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2024 m. sausio 20 d., šeštadienis

Why Americans Have Lost Faith In the Value Of College --- Three generations of 'college for all' in the U.S. has left most families looking for alternatives


"The political turmoil that rocked universities over the past three months and sparked the resignations of two Ivy League presidents has landed like an unwelcome thud on institutions already struggling to maintain the trust of the American public. For three generations, the national aspiration to "college for all" shaped America's economy and culture, as most high-school graduates took it for granted that they would earn a degree. That consensus is now collapsing in the face of massive student debt, underemployed degree-holders and political intolerance on campus.

In the past decade, the percentage of Americans who expressed a lot of confidence in higher education fell to 36% from 57%, according to Gallup. A decline in undergraduate enrollment since 2011 has translated into 3 million fewer students on campus. Nearly half of parents say they would prefer not to send their children to a four-year college after high school, even if there were no obstacles, financial or otherwise. Two-thirds of high-school students think they will be just fine without a college degree.

The pandemic drove home a sobering realization for a lot of middle-class American families: "College for all" is broken for most.

Arthur Levine, president emeritus of Columbia Teachers College and author of "The Great Upheaval: Higher Education's Past, Present and Uncertain Future," compares this moment in post-secondary education to the seismic change that followed the Industrial Revolution. That 19th-century wave of disruption washed over schools designed to meet the needs of a sectarian, agricultural society and transformed higher education into a sprawling system of community colleges, land-grant universities and graduate schools.

The dilemma faced by today's high-school students is that while a similarly massive economic disruption has arrived, new educational alternatives have not. "Whatever comes next," Levine says of Generation Z, "It's not going to come soon enough for them."

So how did one of the crown jewels of American society squander so much confidence so quickly?

If the pandemic marked the moment the "college for all" model finally cracked, 1965 marked its birth. As the baby boomers came of age, the federal government made loans available to any college-bound 18-year-old with a high-school diploma, in order to maintain the most educated workforce in the world. High schools scrapped vocational education programs in favor of college preparatory classes.

Cash and prestige saturated college campuses while alternatives like vocational and technical schools withered. Between 1965 and 2011, university enrollment increased nearly fourfold to 21 million as the earning differential between high school and college graduates expanded. 

But embedded in the infrastructure of universities were hairline fractures and misaligned incentives that have led the system to buckle.

University governance was designed for an analog era. Decisions are sifted through a slow, deliberative process until faculty, administrators and trustees reach consensus. The genius of the system is that it avoids the strictures of top-down control and protects academic freedom against political interference. The weakness is that it's a recipe for stagnation.

The digital revolution demanded a nimble realignment of the academy so that students could learn a quickly emerging set of skills to meet changing labor-market demands. 

Instead of adapting, campus interest groups protected their turf. Decisions reached by consensus usually meant the adoption of modest reforms that were the least objectionable to the greatest number of people, said Brian Rosenberg, former president of Macalester College and author of "'Whatever It Is, I'm Against It': Resistance to Change in Higher Education."

As students abandoned the humanities and flooded fields like computer science, big data and engineering, schools failed to respond. The result was undersubscribed history and English departments and waiting lists for classes that led to well-paying jobs. New programs in emerging fields did not start because schools could not free up the resources.

Many university presidents who pushed for new programs, the faster adoption of technology or the removal of undersubscribed majors faced no-confidence votes from their faculty. "Presidents come in and run smack into the culture and the structures of an institution, and they realize that if I want to keep my job, I'm not going to push for transformational change," said Rosenberg.

In 2021, when Chuck Ambrose became chancellor at Henderson State University in Arkadelphia, Ark., the school was in financial peril. The music department had more faculty than graduating students, and none of the 60 academic programs was generating enough revenue to cover its costs, Ambrose said. When he announced that the school was going broke, the faculty rejected his data.

Ambrose declared a fiscal "exigency" -- the academic equivalent of bankruptcy -- and recommended that the school's board eliminate a third of its teaching positions and nearly half of its degree programs. The faculty asked for his termination, and Ambrose left the next year.

"Systems don't want to change," Ambrose said. "Problems accumulate and so does culture."

The misalignment between universities and the labor market is compounded by the failure of many schools to teach students to think critically. Many students arrive poorly prepared for college-level work, and the universities themselves are ill-equipped to provide intensive classroom instruction.

Professors compete for tenure on the basis of the quality of their research and publishing track record. Teaching is mostly an afterthought. Professors who earn tenure negotiate lighter teaching loads. To fill the gap, schools hire less expensive adjuncts with little job security. Non-tenure track professors now make up three-quarters of college faculty, up from a quarter in 1975.

These precariously employed adjuncts depend on strong student performance reviews for job security, a system that incentivizes them to make few demands in exchange for high ratings. Students spend about half as much time studying and attending class as their counterparts did in 1961, but they are three times more likely to earn an A -- now the most common grade in colleges across the country.

A quarter of college graduates do not have basic skills in numeracy and one in five does not have basic skills in literacy, says Irwin Kirsch, who oversees large-scale assessments for ETS, the company that administers the SAT.

Quality control for college degrees falls to accreditors, but they approve programs at hundreds of schools that fail to produce financial value for graduates, and have kept many schools in business with a single-digit graduation rate. About one in 40 U.S. workers draws a paycheck from a college or university, and in recent decades the powerful higher-education lobby in Washington has quashed dozens of proposals to measure the sector's successes and failures.

Meanwhile, through a combination of state budget cuts, administrative bloat and runaway spending on campus amenities, the real cost of a four-year college degree climbed 180% between 1980 and 2020. The high cost increased pressure on universities to treat students as consumers purchasing a credential, instead of scholars receiving an education.

One result of this transactional attitude has been a sharp increase in cheating. College is one of the few products whose consumers try to get as little out of it as possible, because its market value is tied to the credential, not to the education that it is meant to represent, says Bryan Caplan, an economist at George Mason University and author of "The Case Against Education."

Cheating is a rational choice on the part of students when credentials are decoupled from learning, Caplan says. 

He believes that 80% of the value of graduating college today is the signal it sends to employers, and that few students outside of the hard sciences learn much of real value [1].

The combination of more college graduates and weaker learning outcomes has diluted the signal provided by a degree from less prestigious colleges. That has led to a host of knock-on effects, including credential inflation, in which employers ask for college degrees for jobs that don't need one and previously did not require one.

For middle-class Americans, college made sense as long as a degree generated a large enough wage premium to make the rising cost of the investment worthwhile. As that premium became less consistent, the risks of going to college grew and confidence in college as an institution declined.

Of 100 random freshmen enrolling in college today, 40 will not graduate. Of the remaining 60 that earn a degree in six years, 20 will end up chronically underemployed. In other words, for every five students who enroll in a four-year college, only two will graduate and find a job based on their degree.

A college education is among the largest investments most Americans will make. The total cost of attending a public college is about $36,000 a year, and the average length of time to a degree is nearly five years. Tack on debt service for student loans and the opportunity cost of not working while in school, and the real cost of college can easily pass $300,000 -- more than the median net worth of most families.

That math doesn't work for a growing number of families. The percentage of students who enrolled in college after graduating high school fell from 70% in 2016 to 62% in 2022.

Adalyn Arnstrom, a high-school senior in Dandridge, Tenn., is considering taking a job in construction, with the eventual goal of becoming an electrician, or heading to community college to study ultrasound technology. Despite a 3.0 grade-point average, she's not very interested in a four-year degree. "I think I can do just fine without it," she said.

Ben Likens, a high-school senior in Indiana, plans to attend Indiana University next year, mainly because he didn't see any better options and wanted to avoid the stigma of not going to college. His father, Eric, said that he marched off to college in 1988 because that's what everyone did. He earned a degree from Ball State University in biology while he worked summers paving roads. After he graduated he continued with road construction because the money was better than anything he could earn with his degree.

Now when Eric hires new employees he considers a college degree a marker of persistence and discipline, but not knowledge or skill. He is unsure if the college path is the wisest choice for his son: "I worry for him that it will be worth it," he said.

The challenge faced by students willing to buck the gravitational pull of college is to find an alternative. In an economy becoming ever more specialized, most jobs and careers demand skills beyond high school. The question becomes how to get them.

A poll published in 2022 asked parents if they would rather their child attended a four-year college or a three-year apprenticeship that would train them for a job and pay them while they learned. Nearly half of parents whose child had graduated from college chose the apprenticeship.

But unlike the European model of higher education, where students enter a vocational track and apprentice with an employer with the assistance of government support, the U.S. invests almost exclusively in students heading to college. Government financial support for universities outstrips apprenticeships by about 1,000 to one, writes Ryan Craig, author of the book "Apprentice Nation" and managing director of a firm that invests in new educational models.

The pressure to place less emphasis on four-year degrees is growing, however. In what has been called the "degree reset," the federal government and several states eliminated the degree requirements for many government jobs. Companies like IBM and the giant professional services firm Deloitte have too. Last year, a survey of 800 companies by Intelligent.com found that 45% intended to eliminate bachelor degree requirements for some positions in 2024. The Ad Council recently ran a campaign encouraging employers to get rid of the "paper ceiling."

In place of a degree, some employers are adopting skills-based hiring, looking at what students know as opposed to what credential they hold. The problem is that the signal sent by a college degree still matters more, in most cases, than the demonstration of skills. The result is something of a stand-off between old and new ideas of job readiness. A LinkedIn study published last August found that between 2019 and 2022 there was a 36% increase in job postings that omitted degree requirements -- but the actual number of jobs filled with candidates who did not have a degree was much smaller.

New initiatives may start to change that balance. New York Mayor Eric Adams has called for 30,000 new apprenticeships in the city by 2030. California Gov. Gavin Newsom wants to create 500,000 in the state by 2029.

Deloitte is one of dozens of big companies championing the idea that skills matter more than degrees. "This is a decade-long journey," said Kwasi Mitchell, Deloitte's chief purpose and DEI officer. "It's going to be a little bit of time before we really open the floodgates with respect to skills-first hiring."

---

Douglas Belkin covers higher education and national news out of the Chicago bureau of The Wall Street Journal." [2]

1. "Hard science is the term used to define natural and physical sciences that study the universe through theories, hypotheses and experiments. The subjects that are included in this category are physics, math, chemistry, biology, anatomy, and astronomy, to name a few."   
   

2. REVIEW --- Why Americans Have Lost Faith In the Value Of College --- Three generations of 'college for all' in the U.S. has left most families looking for alternatives. Belkin, Douglas.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 20 Jan 2024: C.1.

Ši pernelyg išpopuliarinta technika nepasirodys netrukus: autonominės transporto priemonės

  „Šiandien keliuose miestuose, esant tinkamoms sąlygoms, ribotoje geografinėje vietovėje, galima važiuoti savaeigiu automobiliu.

 

     Tačiau sakyti, kad šiais laikais plačiai paplitusios autonominės transporto priemonės yra visai šalia, yra tas pats, kas 1897 m. sakytume, kad elektra varomos transporto priemonės buvo pasirengusios perimti valdžią dėl to, kad Niujorkas turi visiškai elektrinį taksi parką. (Tuo metu tai ir turėjo.) Kaip ir elektra varomi automobiliai, kurių diegimas ir dabar susiduria su sunkumais, autonominės transporto priemonės yra viena iš tų technologijų, kurių sėkmė užtrunka daug ilgiau, nei daugelis būtų patikėję pradinėmis demonstracijomis ir pažadais.

 

     Kliūčių autonominių transporto priemonių arba AV išleidimui yra daugybė. Pavyzdžiui, jie perkelia atsakomybę nuo vairuotojo transporto priemonės gamintojui arba robotaksi paslaugos operatoriui. Tai tik viena iš priežasčių, kodėl jie negali būti tokie pat geros, kaip žmonės vairuotojai, bet iš tikrųjų turi būti daug saugesnės.

 

     „Kai perkeliate žmones miestuose, negalite sau leisti jų žudyti – tai esminė problema“, – sako Heidi Wyle, autonominių transporto priemonių įmonės „Venti Technologies“ vadovė.

 

     Kita didelė kliūtis yra kaina. Sutaupytas lėšas, kurias turėjo sutaupyti autonominės transporto priemonės, didžiąja dalimi panaikino daugybė jutiklių – kamerų, radarų ir lidarų – bei galingi kompiuteriai, kuriuos jie turi turėti, kad apdorotų visus šiuos duomenis. Be to, kainuoja teritorijų, kuriomis važiuoja šios transporto priemonės, žemėlapių sudarymas ir patikslinimas.

 

     Arlingtonas, Teksasas, yra puikus ekonominių jėgų, stabdančių AV priėmimą, pavyzdys. Mieste nėra įprastos masinio tranzito sistemos – nėra autobusų ar geležinkelių, bet jis sudarė sutartis su įmone „Via Transportation“ dėl mikroautobusų parko eksploatavimo. Piliečiai gali rezervuoti važiavimą mieste, todėl paslauga tampa subsidijuojamu „Uber“.

 

     Arlingtonas šiuo metu taip pat bendradarbiauja su AV kompanija „May Mobility“, kad pasiūlytų kai kuriuos pavėžėjimus, tačiau kol kas nėra skubu pereiti prie AV, sako Arlingtono transporto vadovė Ann Foss. Ji priduria, kad miestui nėra sunku samdyti vairuotojus žmonių valdomam automobilių parkui." [1]

 

1. EXCHANGE --- Keywords: This Overhyped Tech Is No Longer Coming Soon --- As a sugar high of free money wears off, these three technologies are finally facing reality. Mims, Christopher.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 20 Jan 2024: B.5.

This Overhyped Tech Is No Longer Coming Soon: Autonomous Vehicles


"Today, in a few cities, under the right conditions, in a limited geographical area, you can ride in a self-driving car.

But saying widespread autonomous vehicles are right around the corner in this day and age is like saying in 1897 that electric vehicles were poised to take over, on account of New York City having an all-electric taxi fleet. (Which it did, at the time.) Like EVs -- which even now are experiencing challenges to their adoption -- autonomous vehicles are one of those technologies whose success is taking far longer than initial demonstrations and promises would have had us believe.

The barriers to rollout of autonomous vehicles, or AVs, are myriad. For example, they shift liability from the driver to the manufacturer of a vehicle, or the operator of a robotaxi service. That's just one reason they can't just be as good as human drivers -- but in fact must be much safer.

"When you move people in cities, you can't afford to kill them -- that's the crucial issue," says Heidi Wyle, chief executive of autonomous-vehicle company Venti Technologies.

The other big obstacle is cost. The savings that were supposed to come from autonomous vehicles have been largely wiped out by the arrays of sensors -- cameras, radar and lidar -- and the heavy-duty computers they have to carry onboard to process all that data. Plus, there's the cost of mapping and remapping the areas these vehicles drive.

Arlington, Texas, is a prime example of economic forces holding back AV adoption. The city has no conventional mass-transit system -- no bus or rail -- but instead contracts with a company called Via Transportation to operate a fleet of minivans. Citizens can reserve rides in the city, making the service a kind of subsidized Uber.

Arlington is also currently partnering with AV company May Mobility to offer some rides, but there's not yet any urgency to switch to AVs, says Arlington transportation manager Ann Foss. The city has no trouble hiring drivers for its human-driven fleet, she adds." [1]


1. EXCHANGE --- Keywords: This Overhyped Tech Is No Longer Coming Soon --- As a sugar high of free money wears off, these three technologies are finally facing reality. Mims, Christopher.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 20 Jan 2024: B.5.

2024 m. sausio 19 d., penktadienis

A. Armonaitė on defense financing: residents could lend their savings

 Lithuanian residents could also give their underpants to the defense. After all, you can also cover yourself with your little hands. 

A. Armonaitė apie gynybos finansavimą: savo santaupas galėtų paskolinti gyventojai

Lietuvos gyventojai galėtų ir kelnaites atiduoti gynybai. Juk prisidengti galima ir rankytėmis.   
 


Kinija jau nebesustabdoma, todėl visos Bideno subsidijos Amerikos įmonėms yra švaistymas

„Vašingtone auga nerimas, kad Kinijos produktų antplūdis gali sukelti pavojų naujoms Amerikos investicijoms į švarią energiją ir aukštųjų technologijų gamyklas.

 

Bideno administracija pradėjo pumpuoti daugiau, nei 2 trilijonus, dolerių į JAV gamyklas ir infrastruktūrą, investuodama didžiules sumas, kad pabandytų sustiprinti Amerikos pramonę ir kovoti su klimato kaita.

 

Tačiau pastangos susiduria su pažįstama grėsme: pigių produktų iš Kinijos antplūdžiu. Tai atkreipia prezidento Bideno ir jo padėjėjų dėmesį, kurie svarsto naujas protekcionistines priemones, siekdami užtikrinti, kad Amerikos pramonė galėtų konkuruoti su Pekinu.

 

Kai JAV gamyklos pradeda gaminti elektra varomus automobilius, puslaidininkius ir saulės baterijas, Kinija užtvindo rinką panašiomis prekėmis, kurios dažnai gerokai mažesnės kainos, nei konkurentų amerikiečių. Panašus antplūdis pasiekia ir Europos rinką.

 

Amerikos vadovai ir pareigūnai tvirtina, kad Kinijos veiksmai pažeidžia pasaulines prekybos taisykles. Susirūpinimas Amerikoje ir Europoje skatina naujus raginimus įvesti didesnius muitus Kinijos importui, o tai gali paaštrinti jau ginčytinus Kinijos ir Vakarų ekonominius santykius.

 

Kinijos importas atspindi augimą, kuris sumažino Obamos administracijos pastangas pradėti saulės energijos gamybą šalyje po 2008 m. finansų krizės ir išstūmė kai kurias Amerikos naujas įmones iš verslo. Administracija keršijo tarifais saulės energijos įrangai iš Kinijos ir sukėlė ginčą Pasaulio prekybos organizacijoje.

 

Kai kurie Bideno pareigūnai yra susirūpinę, kad Kinijos gaminiai vėl gali kelti grėsmę JAV gamyklų išlikimui, kai vyriausybė išleidžia didžiules sumas vietinei gamybai pradėti. Tikėtina, kad administracijos pareigūnai padidins tarifus elektrinėms transporto priemonėms ir kitoms strateginėms prekėms iš Kinijos, peržiūrėdami mokesčius, kuriuos prieš ketverius metus Kinijai įvedė buvęs prezidentas Donaldas J. Trumpas, teigia su šiuo klausimu susipažinę žmonės. Ši peržiūra, kuri buvo vykdoma nuo tada, kai J. Bidenas pradėjo eiti pareigas, pagaliau gali būti baigta per ateinančius kelis mėnesius.

 

Kongresas taip pat ragina siekti daugiau apsaugos. Sausio 5 d. laiške Bideno administracijai Atstovų rūmų komiteto dvišaliai nariai išreiškė susirūpinimą dėl to, kad Kinija užtvindo Jungtines Valstijas puslaidininkiais. Įstatymų leidėjai klausė, ar vyriausybė galėtų nustatyti naują „komponentinį“ tarifą, kuris apmokestintų lustą, importuotą su kitu gatavu produktu.

 

Tai buvo po lapkritį paskelbto laiško, kuriame to paties komiteto nariai patarė Bideno administracijai apsvarstyti naują prekybos bylą dėl Kinijos subsidijų elektromobiliams, dėl kurių automobiliams gali būti taikomi papildomi tarifai.

 

JAV prekybos atstovė Katherine Tai įstatymų leidėjams sakė, kad ji išreiškė susirūpinimą dėl Kinijos praktikos elektromobilių pramonėje, rašoma sausio 4 d. laiške, kuris buvo pasidalintas su „The New York Times“. Ponia Tai sakė komitetui, kad administracija turi „dirbti su JAV įmonėmis ir sąjungomis, kad nustatytų ir panaudotų papildomus atsakymus, kurie padėtų įveikti Kinijos valstybės nukreiptą pramonės taikymą šiame sektoriuje“.

 

Jungtinės Valstijos per pastaruosius penkerius metus išlaikė muitus šimtų milijardų dolerių vertės Kinijos gaminiams, laikydami tai būdu kompensuoti Pekino gebėjimą numušti Amerikos gamintojus, parduodant pigesnius produktus Jungtinėse Valstijose. Bidenas bandė toliau padėti Amerikos įmonėms, skirdamas milijardines subsidijas, skirtas skatinti JAV švarios energijos technologijų, tokių, kaip saulės baterijos ir elektrinės transporto priemonės, bei puslaidininkių gamybą.

 

Tačiau Kinijos pramonės politikos išlaidos vis dar gerokai lenkia JAV išlaidas. Susidūrusi su ekonomikos sulėtėjimu ir laipsnišku nekilnojamojo turto burbulo sprogimu, Kinijos vyriausybė pastaruoju metu padvigubino pastangas skatinti eksportą ir remti jos gamyklų sektorių.

 

Pekinas ypač daug dėmesio skiria investicijoms į strategiškai svarbius aukštųjų technologijų produktus, tokius, kaip elektrinės transporto priemonės ir puslaidininkiai, sakė Vašingtono ekspertų centro Strateginių ir tarptautinių studijų centro Kinijos verslo ir ekonomikos vyresnioji bendradarbė Ilaria Mazzocco.

 

„Tokių pramonės šakų taip pat nori likęs pasaulis“, – sakė ji.

 

Dalis Kinijos sėkmės kyla iš jos didesnės rinkos, kuri suteikia Kinijos įmonėms masto ir galimybių tobulinti jų produktus, kartu su didžiuliu talentingų inžinierių būriu. Pavyzdžiui, Kinija praėjusiais metais pardavė apie 6,7 mln. vien tik elektrinių transporto priemonių, o Jungtinėse Valstijose jų buvo maždaug 1,2 mln.

 

Kinijos vyriausybė pareiškė, kad konkuruoja sąžiningai, ir apibūdino JAV prekybos priemones, kaip protekcionistines.

 

Tačiau Wendy Cutler, Azijos visuomenės politikos instituto viceprezidentė ir buvusi prekybos derybininkė, teigė, kad Kinijos švarios energijos ir puslaidininkių pramonė gavo daug valstybės pagalbos – mokesčių kreditų, galimybės gauti pigesnės energijos ir nuosavo kapitalo infuzijos.

 

„Sąrašas tęsiasi ir toliau“, – sakė ji. „Kadangi Kinijos įmonės naudojasi tokio tipo sistemomis, tai tiesiog sukelia perteklinį pajėgumą."

 

Jungtinėse Valstijose, kai saulės baterijų pasiūla viršija paklausą, gamyklos nenaudoja savo linijų, atleidžia darbuotojus ir bando sumažinti pajėgumus, sakė Michael Carr, Saulės energijos gamintojų koalicijos, atstovaujančios JAV, vykdomasis direktorius Michaelas Carras.

 

„Kinijoje tai neveikia“, – sakė jis. „Jie tiesiog toliau kūrė, kūrė ir kūrė“.

 

Pasak energetikos tyrimų įmonės Wood Mackenzie analitikų, Kinija praėjusiais metais investavo daugiau nei 130 mlrd. milijardų dolerių į saulės sektorių ir sukuria pakankamai pajėgumų pilnai patenkinti visus šiuos globalinius poreikius nuo 2032 metų.

 

Praėjusio mėnesio pabaigoje dvi JAV įmonės metė teisinį iššūkį dėl laikinojo moratoriumo, kurį Bideno administracija įvedė tarifus importuojamoms saulės baterijoms.

 

Didelės Kinijos investicijos į puslaidininkius, įskaitant naują 40 milijardų dolerių fondą pramonei remti, taip pat kelia nerimą įmonėms, investuojančioms į naujus JAV lustų įrenginius.

 

Kinija gamina nedidelę pasaulinės lustų gamybos dalį – tik apie 7 procentus 2022 m. Tačiau ekspertai teigia, kad šalis puslaidininkių pramonei išleidžia daugiau, nei Jungtinės Valstijos ir Europa kartu paėmus ir kad ji gali tapti didžiausia pasaulyje mikroschemų gamintoja per ateinantį dešimtmetį.

 

Danas Hutchesonas, tyrimų įmonės „TechInsights“ pirmininko pavaduotojas, teigė, kad baiminamasi, kad Kinija puslaidininkių atžvilgiu pasielgs taip pat, kaip laivyba, saulės elementai ar plienas – sukurs perteklinius pajėgumus ir išstums iš verslo užsienio konkurentus.

 

„Tai teisėta baimė, nes Vakarų įmonių silpnybė yra ta, kad jos turi būti pelningos“, – sakė jis.

 

Jungtinės Valstijos gali – ir taiko – įvesti muitus Kinijos eksportui, kuris yra nesąžiningai subsidijuojamas arba parduodamas Amerikos rinkoje pigiau, nei kainuoja jam pagaminti. Šį mėnesį ji nustatė daugiau, nei 120 procentų tarifus Kinijos plienui.

 

Tačiau net ir užblokavus Kinijos prekes įvežimui į JAV, jos gali patekti į kitas šalis. Tai sumažina kainas visame pasaulyje iki lygio, su kuriuo JAV įmonės teigia negalinčios konkuruoti, ir išstumia Amerikos įmones iš užsienio rinkų, sumažindamos jų pajamas ir konkurencingumą.

 

Kai kas sako, kad Jungtinės Valstijos turėtų tiesiog priimti pigias Kinijoje pagamintas saulės baterijas ir senus lustus, o ne įvesti tarifus, didinančius Amerikos vartotojų ir gamyklų, naudojančių importuotas žaliavas, išlaidas.

 

Libertarų Cato instituto prekybos ekspertas Scottas Lincicome'as teigė, kad JAV nėra ekonomiškai prasminga bandyti išleisti daugiau, nei Kinija, ypač prekėms, kurios nėra susijusios su karine veikla.

 

"Ar tinkamas atsakas yra mūsų pačių subsidijavimas? O gal būti geresniu ekonomistu ir pasakyti: "Tiesą sakant, mes leisime užsienio vyriausybėms subsidijuoti mūsų vartojimą taip beprotiškai, mums tai nerūpi?" - p. Lincicome pasakė.

 

Tačiau dauguma Vašingtono pareigūnų dabar mano, kad Kinijos dominavimas pagrindinėse rinkose yra didelė rizika, atsižvelgiant į didėjančią įtampą tarp šalių ir Kinijai taikomus tam tikrus eksporto draudimus. Kinija gamina apie 80 procentų pasaulio saulės baterijų, beveik 60 procentų elektromobilių ir daugiau, nei 80 procentų elektromobilių akumuliatorių.

 

Remiantis elektromobilių rinkos tyrimų įmonės Dunne Insights duomenimis, Kinijoje vidutinė elektromobilio kaina yra apie 28 000 dolerių, palyginti su maždaug 47 500 dolerių JAV. Praėjusių metų ketvirtąjį ketvirtį Kinijos automobilių gamintojas BYD pirmą kartą pristatė daugiau elektrinių transporto priemonių, nei Tesla.

 

Kinijos elektromobilių populiarumas Europoje išaugo, todėl Europos Sąjunga pradėjo tyrimą dėl nelegalių subsidijų. Iki šiol Kinijos elektromobiliai dar turi įsitvirtinti Jungtinėse Valstijose, kurios taiko didelius muitus šiam importui.

 

Pagal klimato įstatymą, kurį J. Bidenas pasirašė 2022 m., elektra varomų transporto priemonių, kurios pirmiausia tiekiamos ir surenkamos Jungtinėse Valstijose, o ne Kinijoje, pirkėjai taip pat gaus dosnias mokesčių lengvatas. Vis dėlto kai kurie pareigūnai nerimauja, kad kiniškos transporto priemonės apskritai yra daug pigesnės, nei amerikietiškos, todėl vartotojai vis tiek gali nuspręsti jas pirkti." [1]

 

1. Low-Priced Chinese Goods Present Familiar Challenge: [Business/Financial Desk]. Swanson, Ana; Tankersley, Jim.  New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.. 19 Jan 2024: B.1. 

China is already unstoppable, so all the Biden's subsidies to American companies are waste


"Worries are growing in Washington that a flood of Chinese products could put new American investments in clean energy and high-tech factories at risk.

The Biden administration has begun pumping more than $2 trillion into U.S. factories and infrastructure, investing huge sums to try to strengthen American industry and fight climate change.

But the effort is facing a familiar threat: a surge of low-priced products from China. That is drawing the attention of President Biden and his aides, who are considering new protectionist measures to make sure American industry can compete against Beijing.

As U.S. factories spin up to produce electric vehicles, semiconductors and solar panels, China is flooding the market with similar goods, often at significantly lower prices than American competitors. A similar influx is also hitting the European market.

American executives and officials argue that China's actions violate global trade rules. The concerns are spurring new calls in America and Europe for higher tariffs on Chinese imports, potentially escalating what is already a contentious economic relationship between China and the West.

The Chinese imports mirror a surge that undercut the Obama administration's efforts to seed domestic solar manufacturing after the 2008 financial crisis and drove some American start-ups out of business. The administration retaliated with tariffs on solar equipment from China, sparking a dispute at the World Trade Organization.

Some Biden officials are concerned that Chinese products could again threaten the survival of U.S. factories when the government is spending huge sums to jump-start domestic manufacturing. Administration officials appear likely to raise tariffs on electric vehicles and other strategic goods from China, as part of a review of the levies that former President Donald J. Trump imposed on China four years ago, according to people familiar with the matter. That review, which has been underway since Mr. Biden took office, could finally conclude in the next few months.

Congress is also agitating for more protections. In a Jan. 5 letter to the Biden administration, bipartisan members of a House committee expressed concerns about China flooding the United States with semiconductors. Lawmakers asked whether the government could establish a new "component" tariff that would tax a chip imported inside another finished product.

That followed a November letter in which members of the same committee advised the Biden administration to consider a new trade case over China's electric vehicle subsidies, which could result in additional tariffs on cars.

Katherine Tai, the U.S. trade representative, told the lawmakers that she shared concerns about China's practices in the electric vehicle industry, according to a Jan. 4 letter that was shared with The New York Times. Ms. Tai told the committee that the administration needed "to work with U.S. companies and unions to identify and deploy additional responses to help overcome China's state-directed industrial targeting in this sector."

The United States has maintained tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese products over the past five years, viewing that as a way to offset Beijing's ability to undercut American manufacturers by selling cheaper products in the United States. Mr. Biden has tried to further help American companies with billions in subsidies intended to boost U.S. manufacturing of clean energy technology like solar panels and electric vehicles along with semiconductors.

Yet Chinese industrial policy spending still far outstrips that of the United States. Facing an economic slowdown and a gradual bursting of the property bubble, the Chinese government has recently redoubled efforts to promote exports and support its factory sector.

Beijing is particularly focused on investment in high-tech products with strategic importance, like electric vehicles and semiconductors, said Ilaria Mazzocco, a senior fellow in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

"Those are also the kinds of industry the rest of the world wants as well," she said.

Some of China's success stems from its larger market -- which gives Chinese firms the scale and opportunity to hone their products -- along with its vast pool of talented engineers. China sold about 6.7 million all-electric vehicles last year, for example, compared with around 1.2 million units in the United States.

The Chinese government has said it competes fairly and described U.S. trade measures as protectionist.

But Wendy Cutler, the vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former trade negotiator, said China's clean energy and semiconductor industries had received a lot of state assistance, in the form of tax credits, access to cheaper energy and equity infusions.

"The list goes on and on," she said. "As Chinese companies avail themselves of these types of systems, it just leads to overcapacity."

In the United States, when the supply of solar panels exceeds demand, factories idle their lines, lay off workers and try to bring capacity back into alignment, said Michael Carr, the executive director of the Solar Energy Manufacturers for America Coalition, which represents U.S.-based solar manufacturers.

"That's not the way it works in China," he said. "They've just continued to build and build and build."

China invested more than $130 billion in the solar sector last year, and is positioned to bring enough wafer, cell and panel capacity online this year to meet annual global demand through 2032, according to analysts at Wood Mackenzie, an energy research firm.

Late last month, two U.S. firms mounted a legal challenge to a temporary moratorium that the Biden administration had placed on tariffs on imported solar panels.

China's hefty investments in semiconductors, including a new $40 billion fund to support the industry, are also worrying companies investing in new U.S. chip facilities.

China accounts for a small share of global chip production -- only about 7 percent in 2022. But experts say that the country is spending more on its semiconductor industry than the United States and Europe combined, and that it could become the world's largest maker of chips in the next decade.

Dan Hutcheson, the vice chair of research firm TechInsights, said the fear was that China would do for semiconductors what it did for shipping, solar cells or steel -- build up excess capacity and then drive foreign competitors out of business.

"It's a legitimate fear, because the weakness of Western companies is they have to be profitable," he said.

The United States can -- and does -- impose tariffs on Chinese exports that are unfairly subsidized or sold in the American market for less than it cost to make them. This month, it slapped tariffs of more than 120 percent on Chinese steel.

But even when Chinese goods are blocked from the United States, they can flow into other countries. That pushes prices down globally to levels with which U.S. firms say they cannot compete, and crowds American firms out of foreign markets, cutting into their revenue and competitiveness.

Some say the United States should simply embrace cheap Chinese-made solar panels and legacy chips, instead of imposing tariffs that raise costs for American consumers and factories that use imported inputs.

Scott Lincicome, a trade expert at the libertarian Cato Institute, said it did not make economic sense for the United States to try to outspend China, especially for goods that are not military-related.

"Is the proper response we do our own subsidies? Or is it to be a better economist and say, 'Actually, we'll let foreign governments subsidize our consumption like crazy, we don't really care'?" Mr. Lincicome said.

But most officials in Washington now see China's dominance of key markets as a significant risk, given growing tensions between the countries and China's imposition of certain export bans. China produces around 80 percent of the world's solar panels, nearly 60 percent of electric vehicles and more than 80 percent of electric vehicle batteries.

The average price for an electric vehicle in China is around $28,000, compared with about $47,500 in the United States, according to Dunne Insights, an electric vehicle market research firm. In the fourth quarter last year, the Chinese automaker BYD delivered more electric vehicles than Tesla for the first time.

Chinese electric vehicles have surged in popularity in Europe, prompting the European Union to begin an investigation into illegal subsidies. So far, Chinese electric vehicles have yet to gain a foothold in the United States, which imposes hefty tariffs on those imports.

As part of the climate law that Mr. Biden signed in 2022, buyers of electric vehicles that are primarily sourced and assembled in the United States, rather than China, will also receive lucrative tax credits. Still, some officials worry that Chinese vehicles are in general so much cheaper than American alternatives that consumers could choose to buy them anyway.” [1]

1. Low-Priced Chinese Goods Present Familiar Challenge: [Business/Financial Desk]. Swanson, Ana; Tankersley, Jim.  New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.. 19 Jan 2024: B.1.