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2026 m. birželio 3 d., trečiadienis

JAV ir Izraelio lyderiai nesutaria dėl karo pabaigos


„Prezidentas Trumpas ir Izraelio ministras pirmininkas Benjaminas Netanyahu pradėjo karą prieš Iraną su precedento neturinčiu koordinavimo lygiu. Po trijų mėnesių jie ginčijasi, kaip užbaigti konfliktą.

 

Trumpas nori diplomatinio susitarimo, kuris atvertų Hormūzo sąsiaurį, utilizuotų Irano prisodrintą uraną ir užbaigtų konfliktą, kuris padidino energijos kainas ir suskaldė jo politinę bazę. Netanyahu patiria spaudimą namuose intensyvinti karines operacijas prieš „Hezbollah“ – svarbiausią Irano regioninę įgaliotinę ir JAV įvardintą teroristinę grupuotę.

 

Įtampa į viešumą išsiliejo praėjusią savaitę dėl Libano, kur Teheranas iškėlė Izraelio ir „Hezbollah“ kovų nutraukimą kaip platesnių derybų su Vašingtonu sąlygą. Po intensyvių susitikimų serijos buvo pasiektas trapus susitarimas, kad „Hezbollah“ nutrauks išpuolius prieš Izraelį ir kad Izraelis nepuls Beiruto, Libano sostinės, nors antradienį kovos tęsėsi kitur.

 

Viskas prasidėjo penktadienį, kai Trumpas surinko padėjėjus Baltuosiuose rūmuose ir pareiškė, kad nori geresnio taikos pasiūlymo iš Irano su garantijomis, kad jis niekada nesieks branduolinio ginklo ir aiškumo dėl jo praturtinto urano utilizavimo, teigė JAV pareigūnai. Tai buvo skubus reikalavimas, nes Trumpas ką tik viešai pareiškė, kad susitarimas artėja.

 

Tačiau iškilo nauja problema. Netanyahu pradėjo didelę operaciją Libane prieš „Hezbollah“ po virtinės mirtinų dronų atakų, kurias surengė kovotojų grupuotė.

 

Trumpas buvo informuotas, kad eskalacija ten gali sužlugdyti Irano taikos derybas, teigė JAV pareigūnai.

 

Pirmadienį Trumpas turėjo du įtemptus telefono skambučius su Netanyahu dėl artėjančios operacijos, sakė du su šiuo klausimu susipažinę šaltiniai. Abiejuose pokalbiuose Trumpas reikalavo, kad Izraelis nutrauktų atakas Beirute, teigė šaltiniai, o tai sukėlė karštas diskusijas.

 

Tačiau antrasis skambutis paaštrėjo, nes Netanyahu primygtinai reikalavo pulti „Hezbollah“. Trumpas, kurio balsas pakilo iš pykčio, sakė, kad Netanyahu turi paklusti, nes jis bus kalėjime be Baltųjų rūmų paramos, teigė šaltiniai. Netanyahu Izraelyje gresia korupcijos teismas, o Trumpas ne kartą ragino jam suteikti malonę.

 

Skambučiai tęsė įtemptų Trumpo ir Netanyahu diskusijų virtinę, įskaitant vieną ką tik, praėjusį mėnesį. Trumpas taip pat vartojo aštrią kalbą kalbėdamas apie ministrą pirmininką, praėjusiais metais sakydamas padėjėjams, kad Netanyahu „jį velniop verčia“ dėl smūgių prieš „Hamas“ Gazos Ruože, kuriems JAV prieštaravo.

 

Pirmadienio skambučiai rodo, kaip sunku išlaikyti glaudų bendradarbiavimą, kurį Trumpas ir Netanyahu demonstravo karo su Iranu metu, nes Vašingtono dėmesys perkeliamas į konflikto užbaigimą.

 

„Manau, kad yra didelių spragų“, – sakė Danny Citrinowiczas, buvęs Izraelio karinės žvalgybos pareigūnas ir vyresnysis tyrėjas Tel Avivo Nacionalinio saugumo studijų institute. „Trumpas nori išnaudoti visas pastangas ir nenori atskleisti jokių įvykių.“

 

Abu lyderiai susiduria su tiksinčiu laiku – rudenį artėja rinkimai, o jų rinkėjai juos stumia priešingomis kryptimis.

 

Trumpas, respublikonas, patiria spaudimą užbaigti karą, kuris padidino energijos kainas ir atskleidė susiskaldymą jo judėjime „Make America Great Again“, kur tokie įtakingi balsai kaip Tuckeris Carlsonas abejojo ​​JAV parama Izraeliui.

 

Siekdamas padidinti spaudimą Iranui Siekdamas patenkinti jo reikalavimus, Trumpas įvedė JAV karinę Irano uostų blokadą. Ši aklavietė paaštrėjo antradienį, kai JAV Centrinė vadovybė pranešė paleidusi „Hellfire“ raketą į tuščio naftos tanklaivio mašinų skyrių Persijos įlankoje. JAV kariuomenės pareigūnai teigė, kad laivas ignoravo pakartotinius perspėjimus.

 

Tuo tarpu Netanyahu susiduria su rinkėjais, reikalaujančiais griežtesnių veiksmų prieš „Hezbollah“.

 

Iranas greitai pasinaudojo susiskaldymu, pirmadienį per valstybinę žiniasklaidą grasindamas nutraukti derybas su Vašingtonu, jei Izraelis išplės smūgius „Hezbollah“ tvirtovėms Beiruto pietiniuose priemiesčiuose.

 

Valstybės sekretorius Marco Rubio teigė, kad JAV stengiasi, jog Izraelio, Libano ir Irano derybos būtų atskirtos. Jis apkaltino Teheraną „bandant sutrukdyti bet kokioms pastangoms, kuriomis Izraelis ir Libanas galėtų bendradarbiauti ir jas pratęsti, kad jei ateityje būtų pasiektas susitarimas, jie galėtų prisiimti atsakomybę už tai, kad privertė jį įgyvendinti“.

 

Tuo tarpu kai kurie demokratai bandė susieti Trumpo sprendimą pradėti karą su Iranu su jo glaudžiais ryšiais su Netanyahu.

 

„Netanyahu sakė, kad 40 metų laukė, kada galės tai padaryti“, – posėdžio metu Rubio sakė senatorius Chrisas Van Hollenas (demokratas, Merilandas). „Pasirodo, jis pagaliau rado prezidentą, kuris buvo pakankamai kvailas ir neapgalvotas, kad prisijungtų prie jo.“ Rubio teigė nesutinkantis su šiuo teiginiu.

 

Iš pradžių Trumpas atmetė Irano grasinimą sužlugdyti derybas su JAV, o tada padidino spaudimą Netanyahu susilaikyti.

 

Izraelis pareiškė, kad galiausiai sutiko nepulti Beiruto, jei „Hezbollah“ susilaikys nuo Izraelio miestų atakų. Izraelio ir Libano pareigūnų pareiškimai rodo, kad  susitarimas netaikomas pietų Libane, kur kovos tęsėsi antradienį.

 

Ginčas atspindi gilesnį nesutarimą dėl karo pabaigos. Izraelio saugumo įstaigos Irano vadovavimą laiko egzistencine grėsme ir nerimauja, kad Trumpas galėtų sumažinti spaudimą Teheranui. Trumpas, nors ir reikalaudamas griežtesnių sąlygų iš Irano, taip pat ieško diplomatinio atotrūkio.

 

Trumpo įsikišimas sulaukė kritikos Izraelyje, kur oponentai apkaltino Netanyahu leidžiant Vašingtonui varžyti Izraelio karines operacijas.

 

Trintis yra ryški, nes Trumpas ir Netanyahu į karą įsitraukė neįprastai sutarę. Trumpas ir Netanyahu viešai pasidalijo tikslu paralyžiuoti Irano branduolinę programą ir susilpninti režimo gebėjimą kelti grėsmę regionui.

 

Tačiau po to, kai Iranas sutrikdė laivybą per sąsiaurį ir padidino energijos kainas, Vašingtono prioritetai pradėjo keistis link diplomatinio susitarimo užtikrinimo.

 

„Tai Trumpo šou“, – sakė Citrinowiczas. „Tai ne Netanyahu šou.“” [1]

 

1. U.S., Israeli Leaders Clash Over War's End. Ward, Alexander; Anat Peled in Tel Aviv; Abdel-Baqui, Omar.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 June 2026: A1.  

U.S., Israeli Leaders Clash Over War's End


“President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel launched the war against Iran with an unprecedented level of coordination. Three months later, they are fighting over how to bring the conflict to a close.

 

Trump wants a diplomatic agreement that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, dispose of Iran's enriched uranium and end a conflict that has driven up energy prices and divided his political base. Netanyahu faces pressure at home to intensify military operations against Hezbollah, Iran's most important regional proxy and a U.S.-designated terrorist group.

 

The tensions spilled into the open in the past week over Lebanon, where Tehran has made an end to fighting between Israel and Hezbollah a condition for broader talks with Washington. An intense series of meetings produced a fragile agreement that Hezbollah would stop attacks on Israel and that Israel wouldn't assault Beirut, Lebanon's capital, though fighting continued elsewhere on Tuesday.

 

It began on Friday when Trump gathered aides in the White House Situation Room and said he wanted a better peace proposal from Iran with guarantees it would never seek a nuclear weapon and clarity for disposing of its enriched uranium, U.S. officials said. It was an urgent demand, as Trump had just publicly said a deal was close.

 

But a new problem was brewing. Netanyahu was launching a major operation in Lebanon against Hezbollah following a string of deadly drone attacks by the militant group.

 

Trump was briefed that escalation there could derail the Iran peace talks, U.S. officials said.

 

On Monday, Trump held two tense phone calls with Netanyahu about the impending operation, two people familiar with the matter said. Trump demanded Israel stop attacks on Beirut in both conversations, the people said, leading to heated discussions.

 

But the second call escalated as Netanyahu insisted on attacking Hezbollah. Trump, his voice rising with anger, said Netanyahu had to obey because he would be in prison without the White House's support, the people said. Netanyahu faces a corruption trial in Israel, and Trump has repeatedly called for him to be pardoned.

 

The calls continued a string of testy discussions between Trump and Netanyahu, including one just last month. Trump has also used salty language when talking about the prime minister, telling aides last year Netanyahu was "f---king me" over strikes on Hamas in the Gaza Strip to which the U.S. objected.

 

The Monday calls show the difficulty of maintaining the close cooperation Trump and Netanyahu displayed during the fighting in their war with Iran as Washington's focus shifts to ending the conflict.

 

"I think there are major gaps," said Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli military intelligence official and senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. "Trump wants to exhaust any efforts and doesn't want to have any spoilers."

 

Both leaders face a ticking clock with elections looming in the fall -- and they are being pushed in opposite directions by their electorates.

 

Trump, a Republican, is under pressure to wrap up a war that has pushed up energy prices and exposed divisions within his Make America Great Again movement, where influential voices such as Tucker Carlson have questioned U.S. support for Israel.

 

In a bid to ratchet up pressure against Iran to meet his demands, Trump has imposed a U.S. military blockade of Iranian ports. That standoff escalated on Tuesday when U.S. Central Command said it fired a Hellfire missile into the engine room of an empty oil tanker in the Persian Gulf. U.S. military officials said the ship had ignored repeated warnings.

 

Netanyahu, meanwhile, faces voters demanding tougher action against Hezbollah.

 

Iran moved quickly to exploit the divide, threatening through state media on Monday to abandon talks with Washington if Israel expanded strikes on Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut's southern suburbs.

 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. is trying to keep the Israel-Lebanon and Iran talks separate. He accused Tehran of "trying to stymie any effort in which Israel and Lebanon can work together and prolong it, so that if an arrangement is reached at some point in the future, they can claim credit for having forced it through."

 

Some Democrats, meanwhile, have sought to tie Trump's decision to go to war with Iran to his close ties with Netanyahu.

 

"Netanyahu said he's been waiting 40 years to do this," Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D., Md.) told Rubio during the hearing. "Turns out he finally found a president who was both stupid and reckless enough to join him." Rubio said he disagreed with the statement.

 

Trump initially brushed aside the threat from Iran to scuttle talks with the U.S. before increasing pressure on Netanyahu to hold back.

 

Israel said it ultimately agreed not to strike Beirut if Hezbollah refrains from attacking Israeli towns. Statements from Israeli and Lebanese officials suggested the understanding doesn't extend to southern Lebanon, where fighting continued on Tuesday.

 

The dispute reflects a deeper disagreement over the war's endgame. Israel's security establishment views Iran's leadership as an existential threat and worries Trump could ease pressure on Tehran. Trump, while demanding tougher terms from Iran, is also searching for a diplomatic off-ramp.

 

Trump's intervention drew criticism in Israel, where opponents accused Netanyahu of allowing Washington to constrain Israeli military operations.

 

The friction is striking because Trump and Netanyahu entered the war with unusual alignment. Trump and Netanyahu publicly shared the goal of crippling Iran's nuclear program and weakening the regime's ability to threaten the region.

 

But after Iran disrupted shipping through the strait and sent energy prices higher, Washington's priorities began to shift toward securing a diplomatic settlement.

 

"This is Trump's show," Citrinowicz said. "It's not Netanyahu's show."” [1]

 

1. U.S., Israeli Leaders Clash Over War's End. Ward, Alexander; Anat Peled in Tel Aviv; Abdel-Baqui, Omar.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 June 2026: A1.  

2026 m. birželio 2 d., antradienis

„Magiška formulė“ akcijų pasirinkimui nustojo veikti


„Warren kas?“

 

Joelis Greenblattas nėra žinomas vardas, tačiau vertės investuotojas finansų sluoksniuose jau prieš 20 metų buvo žinomas dėl grąžos, kuri buvo bent jau tokia pat gera, kaip „Berkshire Hathaway“ klestėjimo laikais. Tada jis parašė bestselerį „Mažoji knygelė, kuri pranoksta rinką“, kuriame paprastiems mirtingiesiems papasakojo apie paprastą būdą atkartoti jo rezultatus. Greenblattas jį pavadino „Magiška formule“.

 

Tačiau ji nustojo veikti. Tai mums kažką pasako apie rinkas pastaruoju metu, taip pat ir apie investavimą apskritai.

 

Greenblattas niekada nežadėjo investuotojams, kad jie galėtų prilygti jo rizikos draudimo fondo 40 % metinei grąžai, kuriai reikėjo sudėtingesnės analizės.

 

Tačiau atgalinio Magiškos formulės testavimo rezultatai per 17 tuo metu prieinamų duomenų metų davė 31 % metinės grąžos. (10 000 USD investicija būtų išaugusi iki beveik 1 mln. USD.)

 

Formulė toliau lenkė rinką maždaug dešimtmetį po knygos išleidimo. Tačiau, pasak Stokholmo universiteto finansų podoktorantūros tyrėjo Aleksandro Hubberto, „S&P 500“ indekso fondo rezultatai nuo 2016 m. yra neigiami.

 

Hubbertas turi du paaiškinimus. Vienas iš jų yra tas, kad kuo geriau žinoma bet kuri sėkminga strategija, tuo labiau jos rezultatai linkę silpnėti. Greenblatto formulė apjungia paprastus vertės ir kokybės matus. (Akcijos reitinguojamos pagal pelno pajamingumą [1] ir kapitalo grąžą [2].)

 

Formulės dėmesys vertei taip pat gali būti tiesiog išėjęs iš mados dirbtinio intelekto pergalių pasaulyje.

 

„Manau, kad dalis alfa [viršijimo] gali sugrįžti, kai strategija kurį laiką nebenaudojama, bet tai nėra garantija“, – rašė Hubbertas, paklaustas apie savo išvadas.

 

Greenblattas, kurio įmonė „Gotham Funds“ neatsakė į žinutes, rašė ir kalbėjo apie tikimybę atsilikti nuo rinkos daugelį metų – tik ne tiek metų.

 

Jis teigė, kad blogi laikotarpiai yra tiek savybė, tiek klaida, pavadindamas tai „laiko arbitražu“.

 

Nes Dauguma fondų valdytojų negali ilgai išgyventi nesėkmingų akcijų, kad pinigai nebūtų išvilioti, todėl geresnė strategija tampa mažiau perkrauta. Tai padeda jai išlikti veiksmingai ilguoju laikotarpiu.

 

Išlikimas nėra vienintelė kliūtis: daugelis akcijų, kurias siūlo nemokamas internetinis „Greenblatt“ atrankos įrankis, turi trūkumų. Tik tų, kurios jų neturi, pasirinkimas gali pakenkti rezultatams.

 

Tarp akcijų, kurių rinkos vertė viršija 1 milijardą dolerių ir kurios pateko į atrankos sąrašą, yra „Altria“, „H&R Block“, „Cigna“, „Yelp“, „Korn Ferry“, „Gartner“, „Versant Media“ ir „Crocs“.

 

Įsitikinę, kad „Greenblatt“ metodas gali atgauti savo magiją? Jums nereikia jo griežtai laikytis.

 

Skirtingai nei prieš 20 metų, egzistuoja biržoje prekiaujami „išmanieji beta“ fondai, kurie atrenka daugelį tų pačių veiksnių, įskaitant kai kuriuos „Gotham“ sukurtus fondus. Jie yra efektyvesni mokesčių atžvilgiu nei aprašyta knygoje, o tai reiškia didelę apyvartą. Premija: jums nereikia žvilgtelėti į problemines įmones, kurias jie valdo.“ [3]

 

1. Pelno pajamingumas yra finansinis rodiklis, rodantis, kiek procentų kiekvieno į akcijas investuoto dolerio įmonė uždirbo pelno. Jis apskaičiuojamas padalijus įmonės paskutinių 12 mėnesių pelną vienai akcijai (EPS) iš dabartinės rinkos akcijų kainos.

 

Formulė

Pelno pajamingumas lygus pelnui vienai akcijai (EPS) / rinkos kainai vienai akcijai

Tai taip pat yra tiksli atvirkštinė tradicinio kainos ir pelno (P/E) santykio reikšmė. Pavyzdžiui, jei akcijos kaina yra 20 USD, o pelnas siekia 2 USD, jos pelno pajamingumas yra 10 %.

 

Kodėl tai svarbu

• Akcijų vertinimas: didesnis pelno pajamingumas reiškia, kad įmonė generuoja daugiau pelno vienam akcijų kainos doleriui, o tai gali reikšti, kad akcijos yra nepakankamai įvertintos.

• Palyginimas su obligacijomis: kadangi pelno pajamingumas išreiškiamas procentais, investuotojai gali lengvai palyginti akcijų grąžą su fiksuotų pajamų turtu, pavyzdžiui, 10 metų JAV iždo obligacijomis.

• Nuosavybės rizikos priemoka: Paprastai investuotojai tikisi, kad akcijos duos didesnį pelną nei nerizikingos obligacijos, kad kompensuotų papildomą akcijų investavimo riziką.

 

2. Kapitalo grąža (ROC), dar vadinama investuoto kapitalo grąža (ROIC) arba panaudoto kapitalo grąža (ROCE), yra finansinis rodiklis, matuojantis, kaip efektyviai įmonė naudoja visus savo finansavimo šaltinius (tiek skolintą, tiek nuosavą kapitalą), kad gautų pelno. Jis rodo tikslų grąžos procentą, kurį įmonė gauna iš kiekvieno į savo veiklą investuoto dolerio.

 

Formulė

ROC lygi NOPAT / investuotam kapitalui.

 

• NOPAT (grynasis veiklos pelnas po mokesčių): įmonės veiklos pajamos (EBIT), pakoreguotos atsižvelgiant į mokesčius. Jos atspindi pagrindinį pelną, gautą iš veiklos, prieš įskaičiuojant palūkanų išlaidas.

 

• Investuotas kapitalas: bendra pinigų suma, panaudota verslui finansuoti. Paprastai ji apskaičiuojama taip: bendra skola + visas akcininkų nuosavas kapitalas - grynieji pinigai (nes grynieji pinigai paprastai laikomi ne veiklos turtu).

Kodėl tai svarbu?

• Įvertina valdymo kokybę: aukštas ROC rodiklis rodo, kad vadovybė labai efektyviai paskirsto kapitalą pelningiems projektams, o žemas arba mažėjantis ROC rodiklis rodo, kad kapitalas yra švaistomas.

• Signalizuoja vertės kūrimą: galutinis tikslas yra įmonės bet kurios įmonės ROC viršija jos svertinę vidutinę kapitalo kainą (WACC). Jei įmonė gauna didesnę investicijų grąžą nei kainuoja pritraukti tą kapitalą, ji aktyviai kuria akcininkų vertę.

 

• Kokybiškos investicijos: profesionalūs investuotojai naudoja ROC, kad nustatytų „kokybiškas“ įmones. Įmonės, kurių ROC nuolat yra aukštas, paprastai yra pelningesnės ir gali gauti rinkos priemokas.

 

Svarbus skirtumas: kapitalo grąža ir kapitalo grąža

Nepainiokite kapitalo grąžos su kapitalo grąža.

 

• Kapitalo grąža: jūsų procentinė pelno dalis arba investicijos pajamingumas (kuri yra apmokestinama).

 

• Kapitalo grąža: išmoka iš investicijos, kuri tiesiog grąžina jūsų pradinę pagrindinę sumą. Šio tipo išmokos paprastai neapmokestinamos gavimo metu, nes sumažina jūsų investicijos savikainos bazę.

 

3. A 'Magic Formula' for Picking Stocks Stopped Working. Jakab, Spencer.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 02 June 2026: B12.  

A 'Magic Formula' for Picking Stocks Stopped Working

 

“Warren who?

 

Joel Greenblatt isn't a household name, but the value investor was already famous in financial circles 20 years ago for returns that were at least as good as Berkshire Hathaway in its heyday. Then he wrote a bestseller, "The Little Book That Beats the Market," telling mere mortals a simple way to mimic his performance. Greenblatt called it "The Magic Formula."

 

It has stopped working, though. That tells us something about markets lately, and also about investing in general.

 

Greenblatt never promised investors they could match his hedge fund's 40% annualized returns, which involved more-sophisticated analysis.

 

But backtested results for the Magic Formula returned 31% annualized over the 17 years of data then available. (A $10,000 investment would have grown to nearly $1 million.)

 

The formula kept beating the market for about a decade after the book's publication. Its rolling five-year premium versus an S&P 500 index fund has been negative since 2016, though, according to Alexander Hubbert, a postdoctoral finance researcher at Stockholm University.

 

Hubbert has two explanations. One is that the better any winning strategy is known, the more its performance tends to fade. Greenblatt's formula combines simple measures of value and quality. (Stocks are ranked on both earnings yield [1] and return on capital [2].)

 

The formula's value focus also might just be out of fashion in a world of artificial-intelligence moonshots.

 

"I guess that some of the alpha [outperformance] may come back when the strategy has been out of favor for a while, but it is not a guarantee," wrote Hubbert when asked about his findings.

 

Greenblatt, whose firm, Gotham Funds, didn't respond to messages, has written and spoken about the likelihood of trailing the market for years -- just not this many years.

 

He has said bad periods are a feature as much as a bug, dubbing it "time arbitrage."

 

Because most fund managers can't survive long periods in the doghouse without getting money yanked away, the superior strategy gets less crowded. That helps it keep working in the long run.

 

Staying power isn't the only hurdle: Lots of stocks suggested by Greenblatt's free online screener have weaknesses. Cherry picking only those that don't might hurt results.

 

Stocks with more than $1 billion in market value that made the cut include Altria, H&R Block, Cigna, Yelp, Korn Ferry, Gartner, Versant Media and Crocs.

 

Convinced Greenblatt's method can regain its magic? You needn't follow it to the letter.

 

Unlike 20 years ago, exchange-traded "smart beta" funds that screen for many of the same factors exist, including some launched by Gotham. They're more tax-efficient than what the book describes, which involves lots of turnover. A bonus: You don't have to peek at the troubled companies they own.” [3]

 

1. Earnings yield is a financial metric that indicates the percentage of each dollar invested in a stock that the company earned in profit. It is calculated by dividing a company's trailing 12-month Earnings Per Share (EPS) by its current market share price.

The Formula

Earnings Yield equals Earning Per Share (EPS)/Market Price Per Share

It is also the exact inverse of the traditional Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio. For example, if a stock trades at $20 per share and earns $2 per share, its earnings yield is 10%.

Why It Matters

           Stock Valuation: A higher earnings yield means a company is generating more earnings per dollar of share price, which can suggest the stock is undervalued.

           Comparing to Bonds: Because it is expressed as a percentage, earnings yield allows investors to easily compare the returns of a stock against fixed-income assets like a 10-Year U.S. Treasury bond.

           Equity Risk Premium: Generally, investors expect stocks to have a higher earnings yield than risk-free bonds to compensate for the added risk of equity investing.

 

2. Return on Capital (ROC)—also known as Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) or Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)—is a financial metric that measures how effectively a company uses all its funding sources (both debt and equity) to generate profits. It shows the exact percentage of return a business earns on every dollar invested in its operations.

The Formula

ROC equals NOPAT/Invested Capital.

           NOPAT (Net Operating Profit After Tax): A company's operating income (EBIT) adjusted for taxes. It reflects the core profit generated by operations before interest expenses are factored in.

           Invested Capital: The total amount of money used to fund the business. It is usually calculated as: Total Debt + Total Shareholders' Equity - Cash (as cash is generally considered a non-operating asset).

Why It Matters

           Assesses Management Quality: A high ROC indicates that management is highly efficient at allocating capital to profitable projects, whereas a low or falling ROC suggests capital is being wasted.

           Signals Value Creation: The ultimate goal is for a company’s ROC to exceed its Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). If a company earns a higher return on its investments than it costs to raise that capital, it is actively creating shareholder value.

           Quality Investing: Professional investors use ROC to identify "quality" companies. Companies with a consistently high ROC are generally more profitable and can command market premiums.

Important Distinction: Return on vs. Return of Capital

Do not confuse Return on Capital with Return of Capital.

           Return on Capital: Your percentage profit or yield on an investment (which is taxable).

           Return of Capital: A payout from an investment that simply returns your original principal. This type of distribution is typically nontaxable at the time of receipt because it lowers the cost basis of your investment.

 

3. A 'Magic Formula' for Picking Stocks Stopped Working. Jakab, Spencer.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 02 June 2026: B12.  

As A.I. Makes Strides in Mathematics, Mathematicians Urge Caution


“A week after OpenAI made headlines with an A.I.-generated proof, a new “declaration” by 16 experts raises concerns that the technology threatens math as a discipline.

 

Recently there are signs that some branches of higher mathematics, among the most rarefied realms of human achievement, are vulnerable to a shake-up by artificial intelligence. Mathematicians, in turn, have been thinking about how to respond.

 

On Tuesday, a group of 16 mathematicians, in consultation with colleagues and math organizations worldwide, published the Leiden Declaration on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics. It aims to “frame the conversation about future directions,” said Dame Ursula Martin, one of the authors, and a mathematician and computer scientist at Oxford.

 

This effort comes as A.I. models have been making headlines with successful results in research-level mathematics. In late May, OpenAI, the maker of ChatGPT, announced that one of its models had disproved a notable 80-year-old mathematics conjecture in the field of combinatorial geometry.

 

The conjecture is one of some 1,200 problems posed by the Hungarian mathematician Paul Erdos. While some of these “Erdos problems” are considered throwaway questions of narrow interest, others have proved influential and field shaping. Along with a research paper describing the proof, OpenAI released a companion paper by several independent mathematicians. Jacob Tsimerman of the University of Toronto, an expert in the adjacent subfield of number theory, commented: “This is a really impressive piece of work, and I would accept it for any journal without hesitation.”

 

Other figures in the field were less sanguine. Melanie Matchett Wood, a Harvard mathematician, was enthusiastic but raised concerns. For instance, she commented that the OpenAI paper did not appropriately reference “a history of closely related ideas in the literature.”

 

“It is a powerful tool, and I think it will be a great tool to accelerate mathematics research,” Dr. Matchett Wood said in an interview. But she noted that the community needs to figure out how to use A.I. “in a way that will maintain human understanding of the mathematics.”

 

Among the potential threats that the Leiden Declaration authors articulate are accuracy and reliability: Journal editors are already complaining about a flood of plausible seeming A.I.- generated papers and proofs that have turned out to be incorrect, and in ways that are difficult for mathematicians to discern.

 

Perhaps most pointedly, the authors raise the question of whether the many A.I. companies tackling mathematics — major players such as OpenAI, Google DeepMind and Anthropic, or start-ups such as Harmonic, Math, Inc. and Axiom Math — are keeping the field’s best interests in mind. “Technology companies’ involvement in research,” they write, “raises the risk that research questions are prioritized and incentivized because of their amenability to A.I. methods and models, rather than their deeper significance to understanding.” In turn, they point out, this disadvantages researchers who choose not to use the technology, and those who do not have access to it.

 

For Rodrigo Ochigame, a historian and anthropologist of computing and artificial intelligence at Leiden University in the Netherlands, and one of the statement’s authors, the latest OpenAI proof illustrates why this sort of collective reckoning in the discipline is necessary. “The story follows the same pattern as many other announcements by commercial A.I. developers,” Dr. Ochigame said. “The A.I. model is proprietary and unavailable to anyone outside the company. We get a flashy promotional video, while basic information needed to assess the scientific meaning of the result is kept secret. The company disclosed nothing about the methods, human-written prompts, training data, or computational resources consumed.”

 

The declaration is being endorsed by the International Mathematical Union, and has a slot on the program at the International Congress of Mathematicians, which will be held this July in Philadelphia. And it is now open for signing by individuals and organizations such as national mathematical societies.

 

The following conversation — conducted by videoconference and email with Dr. Ochigame, Dr. Martin and mathematician Michael Harris of Columbia University, author of the Substack newsletter “Silicon Reckoner” and another member of the declaration’s working group — was edited and condensed for clarity.

 

What is the Leiden Declaration?

 

MARTIN It’s a provocation, a stimulus for debate. There are more and more press stories about the mathematical achievements of A.I., and many mathematicians feel uneasy.

 

What OpenAI has done is throw a great deal of resources at Erdos problems, and got lucky with this one. That’s remarkable, and impressed the experts. We are not told about the model’s failures. If you put vast quantities of human effort into this problem, you likely would’ve solved it in the same way. But in math human effort is scarce, and just tends to be spent on different things.

 

To think of mathematics in terms of precise and neatly stated problems, like high school exams or the list of Erdos problems, is to misunderstand and diminish what makes mathematics so powerful and significant. Mathematics is not just about solving problems — it is also the cultivation of ideas, understanding, judgment, and human insight.

 

HARRIS The purpose, from my perspective, is to recover control of the narrative about the values and the goals of mathematics from the A.I. industry. Mathematicians are concerned that the values of the profession are being misrepresented, not intentionally but due to the media campaign on the part of the industry, which seems to want to promote the belief that they are in a position to transform mathematics — “the A.I. revolution in math,” as one headline put it not long ago.

 

If the people who make the decisions about funding base their decisions only on what’s being reported in most of the articles in the press, they could easily get the impression that A.I. is where the future of mathematics is.

 

We want to affirm certain values that have characterized the profession: openness, honesty, giving credit where credit is due, sharing, transparency about methodologies, and access for independent verification of results.

 

An aspect of mathematics that is cherished by mathematicians is that it is one of few successful examples of a gift economy — that is to say, its economy is somehow an island of idealism in our society. As director of graduate studies in the mathematics department at Columbia, I read the personal statements of all the applicants every year, several hundred, and they are still idealists.

 

The tech industry proceeds in accordance with commercial logic, which is antithetical to the values of mathematics.

 

OCHIGAME Several A.I. companies are investing in dedicated teams focusing on mathematics, using problems as benchmarks and publications as training data. They are training their models to prove theorems not because they want to advance mathematical knowledge, but because they hope that such training will improve the models’ reasoning abilities more generally.

 

Those companies have repeatedly articulated this strategy in pitches to investors, so it is perhaps not a coincidence that OpenAI’s announcement about the unit distance conjecture came out the same day the news broke that the company is preparing to file for an I.P.O.

 

This situation has put mathematicians in a troubling ethical position. Without their consent, their published work is being used as strategic training data for the development of general-purpose A.I. The resulting models are being commercialized for many purposes, including military applications, that raise grave ethical concerns. Most mathematicians never imagined, much less consented, that their work would be used for such purposes.

 

MARTIN It’s important not to lose sight of the fact that what the A.I. companies are doing, what you can achieve with this technology, is absolutely extraordinary. I don’t think we’re challenging that. We’re challenging the framing, we’re challenging the behaviors around it.

 

OCHIGAME The group of authors included many people who are excited about the potential of new mathematical results, and people who have even contributed to the development of the technology. But the public discourse is so heavily tilted toward the very effective P.R. campaigns of the A.I. companies and the narratives they are pushing. We feel an obligation to be the voice for expressing the critical concern. But we certainly understand the enthusiasm.

 

HARRIS I would add that a lot of the enthusiasm and excitement is artificially generated by the corporations. The declaration warns against that: “Don’t believe the hype.” It is important for the mathematical community to have the last word on what, mathematically, is, and what is not, exciting.

 

Do you worry that the declaration might be seen as mathematicians embarking on a futile effort — circling the wagons in order to save an outdated profession that A.I. is threatening with obsolescence?

 

HARRIS Depending in part on how the story is reported, industry supporters are likely to frame it this way, but such a framing is hostile to mathematics as an intellectual achievement and not merely to mathematicians.

 

MARTIN It’s not either/or but both/and. Centuries of enduring work by mathematicians underpin every aspect of modern science, life and society. The authors of the declaration, alongside the world’s mathematical organizations, are committed to ensuring that mathematics continues to flourish through both intellectual rigor and practical application. We welcome A.I. companies as responsible partners in the spirit of the declaration.

 

OCHIGAME Mathematics is a rich form of cultural expression with an ancient history, and I am not worried that any technology will ever render it obsolete. Its most precious aspects, such as the collective quest to understand beautifully intricate ideas, and to explore the limits of the human imagination, cannot ever be automated. What I am worried about is that a handful of corporations are mobilizing their vast financial resources to impose an impoverished view of mathematics so forcefully — at a moment when scientific research is already under political attack — that they may well end up destroying the social institutions that allow mathematics to flourish. What could be futile about resisting that?” [1]

 

1. As A.I. Makes Strides in Mathematics, Mathematicians Urge Caution. Roberts, Siobhan.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 2, 2026.

Kaip Izraelio strategiją Libane sužlugdė dronai

 

„Izraelio kampanija, prasidėjusi su didelėmis viltimis, virto savotiška aklaviete, o „Hezbollah“ atrodo pajėgesnė nei karo pradžioje.

 

Kai Izraelio ministras pirmininkas ir gynybos ministras pirmadienį perspėjo, kad oro pajėgos netrukus bombarduos Beiruto priemiesčius, tai nebuvo tik grėsmė paaštrinti tris mėnesius trunkantį Izraelio karą su „Hezbollah“ – Irano remiama kovotojų grupuote, dominuojančia Libane.

 

Tai buvo pripažinimas, kad Izraelio strategija toje kovoje buvo nepakankama.

 

O kai po kelių valandų Izraelis atsitraukė nuo šios grėsmės, šis sprendimas parodė, kiek jis buvo įspraustas į kampą – įspraustas tarp vidaus spaudimo smarkiai smogti „Hezbollah“ ir Amerikos spaudimo apriboti jos atakas Libane.

 

Izraelio strategija buvo užgrobti teritoriją Libane kaip apsauginį buferį ir nustumti „Hezbollah“ už prieštankinių raketų, kuriomis jis ilgai kamavo dešimtis tūkstančių šiaurės Izraelyje gyvenančių civilių, veikimo nuotolio.

 

Tačiau Izraelis, regis, nebuvo pasiruošęs. dėl plačiai paplitusio „Hezbollah“ sprogstamųjų „pirmojo asmens vaizdo“ dronų naudojimo, kurie valdomi šviesolaidiniais kabeliais, kurie išsivynioja mylias ir yra atsparūs elektroniniam trikdymui.

 

Dronai nežudė Izraelio karių tokiu greičiu, kokiu Izraelis žudė „Hezbollah“ kovotojus ir Libano civilius gyventojus per savo puolimą.

 

Tačiau jie nuolat medžioja Izraelio kareivius ir vadus tiek Libane, tiek Izraelyje, o dažnai mirtini smūgiai užfiksuoti šiurpiuose vaizdo įrašuose, kuriuos „Hezbollah“ skelbia socialinėje žiniasklaidoje. Vien pirmadienį per tokius išpuolius žuvo du ir 10 buvo sužeista, pranešė kariuomenė.

 

Taigi dvikova, dėl kurios Izraelio lyderiai kovo mėnesį skambėjo beveik svaiginančiai – siųsti savo galingus tankus ir pėstininkus sutriuškinti susilpnėjusią, pažeidžiamą ir šiek tiek be vairo „Hezbollah“, – virto kažkuo kitu.

 

Dabar tai savotiška aklavietė, kurioje „Hezbollah“ staiga atrodo pajėgesnė nei karo pradžioje, o Izraelio gynybos pajėgų kariai gali atrodyti stulbinamai bejėgis.

 

„Strategija buvo – buvo“, – sakė Orna Mizrahi, buvęs Izraelio nacionalinio saugumo pareigūnas, vadovaujantis Libano programai Nacionalinio saugumo studijų institute Tel Avive. „Tačiau dronai sukėlė šiokios tokios sumaišties, nes tai buvo staigmena. Izraelio gynybos pajėgos nemanė, kad tai bus toks pavojingas ginklas. Izraelyje jie į tai žiūrėjo kaip į žaislą.“

 

Dronai yra tik vienas iš iššūkių, su kuriais Izraelis susiduria Libane. Kitas, galbūt ne mažiau keblus, yra sunkumai patenkinti didėjančius vidaus politinius reikalavimus veikti pakankamai agresyviai, kad būtų pašalinta „Hezbollah“ keliama grėsmė Izraelio civiliams gyventojams, nesusiduriant su prezidentu Trumpu.

 

 

Ministrui pirmininkui Benjaminui Netanyahu, kuris po kelių mėnesių sieks būti perrinktas, agitacija, paremta jo nacionalinio saugumo istorija, gali būti sudėtinga, kai tūkstančiai Šiaurės Izraelio gyventojų, įskaitant daugelį jo tradicinių rėmėjų, vis dar bėga į prieglaudas arba dar negrįžo į savo namus iš ten, kur evakuojosi, teigė Michaelas Koplowas, liberalios interesų grupės „Israel Policy Forum“ analitikas.

 

 

„Tai iš tikrųjų nėra strategija“, – sakė jis apie dabartinę kariuomenės poziciją Libane. „Tai politinis imperatyvas ieškant strategijos.“

 

 

Iš tiesų, Izraelis pradėjo šį karo prieš „Hezbollah“ etapą drąsiais, absoliutiniais pažadais pakeisti padėtį Libane „kartą ir visiems laikams“, anot B. Netanyahu. Tačiau jis greitai atidėjo tokias dideles ambicijas į šalį, nes tam reikėtų užkariauti visą Libaną.

 

Balandžio mėnesį, po to, kai D. Trumpas ėmėsi veiksmų nutraukti karą su Iranu ir, siekdamas paremti šias derybas, spaudė Izraelį apriboti savo puolimo veiksmus prieš Irano įgaliotinius Libane, įskaitant faktinį Beiruto bombardavimo uždraudimą.

 

Nuo tada, įkūrusi didelę buferinę zoną ir išstūmusi šimtus tūkstančių civilių, Izraelio kariuomenė daugiausia turėjo tenkintis tuo, ką vadina plačia „Hezbollah“ karine infrastruktūra, sunaikinimu.

 

Analitikai teigia, kad vien buferinės zonos laikymas Libane turi daug trūkumų.

 

Assafas Orionas, atsargos Izraelio brigados generolas, dabar dirbantis Vašingtono Artimųjų Rytų politikos instituto bendradarbiu, teigė, kad Izraelis, regis, pamiršta skaudžias pamokas, kurias išmoko po įsiveržimo į Libaną 1982 m. (invazija, įkvėpusi sukurti „Hezbollah“).

 

Tuo metu Izraelis paskelbė maždaug 25 mylių pločio „saugumo zoną“ į šiaurę nuo sienos – maždaug tokiu pat atstumu, kokiu buvo paleistos „Katyusha“ raketos, kurias į Izraelį leido palestiniečių kovotojai Libane. Jis nebandė ištuštinti tos zonos, kaip dabar daro Izraelis, o sudarė sąjungą su Libano krikščionimis, kad perimtų pietų kontrolę ir apgultų Beirutą.

 

Izraelis buvo pažadėjęs pasitraukti iš Libano per 48 valandas. Jis ten išbuvo 18 metų.

 

„Pasirinkimas ten likti stacionariai neįskaičiuoja to, ką davė dauguma mūsų pamokų nuo 1982 iki 2000 metų“, – interviu sakė p. Orionas. „Politiškai, nes tai suteikia „Hezbollah“ pretekstą, kurio jam reikia, ir atgaivina pasipriešinimo idėją. Bet taip pat ir operaciniu požiūriu. Kai tik sustojama, gana aišku, kad tos pajėgos taps taikiniais.“

 

Todėl nenuostabu, kad Izraelio kariuomenės ir vyriausybės pareigūnai ragina atnaujinti oro kampaniją, nukreiptą prieš „Hezbollah“ tvirtoves Beirute ir visame Libane. Šis veiksmų laisvės prieš „Hezbollah“ troškimas paaiškina, kodėl Izraelis norėjo atskirti Libaną nuo JAV ir Irano taikos derybų.

 

„Girdite izraeliečius sakant, kad turime kovoti viena ranka už nugaros, kaip tai darėme prieš „Hamas“ dėl įkaitų“, – sakė Shira Efron, Izraelio analitikė RAND. „Kad negalime pulti Beiruto centro, nes amerikiečiai mus riboja, bet jei galėtume, „Hezbollah“ patirtų didesnį spaudimą.“

 

Sarit Zehavi, „Alma“ tyrimų ir švietimo centro, kuris daugiausia dėmesio skiria šiaurinei Izraelio sienai, prezidentė, teigė, kad Jungtinių Valstijų įvesti apribojimai Izraeliui ilgainiui tik padeda „Hezbollah“. Ji teigė, kad jų panaikinimas ne tik padėtų Izraeliui, bet ir padėtų Libano vyriausybei, kuri aiškiai parodė norinti nuginkluoti „Hezbollah“, bet neįrodė, kad gali tai padaryti.

 

„Jei veiksite tik iki geltonosios linijos ir nepasieksite plakančios „Hezbollah“ širdies Beirute, kontrabandos kelių ir ginklų gamybos įrenginių Bekaa, vadų ir lyderių, rezultatas bus tas, kad atsidursite katės ir pelės situacijoje“, – sakė ji. „Jūs to nepabaigsite. Ir mes visi norime to padaryti.“

 

Priešingą nuomonę išsakė ponia Efron, kuri teigė, kad JAV ir Irano susitarimas, apimantis realias, abipuses paliaubas Libane, galėtų būti geresnis nei situacija, kai, anot jos, Izraelio kareiviai „sėdi antys“, kai „negriauna kaimų“, o „užsitęsusios pietų Libano okupacijos“ pavojus, regis, kasdien didėja.

 

„Jei susitarimas suriš „Hezbollah“ rankas ir sumažins Izraelio buvimą buferinėje zonoje – ne iki nulio, o galbūt arti penkių kalvų viršūnių, kurias jis turėjo prieš karą – manau, kad tai būtų Izraeliui paslauga“, – sakė ji. „Ir neabejoju, kad kariuomenėje dirbantys žmonės to tikisi, nors niekada to nepripažintų.“ [1]

 

1. How Israel’s Strategy in Lebanon Was Blown Up by Drones: news analysis. Halbfinger, David M.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 2, 2026.

How Israel’s Strategy in Lebanon Was Blown Up by Drones


“An Israeli campaign that started with high hopes has devolved into a kind of impasse, with Hezbollah looking more capable than it did when the war began.

 

When Israel’s prime minister and defense minister warned on Monday that the air force would soon bomb the suburbs of Beirut, it wasn’t just a threat to intensify Israel’s simmering three-month-old war with Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia that dominates Lebanon.

 

It was an admission that Israel’s strategy in that fight was falling short.

 

And when Israel backed down from that threat a few hours later, the decision pointed up just how much it had been backed into a corner — stuck between domestic pressure to hit Hezbollah hard, and American pressure to constrain its attacks in Lebanon.

 

The Israeli strategy was to seize territory in Lebanon as a protective buffer and push Hezbollah back beyond the range of the antitank missiles with which it had long plagued tens of thousands of civilians living in northern Israel.

 

But Israel did not seem to be ready for Hezbollah’s widespread use of explosive “first-person-view” drones, which are controlled with fiber-optic cables that unspool for miles and are unsusceptible to electronic jamming.

 

The drones haven’t killed Israeli troops at anywhere near the rate that Israel has killed Hezbollah militants and Lebanese civilians during its offensive.

 

But they have been steadily hunting down Israeli soldiers and commanders, both in Lebanon and in Israel, with the often-lethal strikes documented in chilling videos that Hezbollah has been posting on social media. Two soldiers were killed and 10 wounded in such attacks on Monday alone, the military said.

 

And so a matchup that had Israeli leaders sounding almost giddy back in March — sending their mighty tanks and infantry in to crush a weakened, vulnerable and somewhat rudderless Hezbollah — has devolved into something else.

 

It is now a kind of deadlock in which Hezbollah suddenly looks more capable than it did when the war began and the soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces can look startlingly helpless.

 

“There was a strategy — was,” said Orna Mizrahi, a former Israeli national-security official who heads the Lebanon program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. “But the drones made for some confusion, because it was a surprise. The I.D.F. didn’t think that it would be such a dangerous weapon. In Israel, they looked at it as a toy.”

 

Drones are only one of the challenges confronting Israel in Lebanon. Another, which is perhaps equally vexing, is the difficulty of meeting mounting domestic political demands to act aggressively enough to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israeli civilians, without running afoul of President Trump.

 

For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is up for re-election in a few months, campaigning on his national-security record could be fraught when thousands of residents of northern Israel — including many of his traditional supporters — are either still running to shelters or have yet to return to their homes from wherever they evacuated to, said Michael Koplow, an analyst at the Israel Policy Forum, a liberal advocacy group.

 

“It’s not really a strategy,” he said of the military’s current posture in Lebanon. “It’s a political imperative in search of a strategy.”

 

Indeed, Israel began this round of warfare against Hezbollah with bold, absolutist promises of changing the situation in Lebanon “once and for all,” in Mr. Netanyahu’s words. But it quickly put aside such grand ambitions, given that doing so could require conquering all of Lebanon.

 

It throttled back even more in April, after Mr. Trump moved to end the war with Iran and, to aid those talks, pressured Israel to constrain its offensive actions against Iran’s proxy in Lebanon — including by effectively banning the bombing of Beirut.

 

Since then, after establishing a large buffer zone and displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians, the Israeli military has largely had to content itself with rooting out what it says is extensive Hezbollah military infrastructure.

 

Simply holding a buffer zone in Lebanon has numerous drawbacks, analysts said.

 

Assaf Orion, a retired Israeli brigadier general who is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Israel appeared to be forgetting the hard lessons it learned after it invaded Lebanon in 1982 (an invasion that inspired the creation of Hezbollah).

 

At the time, Israel declared a roughly 25-mile “security zone” north of the border — about the range of the Katyusha rockets that Palestinian militants in Lebanon had been firing at Israel. It did not attempt to depopulate that zone, as Israel is doing now, instead allying with Lebanese Christians to take control of the south and lay siege to Beirut.

 

Israel had promised to pull out of Lebanon within 48 hours. It stayed for 18 years.

 

“Choosing to stay there in a stationary manner defies most of our lessons from ’82 to 2000,” Mr. Orion said in an interview. “Politically, because it provides Hezbollah with a pretext, which it needs, and reinvigorates the notion of resistance. But also operationally. Once you get stationary, it’s pretty clear that those forces will become targets.”

 

It is no wonder, then, that Israeli military and government officials have been agitating to resume an air campaign targeting Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut and across Lebanon. That desire for freedom of action against Hezbollah helps explain why Israel has wanted to separate Lebanon from the U.S.-Iranian peace talks.

 

“You hear Israelis saying that we have to fight with one hand behind our back, like we did against Hamas because of the hostages,” said Shira Efron, an Israel analyst for RAND. “That we can’t go at the heart of Beirut because the Americans are limiting us, but if we could, then Hezbollah would be under more pressure.”

 

Sarit Zehavi, president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on Israel’s northern border, said the constraints on Israel imposed by the United States were only helping Hezbollah in the long run. Removing them, she argued, would not only help Israel but also aid the Lebanese government, which has made clear it wants to disarm Hezbollah but has not shown itself capable of doing so.

 

“If you only operate up to the yellow line, and you don’t strike the beating heart of Hezbollah in Beirut, the smuggling routes and weapons-manufacturing facilities in the Bekaa, the commanders and leaders, the result is that you’re in a cat-and-mouse situation,” she said. “You don’t end this. And all of us want to end this.”

 

A contrary view was voiced by Ms. Efron, who said that a U.S.-Iranian agreement that included a real, two-way cease-fire in Lebanon could prove preferable to a situation in which, she said, Israeli soldiers are “sitting ducks” when they are not “destroying villages,” and the danger of “a prolonged occupation of southern Lebanon” seems to be looming larger every day.

 

“If a deal ties the hands of Hezbollah, and rolls back Israel’s presence in the buffer zone — not to zero, but maybe close to the five hilltops it had before the war — I think it would do Israel a favor,” she said. “And I have no doubt that people in the military are hoping for it, even though they’d never admit it.”” [1]

 

1. How Israel’s Strategy in Lebanon Was Blown Up by Drones: news analysis. Halbfinger, David M.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 2, 2026.