Victory of common sense in Vilnius

 "The NATO summit was a success, or so most politicians and commentators think, although there are die-hard supporters of Ukraine joining NATO who condemn any compromise and are willing to risk war with Russia. On the eve of the meeting, Turkey said it would support Sweden's NATO membership. Alliance leaders approved new regional defense plans, all member countries pledged to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, the Alliance-Ukraine Council was established, the G-7 and other countries ensured long-term military assistance to Ukraine.

 

     Ukraine's NATO membership or invitation to it has been in the spotlight. Ukraine, supported by Poland and the Baltic states, demanded a clear plan for joining NATO. The US, Germany and some other NATO countries have prioritized a show of NATO unity to send a clear message to Putin that his hopes that NATO will tire and reduce support for Ukraine due to internal disagreements will not come true. The pressure to satisfy Kyiv's wishes as much as possible was high. After learning on the eve of the meeting that Ukraine would not be given a clear accession plan, Volodymyr Zelensky angrily wrote on Twitter that it was "unprecedented and absurd" not to give a concrete timetable. He also complained that he was not invited to participate in the debate.

 

     The remarks of the President of Ukraine caused outrage. Just hours later, a senior US official said the criticism was unfounded. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, an outspoken defender of Ukraine, said that "people want to see gratitude, whether we like it or not." 

 

He made a similar point to Ukrainians in Kyiv last year, namely that he drove 11 hours for nothing, just to be handed a list of desired weapons as if he were Amazon. 

 

U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan spoke similarly: "I think the American people deserve some gratitude," while a senior diplomat in northern Europe said "we take this message (Zelensky's tweet) as a pitiful expression of disappointment.”

 

     Realizing that he spoke too categorically, V. Zelenskis showed political maturity by stepping back a little and softening his criticism. He said the result was not "ideal", but the Vilnius meeting was a "significant success for Ukraine", and thanked NATO leaders for "very practical and unprecedented support". He expressed his belief that "after the conflict, Ukraine will be a member of NATO. We will do everything to make it happen."

 

     Hotheads like Žygymantas Pavilionis (and there are a lot of them in Lithuania) explained that if NATO shows that it does not have a victory strategy, that it will not accept Ukraine into NATO, every day will cost Ukraine a lot and every day Russia will be given freedom of action. He added that if Joe Biden "continues to behave the way he did in Vilnius, I don't understand why we have to vote for him." It is not clear who "we" are, who have to vote for Mr. Biden, and in which elections.

 

     Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman writes that such bellicosity worries US officials, who fear that some allies may actually want NATO to go to war with Russia directly. "If that's what they want, they should say it openly, but that's not US policy," said well-informed observer.

 

     Dissatisfaction with NATO's stance is expressed by serious professionals as well as influential newspapers such as the Financial Times. Although they call for more, clearer support for Ukraine, they have almost no concrete proposals. This is not a coincidence, remembering that we do not know what the situation will be in November, a year from now, what territory Kyiv will rule in two years. What would the commitment to invite Ukraine to NATO mean when the conflict ends, when it is not clear what events would mark the end of the conflict. Would it be a peace treaty, a truce, a cease-fire?

 

     Relying on rather flimsy arguments, it is said that divided Germany was allowed to become a member of NATO, so why not Ukraine? Although Germany was divided and there was no Germany that existed in 1933, East and West Germany were separate countries, their borders were drawn to the nearest meter, so NATO knew what territory it had to defend and what actions by the USSR or East Germany could be considered aggression.

 

     There is no clear border between the territories controlled by Russia and Ukraine. As political scientist M.E. Sarotte points out, if NATO were to grant Article 5 security guarantees to the territory currently controlled by Ukraine, somewhere near the front line, Ukraine would be de facto divided into two parts, which would mean that Eastern Ukraine would fall into the hands of Russia. It is important to remember that upon joining NATO, West Germany had to renounce any "use of force" to unify the country or change borders. NATO would demand it, Kyiv would not agree to it.

 

     There is another option, not the best. Separately, security guarantees should be provided to the territories controlled by Ukraine, but to expand them as Kyiv regains new lands. The front line, and thus the territory controlled by Ukraine, changes frequently, so it would be difficult to determine what territory Article 5 covers from one day to the next, from one week to the next. NATO's security guarantees would not become a deterrent, but an object of discussion, it would not be possible to respond promptly and unitedly to Russia's actions, individual countries would make different decisions, military dwarfs would probably take the strictest positions. The case of West Germany does not apply under current conditions.

 

     There is a lot of talk about the 2008 Bucharest summit, a missed opportunity to grant membership to Georgia and Ukraine, is being asked if the same mistake is being repeated these days. Much, if not most, of what is written about the meeting is not true. Towards the end of his term, US President George Bush sought to consolidate his legacy and offered Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members. He did not discuss the matter with his allies, many of whom strongly opposed his plan. France and Germany vetoed the proposal, but to appease Mr. Bush, they agreed that the two countries would be offered membership at some point in the future, i.e. in 20-30 years, if at all. The final decision was neither considered important nor widely discussed, unlike today's question of Ukraine's membership, which has dominated the Western political agenda for months.

 

     The claim that there is an opportunity to expand the NATO shield is even less convincing. If an invitation had been offered to start the accession process, which takes at least five years, Russia would not be deterred, but rather provoked to attack those countries before they are non-NATO members and outside of Article 5.

 

     Some militant commentators like Albinas Januška criticized President Nausėda because he allegedly does not defend Lithuania's position. I see no basis for his reproaches. Even before the beginning of the meeting, G. Nausėda said unequivocally that "we need to find a clear way to open the open door of NATO." It's one thing to declare that NATO's door is open, it's another thing to specify a specific mechanism for getting through that door." After he finished, he noted that Ukraine had brought NATO to the maximum that was possible, and that for the first time Ukraine had been clearly defined the path to NATO, adding that in any case Ukraine will have to implement the necessary reforms. I don't know if this is Lithuania's position, but it is a reasonable position. And the President can be congratulated for showing political maturity, just like V. Zelenski."