China's Top Tech Talent Is Heading Back Home --- Those who return after working here, called 'sea turtles,' are fueling efforts to take on Silicon Valley

“When Meta Platforms said in April that it would lay off 10% of its staff, Allen Sun quickly booked a trip to Menlo Park, Calif.

 

It was a prime opportunity. Sun, a Beijing-based headhunter for some of the biggest Chinese tech companies, works to lure China-born talent back home, targeting people at U.S.-based companies such as Meta, Google, Anthropic and Amazon. Some clients are authorizing him to promise salaries that match or exceed the workers' Silicon Valley pay -- a windfall given China's lower cost of living.

 

"The compensation is very competitive," said Sun.

 

For decades, making it in the U.S. was the ultimate sign of success for China's best and brightest. Now, many of them are coming home -- and the reverse brain drain is fueling Beijing's efforts to edge out the U.S. in artificial intelligence, robotics and medical research.

 

There is an unprecedented jostling for AI talent among the richest companies and global superpowers that has skyrocketed tech researchers to NBA and Hollywood levels of wealth and spurred a cutthroat recruitment blitz across the industry. It's not just American CEOs attempting to entice researchers with lavish job offers.

 

(Meta's Mark Zuckerberg was dangling $100 million pay packages last year.)

 

Recent examples of high-profile AI talent poached by top Chinese tech companies include Wu Yonghui, a former vice president of research at Google who helped develop Gemini and now heads research for TikTok-parent ByteDance's AI arm, and Yao Shunyu, a former OpenAI researcher who was named Tencent Holdings' chief AI scientist.

 

There's a longstanding name within China for those going back home -- "sea turtles," a pun on the Mandarin term for overseas returnees, haigui, that also evokes female sea turtles' instinct to return to their natal beach after years of migrating around the world's oceans.

 

But the trend as it relates to top tech talent today has implications for American economic competitiveness, both now and in the future. The number of recent Chinese graduates returning home to seek jobs grew 12% in 2025 from the previous year, and the figure has more than doubled since 2018, according to a report by Chinese recruiting platform Zhaopin.

 

Once known more as a technology copycat than as an innovator, China now offers returnees a chance to work in cutting-edge industries. National and local governments dangle perks such as housing subsidies and startup funding. The shift also comes as some Chinese feel less welcome in the U.S. owing to worsening U.S.-China relations and tightening immigration policy. Returnees said they felt it was harder to advance to leadership roles in the workplace being Chinese in the U.S. In some cases, returnees were motivated by the promise of more professional freedom.

 

Zhang Kai is a star researcher who works to visualize the inside of cells down to the near-atomic level, an area of high interest for pharmaceutical companies. Earlier this year, he left a professorship at Yale for the state-run University of Science and Technology of China.

 

Zhang said it was becoming harder for Chinese researchers to lead ambitious projects in the U.S., and that the political environment was getting tougher, citing the example of a Chinese Ph.D. student working with him who was restricted from entering the country during the first Trump administration. "Invisible restrictions exist," he said in an email. "While I don't intend to frame this as a lofty nationalist gesture, Trump's actions over the years actually made me 'more patriotic.'"

 

Jeff Li felt pigeonholed in his job in the U.S. After graduating from New York University with a master's degree in computer science, he had to work in the field in order to stay in the States. He felt like U.S. companies tended to hire Chinese workers for engineering jobs, but he was interested in exploring a role in product management.

 

He landed a job at Microsoft and moved to the Seattle area in 2018. It was his first time living in the suburbs, where it was pitch-black at night and he needed to drive 15 minutes to buy anything. He felt the "Seattle freeze" -- what West Coasters refer to as the city's reputation for being a difficult place to make friends.

 

As an H-1B visa holder, he felt nervous leaving the U.S., fearing he would not be able to get back in.

 

He decided to move back to Beijing at the end of 2021 to work at a leading Chinese tech company. Going home had its own downsides. The country is notorious for its "996" work culture: working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week. He had to get used to living in a big city again, where strangers pressed up against him on a crowded subway.

 

But his quality of life felt better. He could order food delivery from an app anytime, anywhere. He didn't have to worry about renewing his visa.

 

Now, Li is building AI agent products for a startup. His friends back in the U.S. have gotten green cards and bought houses, but don't have much flexibility in their career paths. Li said he felt more unrestrained.

 

"Even though the U.S. has many broader advantages, as a Chinese person, China is my home turf," he said.

 

Many Chinese professionals continue to build careers in the U.S. Four out of five among 6,700 Chinese nationals receiving a research doctorate from a U.S. academic institution from July 2023 to June 2024 indicated an intention to stay in the U.S. rather than return home, according to the latest annual census of the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics.

 

And U.S. companies still generally offer much higher pay and better work-life balance than Chinese competitors. America remains the world leader in AI models and other cutting-edge technologies. Many Chinese professionals have settled down in the U.S. and are raising families, making it hard to uproot their lives.

 

But the Chinese government is working to ease homecoming pains.

 

Shenzhen, a tech hub in southern China, is advertising tax breaks and the equivalent of more than $700,000 in subsidies for qualified overseas returnees. Shanghai's Pudong District is offering up to roughly $14.7 million in project funding for top young talent in science and technology.

 

Another district in Shanghai has a program targeting Ph.D. holders who have held senior positions in companies abroad, as well as people under 40 with experience overseas. Those who make the cut are eligible for a living allowance of up to nearly $300,000 and startups can receive free or low-cost office space.

 

Some recruits help Chinese companies expand to other countries, using their knowledge of languages and local work cultures, said Zak Dychtwald, who runs Bridgeworks Global, a Shanghai-based consulting firm that works with multinational companies. "Chinese companies need people who understand global markets and understand global management," Dychtwald said.

 

Recruiting efforts extend to students who have not yet embarked on a career path. China's Education Ministry in 2022 established a recruitment platform for students returning from abroad, and leading tech companies such as Huawei and Tencent have early-career programs for overseas students. Last year, 535,600 students returned to China from overseas, up from 415,600 in 2023, according to China's Education Ministry.

 

A LinkedIn survey of more than 1,000 overseas Chinese Ph.D. students last year found that 59% planned to return to China after graduating, up from 38% in 2024.

 

The number of people from China living in the U.S. on visas for purposes such as education and work, including H-1Bs, has fallen each year from fiscal year 2022 to 2024, according to Homeland Security Department data.

 

In part, that is because H-1B visas, the main pathway for highly skilled foreign professionals to work in the U.S., have become a political flashpoint in the U.S., especially within the MAGA movement, with critics saying the program allows tech companies to hire foreign workers for cheap instead of Americans. The Trump administration has added a $100,000 fee for H-1B visas and is proposing higher wage requirements.

 

For those Chinese who go back home, the reason isn't always politics or money. One bioengineering Ph.D. graduate worried about gun violence. An AI scholar felt he was discriminated against due to his race, while he was shut out of programs for underrepresented minorities. A pharmaceutical researcher said he wanted to be closer to his aging parents.

 

Lu Wuyuan, a scientist, moved to Shanghai in 2020 after three decades in the U.S. When he first arrived in 1990 to study at Purdue University, he felt like he was in a movie. Driving along I-65 from Indianapolis to West Lafayette, he passed by idyllic farmland and gentle rolling hills.

 

He became an American citizen and raised two sons in the U.S. As a tenured professor at the University of Maryland, he studied cancer, HIV and other infectious diseases.

 

Then, under the first Trump administration, the U.S. government began scrutinizing academics' ties with China, concerned about national security. In 2018, Lu became one of hundreds of scientists investigated by the National Institutes of Health over alleged undisclosed ties with China. Lu said Maryland knew about and encouraged his collaborations with Chinese universities, so he thought the NIH inquiry would pass quickly.

 

The investigation dragged on. By 2020, Lu had enough. He quit and moved to Shanghai to join the faculty of Fudan University, a prestigious school that had been trying to recruit him for years. At Fudan, Lu has continued to research infectious diseases, recently patenting technology for an improved Covid-19 antiviral, which was licensed by an American company.

 

"When China is ascending to become a global power, that makes your choice much easier," he said.” [1]

 

1. EXCHANGE --- China's Top Tech Talent Is Heading Back Home --- Those who return after working here, called 'sea turtles,' are fueling efforts to take on Silicon Valley. Miao, Hannah; Emont, Jon.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 May 2026: B1.

Bideno ir Trumpo pramonės politika nepadeda: Xi Jinpingo pramonės politika yra taikoma viskam ir jau dirba pasauliniu mąstu

„Per dešimtmečius nuo tada, kai Kinija prisijungė prie pasaulio ekonomikos, JAV prezidentai keliavo į Pekiną su nuspėjamu reikalavimų sąrašu: nustokite vogti intelektinę nuosavybę, neverskite technologijų perdavimo, atverkite savo rinkas. Donaldas Trumpas laikėsi šio scenarijaus savo vizito 2017 m. metu.

 

Pakartoti šiuos reikalavimus praėjusią savaitę būtų buvę beprasmiška.

 

Šie reikalavimai atspindi Kinijos pramonės politikos (apskritai vyriausybės paramos privilegijuotiems sektoriams) požiūrį, kuris yra apgailėtinai pasenęs.

 

Xi Jinpingas pakėlė Kinijos pramonės politiką į tai, ko pasaulis dar nematė. Ji taikoma beveik kiekvienai pramonės šakai ir regionui, paklausai ir pasiūlai, paslaugoms ir prekėms, sudėtingiems ir kasdieniškiems dalykams. Jos tikslai yra ekonominiai, technologiniai ir strateginiai. Jos priemonės yra mikro ir makroekonominės.

 

Nėra akivaizdaus sprendimo. Pranešama, kad Trumpas užsitikrino susitarimus su Kinija dėl sojų pupelių, energijos ir orlaivių pirkimo, karinės įrangos tiekimo Iranui sulaikymo ir didesnio atsivėrimo JAV verslui. Tačiau visa tai nesustabdys Kinijos nuo vis didesnės pasaulinės rinkos dalies prarijimo.

 

Tyrimų organizacija „Rhodium Group“ JAV prekybos rūmų vardu parengtoje naujoje, nerimą keliančioje ataskaitoje nurodomi pagrindiniai Kinijos „viską apimančios pramonės politikos“ bruožai.

 

Daugelis Kinijos produktų dabar be vyriausybės pagalbos prilygsta arba pranoksta Vakarų konkurentus kokybe ir kaina.

 

Tačiau Pekinas, užuot mažinęs paramą, ją toliau plečia. 2021 m. paskelbtame šalies penkerių metų plane išvardyti 19 prioritetinių sektorių. Naujausiame, kovo mėnesį paskelbtame plane, išvardyti 24, pridedant „smegenų ir kompiuterių sąsajas“ ir „branduolių sintezės energiją“.

 

Nors tokie seksualūs produktai kaip išmanieji telefonai ir elektrinės transporto priemonės užima dėmesio centrą, Kinijos ambicijos apima ir brandžius bei kasdieniškus dalykus.

 

2015 m. paskelbtame plane „Pagaminta Kinijoje 2025“, kuris sukėlė tiek daug nerimo Vakaruose, buvo numatyta 10 pramonės šakų, kurios bus savarankiškos. 2023 m. atnaujinime viena iš jų buvo išbraukta ir pridėtos septynios, įskaitant brandžias pramonės šakas, tokias kaip buitiniai prietaisai ir tekstilė.

 

Geras pavyzdys – cheminės medžiagos: pasaulinis tetrachloretileno, naudojamo cheminiam valymui, eksportas nuo to laiko išaugo 25 kartus. 2019 m. o-ksileno, naudojamo plastikuose ir dangose, eksportas išaugo 12 kartų.

 

Cheminės medžiagos taip pat iliustruoja Kinijos pažadų sumažinti perteklinius pajėgumus, kurie sumažino kainas ir pelną, tuštumą. „Rhodium“ praneša, kad 2025 m. direktyvoje buvo žadėta spręsti naftos chemijos perteklinių pajėgumų problemą, tačiau taikytasi tik į senesnes nei 20 metų gamyklas, kurios sudaro 5–6 % pajėgumų. Planas toli gražu ne mažino gamybos apimties, o buvo skirtas perkelti pramonę nuo birių prie didelės vertės cheminių medžiagų ir padidinti gamybą 5 % per metus.

 

„Rhodium“ praneša, kad Kinijos įmonėms pasiekus technologinę lygybę su savo konkurentais, jos užima rinkos dalį kvapą gniaužiančiu greičiu. „Rhodium“ skaičiavimais, 2016 m. Kinija kontroliavo daugiau nei 50 % eksporto apimčių 163 pramonės šakose iš maždaug 2000, apie kurias yra duomenų. Iki 2024 m. šis skaičius išaugo iki 315.

 

Didžiulis Kinijos prekybos perteklius dažnai siejamas su silpna vidaus paklausa. Tačiau Kinija gali sukurti paklausą, kai tik nori. Kad puoselėtų savo dronus, Pekinas skatina daugybę sektorių integruoti dronus, „papildydamas tai viešosiomis investicijomis į infrastruktūrą, įskaitant specialiųjų vietos valdžios obligacijų naudojimą“, rašo Rhodium.

 

Xi Jinpingas kadaise paslaugas laikė prastesnėmis už „realiąją“ ekonomiką. Tačiau dabar nebe. Valstybės direktyvos išskiria didelės vertės paslaugas, tokias kaip biofarmacijos sutartys. Rhodium apibendrina, kad pardavimai nuo 2018 iki 2022 m. padvigubėjo, o prognozuojama, kad iki 2027 m. jie vėl padvigubės.

 

Nacionalinis saugumas yra neatsiejama Xi Jinpingo pramonės politikos dalis. Importo panaikinimas daro Kiniją mažiau pažeidžiamą užsienio spaudimui, o didėjanti eksporto rinkos dalis daro kitus labiau pažeidžiamus Kinijos spaudimui.

 

Taigi, Xi Jinpingas teikia pirmenybę „užsikimšimo taškų“ produktams, kurie yra labai svarbūs didesnėms tiekimo grandinėms, pavyzdžiui, organinėms cheminėms medžiagoms ir mašinoms, praneša Rhodium.

 

Kinija reguliariai atsako prieš nedraugiškas vyriausybes ginkluodama savo rinką – tai yra, sustabdydama jų eksportą. Užsikimšimo taškų pavertimas ginklu yra galingesnis, nes gali būti uždarytos ištisos gamybos linijos. Net JAV siekė prekybos karo paliaubų, kai Kinija įvedė retųjų žemių ir svarbiausių mineralų eksporto kontrolę. „Didėjant priklausomybei nuo Kinijos, užsienio vyriausybių gebėjimas sušvelninti šią priklausomybę mažėja“, – perspėja Rhodium.

 

Dėl plačiai paplitusios Kinijos pramonės politikos konkurentams sunku atsilaikyti. Pavyzdžiui, Trumpo tarifai sumažino JAV prekybos deficitą su Kinija. Tačiau Kinija nukreipė eksportą į kitas rinkas. Kadangi Kinijos žaliavos yra visur pasaulinėse tiekimo grandinėse, į JAV patenkančio kiniško turinio vertė gali išlikti stabili net ir mažėjant importui.

 

Tai būtų galima spręsti nustatant tarifus kiniškam turiniui, neatsižvelgiant į produkto kilmės vietą, arba taikant griežtesnes kilmės taisykles – tai ypač svarbi Trumpo prekybos derybininkų kryptis.

 

Tačiau tai nebūtų išeitis, įgalinanti išspręsti konkurencinę grėsmę. JAV galėtų uždrausti kiekvieną Kinijoje pagamintą produktą, tačiau tie produktai ir toliau didintų rinkos dalį užsienyje, keldami grėsmę JAV lyderystei. Pavyzdžiui, Kinijos elektromobiliuose gali būti įdiegta kiniška programinė įranga ir dirbtinis intelektas. Šioms elektromobilių sistemoms užimant rinkos dalį užsienyje, Kinijos programinė įranga ir dirbtinis intelektas gali išstumti JAV konkurentus, kaip pasaulinis standartas.

 

Tai reikalauja bendro visų rinkos demokratijų atsako į Kinijos pramonės politiką. Tačiau JAV sąjungininkų noras koordinuoti veiksmus su JAV Kinijos klausimu Trumpo valdymo metu susilpnėjo.

 

Kinijos pramonės politikos Achilo kulnas yra jos kaina ir švaistymas. Kinija turi didesnį biudžeto deficitą, palyginti su ekonomine produkcija, nei JAV. Be pažangios gamybos, ekonomika merdi, ją slegia skolos, defliacija ir senstanti demografinė padėtis.

 

Todėl daugelis kritikų tikisi, net viliasi, kad Kinijos pramonės politika galiausiai žlugs dėl savo pačios prieštaravimų svorio.

 

Tačiau nėra jokių garantijų, kad tai įvyks greitai. Perfrazuojant posakį apie rinkas, Kinija gali išlikti neracionali ilgiau, nei užsienio konkurentai gali išlikti mokūs.“ [1]

 

1. U.S. News -- Capital Account: Xi's Industrial Policy of Everything. Ip, Greg.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 May 2026: A2.  

Biden and Trump's industrial policies are not helping: Xi Jinping's industrial policies are applicable to everything and are already working globally

“In the decades since China joined the world economy, U.S. presidents have traveled to Beijing with a predictable list of demands: stop stealing intellectual property, don't force technology transfer, open your markets. Donald Trump followed the script on his visit in 2017.

 

To repeat those demands this past week would have been pointless.

 

Those demands reflect a view of Chinese industrial policy (broadly, government support for favored sectors) that is woefully out of date.

 

Xi Jinping has elevated Chinese industrial policy into something the world has never seen. It targets almost every industry and region, demand and supply, services and goods, the sophisticated and the mundane. Its goals are economic, technological and strategic. Its tools are micro- and macroeconomic.

 

There's no obvious solution. Trump reportedly secured agreements by China to purchase soybeans, energy and aircraft, withhold military equipment from Iran, and open up more to U.S. business. But none of this will stop China from swallowing ever more global market share.

 

Rhodium Group, a research organization, in a sobering new report prepared on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, identifies the key features of what it calls China's "industrial policy of everything."

 

Many Chinese products now match or beat Western competitors on quality and price without government help.

 

Yet rather than dial back support, Beijing keeps broadening it. The country's five-year plan issued in 2021 listed 19 priority sectors. The latest, released in March, lists 24, adding "brain-computer interfaces" and "nuclear fusion energy."

 

While sexy products such as smartphones and electric vehicles hog the limelight, China's ambitions also cover the mature and the mundane.

 

The "Made in China 2025" plan released in 2015, which caused so much consternation in the West, earmarked 10 industries for self-sufficiency. The 2023 update dropped one and added seven, including mature industries such as household appliances and textiles.

 

Chemicals are a good example: Global exports of tetrachloroethylene, used in dry cleaning, have risen 25-fold since 2019. Exports of o-Xylene, used in plastics and coatings, have climbed 12-fold.

 

Chemicals also illustrate the emptiness of China's promises to cut back on overcapacity, which has depressed prices and profits. Rhodium reports that a 2025 directive promised to address petrochemical overcapacity, but only plants more than 20 years old were targeted, accounting for 5% to 6% of capacity. Far from shrinking output, the plan aimed to shift the industry from bulk to high-value chemicals and boost output 5% a year.

 

Rhodium reports that once Chinese firms reach technological parity with their competitors, they take market share at breathtaking speed. In 2016, Rhodium estimates, China controlled more than 50% of export volumes in 163 industries out of about 2,000 for which data are available. By 2024, that had risen to 315.

 

China's massive trade surpluses are often attributed to weak domestic demand. Yet China can create demand when it wants. To nurture its drone industry, Beijing encourages numerous sectors to integrate drones, "complemented by public investment in enabling infrastructure, including the use of local government special bonds," Rhodium writes.

 

Xi once regarded services as inferior to the "real" economy. Not any more. State directives single out high-value services such as biopharma contracting. It saw sales double between 2018 and 2022, and they are projected to double again by 2027, Rhodium concludes.

 

National security is integral to Xi's industrial policy. Eliminating imports makes China less vulnerable to foreign pressure, while increasing export market share makes others more vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

 

Thus, Xi prioritizes "chokepoint" products that are critical to larger supply chains, such as organic chemicals and machinery, Rhodium reports.

 

China routinely retaliates against unfriendly governments by weaponizing its market -- that is, shutting out their exports. Weaponizing chokepoints is more potent, with potential to shut entire production lines. Even the U.S. sought a trade-war truce when China put export controls on rare earths and critical minerals. "As dependence on China increases, the capacity of foreign governments to mitigate that dependence diminishes," Rhodium warns.

 

The pervasive nature of China's industrial policy makes it hard for competitors to counter. Trump's tariffs, for example, have driven down the U.S. trade deficit with China. But China has redirected exports to other markets. And because Chinese inputs are omnipresent in global supply chains, the value of Chinese content entering the U.S. can remain steady even as imports drop.

 

This could be addressed through tariffs on Chinese content, regardless of where the product originated, or through tighter rules of origin, a particular thrust of Trump's trade negotiators.

 

But that wouldn't solve the competitive threat. The U.S. could ban every Chinese-made product, but those products would keep gaining market share abroad, threatening U.S. leadership. For example, Chinese electric vehicles may incorporate Chinese software and artificial intelligence. As those EVs gain market share abroad, Chinese software and AI may supplant U.S. rivals as the global standard.

 

This calls for a joint response by all market-based democracies to Chinese industrial policy. But U.S. allies' willingness to coordinate with the U.S. on China has eroded under Trump.

 

The Achilles' heel of Chinese industrial policy is its cost and waste. China runs bigger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S. Outside advanced manufacturing, the economy is moribund, weighed down by debt, deflation and aging demographics.

 

Many critics thus expect, even hope, that Chinese industrial policy will eventually implode under the weight of its own contradictions.

 

But there's no guarantee of that soon. To paraphrase an adage about markets, China can stay irrational longer than foreign competitors can stay solvent.” [1]

 

1. U.S. News -- Capital Account: Xi's Industrial Policy of Everything. Ip, Greg.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 16 May 2026: A2.  

If Thucydides’ Trap Hits Again, Russia Wins

If China is now repeating the path of Germany in World Wars I and II, and the US is repeating the actions of the UK of that time, then conflict is inevitable. Both are bleeding.

 

What comes next? The largest country in the world by territory remains Russia. Global warming is significantly improving human conditions in Russia. Control of the Northern Trade Route alone brings many benefits, transporting Indian spices and clothing to Europe, and European gold to India. Stifled by huge bureaucracies, India and the EU lack the order, discipline, necessary for a world leader. Closing Thucydides’ trap this time may be beneficial to Russia.

 

The dynamic of an escalating US-China rivalry—often likened to the ancient conflict between Athens and Sparta—carries deep structural risks. While experts frequently describe this as the "Thucydides Trap", a prolonged conflict between the two superpowers could reshape global power balances. 

 

Proponents of the view that Russia might benefit from such a scenario often highlight several strategic advantages:

•           Climate Change and Geography: Warmer temperatures are gradually making previously inhospitable northern territories in Russia more habitable, which could improve agricultural output and resource extraction.

•           The Northern Sea Route: The Arctic shortcut significantly reduces shipping times between Asia and Europe compared to traditional southern channels. Russia’s control over this corridor positions it as a major geopolitical gatekeeper for transcontinental commerce.

•           Shifting Alliances: As the EU and other traditional powers grapple with complex bureaucracies, and with US-China tensions threatening global stability, a multipolar order may provide an opportunity for Russia to assert itself as a disciplined and formidable anchor in world affairs.