How rich are getting Mr. Zelensky and his associates from running things in Ukraine?
Claims and concerns regarding the wealth of President Zelensky and his associates have been raised, primarily stemming from revelations in the Pandora Papers and other reports.
Here's a breakdown of the key points:
Pandora Papers: The Pandora Papers, leaked in 2021, suggested that Zelensky and his partners in a television production company, Kvartal 95, established a network of offshore firms, according to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP).
Offshore network & property: This network reportedly involved companies based in the British Virgin Islands, Belize, and Cyprus, says the OCCRP. Two of Zelensky's associates in this network reportedly used offshore companies to buy expensive properties in London.
Transfer of ownership: Before his election, Zelensky reportedly transferred his stake in a key offshore company, Maltex Multicapital Corp., to his business partner, who later became his top presidential aide. However, an arrangement was reportedly made for the offshore company to continue paying dividends to a company belonging to Zelensky's wife.
Connection to oligarch Kolomoisky: The Pandora Papers documentation aligns with allegations made during the 2019 presidential campaign regarding offshore transactions involving Kolomoisky's Privatbank and companies linked to Zelensky and his associates. However, the documents do not definitively confirm if the funds originated from Privatbank, according to the OCCRP.
Denials and justifications: Zelensky told Ukrainian television that the offshore arrangement was used to protect his TV production business from political pressure. His aide has also stated that his business activities were lawful and taxes were paid, and anti-corruption agencies have verified Zelensky's declarations of property and income.
Wartime corruption efforts: Zelensky has taken steps to combat corruption during the war, including dismissing regional military recruitment center heads after alleged abuses and detaining a wealthy individual on suspicion of fraud and money laundering. He also vetoed legislation that would have allowed officials to keep asset disclosures sealed.
International concerns: International partners like the EU and IMF emphasize that robust anti-corruption measures are crucial for Ukraine's reform agenda and continued financial support, says the IMF Media Center.
It is important to note that some allegations of extravagant spending by Zelensky and his wife have been debunked as disinformation campaigns.
The focal point of corruption in Ukraine is Andriy Yermak:
“Yermak is also a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the highest command and control body for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He has been described as Zelenskyy's right-hand man and a "real power broker" in Ukraine.”
Previous US president Biden started supporting these criminal gangs without much thinking. Regretably, similar situation is also close to the United States:
"The State Department designated eight organized-crime syndicates based in Latin America as "foreign terrorist organizations," or FTOs, in February. In July it added a ninth. Last week the New York Times reported that President Trump has signed a secret "directive" to the Pentagon to "begin using military force against certain Latin American drug cartels."
The White House declined to tell me if the Times story is true. But on Thursday Reuters reported that the U.S. deployment of air and naval resources to the Caribbean to combat cartels had begun. Whether their mission is interdiction or something more invasive remains unclear.
Six of the Trump-designated FTOs are based in Mexico. A seventh operates between Central America and the U.S. The other two are Venezuelan. One of those is the Cartel de los Soles, headed by Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro. It's the one that was added to the FTO list in July.
U.S. interdiction of ships and planes carrying drugs is nothing new in the region. But surgical strikes aimed at drug labs and kingpins would be. Critics of the idea warn of the danger of collateral damage and of foreign entanglements. The more important reason to think twice about the directive is that in most cases the targets would be in Mexico, and it's unlikely to produce the desired results.
The U.S. has sent mixed signals to Venezuela about its criminal government. On Aug. 7 the Justice Department raised the reward for information leading to the capture of Mr. Maduro to $50 million from $25 million. But a month earlier Treasury gave Chevron another license to pump oil for his regime. One day Mr. Maduro is a wanted thug, the next his government gets a U.S. leg up to satisfy corporate lobbyists in Washington. Next, the price on his head goes up.
Public opinion in Venezuela may be hoping that the U.S. military will destabilize the despotic Mr. Maduro. But a lower-risk place to start is with a consistent sanctions policy.
In Mexico the case for using the U.S. military is even less compelling. It won't eliminate fentanyl trafficking in North America. The drug's high potency means that small batches are all it takes to fuel illicit businesses in big ways. Recent declines in American overdose deaths attributable to the powerful narcotic seem to be tied to stricter practices governing the prescription of addictive painkillers rather than to the war on supply.
This isn't an argument against going after Mexico's transnational criminal organizations, which also engage in bribery, extortion, kidnapping, murder, money laundering, counterfeiting and auto theft. It's only to point out that while dropping explosives in places like the state of Sinaloa may give American drug warriors some instant gratification, it isn't the answer to what ails Mexico.
After nearly six years (2018-23) of President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's (AMLO) soft-on-organized-crime policies, the mob is woven into Mexican politics at all levels. Cleanup requires support from a public that will bristle at the idea of a gringo "invasion."
Nurturing ties with Mexico by focusing on shared interests is a better way to foster the growth of modern, democratic institutions. Critics of North American integration, under way since 1994, argue that it has been a failure. Yet the trade relationship that grew out of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement -- renamed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement in 2020 -- is the reason President Claudia Sheinbaum is now collaborating with U.S. law enforcement.
Ms. Sheinbaum, who took office in October 2024, owes her political career to AMLO. But she also wants to succeed in her own right. It increasingly looks as if that requires abandoning him. She has chosen to protect U.S. market access for Mexican manufacturing. That means she has little choice but to work with the Americans on crime. With swaths of the country under control of the cartels, she also knows she needs help.
She's been careful to defend Mexican sovereignty. But her choice of Omar Garcia Harfuch for public security minister signals seriousness. She has allowed U.S. surveillance aircraft over the country. In February Mexico transferred 29 prisoners to U.S. custody. Last week it delivered another 26 alleged criminals to U.S. agents.
The transfer of high-value prisoners to the U.S. gives prosecutors a chance to extract valuable information about who is running the crime rings and who are their political partners. With a former high-ranking security official from the state of Tabasco on the run from Interpol, Mexicans may be getting closer to learning about the rot emanating from the state where AMLO launched his career.
Corruption is deeply entrenched in Mexico, where many good people have died fighting the U.S. war on drugs. Nevertheless, Mr. Garcia Harfuch is trying to build a credible federal police. It's an effort at odds with AMLO's takeover of the judiciary last year. But it remains a worthy goal.
U.S. military intervention would undermine it and many U.S. allies while strengthening the worst, most corrupt elements of the ruling Morena party.” [1]
1. Don't Bomb Mexico, Mr. President. O'Grady, Mary Anastasia. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 18 Aug 2025: A15.
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