Trump, the Working Class and Social Order

“Conservatives often say politics is downstream from culture. This is true, at least in part. Cultural change can create new demands to which government is pushed to respond.

 

But politics is shaped by more than culture. Economic events can create new eras of public policy. Consider the rise of giant corporations after the Civil War, the growth of the welfare state during the Great Depression, the recovery of America's competitors after World War II, the stagflation of the 1970s and China's economic leap.

 

Demographic shifts compel governments to act by challenging the assumptions of current policy. Falling fertility rates make it harder to sustain expansive social programs, while demand for immigrant labor increases -- often provoking controversy.

 

Elite opinion can shape government for decades. The Progressive emphasis on the public role of neutral experts, the rise of Keynesian and supply-side economics, and the emergence of regulation as a central focus of government are a few of the examples from the past 100 years.

 

Shifts in legal thought can lead to significant political consequences. During the Warren court, jurisprudence focused on individual rights and the "living Constitution."

 

Since then, concepts like strict construction, originalism and the unitary executive have gained prominence.

 

Finally, politics can be downstream from itself. When voters come to believe that a dominant party has gone too far, the stage is set for political backlash. When that backlash goes too far, the cycle continues. Joe Biden's weak immigration policy opened the door for Donald Trump's return to the White House.

 

In a recent article, David Brooks points to a cultural phenomenon -- the common belief that social order has collapsed -- as the catalyst for the latest emergence of populism in America. No doubt many of Mr. Trump's supporters view his attacks on universities, journalists, bureaucrats and others as an overdue effort to restore order -- and a satisfying response to the disrespect they feel from educated elites.

 

But it is economic change that lies at the heart of the working-class revolt. As late as the 1960s, industrial production dominated the economies of cities and smaller communities across the country. Factories offered steady employment with increasing wages for nearly one-third of the workforce, many with expanding healthcare and pension benefits. Economic order underpinned social order. When foreign competition began to erode American economic order, it wasn't long before social order weakened and working-class discontent spread.

 

Mr. Brooks rightly points to stable families as a pillar of social order. But as economic opportunity for working-class men shrank in the U.S., so did working-class marriage rates -- even as marriage remained relatively stable among those with a bachelor's degree or higher. Meanwhile, divorce rates in working-class marriages have become much higher than in marriages between more educated and well-off Americans.

 

Conservative critics have argued that feminism would be especially harmful to marriage among educated women, but they got it backward. These women were more likely than their lower-income counterparts to get and stay married -- provided that their spouses were prepared to accept a more equal share of responsibility for child-rearing and household work.

 

Consider another key foundation of social order -- organized religion. Theorists have long argued that as education increases, religious observance declines. This hypothesis turns out to be true for Europe but not for the U.S., where regular attendance at worship services increases with higher levels of education. Notably, this correlation holds even among white evangelical Protestants, long thought of as the bastion of working-class religiosity.

 

What Mr. Brooks identifies as the foundations of social order have weakened most among working-class Americans, whose economic prospects have declined in the postindustrial information era.

 

Mr. Trump's effort to restore manufacturing employment by raising tariffs thus represents a more direct attack on social disorder than does his assault on elite institutions.

 

But even if he succeeds in raising U.S. manufacturing output, the effect on employment is likely to be muted. To remain competitive in a high-wage economy, contemporary manufacturing must be highly automated.

 

In the West, working-class discontent is the main driver of populism's rise. Political parties that can find effective and enduring responses to the economic problems at the heart of working-class ills will control the future.” [1]

 

The sentiment that "political parties that can find effective and enduring responses to the economic problems at the heart of working-class ills will control the future" appears to resonate with current analyses of American politics

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In recent years, The Wall Street Journal notes that working-class discontent is a significant factor driving the rise of populism. This suggests that addressing these economic concerns is crucial for political success.

According to a report published by the Center for American Progress, working-class Americans face significant economic challenges, including:

 

    Lower Wages: The median worker without a four-year college degree earned $47,000 in 2022, compared with $85,000 for the median college-educated worker.

    Dominance of Service Sector Jobs: 78% of the working class works in services, with lower wages compared to jobs in the "knowledge economy" often held by those with college degrees.

    Higher Unemployment: The unemployment rate for the working class was twice as high in 2023 (nearly 5%) compared to college-educated workers (2.3%).

    Decreased Unionization: Union membership among workers without college degrees has fallen to a historic low of 9% in 2024, impacting their ability to collectively bargain for better wages and working conditions.

    Income Volatility and Low Savings: Many working-class families experience unstable incomes and low wealth, making them vulnerable to financial shocks and less able to save.

    Concentrated Wealth: Wealth is increasingly concentrated at the top, while middle-class wealth has declined.

 

While the working class has historically shown support for progressive economic policies such as a higher minimum wage, stronger unions, and increased investments in infrastructure and the social safety net, recent electoral trends have seen a shift in some working-class voting behavior, according to The New York Times.

Some argue that Democrats have become estranged from working-class voters by focusing on policies that prioritize consumers over workers or have failed to deliver on promises related to manufacturing jobs. Others believe that the working class is increasingly drawn to populist appeals and conservative social stances, despite favoring economically progressive policies. The Republican platform in 2024, for example, included proposals like making Trump tax cuts permanent, cutting taxes on tips, and promoting fair trade deals aimed at working-class voters. However, the effectiveness of these policies in addressing working-class economic concerns is debated, with some arguing that proposed tax cuts primarily benefit the wealthy and could worsen economic conditions for the working class.

Ultimately, the ability of political parties to connect with and address the tangible economic anxieties of the working class will likely be a significant factor in their future electoral success. This requires carefully considering the root causes of these problems and offering concrete, impactful solutions.

 

1. Politics & Ideas: Trump, the Working Class and Social Order. Galston, William A.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 06 Aug 2025: A13.