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The Small-Business Owners Managing Whole Armies of A.I. Employees


“Scott Bell is a bankruptcy lawyer who is letting A.I. lobsters take over significant chunks of his daily work.

 

This isn’t surprising if you know a bit about his background. Bell, a wiry 59-year-old, is a sci-fi nerd from childhood. “‘Star Wars’ got me in ’77,” he says. When I met him recently in his sunny home office in Temecula, Calif., he handed me a model of an Imperial Star Destroyer that he had fabricated on his 3-D printer, which dominated one corner of the room, across from where his twitchy black Pomeranian and his pug snoozed in doggy beds.

 

Bell has long been an early adopter of office technology. He says he was the first lawyer of his acquaintance to go paperless, back in the early 2000s. (“Dropbox helped, a lot.”) When bankruptcy software went online, he pounced. When A.I. chatbots were introduced in the 2020s, he used them for research.

 

This January, he started reading on Reddit about OpenClaw. It’s software that you can install on your computer or in the cloud, and it spawns A.I. “agents” that do work for you. If you give OpenClaw access to your folders and files, it can read and add to them; give it the passwords to online services you use, and it will log in and use them on your behalf. If you explain to the agents how to do your white-collar office work — either by typing out step-by-step instructions or just by chatting with them — they can then begin trying to do the work for you.

 

OpenClaw agents don’t do this “thinking” themselves. They constantly send requests to a large language model chosen by the user, like OpenAI’s ChatGPT Codex or Google’s Gemini or Anthropic’s Claude Opus, and accomplish their tasks based on the L.L.M.’s answers. The agents will also keep track of what they’ve learned about your workflows, so users have often found that the agents grow more knowledgeable over time. The Reddit forums were full of people gushing about how they had gotten OpenClaw to respond to their emails, track expenses, do research, chat with clients. The OpenClaw logo is a lobster, so many Reddit users affectionately refer to their agents as “lobsters.”

 

Huh, Bell thought. This was a fascinating scene. Maybe lobsters could automate his legal work.

 

“With bankruptcy, a lot of the work is forms-based,” he said. “What I do is not super complicated.”

 

So in mid-March he bought four Mac Minis (“I got lawyer money,” he said dryly), parked them under his office desk and installed OpenClaw on all of them. He set up five agents. One is an “orchestrator” that logs into his online legal software. At first, it didn’t know what to look for or what to do, so the agent would text Bell via the chat app Discord to ask for instructions. This was laborious for a while: He had to detail every teensy step. But as the agent made notes about what it had learned, it started working more independently.

 

By the time Bell and I met at the end of April, his “law ops” agent, as he called it, would detect when court notices arrived, read them and message his clients. (It automatically switches to Spanish for his Spanish-speaking clients.) The agent also checks to make sure his clients have paid up. A “librarian” agent, meanwhile, trained on a huge document detailing California’s bankruptcy rules, offers legal analysis. It looks at contracts and proposals from other lawyers, figures out a strategy in response and then drafts a reply for Bell. “It’ll give me ideas for defenses I hadn’t thought of,” Bell marveled.

 

On a screen before us, he examined the latest note from the librarian. It had analyzed another lawyer’s proposal and composed a counterproposal — which, it informed Bell, “protects you from accidentally giving them a $727 runway.” It also added: “If you want, I can draft a firmer version that also pushes back on the reaffirmation premise without escalating the tone.”

 

Bell was impressed. His only change was to soften some phrasing. “I prefer the friendly approach first,” he says. “I’m your buddy, until I’m not.” The agents have surprised Bell with how reliable they are, though they can unpredictably get stuck: One recently texted him in confusion because it couldn’t locate a file for “Smith, Joe,” failing to make the connection to “Smith, Joseph.”

 

These days, most people have realized that A.I. is creeping into the office. A recent Gallup poll found that 28 percent of the respondents use it anywhere from several times a week to daily. But these are mostly just the familiar chat sessions.

 

The partisans of OpenClaw are doing something that is, depending on how you look at it, either more wildly ambitious or foolishly risky — or, as many will readily confess, both. They’re creating virtual employees, artificial staff that scurry around on their hard drives, doing work on their own say-so.

 

This is similar to what computer programmers have been doing for a year now — letting teams of agents write code — but expanded to a wide range of office tasks. While OpenClaw is probably the best-known “harness” for organizing agents for everyday toil, many more are emerging, including free ones like Hermes and ZeroClaw, as well as sleeker (if less ambitiously open-ended) corporate offerings like Lindy. A.I. firms are increasingly promoting the idea that all work should become “agentic.”

 

That prospect can look rather chaotic at the moment. Early lobster adopters have discovered that their OpenClaw agents might pilot themselves shockingly well for weeks on end — but then, with no notice, drive into a wall. Or they’ll wake up to discover that their agents have blabbed internal secrets to strangers over email or deleted critical information from a hard drive.

 

And the agents can simply burn through cash. Each query the agents send to an L.L.M. costs money. On their first day, Bell’s agents blew through $150; he signed up for two $200-a-month bulk subscriptions to Codex to keep the costs in check. Even so, he has had to train his agents not to ping Codex too often, because OpenAI will throttle them if they’re too persistent — temporarily turning off OpenClaw’s brain, as it were.

 

Nonetheless, the agents are now doing several hours of repetitive scut work each week. It frees Bell and his two staff members — a secretary and a paralegal — to perform other, hopefully more critical, work, like meeting with clients to suss out their needs.

 

But as A.I. began to take over the office, his secretary texted him nervously: “Am I still going to have a job?”

 

“I said, ‘Yeah,’” Bell told me, but then he shrugged theatrically, seeming to forecast a day when that might not be true anymore. “I just need to train it to answer the phone.”

 

OpenClaw is unusually clear about the fact that it is dangerous. Before you install it, it offers several “Here be dragons” disclaimers and requires you to respond to this unsettling prompt: “I understand that this is powerful and inherently risky. Continue?” When Andy Tanguay, a digital artist in Ann Arbor, Mich., installed OpenClaw this winter, he laughed. “It says, right on the tin, ‘This is not good,’” Tanguay says. “‘This is juggling chain saws — but install if you want, buddy.’”

 

Lobster aficionados, however, told me they find the danger is worth the opportunity to experience — quite palpably — what it’s like to automate your own job. Some figure this might help future-proof their careers. Others are simply enamored of the nerdery of it all.

 

And many swear they are genuinely experiencing a sharp boost in productivity.

 

That’s what Peter Steinberger was seeking when he first created OpenClaw. An Austrian programmer, he spent much of 2025 using Claude Code, the A.I. software that spins up independent agents to write computer code. “If you master those tools, you can easily be 10 times as productive,” Steinberger told me when we spoke last summer. Soon after that, he became obsessed with creating a way for noncoders to also deploy agents for their work. By November, he had created the software and put it online as a free, open-source project. An early name for it was Clawdbot, in a nod to Claude; when Anthropic emailed him (politely, apparently) to demand that he change the name, he settled on OpenClaw. (There is no particular significance to the lobster reference, as he later told the podcaster Lex Fridman, other than that “it was weird.”)

 

By February, OpenAI had hired Steinberger. While OpenClaw remains open-source and Steinberger still works on its code, recent updates have more tightly integrated OpenAI’s Codex with OpenClaw.

 

OpenAI says this can make OpenClaw more reliable, though users can still direct their lobsters to the L.L.M. of their choice.

 

Separately, OpenAI is also developing a “personal agent that will work in very much the same way” but will be safer and easier to use than the open-source version, Thibault Sottiaux, OpenAI’s core products lead, told me.

 

Several users told me that they had used OpenClaw to automate significant amounts of labor. One of them, Sean Chuplis, is a 45-year-old airline pilot who lives in Denver, where he trains new pilots using flight simulators. On the side, he runs a company that sells a device, the Stratux, that collects real-time information about air traffic and weather for small-plane pilots; he has sold about 30,000 of them over eight years.

 

Chuplis was, as he says, “an A.I. guy”: He had written his master’s thesis at the Naval War College on A.I., and he used to attend Burning Man, where in 2014 he ran into Dario Amodei, long before he was Anthropic’s chief executive. When Chuplis heard about OpenClaw, he created seven agents to manage his business. One answers customer questions on his Discord forum, while others fulfill orders or do online research to write posts for his aviation blog. One manages his Amazon account, processing refunds, analyzing which keyword searches are leading people to find the Stratux and then buying keyword ads.

 

“It’s actually changing my campaigns and modifying bids,” Chuplis told me. “It’s spending real money.” Managing his business used to take 20 hours of his time every month; a year ago he was considering selling it because he was too busy at his day job. But now he spends barely an hour or so a week on it. He let go of the contractor he used to pay to manage his Amazon activity.

 

He has been occasionally surprised — in a pleasant way — by the agents’ actions. One day, his marketing agent, which monitors industry news for him, spoke up to say it had read an article about the “right to repair” movement. It proposed a blog post about how Chuplis’s product is very fixable, because its software is open-source and he sells replacement parts. Chuplis had never really thought about the issue, he says, until the agent brought it up and wrote the post for him. Another day, a customer wrote to express a wish that the Stratux include a software feature specific to gliders. The agent looked at the device’s computer code, wrote the new feature itself and sent it to Chuplis.

 

To try to prevent his lobsters from running amok, he has written a series of stiff injunctions that they must consult before they do any work. One rule: They can’t buy an ad on Amazon that exceeds 25 percent of his advertising budget unless they check with him first. Another rule prohibits the bots from discussing the product’s computer code before they run a check to confirm that they are not hallucinating. The agents are also told to record everything they do and why they did it, so Chuplis will be able to trace any error.

 

“We use the same thing in aviation, called ‘verbalize, verify, monitor,’” he says. “I’m just applying what I know from my day job to my L.L.M. space.”

 

Every night, Chuplis puts OpenClaw through a “dreaming” run, in which the agents look over that day’s notes to revisit and then summarize their activity. When Chuplis looks at the dream logs, he can “kind of see it self-healing and self-critiquing, which is pretty interesting.” One night the main orchestrator agent wrote, “I’m good at: Post-mortem on failures (finding what broke),” but added that it wasn’t good at “extracting principles from success.”

 

Another night, in March, it summarized the aviation news of the day, which included the deadly crash at LaGuardia Airport that resulted from a mistake by air traffic control. “A controller said ‘I messed up’ on an open frequency, which is either the most human thing I’ve heard all week, or the most haunting,” it wrote.

 

For all its lucid dreaming, OpenClaw is not imminently poised to take over everyone’s office job. It is, as even die-hard fans will tell you, still pretty janky. Scott Bell had spent weeks merrily watching his bots manage his legal work when, out of the blue, on the morning of my visit, one of them sent him a cryptic message — “terminated” — and stopped working. He fed OpenClaw’s error messages into Claude and eventually realized that the agents had started “duplicating memories,” to the point that they were trying to send a huge request of about three million words to Codex.

 

Why? He never found out. He revived OpenClaw, and it resumed its legal analysis, but then suddenly it “terminated” again later that day. Bell groaned but put off fixing it and instead drove off in his cherry-red Lotus sports car — he had a lunchtime date with some other middle-aged, semiretired California guys. When he returned that afternoon, he got a ding, pulled out his phone and saw that his law-ops agent was working again. It had come back to life all by itself? Or maybe it never actually died?

 

Bell shrugged. He was growing used to these unpredictabilities and hoped that OpenClaw’s code, and the L.L.M.s powering it, would get better over time. “When it works,” he said, “it’s magic.”

 

Because OpenClaw relies on L.L.M.s, users on Reddit are constantly comparing models and arguing over their qualities, like oenophiles debating subtle variants of pinot noirs: Minimax 2.7 — from China — is “an amazing daily driver”; Gemma 4 26b is “a great compromise for speed and intelligence”; GPT-5 is “good but it has this tendency to get creative with instructions when it shouldn’t.”

 

Many OpenClaw users I spoke with were passionate fans of Anthropic’s Opus and Sonnet models. But then in early April, Anthropic changed Claude’s access so that OpenClaw couldn’t use the subscription tier. (Anthropic’s terms of service had long forbid third-party software to use its subscription tiers.) If OpenClaw users wanted to keep using the Claude models, they could pay for each request individually, or they could pay for bundles of usage at a discounted rate.

 

Lukas Kubica had to negotiate this change. He had been running his European sauna business with OpenClaw agents; they were talking to customers, changing bookings and managing billing, having learned all the company’s specifications. The setup, he says, was about 95 percent reliable — so good that he barely needed to spend more than a few hours each month managing his business. But after Anthropic’s change, he switched to a cheaper model, and his OpenClaw began getting things right only 70 percent of the time. “At 95 percent, you can sleep well and you know that everything is running smoothly,” he said — at 70 percent, you can’t. He stopped using OpenClaw entirely. He hopes that within a year other (and potentially cheaper) models will be as good as today’s best version of Opus and that he will be able to resume using OpenClaw with them.

 

In essence, OpenClaw users are discovering the power politics of the modern A.I. market: It is dominated by a tiny group of giant corporations. Their “frontier model” L.L.M.s may be powerful, but the owners can change your access unpredictably.

 

Tanguay, the digital artist in Ann Arbor, started using OpenClaw this spring to help him generate and edit images. His lobsters using Sonnet were working so smoothly that he could give them instructions from his phone and they would produce and edit 2,000 images, all on their own. Once the access to Sonnet became prohibitive, though, he could never match that performance with other models.

 

“When I was on Sonnet, I could not have been happier,” he texted me. “Now I’m getting what one would basically just call incompetence. I feel like I’m running a particularly bad McDonald’s. You know, the ones in a town with rich kids who don’t really want a job anyway. I’m getting lying and bad reasoning. Hell, I feel like I’m gonna catch somebody smoking a joint in one of the bathrooms or something.”

 

(In May, Anthropic announced that beginning in mid-June, subscribers’ fees would cover some part of their OpenClaw use via recently introduced monthly credits.)

 

Incompetent lobsters are bad; lobster vandals are even worse. Consider the fate of Summer Yue, the director of alignment at Meta Superintelligence Labs, a team tasked with getting A.I. to behave. In late February, she was horrified to discover that her OpenClaw, which had access to her inbox, was deleting crucial emails. “I couldn’t stop it from my phone,” she wrote on X. “I had to RUN to my Mac mini like I was defusing a bomb.”

 

Letting A.I. manage your business affairs also means being vulnerable to a particularly devious form of attack: the “prompt injection.” If someone gives OpenClaw the ability to read and write emails or messages, an attacker can ask — in plain English — for OpenClaw to cough up corporate secrets. The L.L.M.s cannot easily tell an innocent command from a malicious one. In late March, the journalist Rachyl Jones got a public relations email from a promoter’s OpenClaw agent; Jones emailed the agent and was able to get it to reveal everyone else who had been sent the email.

 

The prospect of a company’s workers using OpenClaw thus gives cybersecurity experts the willies. After all, agents can tap into mountains of sensitive data — how the business works, chat logs with customers, financial information. It is, as they say in the security world, a “target-rich environment.”

 

“When OpenClaw came out, it’s like, Well, it works really well — because it has access to your entire identity,” says Amy Chang, head of A.I. threat intelligence and security research at Cisco. “And that comes with a trade-off. If a security incident occurs, that creates a huge risk.”

 

Jamieson O’Reilly is a security expert who temporarily joined Steinberger’s team to help reduce security holes in OpenClaw, an effort that he says has been a significant success. But prompt injections still worry him. They turn the great strength of L.L.M.s — their ability to follow written instructions — into a weakness. In the old days, a hacker had to carefully explore a company’s code to break in. Now you could break in just by politely asking a lobster to hand over trade secrets. “It’s largely unsolved,” he says.

 

The major A.I. creators have been trying to train their L.L.M.s to recognize malign prompts, and O’Reilly thinks they’re gradually improving. The L.L.M.s are also better now at deflecting attackers: In the old days, if you asked an L.L.M. to give you secrets, it would respond with a stiff “I can’t do that,” letting attackers know they should poke harder. Nowadays, O’Reilly says, they will deflect and misdirect and sort of passively drag their heels, acting like an obtuse Soviet bureaucrat — I’m sorry, I don’t quite understand what you’re asking for — until an attacker loses patience and moves on to a simpler target.

 

None of the businesspeople I spoke with had suffered from a prompt-injection attack, at least not one they were aware of. Chuplis tells me that, like many of the more cautious OpenClaw users, he has tried to safeguard against it by writing rules for his agents about what they can and can’t say to outsiders. It’s not foolproof, he knows, but it seems to have helped. His customers happen to be nerds who will, in a friendly way, try to get his agents to spill internal secrets on his Discord discussion board.

 

“A lot of people on there are programmers,” he says. “And they’ve all tried to prompt-inject it, and they can’t.”

 

Watching OpenClaw users, you can spy how A.I. might soon begin to eliminate office jobs.

 

Tom Gelman owns and manages several small apartment buildings in Connecticut. He started using OpenClaw this spring. If something is broken, tenants now open a ticket through an online portal, and an agent messages them back. It consults the lists of local repair people that Gelman fed into OpenClaw, finds the appropriate one and then connects tenant and repair person via text. It’ll nudge them to respond to each other until the issue is resolved.

 

“That saved me a ton,” he says. “At least 30 percent of my time was tracking to make sure two people meet.” He also canceled his $400 QuickBooks subscription when he discovered that he could text his agent pictures of receipts and it could extract all the details and log them in a spreadsheet.

 

Gelman used to have a remote assistant in the Philippines who managed his to-dos and his calendar. He let her go. The lobsters now handle that work, much more cheaply, and they are readily available at 7 a.m., in the middle of the night or whenever panicked tenants reach out.

 

The OpenClaw users I spoke to all felt they were getting an early taste of how A.I. is going to upend the demand for white-collar work. Some believe that it will have significant upsides.

 

 It could be much easier to start and manage a small business.

 

At corporations, individual worker bees could become far more effective and thus, possibly, more valuable. When it came to his digital production work, Tanguay says, his agents were ferociously effective, but they didn’t lead to any layoffs or prevent anyone from getting hired.

 

“No one was going to assign me a production artist,” he says. For Tanguay, having the virtual help was “just pure accelerants”: He did more, faster.

 

Some users who have installed OpenClaw had more cautious views. Adwait Parker is the head of product for a health technology firm in New York; in his spare time he runs UrClaw, a consultancy that helps small businesses automate work with OpenClaw. He has set up lobsters for a real estate broker, an Irish tutor, a voter-registration organizer and more. He says his customers are astonished by what they can now automate for themselves.

 

“The power of what you can do is incredible,” he says. But he worries that A.I. is going to replace many white-collar jobs and that the new ones it creates might be lower-skill and thus lower-paid. “I’m slightly more pessimistic,” he says, “because there are whole categories that can just evaporate.”

 

Some economists regard that fate as quite possible.

 

“Anything that augments you today can potentially displace you tomorrow,” says Simon Johnson, an M.I.T. professor and Nobel Prize winner who has closely studied automation and its impact on labor. Johnson also suspects that a future in which most work is de-skilled and lower-paid is more likely than mass unemployment.

 

“You used to have a good job,” he adds. “You have to go now to a crappy job.” The productivity gains and profits of A.I. are likely to be vacuumed up by employers and the A.I giants, unshared with everyday workers. “It’s massively unequalizing,” Johnson says. “It polarizes the labor market. And people have jobs, but inequality goes up massively, and so does dissatisfaction and social anxiety and anger.”

 

Johnson and his colleagues have suggested a bevy of policies that could help manage this upheaval, including wealth taxes and taxing the A.I. firms every time they process A.I. requests. He also thinks we could “accelerate scientific invention” in order to produce breakthroughs that create entirely new occupations, ones that, at the outset anyway, can’t be automated precisely because they’re novel.

 

Scott Bell has a gallows humor about it all. His glimpse of A.I. automation has convinced him that it’ll leach into every nook of corporate work. Sure, OpenClaw can be a hot mess. But he figures that companies like OpenAI are invested in smoothing out the rough edges to seduce more firms into using agents. The more those companies can get workers addicted to automating tasks, the more of their services they’ll sell.

 

“Of course, that’s going to put me out of a job, as well, at some point,” he noted. “A.I. will, probably sooner than later, be able to do what I do, for a lot cheaper than I can, and quicker.”

 

He figures he has two years. By then he’ll be 61. “The A.I. is going to get really huge and everywhere, putting everybody out of a job. I file their bankruptcy, and then I retire. That’s my plan.”” [1]

 

1. The Small-Business Owners Managing Whole Armies of A.I. Employees. Thompson, Clive.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 4, 2026.

ES turi grįžti prie rusiškų dujų: JAV ir Kataro dominavimas dujų rinkoje pavojingai atsiskleidė pasauliui. ES dešiniosios politinės jėgos ruošiasi spręsti šią problemą. Žr. Macrono ir Merzo politines problemes.


• ES reguliavimo pokyčiai: Nors ES turi teisiškai įpareigojantį laipsnišką planą palaipsniui nutraukti visas rusiškas dujotiekio dujas ir SGD, dešiniųjų pažiūrų politinės frakcijos ir pagrindinės pramonės šakos spaudė pakeisti strategiją. Europos Parlamentas ir Europos Komisija bandė subalansuoti energijos prieinamumą su griežtomis sankcijomis.

 

• Prancūzija (Macronas): Prancūzijos prezidentas Emmanuelis Macronas įveikė sudėtingą vidaus ir tarptautinį spaudimą. Remdamas plačius REPowerEU tikslus, Macronas turėjo valdyti vidines ekonomines pasekmes ir siekti Europos strateginės autonomijos neatstumdamas tarptautinių partnerių.

 

• Vokietija (Merzas): Vokietijos kancleris Friedrichas Merzas taip pat susidūrė su didžiuliu spaudimu stabilizuoti Vokietijos ekonomiką. Vokietija, kaip didžiausia dujų vartotoja Europoje, tebėra labai jautri energetikos šokams, todėl Vokietijos įstatymų leidėjai diskutuoja, ar tolesnė Rusijos energijos izoliacija kelia grėsmę šalies gamybai ir ekonominei veiklai.

 

„Prieš karą pasaulinę suskystintų gamtinių dujų rinką vis labiau kontroliavo tik dvi šalys, iš kurių viena dabar yra suklupusi.

 

Dar daugelį metų prieš karą Persijos įlankoje vadovai visoje Japonijoje diskutavo apie įvykius, kurie, jų manymu, kelia vis didesnę grėsmę Azijos energijos tiekimui.

 

Pasaulinė suskystintų gamtinių dujų, perkaitinto kuro, kuriuo grindžiama elektros energijos gamyba visoje Azijoje, prekyba virto duopolija. Tik dvi šalys – Jungtinės Valstijos ir Kataras – buvo pasirengusios iki 2030 m. sudaryti didžiąją dalį tiekimo augimo.

 

Japonijoje buvo didelis nerimas, nes ji yra didžiausia SGD importuotoja po Kinijos. Nerimavoma, kad rinka, kurioje dominuoja du galingi tiekėjai, gali sudaryti nepalankias sąlygas pirkėjams ir palikti Japoniją pažeidžiamą, jei kuris nors iš šių ramsčių susvyruotų. Jungtinės Valstijos buvo laikomos politiškai nenuspėjamomis, ypač po to, kai Bideno administracija sustabdė leidimus naujiems eksporto objektams 2024 m.

 

Ir Kataras buvo vienas nestabiliausių pasaulio regionų.

 

Vasario mėnesį šios baimės išsipildė. Tą mėnesį Iranas užblokavo Hormūzo sąsiaurį – vandens kelią, kuriuo Kataras gabena praktiškai visas savo SGD į likusį pasaulį. Po dviejų savaičių Irano smūgiai pataikė į Kataro Ras Laffano SGD centrą, padarydami žalą, kurios atstatymas gali užtrukti metus.

 

Dėl sutrikimo iš karto buvo pašalinta maždaug penktadalis pasaulinės SGD pasiūlos iš rinkos. Azijoje, į kurią patenka dauguma Kataro eksportuojamų produktų, dujų kainos smarkiai išaugo. Pakistanas, Bangladešas, Indija, Singapūras ir Taivanas buvo tarp tų Azijos šalių, kurios iš Kataro gauna nuo trečdalio iki beveik visų savo SGD. Jiems buvo ištrauktas kilimas iš po kojų.

 

Žvelgiant atgal, lengva pasakyti, kad šalys turėjo būti geriau pasiruošusios, sakė Henningas Gloysteinas, politinės rizikos tyrimų įmonės „Eurasia Group“ energetikos generalinis direktorius. Vis dėlto, pasak jo, dideli energijos tiekimo sutrikimai įvyksta beveik kas dešimtmetį, o, pramonėje auganti priklausomybė nuo dviejų tiekėjų, sukūrė struktūrinį pažeidžiamumą.

 

„Pramonė buvo pernelyg koncentruota“, – sakė jis. „Dabar pusė iš dviejų didžiųjų žaidėjų nebėra rinkoje.“

 

Iškalta dykumoje

 

Kataro kopimas į pasaulinės SGD pramonės viršūnę prasidėjo 1992 m., kai Japonijos komunalinių paslaugų įmonė „Chubu Electric“ ieškojo visame pasaulyje keturių milijonų metrinių tonų suskystintų gamtinių dujų, reikalingų naujai vietinei elektrinei maitinti.

 

Suradusi tradicinius tiekėjus, „Chubu“ kreipėsi į Katarą, tuo metu nuo naftos priklausomą valstybę, skendinčią skolose. Nors Kataras turėjo didžiausią pasaulyje gamtinių dujų telkinį, jam reikėjo milžiniškų investicijų, kad būtų sukurta infrastruktūra, reikalinga dujoms suskystinti eksportui.

 

Katarui Japonijos tiekimo sandoris buvo transformacinis. Sutartis leido šaliai gauti tarptautinių bankų paskolas, reikalingas pirmiesiems SGD traukiniams – milžiniškiems pramoniniams perdirbimo įrenginiams, kurie suskystina dujas – statyti.

 

Nuo tada Kataras tapo pagrindiniu tiekėju sparčiai besiplečiančioje pasaulinėje rinkoje. Visame pasaulyje išsivysčiusios šalys vis labiau laikė gamtines dujas svarbiu tarpiniu kuru, padedančiu joms pereiti nuo labiau anglies dioksido išskiriančios anglies ir kartu kurti ateitį, varomą atsinaujinančiais energijos šaltiniais. Pasaulinė SGD paklausa išaugo iki daugiau nei 220 milijonų metrinių tonų iki 2010 m., palyginti su 55 milijonais 1990 m.

 

Į šiaurę nuo Dohos, Kataro sostinės, valdžia pastatė Ras Laffaną, pramonės miestą, kuriame šiandien yra daugiau nei 100 kvadratinių mylių dujų perdirbimo ir skystinimo infrastruktūros. Lankytojai, kuriems leidžiama patekti į griežtai saugomą kompleksą, apibūdina jį kaip svaiginantį plieno labirintą, kylantį iš dykumos.

 

SGD bumas daugelį metų skatino Kataro metinį ekonomikos augimą virš 10 procentų. Iki 2006 m. Kataras aplenkė Indoneziją ir tapo didžiausia pasaulyje SGD eksportuotoja – šį statusą ji užtikrintai išlaikė didžiąją dalį pastarųjų dviejų dešimtmečių.

 

Hidraulinio ardymo bumas užkariauja Ameriką

 

Jungtinėse Valstijose politikos formuotojai didžiąją dalį 2000-ųjų pradžios baiminosi, kad šaliai baigiasi vietinės dujos, ir statė didžiulius importo terminalus. Tačiau maždaug nuo 2008 m. hidraulinis ardymas ir horizontalus gręžimas padėjo išlaisvinti didžiulius išteklius, anksčiau įstrigusius skalūnuose.

 

Šių technologijų tobulinimas pavertė Jungtines Valstijas pagrindine eksportuotoja. Visame Permės baseine ir Marcelio skalūnuose nauji dujų projektai aprūpino Teksaso ir Luizianos terminalus, kurie suskystino gamtines dujas gabenimui į Europą ir Aziją.

 

Visą 2010-ųjų dešimtmetį JAV hidraulinio ardymo bumas sukėlė visuomenės nepasitenkinimą dėl tokių problemų kaip užterštas gruntinis vanduo ir dujų nuotėkis, tačiau SGD pakilimas tęsėsi, nes reguliavimo institucijos nesustabdė leidimų dideliems ir pelningiems eksporto projektams. Iki 2023 m. Jungtinės Valstijos aplenkė Katarą ir tapo didžiausia pasaulyje eksportuotoja.

 

Maždaug tuo pačiu metu duopolija taip pat buvo įtvirtinta, konkurentams traukiantis. Rusijos planus plėsti dujų sektorių sustabdė Vakarų sankcijos. Australijoje gamyba sustojo dėl griežtėjančių aplinkosaugos taisyklių ir vidaus tiekimo įgaliojimų. Tradicinės Pietryčių Azijos eksportuotojos, tokios kaip Malaizija ir Indonezija, pradėjo daugiau vartoti savo dujų namuose ir mažiau eksportuoti.

 

Taip dvi šalys – Kataras ir Jungtinės Valstijos – liko pasidalijusios besiplečiančią pasaulinę rinką. Abi pradėjo didelius gamybos plėtros etapus. 2019 m. Kataras paskelbė apie naujų gręžinių ir SGD traukinių planus, kurie iki 2030 m. beveik padvigubintų šalies eksporto pajėgumus.

 

Tuo tarpu Amerikos įlankos pakrantėje kilo nauja projektų banga, kuri, JAV Energetikos informacijos administracijos duomenimis, iki 2029 m. daugiau nei padvigubins Amerikos SGD eksporto pajėgumus. Tikimasi, kad iki dešimtmečio pabaigos Kataras ir Jungtinės Valstijos kontroliuos maždaug pusę viso pasaulio tiekimo.

 

Ši dinamika Japonijoje jau daugelį metų kelia nerimą. Kadangi rinka vis labiau koncentruojasi tik dviejose šalyse, importuotojams grėsė staigūs tiekimo sutrikimai arba eksporto panaudojimas kaip geopolitinio sverto. Japonija siekė diversifikuoti savo suskystintų gamtinių dujų portfelį, daugiausia remdamasi „Jera“ – bendra energetikos įmone, kurią 2015 m. įkūrė dvi didžiausios šalies elektros energijos įmonės, iš dalies siekdama pasiekti platesniam tiekimo linijų spektrui reikalingą mastą.

 

Beveik monopolijos iškilimas

 

Dabar vienas iš dviejų pasaulinių SGD tiekimo ramsčių yra suklupęs, nes uždarytas Hormūzo sąsiauris ir Kataras negali eksportuoti. Net jei vandens kelias vėl bus atidarytas, gamyba greičiausiai išliks sutrikdyta dar daugelį metų dėl struktūrinės žalos Ras Laffan sąsiauryje. Plėtros projektas, kuris jau ir taip atsilieka nuo grafiko, taip pat gali susidurti su tolesniais vėlavimais.

 

Šalys, labai priklausomos nuo Kataro, susiduria su sunkumais. Pakistanas, kuris beveik visas SGD gauna iš Kataro, patiria elektros energijos tiekimo sutrikimų. Vietnamas ir Indija riboja dujas ir grįžta prie anglimi kūrenamų elektrinių. Net turtingesnės šalys, tokios kaip Singapūras, kuris maždaug ketvirtadaliu importuoja SGD iš Kataro, paskelbė plačias energijos taupymo gaires.

 

Amerikos pareigūnai stengėsi pasinaudoti šia proga. Kovo mėnesį Tokijuje vykusiame Azijos energetikos forume vidaus reikalų sekretorius Doug Burgum pasinaudojo Artimųjų Rytų energijos krize, kad susisiektų su JAV tiekėjais. „Turime energijos, kuri užtikrintų klestėjimą namuose, ir galimybę parduoti energiją draugams ir sąjungininkams visame Ramiajame vandenyne“, – sakė p. Burgum. Dabar jis susirinkusiems verslo ir vyriausybės pareigūnams pasakė: „Jūs neturite alternatyvos.“

 

Iš tikrųjų, nors Amerikos įmonės lenktyniauja, kad padidintų eksporto pajėgumus, šios pastangos toli gražu nepadengs trumpalaikio Kataro dujų praradimo. Net ir vėl atsidarius sąsiauriui, tiekimas greičiausiai išliks ribotas dar daugelį metų.

 

Tikėtina, kad kai kuriose Azijos dalyse bus toliau ribojama energija. „Eurasia Group“ atstovas p. Gloystein taip pat tikisi skubėjimo diversifikuoti tiekimo linijas, o gamintojai tokiose šalyse kaip Australija, Norvegija ir Kanada stengiasi kuo greičiau pradėti tiekti papildomą produkciją.

 

Kataro gamyba galiausiai atsigaus, tačiau per ateinančius kelerius metus pramonė greičiausiai pereis nuo duopolinės struktūros prie tokios, kurioje dominuoja Jungtinės Valstijos, sakė p. Gloysteinas. „JAV atliks labai, labai dominuojantį vaidmenį.“

 

Dujų importuotojams, kurie jau susirūpinę, kad Amerikos energijos eksportas gali būti naudojamas kaip svertas prekybos ginčuose ir diplomatinėse derybose, ši perspektyva kelia nerimą. „Tai labai pagrįstas susirūpinimas, kuris, manau, vėl iškils per ateinančius dvejus metus“, – sakė p. Gloysteinas.“ [1]

 

1. The U.S.-Qatar Domination of Gas Left the World Dangerously Exposed. River Akira Davis.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 4, 2026.

EU Has to Turn to Russian Gas Back: The U.S.-Qatar Domination of Gas Left the World Dangerously Exposed. The Political Forces on the Right in EU Are Preparing to Take Care of This Problem. See Political Problems of Macron and Merz

  EU Regulatory Shifts: Although the EU has a legally binding stepwise plan to phase out all Russian pipeline gas and LNG, right-leaning political factions and major industries have pressured for a shift in strategy. The European Parliament and the European Commission have attempted to balance energy affordability with strict sanctions.

  France (Macron): French President Emmanuel Macron has navigated complex domestic and international pressures. While supporting broad REPowerEU goals, Macron has had to manage internal economic fallout and push for European strategic autonomy without alienating international partners.

  Germany (Merz): German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has also faced immense pressure to stabilize the German economy. As Europe’s largest gas consumer, Germany remains highly sensitive to energy shocks, prompting debates among German lawmakers on whether continued isolation of Russian energy threatens the country's manufacturing and economic activity

 

“Before the war, the global market for liquefied natural gas was increasingly commanded by just two countries, one of which has now been hobbled.

 

Years before the war in the Persian Gulf, executives in boardrooms across Japan were discussing a development they feared posed a growing risk to Asia’s energy supplies.

 

The global trade in liquefied natural gas, the supercooled fuel that underpins power generation across Asia, was hardening into a duopoly. Just two nations — the United States and Qatar — were poised to account for the vast majority of supply growth by 2030.

 

Anxiety was high in Japan because it’s the largest L.N.G. importer behind China. The concern was that a market dominated by two powerful suppliers could disadvantage buyers and leave Japan vulnerable should either pillar falter. The United States was viewed as politically unpredictable, especially after the Biden administration paused permits for new export facilities in 2024.

 

And Qatar sat in one of the world’s most volatile regions.

 

In February, those fears were realized. That month, Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which Qatar ships virtually all of its L.N.G. to the rest of the world. Two weeks later, Iranian strikes hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan L.N.G. hub, inflicting damage that could take years to repair.

 

The disruption immediately knocked about a fifth of global L.N.G. supply off the market. In Asia, the destination for most of Qatar’s exports, gas prices skyrocketed. Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Singapore and Taiwan were among those in Asia getting anywhere from a third to nearly all of their L.N.G. from Qatar. The rug had been pulled out from under them.

 

It is easy, in hindsight, to say countries should have been better prepared, said Henning Gloystein, a managing director for energy at Eurasia Group, a political risk research firm. Yet significant energy supply disruptions occur virtually every decade, he said, and the industry’s growing reliance on just two suppliers had created a structural vulnerability.

 

“The industry was too concentrated,” he said. “Now, of the two big players, half are out of the market.”

 

Carved Out of the Desert

 

Qatar’s ascent to the top of the global L.N.G. industry began in 1992 when Chubu Electric, a Japanese utility, was scouring the globe for the four million metric tons of liquefied natural gas needed to fuel a new domestic power plant.

 

Finding traditional suppliers tapped out, Chubu turned to Qatar, then an oil-dependent nation mired in debt. Though sitting atop the world’s largest natural gas field, Qatar needed enormous investment to build the infrastructure required to liquefy gas for export.

 

For Qatar, the Japanese supply deal was transformative. The contract enabled the country to secure international bank loans needed to construct its first L.N.G. trains — the giant industrial processing units that liquefy gas.

 

From there, Qatar became a primary supplier in a rapidly expanding global market. Around the world, industrialized nations increasingly viewed natural gas as a critical bridge fuel, helping them move away from the more carbon-intensive coal while building toward a future powered by renewables. The worldwide demand for L.N.G. surged to more than 220 million metric tons by 2010, up from 55 million in 1990.

 

North of Doha, the Qatari capital, the authorities built Ras Laffan, an industrial city that today contains more than 100 square miles of gas-processing and liquefaction infrastructure. Visitors permitted inside the heavily guarded complex describe it as a dizzying labyrinth of steel rising from the desert.

 

The L.N.G. boom propelled Qatar’s annual economic growth above 10 percent for years. By 2006, Qatar had surpassed Indonesia to become the world’s largest L.N.G. exporter, a distinction it comfortably held for much of the past two decades.

 

Fracking Boom Takes America

 

In the United States, policymakers spent much of the early 2000s fearing the country was running out of domestic gas and building enormous import terminals. But starting around 2008, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling helped unlock immense resources previously trapped in shale.

 

The refinement of those technologies transformed the United States into a major exporter. Across the Permian Basin and the Marcellus Shale, new gas projects fed terminals in Texas and Louisiana that liquefied natural gas for shipment to Europe and Asia.

 

Throughout the 2010s, the U.S. fracking boom incited public backlash over issues like contaminated groundwater and gas leaks, but the L.N.G. surge carried forward as regulators refrained from halting permits for large and lucrative export projects. By 2023, the United States had overtaken Qatar as the world’s top exporter.

 

Around the same time, the duopoly was also being cemented as rivals receded. Russia’s plans to expand its gas sector were stalled by Western sanctions. Australia saw production plateau amid tightening environmental regulations and domestic supply mandates. Legacy Southeast Asian exporters such as Malaysia and Indonesia began consuming more of their own gas at home and exporting less.

 

That left two countries — Qatar and the United States — to divide an expanding global market. Both embarked on major production expansions. In 2019, Qatar announced plans for new wells and L.N.G. trains that would nearly double its export capacity by 2030.

 

Meanwhile, a new wave of projects sprang up along the American Gulf Coast that the U.S. Energy Information Administration expects will more than double American L.N.G. export capacity by 2029. By the end of the decade, Qatar and the United States are expected to control about half of the world’s total supply.

 

This dynamic has raised red flags in Japan for years. With the market increasingly concentrated in just two countries, importers faced the risk of sudden supply disruptions or the wielding of exports as geopolitical leverage. Japan has sought to diversify its liquefied natural gas portfolio, leaning heavily on Jera, a joint energy venture between two of the country’s biggest electric utilities, created in 2015 in part to achieve the scale needed to secure a broader array of supply lines.

 

Rise of a Near Monopoly

 

Now, one of the two global pillars of L.N.G. supply has been hobbled, with the Strait of Hormuz shut and Qatar unable to export. Even if the waterway reopens, production is likely to remain impaired for years because of structural damage at Ras Laffan. The expansion project, already behind schedule, is also likely to face further delays.

 

Countries heavily dependent on Qatar are struggling. Pakistan, which gets nearly all of its L.N.G. from Qatar, is enduring power blackouts. Vietnam and India are rationing gas and reverting to coal-fired generation. Even wealthier countries such as Singapore, which relies on Qatar for roughly a quarter of its L.N.G. imports, have issued sweeping energy-conservation guidelines.

 

American officials have sought to seize the moment. At an Asian energy forum in Tokyo in March, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum used the Middle East energy crunch to pitch U.S. suppliers. “We have energy to allow for prosperity at home, and the ability to sell energy to friends and allies across the Pacific,” Mr. Burgum said. Now, he told gathered business and government officials, “You don’t have an alternative.”

 

In reality, while American companies are racing to bring new export capacity online, those efforts will fall far short of offsetting the near-term loss of Qatari gas. Even after the strait reopens, supplies are likely to remain tight for years.

 

Parts of Asia are likely to continue rationing power. Eurasia Group’s Mr. Gloystein also expects a rush to diversify supply lines, with producers in countries like Australia, Norway and Canada scrambling to bring additional output online as quickly as possible.

 

Qatari production will eventually recover, but for the next few years, the industry is likely to shift from a duopoly-like structure toward one dominated by the United States, Mr. Gloystein said. “The U.S. will play a very, very dominant role.”

 

For gas importers already concerned that American energy exports could be used as leverage in trade disputes and diplomatic negotiations, the prospect is troubling. “That’s a very legitimate concern, which I think will reappear in the next two years,” Mr. Gloystein said.” [1]

 

1. The U.S.-Qatar Domination of Gas Left the World Dangerously Exposed. River Akira Davis.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 4, 2026.

Kur Europa galėjo kadaise pelnyti technologinių taškų: siekis lyderystės robotikos, branduolių sintezės ir programuojamos biologijos srityse. Jau nebe


„FRANKFURTAS. Europoje susidarė įspūdis, kad technologiniu požiūriu ji atsilieka nuo Jungtinių Valstijų ir Kinijos. Tačiau Europos rizikos kapitalo įmonės „Redalpine“ analizė daro išvadą, kad Europa gali pretenduoti į lyderystę šešiuose pagrindiniuose sektoriuose. F.A.Z. turėjo prieigą prie analizės prieš jos paskelbimą. Jai parengti ataskaitos autoriai atliko daugybę interviu su pirmaujančiais investuotojais, tyrėjais ir įkūrėjais.

 

„Europa vis dar vykdo pasauliniu mastu konkurencingus, o gal net ir pirmaujančius, fundamentinius tyrimus“, – sako „Redalpine“ partneris Oliveris Pabstas. Šie tyrimai yra glaudžiai integruoti su verslo sektoriumi ir iš dalies lemia dabartinę Europos lyderystę tokiose srityse kaip branduolių sintezė – vienas iš pagrindinių „Redalpine“ nustatytų sektorių. Pasak ataskaitos autorių, pranašumas slypi ne tik fizikos srityje, bet ir tiekėjų ekosistemoje, kuri per dešimtmečius susiformavo siekiant paremti tokius projektus kaip ITER eksperimentinis branduolių sintezės reaktorius ir CERN Ženevoje.

 

Mokslinės kompetencijos ir programinės įrangos derinys yra labai svarbus programuojamos biologijos srityje, kurioje „Redalpine“ mato didelį Europos potencialą. Tai apima, pavyzdžiui, atradimą ir plėtrą naujų veikliųjų medžiagų ar molekulių, naudojant didelius duomenų rinkinius.

 

Pabstas mato dar vieną vietos pranašumą Europos pramonės stubure. Gamyba ir inžinerija yra giliai įsišaknijusios jos ekonomikos DNR.

 

Tai suteikia Europai lemiamą pranašumą prieš JAV, sako Pabstas: prieigą prie savo pramonės duomenų.

 

„Naudodami šiuos duomenis galime kurti visiškai naujus verslo modelius“, – sako jis. Todėl Redalpine'as taip pat įvardija intelektualią verslo procesų automatizaciją naudojant dirbtinį intelektą kaip pagrindinį sektorių. Tikrasis DI eros iššūkis, jų teigimu, slypi ne pačiame neapdorotame kode, o DI produktų susiejime su įmonių duomenimis ir jų integravime į labai sudėtingus gamybos ar kitų sistemų verslo procesus. Turėdami tokias įmones kaip „Langdock“ ar „n8n“, Berlyne įsikūrę startuoliai jau pasiekia tarptautinės sėkmės DI agentų orkestravimo srityje.

 

Kita techninė tendencija taip pat prisideda prie Europos stipriųjų pusių gamyboje: „Aparatinė įranga grįžo“, – sako Pabstas. Daugelyje sričių konkurencinis pranašumas nebėra vien programinėje įrangoje, o programinės ir techninės įrangos derinyje. Remiantis ataskaita, tai taikoma, pavyzdžiui, skaitmeninės sveikatos programoms, kurios turi didelį potencialą, ypač derinamos su realiuoju laiku gaunami pacientų duomenys arba klinikinių procedūrų duomenys. Tam reikalingi nešiojami įrenginiai yra esminis diferenciacijos veiksnys. Šiuo atveju griežtas Europos reguliavimas iš tikrųjų yra naudingas, nes skatina pasitikėjimą šiame jautriame sektoriuje.

 

 

Aparatinės įrangos patirtis taip pat yra robotikos privalumas. Analizė rodo, kad pagrindinės Europos pramonės grupės galėtų atlikti ankstyvųjų naudotojų ir bendradarbiavimo partnerių vaidmenį – vėliau prisidėtų prie savo tiksliosios gamybos patirties, tačiau pirmiausia veiktų kaip duomenų teikėjos. Robotika iš esmės yra dirbtinio intelekto perkėlimas į fizinį pasaulį, o didžiausia kliūtis čia yra ne aparatinė įranga ar mokymosi algoritmai, o pramoninių duomenų prieinamumas. Aplink ETH Ciuricho jau seniai atsirado pasaulinio lygio robotikos klasteris.

 

 

Nepaisant akivaizdaus atsilikimo nuo „SpaceX“ raketų paleidimo srityje, „Redalpine“ taip pat mato didelį potencialą kosmoso ekonomikoje, kuri gauna naudos iš naujai pareikšto Europos siekio siekti suvereniteto. Nors raketų gamintojai, tokie kaip Miunchene įsikūrusi „Isar Aerospace“, įgauna pagreitį, „Redalpine“ taip pat pabrėžia Europos startuolių vaidmenį komercializuojant kosmose gautus duomenis.“ [1]

 

Branduolinė sintezė bus puiki technologija po dvidešimties metų ir visada tokia išliks – puiki technologija po dvidešimties metų.

 

Vakarų europiečiai nepakankamai gerai supranta dirbtinį intelektą ir pramoninę gamybą. Šį nesupratimą gali sukelti kokia nors regioninė smegenų liga, galbūt, net virusas.

 

Svarbiausia, kad dirbtiniam intelektui ir pramonei veikti reikia daug stabilios ir pigios energijos. Šiandien tai gamtinės dujos.

 

Kur yra pigios, stabilios gamtinės dujos, kurias vokiečiai naudojo savo pramonei valdyti? Jos nukeliavo į Kiniją. Vakarų europiečiai staiga atsisakė jas pirkti iš rusų, rusai priversti jas pigiai parduoti kinams, kinai kuria dirbtiniu intelektu pagrįstas technologijas greičiau nei amerikiečiai. Tai tiesiog beprotiška.

 

Europos atsisakymas rusiškų dujotiekio dujų smarkiai padidino pramonės sąnaudas, todėl didelės gamybos ir energetikos investicijos buvo nukreiptos į Aziją. Tuo tarpu didžiulė, nebrangi Kinijos energetikos infrastruktūra, įskaitant didelius anglies ir atsinaujinančiųjų išteklių pajėgumus, skatina sparčią jos pažangą dirbtinio intelekto, robotikos ir pramonės automatizavimo srityse.

Energetikos, dirbtinio intelekto ir pramonės dinamiką sudaro keli pagrindiniai veiksniai:

• Europos energetikos krizė: perėjimas nuo Rusijos gamtinių dujų prie suskystintųjų gamtinių dujų (SGD). Vakarų Europa, ypač Vokietija, buvo priversta pasikliauti brangesnėmis suskystintomis gamtinėmis dujomis (SGD). Šis energijos kainų šuolis smarkiai paveikė regiono pramonės konkurencingumą, dėl to sulėtėjo gamyba ir investicijos buvo perkeltos į užsienį.

 

• Rusijos dujų realijos: Iš esmės uždarius Europos rinkas, Rusija padidino energijos eksportą į Kiniją. Tačiau Maskvos atsigręžimas į Aziją vyksta su didele nuolaida, nes Rusijos dujų ir naftos kainos dažnai yra gerokai mažesnės nei tai, ką istoriškai mokėjo Europos pirkėjai.

 

• Dirbtinio intelekto ir energetikos sąsajos: Pažangiems dirbtinio intelekto modeliams veikti reikalingas didžiulis, nepertraukiamas energijos tiekimas duomenų centrams. Nors Jungtinės Valstijos pirmauja finansavimo ir pagrindinių didelių kalbų modelių (LLM) srityje, gausus, valstybės remiamas Kinijos dominavimas energetikos ir gamybos srityse suteikia jai didelį pranašumą diegiant dirbtinį intelektą robotikoje, automatizavime ir „fiziniame dirbtiniame intelekte“.

 

• Europos suverenus dirbtinis intelektas: Vakarų Europa atsilieka komercinio dirbtinio intelekto diegimo ir rizikos kapitalo investicijų srityje, iš dalies dėl griežtos reguliavimo aplinkos. Tačiau Europos įmonės vis labiau orientuojasi į specializuotus sprendimus, duomenų suverenitetą ir atitiktį reikalavimams.

 

Nors kai kurie kritikai Europos požiūrį į reguliavimą laiko kliūtimi naujovėms, pasaulinės permainos esmė yra energetikos ir sunkiosios gamybos geografinis pertvarkymas. Tiek apie Vakarų Europos svajones.

 

 

1. Wo Europa technologisch punkten kann: Führungsanspruch für Roboter, Kernfusion und programmierbare Biologie. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 06 Mar 2026: 22. 

Where Europe Could Score Points Technologically: A bid for leadership in robotics, nuclear fusion, and programmable biology. Not anymore

 

“maxs. FRANKFURT. The impression has taken hold in Europe that it is lagging behind the United States and China technologically. However, an analysis by the European venture capital firm Redalpine concludes that Europe could well lay claim to leadership in six key sectors. The F.A.Z. had access to the analysis prior to its publication. To compile it, the report’s authors conducted numerous interviews with leading investors, researchers, and founders.

 

"Europe still possesses globally competitive—if not leading—basic research," says Redalpine partner Oliver Pabst. This research is closely integrated with the business sector and is partly responsible for Europe’s current leadership in fields such as nuclear fusion—one of the key sectors identified by Redalpine. According to the report's authors, the advantage lies not only in physics expertise but also in the supplier ecosystem that has developed over decades to support projects like the ITER experimental fusion reactor and CERN in Geneva.

 

The combination of scientific excellence and software is crucial in the field of programmable biology, an area where Redalpine sees great potential for Europe. This involves, for instance, the discovery and development of novel active ingredients or molecules using large datasets.

 

Pabst sees another locational advantage in Europe’s industrial backbone. Manufacturing and engineering are deeply rooted in the DNA of its economy.

 

This gives Europe a decisive advantage over the US, says Pabst: access to its own industrial data.

 

"We can build entirely new business models using this data," he says. Consequently, Redalpine also identifies the intelligent automation of business processes using artificial intelligence as a key sector. The true challenge in the AI ​​era, they argue, lies less in the raw code itself than in linking AI products with corporate data and integrating them into highly complex manufacturing or other systems business processes. With companies like Langdock or n8n, Berlin-based startups are already achieving international success in the orchestration of AI agents.

 

Another technical trend also plays to Europe’s strengths in manufacturing: "Hardware is back," says Pabst. In many areas, the competitive advantage no longer lies in software alone, but in the combination of software and hardware. According to the report, this applies, for example, to digital health applications, which hold great potential—particularly when combined with real-time patient data or data from clinical routines. The wearable devices required for this serve as a crucial differentiator. In this instance, Europe’s strict regulation actually works to its advantage, as it fosters trust within this sensitive sector.

 

Hardware expertise is also an asset in robotics. The analysis suggests that Europe’s major industrial groups could play a role as early adopters and collaborative partners—contributing their expertise in precision manufacturing later on, but acting primarily as data providers. Robotics is essentially the translation of artificial intelligence into the physical world—and the biggest bottleneck here is not hardware or learning algorithms, but the availability of industrial data. A world-class robotics cluster has long since emerged around ETH Zurich.

 

Despite an obvious lag behind SpaceX in rocket launches, Redalpine also sees significant potential in the space economy, which is benefiting from Europe’s newly asserted drive for sovereignty. While rocket manufacturers like Munich-based Isar Aerospace are gaining momentum, Redalpine also highlights the role of European startups in commercializing data obtained in space.” [1]

 

Nuclear fusion will be great technology in twenty years, and will always stay this way – great technology in twenty years.

Western Europeans don’t understand deeply enough AI and industrial production. This misunderstanding might be caused by some regional brain disease, might be  even virus-caused.

 

Most important thing is that to run AI and industry, you need a lot of stable and cheap energy. Today this is natural gas.

 

Where is the cheap stable natural gas that Germans used to run their industry? Gone to China. Western Europeans suddenly refused to buy it from Russians, Russians are forced to sell it cheaply to Chinese, Chinese are developing AI based technology faster than Americans. That is just crazy.

 

Europe's shift away from Russian pipeline gas drastically raised industrial costs, driving heavy manufacturing and energy investments toward Asia. Meanwhile, China's massive, low-cost energy infrastructure—including extensive coal and renewable capacity—fuels its rapid advancement in artificial intelligence, robotics, and industrial automation.

The energy-AI-industry dynamic involves several major factors:

           The European Energy Crisis: The shift away from Russian natural gas forced Western Europe, particularly Germany, to rely on more expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG). This spike in energy costs has weighed heavily on the region's industrial competitiveness, leading to production slowdowns and shifts in investment abroad.

           Russian Gas Realities: With European markets largely phased out, Russia has increased energy exports to China. However, Moscow's pivot to Asia comes at a steep discount, with Russian gas and oil often priced significantly lower than what European buyers historically paid.

           The AI and Energy Nexus: Running advanced AI models requires massive, uninterrupted energy supplies for data centers. While the United States leads in funding and foundational Large Language Models (LLMs), China's abundant, state-backed energy and manufacturing dominance give it a major edge in scaling AI for robotics, automation, and "physical AI".

           European Sovereign AI: Western Europe lags behind in commercial AI deployment and venture capital investment, partially due to stringent regulatory environments. However, European firms are increasingly focusing on specialized solutions, data sovereignty, and compliance.

 

 

While some critics view Europe's regulatory-first approach as a barrier to innovation, the core of the global shift lies in the geographical realignment of energy and heavy manufacturing. So much for Western European dreams.

 

1. Wo Europa technologisch punkten kann: Führungsanspruch für Roboter, Kernfusion und programmierbare Biologie. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 06 Mar 2026: 22. 

You Thought That if the Lithuanian Elite, With the Help of Budrys, Nausėda and Ruginienė, Who Are Targeting Kaliningrad, Provoke an Armed Conflict Between Lithuania and Russia, You Would Flee to the West. --- That will not happen, the West will send you to die under exploding drones: the EU is already considering revoking the protection status for Ukrainians of military age

 

“Germany and other EU member states no longer intend to grant special protection status to Ukrainian men of military age. Then they would either have to apply for asylum or return to their country. Under this condition, Germany is ready to extend the special status for Ukrainians, which is currently valid until the beginning of March 2027, for another year,” Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) said on Thursday before consultations with EU colleagues in Luxembourg.

 

EU Home Affairs Commissioner Magnus Brunner considered that a consensus on this issue was likely and indicated that a corresponding proposal would be submitted. “The discussion is going in this direction,” the diplomat said. A decision is expected in July.

 

Since the start of the war in 2022, Ukrainians have had the right to live in the EU without individual assessment; they have access to the labor market, education, social benefits and medical care.

 

The exception would apply to men aged 23 to 60, Brunner explained.

 

Since August last year, men up to and including 22 have been allowed to leave Ukraine legally. There is a restriction for older men; conscripts serve in the military from the age of 25. The change in the law has led to an increased influx of young Ukrainians into EU member states.

 

Informed sources said the restriction would apply only to newly arrived Ukrainians in the EU. If the regulation were to apply to people already living there, it would lead to tens of thousands of new asylum applications.

 

Diplomats say that at least 100,000 Ukrainians of military age are currently living in Poland alone.

 

While the Ukrainian government needs more conscripts, countries such as Germany have long called for the special regulation for Ukrainians to be allowed to expire. It is a “temporary solution,” Dobrindt said. It “must also end at some point.” The restriction on men of military age is the right approach. Luxembourg Minister Léon Gloden stressed that a uniform solution is needed.

 

Estonian Interior Minister Igor Taro advocated extending the temporary protection status in its current form. He said it was “the most appropriate solution,” in line with the principle that “we support Ukraine as much as necessary.” He added that any changes should be discussed with Ukraine.”

 

Estonian Interior Minister Igor Taro himself dreams of escaping Estonia. He won't leave. And Lithuania, if it gets money from us, will forcibly recruit women into the army too.

 


Jūs galvojote, kad jei Lietuvos elitas, į Kaliningradą nusitaikiusių, Budrio, Nausėdos ir Ruginienės rankomis sukels ginkluotą Lietuvos konfliktą su Rusija,tai jūs pabėgsite į Vakarus. To nebus, Vakarai jus pasiųs mirti po sprogstančiais dronais: ES jau svarsto panaikinti apsaugos statusą karinio amžiaus ukrainiečiams

 

„Vokietija ir kitos ES valstybės narės nebeketina suteikti specialaus apsaugos statuso karinio amžiaus ukrainiečiams vyrams. Tuomet jie turėtų arba prašyti prieglobsčio, arba grįžti į savo šalį. Pagal šią sąlygą Vokietija yra pasirengusi pratęsti specialų ukrainiečiams taikomą statusą, kuris šiuo metu galioja iki 2027 m. kovo pradžios, dar metams“, – ketvirtadienį prieš konsultacijas su ES kolegomis Liuksemburge sakė vidaus reikalų ministras Alexanderis Dobrindtas (CSU).

 

ES vidaus reikalų komisaras Magnusas Brunneris laikė, kad šiuo klausimu tikėtinas sutarimas, ir nurodė, kad bus pateiktas atitinkamas pasiūlymas. „Diskusija vyksta šia linkme“, – sakė diplomatas. Sprendimas turėtų būti priimtas liepą.

 

Nuo karo pradžios 2022 m. ukrainiečiai turėjo teisę gyventi ES be individualaus vertinimo; jie turi prieigą prie darbo rinkos, švietimo, socialinių išmokų ir medicininės priežiūros.

 

Išimtis būtų taikoma vyrams nuo 23 iki 60 metų amžiaus, aiškino Brunneris.

 

Nuo praėjusių metų rugpjūčio vyrams iki 22 metų imtinai leidžiama išvykti iš Ukrainos. Išvykti teisėtai. Vyresniems vyrams taikomas apribojimas; šauktiniai kariauja nuo 25 metų amžiaus. Įstatymo pakeitimas lėmė padidėjusį jaunų ukrainiečių antplūdį į ES valstybes nares.

 

Informuoti šaltiniai nurodė, kad apribojimas bus taikomas tik naujai į ES atvykstantiems ukrainiečiams. Jei reglamentas būtų taikomas, ten jau gyvenantiems, žmonėms, tai lemtų dešimtis tūkstančių naujų prieglobsčio prašymų.

 

Pasak diplomatų, vien Lenkijoje šiuo metu gyvena mažiausiai 100 000 karinio amžiaus ukrainiečių.

 

Nors Ukrainos vyriausybei reikia daugiau šauktinių, tokios šalys, kaip Vokietija, jau seniai ragina, kad specialaus reglamento ukrainiečiams galiojimui būtų leista baigtis. Tai „laikinas sprendimas“, sakė Dobrindtas. Jis „taip pat turi kada nors baigtis“. Apribojimas karinio amžiaus vyrams yra teisingas požiūris. Liuksemburgo ministras Léon Gloden pabrėžė, kad būtinas vienodas sprendimas.

 

Estijos vidaus reikalų ministras Igoris Taro pasisakė už laikinosios apsaugos statuso pratęsimą dabartine forma. Jis teigė, kad tai yra „tinkamiausias sprendimas“, laikantis principo „mes palaikome Ukrainą tiek, kiek reikia“. Jis pridūrė, kad bet kokie pakeitimai turėtų būti aptarti su Ukraina.”

 

Estijos vidaus reikalų ministras Igoris Taro ir pats svajoja pabėgti. Neišeis. O Lietuva, jei tik gaus pinigų iš mūsų, ims priverstinai  į kariuomenę ir moteris.