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2023 m. liepos 25 d., antradienis

Organizers of Zelensky's army knew that they would get catastrophic casualty counts in their offensive. They went forward anyway.


"BRUSSELS -- When Ukraine launched its big counteroffensive this spring, Western military officials knew Kyiv didn't have all the training or weapons -- from shells to warplanes -- that it needed to dislodge Russian forces. But they hoped Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness would carry the day.

They haven't. Deep and deadly minefields, extensive fortifications and Russian air power have combined to largely block significant advances by Ukrainian troops. Instead, the campaign risks descending into a stalemate with the potential to burn through lives and equipment without a major shift in momentum.

As the likelihood of any large-scale breakthrough by the Ukrainians this year dims, it raises the unsettling prospect for Washington and its allies of a longer conflict -- one that would require a huge new infusion of sophisticated armaments and more training to give Kyiv a chance at victory.

The political calculus for the Biden administration is complicated. President Biden is up for re-election in the fall of 2024 and many in Washington believe concerns in the White House about the conflict's impact on the campaign are prompting growing caution on the amount of support to offer Kyiv.

The American hesitation contrasts with shifting views in Europe, where more leaders over recent months have come to believe that Ukraine must prevail in the conflict -- and Russia must lose -- to ensure the continent's security.

But European militaries lack sufficient resources to supply Ukraine with all it needs to eject Moscow's armies from the roughly 20% of the country that they control. European leaders are also unlikely to significantly increase support to Kyiv if they sense U.S. reluctance, Western diplomats say.

The shift in trans-Atlantic political winds, evident in tensions between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. officials at the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Lithuania, has come as Ukraine's long-expected offensive appears stalled. Kyiv's inability to make headway against Russian defenses has persuaded many Western military observers that Ukrainian forces need more training in complex military maneuvers, more-potent air defenses and much more armor.

Now, Ukraine is on the offensive against Russian positions where troops have had months to build extensive defenses including minefields, barriers and bunkers. Western military doctrine holds that to attack a dug-in adversary, an attacking force should be at least three times the enemy's size and use a well-coordinated combination of air and land forces.

Kyiv's troops lack the mass, training and resources to follow those prescriptions.

"Ukraine really needs to be able to scale up and synchronize military operations if it wants to be able to break through Russian defenses," said Franz-Stefan Gady, an independent military analyst who recently toured Ukrainian front lines.

Gady said that rather than concentrating forces in assaults involving many units firing volleys of rockets and artillery -- supporting simultaneous waves of advancing ground forces -- Ukraine is attacking sequentially, with shelling followed by company-level infantry advances. The tactic "often telegraphs to the Russians that they're attacking," he said.

The small-scale approach, which is easier for commanders to orchestrate than pushing ground forces under covering artillery, creates its own problems, such as reduced mobility. Safely removing wounded soldiers from the front and bringing in fresh ammunition is more treacherous in company-level operations because the medical and logistics corps are less protected.

Conducting synchronized large-scale attacks is difficult for any armed force -- even Western ones with more and better equipment than Ukraine has -- because integrating vast numbers of land and air troops in the fast, violent ballet of a frontal assault is enormously difficult.

No Western military would also try to breach established defenses without controlling the skies.

"America would never attempt to defeat a prepared defense without air superiority, but they [Ukrainians] don't have air superiority," said John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who is now an associate professor of warfighting studies at the U.S. Army War College. "It's impossible to overstate how important air superiority is for fighting a ground fight at a reasonable cost in casualties."

Zelensky acknowledged in an interview with The Wall Street Journal in May that Russia has air superiority at the front and that a lack of protection for Ukrainian troops means "a large number of soldiers will die" in the fight.

Ukraine had hoped to find gaps in Russia's fortifications, flood troops through, and cause havoc. Instead, unexpectedly dense minefields slowed Kyiv's initial attacking forces, leaving them exposed to strikes from Russian aircraft and rockets.

Russian drones and attack helicopters, particularly Kamov Ka-52 "Alligator" gunships, have proved particularly dangerous. Ka-52s, which are among Russia's most modern aircraft, can remain far behind Russian lines and rely on targeting data from spotter drones scanning the front. Their laser-guided Vikhr missiles have a range of roughly 5 miles, more than twice the range of any portable antiaircraft missiles in Ukraine's armory.

U.S. Defense Department analysts knew early this year that Ukraine's front-line troops would struggle against Russian air attacks. A classified Pentagon assessment from February, allegedly leaked by Air National Guard Airman Jack Teixeira, cited Ukraine's risk of "inability to prevent Russian air superiority."

Kyiv lacks sufficient air-defense equipment -- such as U.S.-made Patriot batteries or more mobile German Gepard systems -- to deploy many near front lines. Patriots and other large systems are also vulnerable to Russian drone attacks." [1]

1. Ukraine's Lack of Arms Dims Hope for Conflict Breakthrough. Michaels, Daniel. 
Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]. 24 July 2023: A.1.

 

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