The Outer Hull Was Worn: Three years ago, the submersible Titan imploded on its way to the wreck of the Titanic. Five people lost their lives. The investigation report reveals a lack of inspections.

 

 

“The implosion of the submersible *Titan* off the coast of Newfoundland, which claimed the lives of five people in June 2023, could have been prevented through hull inspections.

 

As the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) summarized in its final report on the disaster, the outer hull of the approximately seven-meter-long submersible had suffered wear and tear from previous expeditions. Furthermore, the operator—the American company OceanGate—failed to adhere to technical specifications during the *Titan’s* construction.

 

Shortly after the implosion, engineers had already criticized the use of materials such as carbon fiber and titanium for the hull instead of steel.

 

 The TSB report also highlighted tensions between OceanGate operator Richard Stockton Rush and certain employees. "Because risk management was compromised by social and psychological factors, the company did not know how long the hull would remain safe," the report concluded.

 

The submersible, which was intended to carry Rush and four paying passengers to the wreck of the RMS Titanic on June 18, 2023, lost contact with its support vessel, the *Polar Prince*, about 45 minutes into its descent. Assisted by French and British forces, the US and Canadian Coast Guards spent days searching for the *Titan* approximately 600 kilometers off the coast of Newfoundland. On June 22, 2023—four days after the last sign of life—a Canadian remotely operated vehicle (ROV) discovered wreckage. Authorities later confirmed that human remains had also been found at a depth of approximately 3,800 meters. In addition to Rush, those who lost their lives in the *Titan* implosion included French deep-sea expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British adventurer Hamish Harding, and Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood along with his 19-year-old son, Sulaiman.

 

In its final report, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada also pointed to a lack of regulatory oversight. Regarding the operation of the *Titan* out of St. John's—the capital of the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador—the country's authorities failed to certify the submersible or verify safety precautions.

 

 Inspections of ships and boats are not standard practice in Canada.

 

The report also criticized the lack of coordination among various federal agencies. OceanGate had been in contact with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, border authorities, and Parks Canada; however, the information gathered by these individual bodies was not passed on to the transport authority. "There was no one to put two and two together," said TSB Chair Yoan Marier.

 

To avoid further endangering lives "due to overlooked safety gaps," the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) has now presented a list of recommendations.

 

It proposed that the Department of Transport develop a catalog of potential hazards that would allow for the inspection of commercial vessels—even those lacking mandatory certification.

 

The TSB also plans to improve coordination between the Department of Transport and other government agencies. In addition to calling for a unified safety framework covering different crews—such as those of the *Titan* and its support vessel, the *Polar Prince*—the TSB recommended on Wednesday that Canada adopt a certification system for submersibles modeled on those used in countries like Japan and the Bahamas.

 

While the United Nations' International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed guidelines for the construction and operation of manned submersibles, these regulations are not internationally binding; instead, they have merely been incorporated into the national laws of a few individual countries.

 

As the final report revealed on Wednesday, an official from the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) had taken a dive in the *Titan* two years prior to the implosion. However, his warnings—regarding the submersible's lack of regulatory certification, OceanGate's lack of insurance coverage, and the hull's rather unusual material—went unheeded at the time." [1]

 

1.  Die Außenhülle war verschlissen: Vor drei Jahren implodierte das U-Boot Titan auf dem Weg zum Wrack der Titanic. Fünf Menschen kamen um. Der Untersuchungsbericht zeigt, dass es an Kontrollen fehlte. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 19 June 2026: 9.       CHRISTIANE HEIL