China and Russia have a special relationship. Their energy trade is not open market trade. Their energy trade is a source of stable energy supply needed for Chinese AI that is more energy hungry than America’s AI. Still America’s AI needs stable energy source too. Iran war is making American AI energy difficult to afford.
Based on recent reports in early 2026, the intensifying conflict in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war—has created a complex scenario where China and Russia, through a strengthened "special relationship," are leveraging a stable bilateral energy trade to fuel their AI sector, while the U.S. faces significant energy price volatility and challenges in powering its AI infrastructure
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China-Russia Energy & AI Nexus
Deepening Energy Alliance: Russia has solidified its position as a primary energy supplier to China, with mineral fuels constituting over 70% of their trade since 2022. By late 2025, Russia was providing roughly 19% of China’s total energy imports, often at discounted, non-market rates.
Stable Energy Supply for AI: This secured supply allows China to feed the extreme energy demands of its developing AI ecosystem, even as global energy markets experience shocks.
The "Electrification" Edge: China is well-insulated from global oil price spikes because electricity accounts for 30% of its total energy consumption, roughly 50% higher than the US or Europe.
Infrastructure Advantage: In addition to stable energy, China’s industrial base allows it to rapidly develop and deploy energy-intensive AI infrastructure, such as liquid cooling systems, to manage the heat generated by AI servers.
Iran War Impact on US AI Competitiveness
Skyrocketing Energy Costs: The war in Iran, with the attendant shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, has caused a surge in global oil prices.
Rising Costs for Data Centers: The conflict has raised the cost of capital and energy, threatening the economics of the U.S. AI boom, which is highly reliant on immense electricity consumption.
Energy Supply Constraints: While the US is a major energy producer, the conflict is inducing a "hidden tax" on fuel, making it difficult to maintain the cheap, reliable 24/7 power required for massive AI data centers.
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: The war has also disrupted the supply of helium, a byproduct of natural gas extraction essential for semiconductor manufacturing, threatening the production of AI chips.
Conclusion on AI Competition
While the U.S. currently leads in top-tier AI modeling, the 2026 conflict environment suggests that China’s ability to secure reliable and lower-cost energy through its alliance with Russia provides a strategic advantage in the long-term, energy-hungry AI race, particularly as US energy costs face rising pressure.
In a drone and missile swarms’ war the victory doesn’t come without huge numbers of dead invading ground troops. Salivating about quick political and military victories in such a war is a fool’s exercise.
The assertion that drone and missile swarm warfare necessitates high ground troop casualties to achieve victory is supported by recent conflict analysis, which shows that while drones dominate the air, they often create lethal "kill zones" that necessitate brutal, close-quarters infantry fighting to hold ground.
The notion of a quick, bloodless victory via technology is considered a strategic folly for several reasons:
Lethal "Kill Zones" & High Attrition: Drones have created 20-kilometer-deep "kill zones" on the front lines, forcing infantry to operate underground and making troop movements extremely dangerous.
Constant Surveillance: Constant drone surveillance hinders the movement of large units, leading to small-group infiltration tactics where troops are highly vulnerable.
Persistent Need for Ground Troops: Despite intense drone usage, capturing and holding land still requires boots on the ground, and these forces face overwhelming risks from persistent drone strikes.
High Casualty Rates: In some environments, up to 80% of casualties are now caused by drones, making them the most lethal factor on the battlefield.
The Difficulty of Evacuation: Drones make resupply and casualty evacuation incredibly dangerous, resulting in high rates of death for wounded soldiers.
False Sense of Security: Relying on superior technology often overlooks the ability of the defender to adapt, use terrain, or employ their own drone swarms to impose high costs, making victory a long, attritional process rather than a quick one.
In summary, drones have redefined modern warfare, turning it into a high-tech, high-casualty environment where victory requires immense resilience and high troop losses rather than rapid, decisive, and painless success.
This doesn’t stop some analysts in the West from dreaming:
“With the Iran war in its sixth week, we don't yet know how or when it will end. But we know that it matters. A lot. All wars matter intensely to those caught up in them, but not every war matters to the whole world. The Iran war does, and every great and near-great power is adjusting its foreign-policy strategies in light of a conflict that is reshaping world politics.
China is thousands of miles from the Persian Gulf, but between its own need for Gulf oil and the effects of the Iran war on China's neighbors and trading partners, the conflict is having major effects on Beijing. Some effects are positive, from Xi Jinping's point of view. China's return to its program of building new islands in the South China Sea has passed almost unnoticed in Washington, where attention is firmly fixed on the Middle East. But China doesn't welcome higher fuel prices, and its export-dependent economy will be hard hit by any global recession.
We can expect Beijing to focus much harder on gaining the ability to project power in and around the Gulf. Already China has managed to take advantage of its relationship with Pakistan to enhance its diplomatic and security influence over events in the Middle East. This will likely lead, among other things, to an intensification of Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. China will seek more access to strategic ports and routes. India will struggle to frustrate those designs.
Japan has also discovered that distance doesn't insulate it from events in the Middle East. At the same time, Tokyo understands that doubts about President Trump don't insulate it from its need for a strong relationship with a powerful U.S. China's efforts to increase its power and sway in the Gulf and along the prime sea routes pose strategic threats to Japan's access to the Gulf's resources. Tokyo fully realizes that without American power, access to Gulf oil and gas will depend on the caprices of an Iranian government of religious fanatics aligned with Russia and China. Expect Japan to double down on its efforts to rearm, expand security partnerships with friendly neighboring states, and stay focused on maintaining the closest possible relations with an unpredictable Washington.
For India, the shock of the Iran war has been profound. The country has sustained a serious economic setback from high energy prices and disruptions in shipping and travel. In addition, India's rival Pakistan has managed to insert itself into the heart of Middle East diplomacy, even as it deepens its relationship with China. As a neighbor of Iran and a Sunni-majority country with historic links to the Gulf Arab states, Pakistan is well placed to act as a broker for peace talks. Its success in selling itself to Washington as a potential mediator has given it renewed diplomatic clout that India must now work to counter.
For Europe, the Iran war is yet another example of the Continent's declining significance in world affairs, the problems of maintaining a positive relationship with the U.S. in the Trump era, and the difficulty of getting European states to align their policies on important issues. European countries weren't consulted over the decision to launch the war, they have little to no influence over the course of the war, and their interests are unlikely to be uppermost in the minds of those who finally end the war. Worst of all, perhaps, the war has done more to divide European countries than to unite them. While Mr. Trump and the Iran war are deeply unpopular almost everywhere in the European Union, Italy and Spain have taken actions designed to raise difficulties for the American war effort, while Germany and Romania have been more supportive.
Next to the actual belligerents, Russia may have the most to lose in the war. The fuel shortage has boosted Russian oil earnings at a critical moment, and a longer war will likely mean more demand for Russian oil and gas at higher prices in more markets around the world. Beyond that, Russia's interests are more complex. Ukraine's ability to sell its drone expertise to the Gulf Arab countries must have been a disagreeable shock to the Kremlin. The increasing bitterness between Iran and its Arab neighbors also creates problems for Russia's attempts to maintain its deep ties to Iran while building cooperation with countries like the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, the risk of alienating the Trump administration is growing. The Kremlin may get some emotional satisfaction from retaliation against American support for Ukraine by helping Iran target American facilities in the Gulf, but the costs could be high.
From the Russian perspective, the worst possible end to the war would be a collapse of the Iranian regime and an end to Iran's long isolation from the West. This would deprive Moscow of an ally and reduce the perceived value of a Russian alliance among the world's rulers. It would also seriously damage Vladimir Putin's most cherished goal: the restoration of Russian power across the former Soviet Union.
Reintegrating Iran into the global economy would lead to the development of multiple pipeline and freight routes for oil, gas and mineral exports from the landlocked ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia, likely ending any hope that Moscow could reassert dominance over any of them. From an American point of view, increasing the economic dynamism of Central Asia while reducing its dependence on China and Russia would substantially improve the chances for a long-term world peace.
The war shows us all that the security of the Gulf matters to everyone. If at the end of the war Iran retains the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, every country on earth will need Tehran's blessing to access vital fuel and supplies. Whatever one thinks of Mr. Trump and his decision to initiate hostilities, a quick and comprehensive American victory offers the best hope for a peaceful future in the Gulf and beyond.” [1]
1. The Iran War Around the World. Walter Russell Mead. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 07 Apr 2026: A15.
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