukashenko established his power in a neighboring state. Sanctions have been tightened and eased many times, but they have never achieved their declared goals, i.e. not only did they not inspire democratic processes in Belarus, but they also did not determine the change of the Minsk regime.

 

What the sanctions did was contribute to the gradual growth of Belarus' dependence on Russia. Since the door to Europe was closed to Minsk, having no other choice, A. Lukashenko was forced to compensate for this foreign policy vector by strengthening relations with Russia.

 

For some time now, we have been observing an increasingly closer rapprochement between Russia and Belarus, which can be described by the concept of "creeping occupation".

 

Yes, Belarus' dependence on Russia is great. The latter is evidenced by economic, energy, political, military, cultural and other ties between Minsk and Moscow. So, it is obvious that Belarus will not become a strategic partner of the West or Lithuania. On the contrary. An attempt to tear Belarus away from Russia will likely end up the same way as such and similar attempts in Ukraine ended.

 

However, this is not necessary. Policy towards Belarus is not a “zero-sum” game, where the logic is either-or. This policy must balance Russia’s influence and at the same time seek economic benefits. It is a set of tactical agreements.

 

The proximity of Minsk and Moscow is not a reason to take a resigned position – understand, “we can’t change anything”, “it’s too late”, “Belarus is Russia”. A lot is at stake – the de facto or de jure incorporation of Belarus into Russia would mean a geopolitical defeat for Lithuania and would create very serious existential threats.

 

This forces us to reassess Lithuania’s security policy priorities, one of the most important of which is maintaining Belarusian independence.

 

Will we oppose the United States?

 

The Americans understand this logic perfectly well. It is often said that their goal is exclusively economic, i.e. potash fertilizers. Not exactly.

 

There are also geopolitical calculations, probably related to negotiations with Russia on the end of the war in Ukraine and other important issues.

 

So, America is actively acting and is already saying bluntly: Lithuania's relations with Belarus must be normalized. Moreover, the US is lifting sanctions on the Belarusian economy in exchange for the release of political prisoners. This proves two things: first, cooperation with Belarus is possible and can be productive; second, Belarus is not an absolute "puppet" of Russia, as some of our foreign policymakers explain.

 

Belarusian potash fertilizers are an important factor. Belarus is one of the largest exporters of these fertilizers in the world, and the United States seeks to diversify imports. Exports through Lithuanian and Latvian ports are more economically efficient than through Russian infrastructure.

 

So, if Belarusian fertilizers travel to America through Lithuania, this will in itself be a guarantee of our country's security. It can be said that there is no better security guarantee than the direct economic interest of the United States of America. In this case, additional security guarantees are not even needed.

 

Secondly, today Belarus exports fertilizers through Russian seaports, paying Russia for it. We all have a feeling where this money could go in the Russian budget. And this money could come to Lithuania - to strengthen the country's defense, improve infrastructure, etc.

Economic ties - both benefit and leverage

 

Historically, Belarus has been an important trade partner of Lithuania and a source of transit flows. For a long time, a large part of Belarusian cargo, especially potash fertilizers and oil products, was exported through the port of Klaipėda.

 

These flows generated significant income for the Lithuanian transport and logistics sector, strengthened the competitiveness of Lithuanian Railways, Klaipėda Seaport and related services.

 

However, economic cooperation with Belarus is important for Lithuania not only in terms of direct income, but also as a geopolitical instrument. The existence of alternative export routes through Lithuania reduces Belarus' dependence on Russian infrastructure - ports, railways, - thus giving Minsk more freedom of maneuver. In addition, Lithuania gains certain leverage that can be used in negotiations on security, information exchange or regional stability issues. If economic ties with Belarus are severed or severely limited, these flows are redirected to Russian ports, which not only reduces economic benefits for Lithuania, but also further integrates Belarus into the Russian economic space.

 

Finally, confrontational policies increase uncertainty in the region, worsen the investment environment and weaken Lithuania's reputation as a reliable transit country.

 

Instead of conclusions: it is time for change

 

Lithuania's current policy towards Belarus seems not only inconsistent, but also strategically short-sighted. Instead of seeking real, tangible results, it relies on declarations that neither change the situation in Minsk nor strengthen Lithuania's security or economy.

 

This does not mean that Lithuania should give up value principles or ignore human rights violations. However, foreign policy cannot be based solely on moral principles, ignoring geopolitical reality.

 

Today, it is obvious that the course chosen so far in relation to Belarus has not achieved its goals. On the contrary, it has contributed to processes that weaken Lithuania's positions in the region. Therefore, it is time to abandon illusions and start forming a more mature, flexible and national interest-based strategy.

 

Otherwise, we risk continuing to watch how the Lithuanian foreign policy balloon not only collapses, but also finally loses direction.”