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2025 m. balandžio 20 d., sekmadienis

Who Will Survive? Spoiler Alert - Liberals Won't

 

"Every great technological change has a destructive shadow, whose depths swallow ways of life the new order renders obsolete. But the age of digital revolution — the time of the internet and the smartphone and the incipient era of artificial intelligence — threatens an especially comprehensive cull. It’s forcing the human race into what evolutionary biologists call a “bottleneck” — a period of rapid pressure that threatens cultures, customs and peoples with extinction.

When college students struggle to read passages longer than a phone-size paragraph and Hollywood struggles to compete with YouTube and TikTok, that’s the bottleneck putting the squeeze on traditional artistic forms like novels and movies.

When daily newspapers and mainline Protestant denominations and Elks Lodges fade into irrelevance, when sit-down restaurants and shopping malls and colleges begin to trace the same descending arc, that’s the bottleneck tightening around the old forms of suburban middle-class existence.

When moderates and centrists look around and wonder why the world isn’t going their way, why the future seems to belong to weird bespoke radicalisms, to Luigi Mangione admirers and World War II revisionists, that’s the bottleneck crushing the old forms of consensus politics, the low-key ways of relating to political debates.

When young people don’t date or marry or start families, that’s the bottleneck coming for the most basic human institutions of all.

And when, because people don’t pair off and reproduce, nations age and diminish and die away, when depopulation sweeps East Asia and Latin America and Europe, as it will — that’s the last squeeze, the tightest part of the bottleneck, the literal die-off.

The idea that the internet carries a scythe is familiar — think of Blockbuster Video, the pay phone and other early victims of the digital transition. But the scale of the potential extinction still isn’t adequately appreciated.

This isn’t just a normal churn where travel agencies go out of business or Netflix replaces the VCR. Everything that we take for granted is entering into the bottleneck. And for anything that you care about — from your nation to your worldview to your favorite art form to your family — the key challenge of the 21st century is making sure that it’s still there on the other side.

That challenge is made more complex by the fact that much of this extinction will seem voluntary. In a normal evolutionary bottleneck, the goal is surviving some immediate physical threat — a plague or famine, an earthquake, flood or meteor strike. The bottleneck of the digital age is different: The new era is killing us softly, by drawing people out of the real and into the virtual, distracting us from the activities that sustain ordinary life, and finally making existence at a human scale seem obsolete.

In this environment, survival will depend on intentionality and intensity. Any aspect of human culture that people assume gets transmitted automatically, without too much conscious deliberation, is what online slang calls NGMI — not going to make it.

Languages will disappear, churches will perish, political ideas will evanesce, art forms will vanish, the capacity to read and write and figure mathematically will wither, and the reproduction of the species will fail — except among people who are deliberate and self-conscious and a little bit fanatical about ensuring that the things they love are carried forward.

Mere eccentricity doesn’t guarantee survival: There will be forms of resistance and radicalism that turn out to be destructive and others that are just dead ends. But normalcy and complacency will be fatal.

And while this description may sound like pessimism, it’s intended as an exhortation, a call to recognize what’s happening and resist it, to fight for a future where human things and human beings survive and flourish. It’s an appeal for intentionality against drift, for purpose against passivity — and ultimately for life itself against extinction.

The fatal progression

But first we have to understand what we are experiencing.

It starts with substitution: The digital age takes embodied things and offers virtual substitutes, moving entire realms of human interaction and engagement from the physical marketplace to the computer screen. For romance, dating apps supplant bars and workplaces and churches. For friendship, texting and DMing replaces hanging out. For entertainment, the small screen replaces moviegoing and live performance. For shopping and selling, the online store supplants the mall. For reading and writing, the short paragraph and the quick reply replace the book, the essay, the letter.

Some of these substitutes have meaningful upsides. There are forms of intellectual and scientific work that were impossible before the internet annihilated distance. Remote work can be a boon to family life even if it limits other forms of social interaction. The online popularity of long podcasts might betoken a retreat from literate to oral culture, but it’s at least counterexample to the general trend of short, shorter, shortest.

But in many cases, the virtual substitutes are clearly inferior to what they’re replacing. The streaming algorithm tends to yield artistic mediocrity compared with the movies of the past, or even the golden age television shows of 20 years ago. BookTok is to literature as OnlyFans is to great romantic love. Online sources of local news are generally lousy compared with the vanished ecosystem of print newspapers. Online friendships are thinner than real-world relationships, online dating pairs fewer people off successfully than the dating markets of the prior age. Online porn — well, you get my point.

But this substitution nonetheless succeeds and deepens because of the power of distraction. Even when the new forms are inferior to the older ones, they are more addictive, more immediate, easier to access — and they feel lower-risk, as well. Swipe-based online dating is less likely to find you a spouse, but it still feels much easier than flirting or otherwise putting yourself forward in physical reality. Video games may not offer the same kind of bodily experience as sports and games in real life, but the adrenaline spike is always on offer and there are fewer limits on how late and long you can play. The infinite scroll of social media is worse than a good movie, but you can’t look away, and novels are incredibly hard going by comparison with TikTok or Instagram. Pornography is worse than sex, but it gives you a simulacrum of anything you want, whenever you want it, without any negotiation with another human being’s needs.

So even though people ultimately get less out of the virtual substitutes, they still tend to come back to them and eventually depend on them. Thus under digital conditions social life attenuates, romance declines, institutions lose support, the fine arts fade and the popular arts are overrun with slop, and the basic skills and habits that our civilization took for granted — how to have an extended conversation, how to approach a woman or man with romantic interest, how to sit undistracted with a movie or a book — are transmitted only weakly to the next generation.

Then, finally, as local embodied experience becomes less important than virtual alternatives, the power of substitution and distraction feeds a sense that real-world life is fundamentally obsolete.

Online life allows for all kinds of hyper-intense subcultures and niches where this sense of obsolescence is less of an issue. But for the average internet surfer, the normie afloat in the virtual realm, digital life tends to elevate the center over the peripheries, the metropole over the provinces, the drama of celebrity over the quotidian.

The result is a landscape where national politics seems incredibly important and local politics irrelevant; where English can seem like the only language worth knowing and an American presidential election feels like an election for the presidency of the world; where the life of small countries and local cultures seems at best anachronistic; where the celebrity influencer half a world away takes the place in your mental space that friends and neighbors used to occupy.

All this means that even though reality is in fact more real than the virtual world, people may still feel disappointed when they re-enter the everyday after marinating in the digital — the potential mates are less beautiful than the Instagram models, the stakes of a local mayor’s race less significant than whatever Donald Trump is doing now.

That letdown creates a special political problem for liberal democracy, which depends on egalitarian ideas about the importance of the common person, the ordinary citizen. It encourages a fashionable antihumanism, an impulse to justify suicide and expand euthanasia, and a general sense of personal and cultural futility that’s especially apparent when you visit the geographic locales that are aging and depopulating fastest. There’s a palpable feeling in these places that history once happened here, but that now it’s happening only in America and inside your phone — so why would any people bother to build a future for themselves in provincial Italy or rural Japan, or on Caribbean islands outside of the resorts, or in the Balkans or the Baltics?

All of this describes our trajectory before artificial intelligence entered the picture, and every force I’ve just described is likely to become more intense the more A.I. remakes our lives. You can have far more substitution — digital workers for flesh-and-blood colleagues, ChatGPT summaries for original books, A.I. girlfriends and boyfriends and companions. You can have far more distraction — an endless stream of A.I.-generated content and entertainment and addictive slop from a “creator” whose engine never tires. And you will absolutely have a stronger sense of human obsolescence or superfluity — economic and social, artistic and intellectual — if A.I. travels just a little bit farther along its current lines of advance. It’s as though all the trends of the digital era have been building up to this consummation of its logic.

How much survives?

Nothing I’ve described is universal: Unless the true A.I. doomsayers are correct, in the year 2100 there will still be nations, families, religions, children, marriages, great books.

But how much survives will depend on our own deliberate choices — the choice to date and love and marry and procreate, the choice to fight for particular nations and traditions and art forms and worldviews, the choice to limit our exposure to the virtual, not necessarily refusing new technology but trying every day, in every setting, to make ourselves its master.

Some of these choices will be especially difficult for liberals, since they will often smack of chauvinism and fanaticism and reaction.

Family lines will survive only because of a clear preference for one’s own kith and kin as opposed to just some general affection for humanity.

Important art forms will survive only because of a frank elitism, an insistence on distinction, a contempt for mediocrity.

 Religions will survive only through a conscious embrace of neotraditionalism, in whatever varied forms.

Small nations will survive only if their 21st-century inhabitants look back to 19th-century nation builders, Irish nationalists and Young Turks and the original Zionists, rather than to the end-of-history cosmopolitanism in which they’re currently dissolving.

So liberalism itself will endure and thrive only if it finds a way to weave some of these intense impulses, already attenuated before the internet, back into its vision of the good society, its understanding of human needs and obligations.

For nonliberals, on the other hand, the temptation will be to embrace radicalism and disruption for their own sake, without regard to their actual fruits — a clear tendency of the populism that governs us today.

Or to imagine a swift technological solution to a crisis created by technology, even if that solution marries dehumanization with authoritarianism. (Imagine the Chinese Politburo with artificial wombs.)

Or to simply embrace the culling of the common person, the disappearance of the ordinary, the emptying of provinces and hinterlands — on the theory that some new master race of human-A.I. hybrids stand to inherit anyway.

But perhaps the strongest temptation for everyone will be to imagine that you are engaged in some radical project, some new intentional way of living, but all the while you are being pulled back into the virtual, the performative, the fundamentally unreal.

This is one temptation I’m very familiar with, as someone whose professional life is a mostly digital existence, where together with others who share my concerns I am perpetually talking, talking, talking … when the necessary thing is to go out into reality and do.

Have the child. Practice the religion. Found the school. Support the local theater, the museum, the opera or concert hall, even if you can see it all on YouTube. Pick up the paintbrush, the ball, the instrument. Learn the language — even if there’s an app for it. Learn to drive, even if you think soon Waymo or Tesla will drive for you. Put up headstones, don’t just burn your dead. Sit with the child, open the book, and read.

As the bottleneck tightens, all survival will depend on heeding once again the ancient admonition: I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live [1].” [2]

1. Moses in Deuteronomy 30:19

2.  Come With Me if You Want to Survive an Age of Extinction: Ross Douthat.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 19, 2025.

Amerika nori Dievo: tikėti

 

 „Dauguma žmonių yra atsargūs valdžios, ateities ir net vieni kitų atžvilgiu, bet vis dar tiki stulbinančiomis galimybėmis. Beveik visi amerikiečiai – 92 procentai suaugusiųjų – sako, kad turi dvasinį tikėjimą Dievu, žmonių sielomis ar dvasiomis, pomirtiniu gyvenimu ar kažkuo „už gamtos pasaulio ribų“, kaip pranešėme anksčiau šiais metais.

 

 Atrodo, kad šalis pripažįsta šį plačiai paplitusį dvasinį alkį. Amerikos sekuliarizacija sustoja, žmonės nustojo palikti bažnyčias, o religija užima svarbesnį vaidmenį viešajame gyvenime – Baltuosiuose rūmuose, Silicio slėnyje, Holivude ir net Harvarde. Tai didelė kartų kaita.

 

Bet kaip tai iš tikrųjų atrodo žmonių gyvenime?

 

 Praėjusius metus praleidau, pranešdamas apie naują „The Times“ projektą „Tikėti“. Šis projektas man yra asmeninis. Arkanzase užaugau, kaip pamaldus mormonas. Išėjau iš Pastarųjų Dienų Šventųjų Jėzaus Kristaus Bažnyčios ir suprantu, kaip kova su tikėjimo problema gali nulemti gyvenimą. Tikėjausi užfiksuoti, kaip ta kelionė atrodė ir kitiems – tiek religijoje, tiek už jos ribų. Apklausiau šimtus žmonių, aplankiau daugybę maldos namų ir paprašiau „Times“ skaitytojų pasakojimų. Atsiliepė daugiau, nei 4 tūkst.

 

 Savo pranešime radau, kad yra daug priežasčių, dėl kurių toks pokytis Amerikos gyvenime. Tyrėjai teigia, kad pandemija ir riboti šalies socialinės apsaugos tinklai paskatino žmones laikytis (ar net kreiptis į) religijos, kad gautų paramą. Tačiau yra ir kita priežastis: daugelis amerikiečių yra nepatenkinti religijos alternatyvomis. Jie jaučia egzistencinį negalavimą ir ieško pagalbos.

 

Žmonės nori stipresnių bendruomenių, prasmingesnių ritualų ir erdvių savo dvasingumui išreikšti. Jie taip pat trokšta turtingesnių, niuansuotų pokalbių apie tikėjimą.

 

 Netenkinančios alternatyvos

 

 Per pastaruosius kelis dešimtmečius apie 40 milijonų amerikiečių paliko bažnyčias, o žmonių, kurie sako, kad jie neturi religijos, skaičius išaugo iki maždaug 30 procentų šalies.

 

 Daugelis žmonių kreipėsi į savo darbus, sporto užsiėmimus (joga, CrossFit, SoulCycle) ir mistiką (astrologijos programėles ir meditaciją), ieškodami atsakymų, kaip gyventi gerai. Kai kurie nustojo kalbėti apie savo praeities tikėjimą – tai buvo nemadinga dideliuose miestuose ir koledžų miesteliuose.

 

 Tyrimai leidžia suprasti, kaip tai vyksta: „Egzistuoja didžiulė empirinė parama duomenimis, kad verta reguliariai būti maldos namuose, atsižvelgiant į įvairius rodiklius – psichinę sveikatą, fizinę sveikatą, turėti daugiau draugų, būti mažiau vienišiems“, – sakė Ryanas Burge'as, buvęs pastorius ir pagrindinis religinių tendencijų tyrinėtojas.

 

 Pew tyrimų centro atliktas tyrimas parodė, kad žmonės, kurie praktikuoja religiją, yra laimingesni už tuos, kurie to nesilaiko. Jie taip pat yra sveikesni: jie žymiai rečiau serga depresija arba rečiau per anksti miršta nuo savižudybės, alkoholizmo, vėžio, širdies ir kraujagyslių ligų ar kitų priežasčių, parodė keli Harvardo tyrimai.

 

 Tai, žinoma, netinka visiems. Daugelis žmonių susikūrė laimingą, sveiką gyvenimą be tikėjimo, o maždaug trečdalis amerikiečių, palikusių religiją, laikosi puikiai, rodo naujas Burge tyrimas.

 

 Tačiau apskritai religija, atrodo, padeda žmonėms, suteikdama jiems tikėjimą kažkuo, priklausymą bendruomenei ir elgesį, kuriuo vadovaujasi jų gyvenimas.

 

 Religija patenkina psichologinį poreikį, – sakė Pensilvanijos universiteto politologė Michele Margolis. „Mes norime jausti ryšį“, – sakė ji. „Mes norime jausti, kad gyvenimas turi prasmę“. Rasti šiuos dalykus atskirai arba sukurti juos nuo nulio yra „tikrai sunku“, pridūrė ji.

 

 Naujas pokalbis

 

 Dabar kažkas keičiasi.

 

 Dauguma amerikiečių laikosi religingų pažiūrų (apie 70 procentų suaugusiųjų), o daugelis yra labai atsidavę savo tikėjimui (44 procentai amerikiečių sako, kad meldžiasi bent kartą per dieną). Pirmą kartą per dešimtmečius Amerikos religingumas išlieka stabilus. Tai, žinoma, gali pasikeisti ateinančiais metais, ypač senstant jauniems žmonėms.

 

 Tačiau kol kas daugelis „neturinčių“ – žmonių, kurie neturi jokios religinės priklausomybės –, su kuriais kalbėjau, auštant pripažįsta, kad, palikdami tikėjimą, jie „išmetė kūdikį su krikšto vandeniu“, kaip sakė mano kolegė iš nuomonės Michelle Cottle.

 

 Kai kurie netgi atsiverčia į religiją. 39 metų Minesotoje gyvenantis Mattas McDonoughas, pandemijos metu prislėgtas ir pasmerktas, sakė, kad vyrų Biblijos studijose rado „gilią“ bendruomenę. "Aš pasikrikštijau jau suaugęs. Mano psichinė ir fizinė sveikata labai pagerėjo."

 

 Dauguma sako, kad negrįžta prie religijos. Tačiau daugelis žmonių man pasakė, kad nori naujų erdvių aptarti ir tyrinėti savo dvasingumą. „Mano vidinis gyvenimas kupinas dvasinių apmąstymų, todėl kartais trokštu atviresnio dialogo apie tai“, – sakė 42 metų Doris Andújar iš Ponce, P.R.

 

 Ieško tikėjimo

 

 Panašu, kad šį ilgesį geriau įvardija konservatoriai. Jie kalba apie „civilizacinį“ atsinaujinimą ir moralinių vertybių atkūrimą. Jie žada išsigelbėjimą per politiką. Savo vizijai perduoti jie naudojasi evangelinės krikščionybės infrastruktūra. Tai jiems tinka.

 

 Bet ar tai vienintelis būdas? Sėkmingos alternatyvos neatsirado dideliu mastu, o daugelis liberalų nepaisė amerikietiško dvasingumo – šio ilgesio – savo partijos nelaimei.

 

 Šie duomenys atskleidžia, kad norint rasti kelią į priekį, gali tekti pripažinti, kad amerikiečiai nori kovoti su sunkiais klausimais, kaip gyventi. Jie ieško atsakymų į svaiginančius sąvokas – išpažintį, išpirkimą, atleidimą ir pasiaukojimą.“ [1]

 

Mažas tikinčiųjų skaičius Vakarų Europoje koreliuoja su branduolinio karo ištroškusiais šių šalių lyderiais, nuolat besižvalgančiais, kaip gauti daugiau ginklų, kaip paskleisti branduolinį ginklą, nuolat besiruošiančiais atakuoti kitas šalis ir net tanklaivius Baltijos jūroje. Didelės nuodėmės jiems nėra. Jie mato save, kaip tik dulkių derinius, pasiruošusius grįžti į pradines dulkes, net ir radioaktyvias.

 

1.  America Wants a God: Believing. Jackson, Lauren.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 20, 2025.

America Wants a God: Believing


"Most people are wary of the government, the future and even each other, but they still believe in astonishing possibilities. Almost all Americans — 92 percent of adults — say they have a spiritual belief, in a god, human souls or spirits, an afterlife or something “beyond the natural world,” as we reported earlier this year.

The country seems to be acknowledging this widespread spiritual hunger. America’s secularization is on pause, people have stopped leaving churches, and religion is taking a more prominent role in public life — in the White House, Silicon Valley, Hollywood and even at Harvard. It’s a major, generational shift. But what does this actually look like in people’s lives?

I have spent the past year reporting “Believing,” a new project for The Times. This project is personal to me. I was raised a devout Mormon in Arkansas. I’ve left the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and I understand how wrestling with belief can define a life. I hoped to capture what that journey looked like for others, too — both inside and outside of religion. I interviewed hundreds of people, visited dozens of houses of worship and asked Times readers for their stories. More than 4,000 responded.

In my reporting, I found that there are many reasons for this shift in American life. Researchers say the pandemic and the country’s limited social safety nets have inclined people to stick with (or even turn to) religion for support. But there is another reason, too: Many Americans are dissatisfied with the alternatives to religion. They feel an existential malaise, and they’re looking for help. People want stronger communities, more meaningful rituals and spaces to express their spirituality. They’re also longing to have richer, more nuanced conversations about belief.

Unsatisfying alternatives

Over the past few decades, around 40 million Americans left churches, and the number of people who say they have no religion grew to about 30 percent of the country.

Many people turned to their jobs, gym classes (yoga, CrossFit, SoulCycle) and mysticism (astrology apps and meditation) for answers on how to live well. Some stopped speaking about their past faith — it was unfashionable, in big cities and on college campuses, to do so.

Studies provide a sense of how that’s going: “There is overwhelming empirical support for the value of being at a house of worship on a regular basis on all kinds of metrics — mental health, physical health, having more friends, being less lonely,” said Ryan Burge, a former pastor and a leading researcher on religious trends.

People who practice a religion tend to be happier than those who don’t, a study by the Pew Research Center found. They are also healthier: They are significantly less likely to be depressed or to die prematurely from suicide, alcoholism, cancer, cardiovascular illness or other causes, multiple studies from Harvard found.

This isn’t true for everyone, of course. Many people have built happy, healthy lives outside of faith, and about a third of Americans who have left religion appear to be doing just fine, according to a new study from Burge.

But in aggregate, religion seems to help people by giving them what sociologists call the “three B’s” — belief in something, belonging in a community and behaviors to guide their lives.

Religion fills a psychological need, Michele Margolis, a political scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, told me. “We want to feel connection,” she said. “We want to feel like life makes sense.” Finding these things alone or creating them from scratch is “really hard,” she added.

A new conversation

Now, something is shifting.

Most Americans identify as religious (around 70 percent of adults), and many are very committed to their faith (44 percent of Americans say they pray at least once a day). For the first time in decades, America’s religiosity is remaining stable. This may change, of course, in the coming years, especially as young people age.

But for now, many “nones” — people who have no religious affiliation — that I spoke to seem to have a dawning recognition that, in leaving faith, they threw “the baby out with the baptismal water,” as my Opinion colleague Michelle Cottle said.

Some are even converting to a religion. Depressed and doomscrolling during the pandemic, Matt McDonough, a 39-year-old in Minnesota, said he found a “profound” community in a men’s Bible study. “I got baptized as an adult. My mental and physical health improved dramatically.”

Most say they aren’t going back to religion. But many people told me they want new spaces to discuss and explore their spirituality. “My inner life is rich with spiritual reflection, and I sometimes yearn for a more open dialogue about it,” said Doris Andújar, 42, from Ponce, P.R.

Looking for belief

Conservatives seem to be better at naming this longing. They speak to “civilizational” renewal and a restoration of moral values. They promise deliverance through politics. They use the infrastructure of evangelical Christianity to communicate their vision. It’s working for them.

But is this the only way? Successful alternatives haven’t emerged at scale, and many liberals have ignored American spirituality — this longing — at their party’s peril.

This data reveals that finding a way forward may require acknowledging that Americans want to wrestle with hard questions about how to live. They’re looking to heady concepts — confession, atonement, forgiveness and sacrifice — for answers." [1]

Low numbers of believers in Western Europe correlates with nuclear war-thirsty leaders of these countries, constantly looking out how to get more weapons, how to spread nuclear weapons, constantly scheming to attack other countries and even tankers in Baltic sea. There is no big sin for them. They see themselves as just combinations of dust ready to return back to original dust.

1.  America Wants a God: Believing. Jackson, Lauren.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 20, 2025.