Georgia has drifted into the Kremlin's orbit.

"The road from Tbilisi airport to the old town—a web of steep cobbled streets with ornate balconies and the mouthwatering smell of khinhali dumplings and khachapuri cheese bread—bears the name of George W. Bush, the first American president to visit the small Caucasian country, in 2005. Saluting its democratic reforms and thanking it for sending troops to Iraq, Mr Bush called Georgia "a beacon of liberty" and told its youthful and restless reformist president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was swept to power in 2003 by the first "colour" revolution, that Georgia had "a solid friend in America".

These days it is the Kremlin that is praising Georgia, a country it invaded in 2008, for toeing its line and refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia. The 55-year-old Mr Saakashvili is under guard in hospital on the outskirts of Tbilisi, fighting dementia and muscle atrophy. His mother, who visits him daily, says he has memory lapses and needs a walking-frame. "My health is in deep shit," Mr Saakashvili wrote to your correspondent in a letter. "Besides all kinds of bad symptoms, what makes me desperate is a terrible memory loss." Mr Saakashvili believes that he has been poisoned, and says he lapsed into a brief coma after an earlier move to a different prison hospital. In December his legal team distributed a toxicology report said to identify the presence of heavy metals in his body, in which the toxicologist expressed the opinion he had been poisoned. On January 31st his associates said he had been moved to intensive care, though the authorities have denied this.

Mr Saakashvili modernised Georgia but also became enmeshed in scandal and repression. After standing down once he had been termed out as president, he fled in 2013 fearing arrest at the hands of Bidzina Ivanishvili, a reclusive businessman who made his money in Russia, served briefly as prime minister, and has in effect ruled Georgia ever since, though he holds no formal government post. Mr Saakashvili, subsequently stripped of his Georgian citizenship, moved to Ukraine and took a Ukrainian passport, but in October 2021 he returned to Georgia, despite an outstanding warrant for his arrest, hoping to rally protests in his favour. Instead he was arrested, having been sentenced in absentia for abusing his powers as president, and is serving a six-year sentence.

The European Parliament and Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine's president, have asked Georgia to release Mr Saakashvili, who once served as the governor of Odessa and still chairs the National Reform Council in Ukraine, a consultative body, for medical treatment outside Georgia. His incarceration and mistreatment appear to be political revenge, according to Amnesty International, and a favour to Vladimir Putin, who once promised to hang Mr Saakashvili "by his balls".

Georgian Dream, the party Mr Ivanishvili founded, has held on to power by stoking fears of turmoil and of Mr Saakashvili's return to power. But while Georgians may be disenchanted by their former president's politics, they are also repelled by the inhumanity of his treatment. "People are more supportive of Saakashvili as a prisoner, than they are of Saakashvili as a politician," says Iago Kachkachishvili, a Georgian sociologist.

Mr Saakashvili's mistreatment is impeding Georgia's chances of integrating into Europe. Other breaches of the rule of law include the imprisonment last year of Nika Gvaramia, who runs a leading private TV channel critical of the government, on patently trumped-up charges. The political opposition is monitored. Georgia's bid to be granted candidate status by the EU was sent back last June with a list of 12 demands, which the government seems in no hurry to address.

"Georgia used to be a favourite toy of America and the West. Now the toy is broken and nobody pays much attention to it," says Shota Utiashvili, a former government official, now a fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Tbilisi. Georgian Dream now rules in coalition with several of its former members who have set up a more radical and overtly anti-Western movement in parliament, called Power of the People. Its rhetoric and policies, including a proposed bill to bar "foreign agents", look like a carbon-copy of Kremlin tactics. The movement has even blamed America for attempts to overthrow Georgia's government.

Georgia is still far less authoritarian than Russia or Belarus, but it is fast drifting into the Kremlin's orbit. To appease Mr Putin, its government has refused to join sanctions against Russia or return an anti-aircraft missile system that Ukraine gave Georgia in 2008. "I don't understand why the Georgian government has shackled itself to the Kremlin," Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe, said on a recent visit to Tbilisi.

Deep is the trauma and fear of war exploited by Mr Ivanishvili's party. Georgian Dream has seen off pro-Ukraine protests and marginalised the opposition by arguing that they risk dragging Georgia into a war with Russia.

The picture is further complicated by the presence of some 100,000 Russian exiles who have taken refuge in Georgia from the very regime that still occupies 20% of the country in the two enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For the most part, these are educated young people who keep out of Georgian politics.

Nowhere are the new alliances and divisions more evident than in Gori, the birthplace of Joseph Stalin. Its main tourist attraction is a museum devoted to the Georgian-born Soviet dictator. The government had removed the giant statue of Stalin from Gori and planned to turn his museum into a grim denunciation of Stalinism rather than a celebration of his life. But, as a visibly embarrassed tour guide tells her group of Russian-speaking tourists, the plan was aborted: the "de-Sovietisation and de-Stalinisation" have been on hold since Mr Saakashvili left power a decade ago.

More recently a dozen new statues and plaques commemorating Stalin have risen across Georgia. The dictator, who destroyed Georgia's democracy and independence by helping the Bolsheviks to occupy Georgia in 1921, is now being promoted as a Georgian hero. The Kremlin must be thrilled.” [1]

 

 Khinkali dumplings and khachapuri cheese bread are still very tasty for everyone who visits there. Lithuania should also focus on freshly smoked skilandis,  cepelinai and shakotis.

 

1. "Georgia has drifted into the Kremlin's orbit." The Economist, 31 Jan. 2023, p. NA.

 

Andrew Krepinevičius apie tai, kaip Kinijos branduolinės ambicijos pakeis atgrasymą

„KINIJA plečia savo branduolinį arsenalą – nuo kelių šimtų ginklų iki maždaug 1 000 2030 m. Iki 2030-čiųjų m. vidurio ji gali turėti 1 550 ar daugiau kovinių galvučių – ribą, dėl kurios Rusija ir Amerika susitarė susitarime, kuris iš pradžių buvo pasirašytas 2010 m. Šis Kinijos susikaupimas keičia geopolitiką. Amerikos ir Rusijos dvipolė branduolinė sistema, kuri dominuoja branduolinėje pusiausvyroje daugiau, nei pusę amžiaus, virsta mažiau stabilia tripole sistema, kuri gali pakenkti ilgalaikiams atgrasymo ramsčiams ir sukelti branduolinio ginklavimosi varžybas. 

 

     Visa tai vyksta Amerikai ruošiantis modernizuoti savo senstančią branduolinių ginklų pristatymo sistemų (iš sausumos ir povandeninių laivų paleidžiamų balistinių raketų ir tolimojo nuotolio bombonešių) „triadą“. Kinijos gambitas kelia klausimų, kaip geriausia elgtis, nes tripolė sistema sugriaus keletą svarbių atgrasymo ramsčių, kurie pasirodė veiksmingi dvipolėje sistemoje.

 

     Vienas atgrasymo ramstis, „paritetas“ – grubus branduolinių pajėgų lygiavertiškumas – buvo kertinis visų Amerikos ir Rusijos susitarimų dėl ginkluotės akmuo per pastarąjį pusšimtį metų. Jis pagrįstas įsitikinimu, kad jei nė viena valstybė neturi reikšmingo pranašumo, kiekviena iš jų mažiau tikėtina, kad panaudos savo branduolinius ginklus. Kaip 2021 metais pareiškė aukštas Rusijos pareigūnas, paritetas „stabilizuoja visą tarptautinių santykių sistemą“. Poreikis išlaikyti lygiavertiškumą ypač svarbus Amerikai, kuri siekia ne tik atgrasyti nuo branduolinių atakų prieš ją pačią, bet ir prieš tokias esmines sąjungininkes, kaip Australija, Vokietija, Japonija ir Pietų Korėja, kurioms trūksta savo branduolinių pajėgų.

 

     Kinijos sprendimas „didinti“ savo branduolinį arsenalą rodo, kad Pekinas siekia branduolinės pariteto su Amerika ir Rusija. Paritetu gali džiaugtis abu dvipolėje sistemoje esantys varžovai. Tačiau to negalima pasiekti tripolėje sistemoje, nes kiekvienas narys negali suderinti dviejų savo konkurentų arsenalų. Bet koks bandymas tai padaryti gali sukelti ginklavimosi varžybas be galimos galutinės būsenos ar laimėtojo.

 

     Panaši problema egzistuoja ir dėl kito bipolinės sistemos ramsčio, žinomo kaip „užtikrintas sunaikinimas“. Joje teigiama, kad atgrasymas sustiprėja, kai šalies branduolinės pajėgos gali atlaikyti netikėtą ataką ir vis tiek pasilikti pakankamai ginklų, kad atsakomuoju smūgiu padarytų nepriimtiną žalą savo priešininko visuomenei. 

 

Šaltojo karo metu vienas amerikiečių vertinimas padarė išvadą, kad 400 ginklų pakaktų, kad būtų užtikrintas sunaikinimo pajėgumas prieš tokį Sovietų Sąjungos puolimą.

 

     Bet kaip išlaikyti užtikrintą naikinimo pajėgumą prieš Rusiją ir Kiniją? Amerikai reikės žymiai didesnės ginklų talpyklos, kad išlikusios pajėgos galėtų užtikrinti patikimą naikinimo pajėgumą tripolėje sistemoje. Kaip ir išlaikant paritetą, tokia padėtis gali paskatinti Maskvą ir Pekiną taip pat sukaupti savo arsenalus, o tai lems neribotas ginklavimosi varžybas.

 

     Kai kurie teigia, kad lygiateisiškumo ir užtikrinto sunaikinimo išlaikymas neturi didelės reikšmės, pažymėdami, kad Kinija dešimtmečius išlaikė „minimalų“ branduolinį atgrasantį poveikį – kelis šimtus ginklų. Tačiau, kalbant apie branduolinius ginklus, atrodo, kad Pekinas niekada nesijautė patogus būti tolimu trečiuoju po Rusijos ir Amerikos. Kiti teigia, kad pusė Amerikos dislokuotų branduolinių ginklų gali būti patalpinti povandeniniuose laivuose, kuriuos labai sunku aptikti. Tačiau tai daro prielaidą, kad Amerikos povandeniniai laivai išliks neaptinkami per pusę amžiaus, nepaisant vis pažangesnių aptikimo technologijų. Taip pat neatsižvelgiama į faktą, kad bet kuriuo momentu maždaug pusė Amerikos povandeninių laivų gali būti uoste, kur jie yra ne slapti rykliai, o tupinčios antys.

 

     Nors perėjimas nuo dvipolio prie tripolio branduolinės sistemos gali destabilizuoti trapią jėgų pusiausvyrą, mes bent šiek tiek suprantame, kaip viskas pasikeis. Tačiau mes tik pradedame mąstyti apie tripolės sistemos ypatybes ir jų pasekmes. Panaši intelektualinė įmonė bipolinės eros pradžioje, kurią vykdė kai kurie iš geriausių Vakarų strateginių mąstytojų, davė didelių dividendų Amerikos ir jos sąjungininkų saugumui. Tokių pastangų reikia dabar.

 

     Laimei, tam yra laiko, nes prireiks daugiau, nei dešimtmečio, kol Kinija pasieks Amerikos ir Rusijos pajėgų lygį. Nereikia skubėti dėl naujų ginklų kontrolės susitarimų ar plėsti Amerikos arsenalą. Pirmas žingsnis – suprasti tripolės branduolinės sistemos dinamiką ir jos reikšmę saugumui. Tik tada Amerika turėtų svarstyti, ar, pavyzdžiui, pasirašyti susitarimą dėl naujosios START sutarties (Rusijos ir Amerikos susitarimo, apribojančio kiekvieną pusę iki 1550 kovinių galvučių), kai ji baigsis 2026 m.

 

     Amerika turėtų išlaikyti savo galimybes atviras, o paraką sausu. Tai reiškia energingai vykdyti administracijos planus modernizuoti šalies triadą nešančias sistemas, kol Amerika neturės aiškesnio vaizdo, kaip geriausiai užtikrinti savo saugumą tripolėje sistemoje. Modernizavimo programa net brangiausiais jos metais, greičiausiai, sunaudotų mažiau, nei 7% gynybos biudžeto.

 

     Modernizacija sukuria galimybę rimtoms deryboms su kinais ir rusais, kurie jau modernizuoja savo branduolines pajėgas. Jie turės daug mažiau paskatų derėtis, jei Amerika leis savo triadai pasenti.

 

     Triados modernizavimas taip pat leis Amerikai išplėsti savo arsenalą, jei Kinija ir Rusija viršytų Naujojoje START sutartyje numatytą 1550 kovinių galvučių ribą. Norint pasinaudoti šia galimybe, reikės „šiltos“ pramoninės bazės su aktyviomis gamybos linijomis. Pentagonas, perdavęs Ukrainai didelius amunicijos kiekius, atskleidžia, kad jo nesugebėjimas padidinti gamybos, kad būtų patenkinti nenumatyti poreikiai, gali pakenkti Amerikos ir jos sąjungininkų saugumui. Taigi, triados modernizavimo, kaip geriausio būdo apsidrausti nuo neaiškios ateities, svarba.

 

     Andrew Krepinevičius yra Hudsono instituto, Amerikos ekspertų grupės, vyresnysis bendradarbis." [1]

 

1. "Andrew Krepinevich on how China's nuclear ambitions will change deterrence." The Economist, 31 Jan. 2023, p. NA.

Andrew Krepinevich on how China's nuclear ambitions will change deterrence.

"CHINA IS EXPANDING its nuclear arsenal, from a few hundred weapons to roughly 1,000 by 2030. It may have 1,550 warheads or more by the mid-2030s—the limit agreed to by Russia and America in a deal originally signed between them in 2010. This Chinese buildup is changing geopolitics. The American-Russian bipolar nuclear system, which has dominated the nuclear balance for over half a century, is evolving into a less stable tripolar system that risks undermining long-standing pillars of deterrence and triggering a nuclear arms race.

All this comes as America prepares to modernise its ageing "triad" of nuclear-weapons delivery systems (land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers). China's gambit raises questions over how best to proceed, as a tripolar system will erode several critical pillars of deterrence that proved effective in the bipolar system.

One pillar of deterrence, "parity"—a rough equivalence in nuclear forces—has been a cornerstone of all arms agreements between America and Russia over the past half-century. It is rooted in the belief that if neither power enjoys a significant advantage, each is less likely to use its nuclear weapons. As a senior Russian official declared in 2021, parity "stabilises the entire system of international relations". The need to maintain parity is particularly important for America, which seeks not only to deter nuclear attacks against itself, but also against crucial allies such as Australia, Germany, Japan and South Korea that lack nuclear forces of their own.

China's decision to "superpower-size" its nuclear arsenal suggests Beijing seeks nuclear parity with America and Russia. Parity can be enjoyed by both rivals in a bipolar system. But it cannot be achieved in a tripolar system, because it is not possible for each member to match the combined arsenals of its two rivals. Any attempt to do so risks triggering an arms race with no possible end state, or winner.

A similar problem exists with respect to another pillar of the bipolar system, known as "assured destruction". It holds that deterrence is strengthened when a country's nuclear forces can survive an all-out surprise attack and still retain enough weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on its opponent's society in a retaliatory strike. During the cold war one American estimate concluded that 400 weapons would suffice as an assured-destruction capability against such an attack by the Soviet Union.

But what about maintaining an assured-destruction capability against both Russia and China? America will need a substantially larger cache of weapons so that a surviving force could provide an assured destruction capability in a tripolar system. As with maintaining parity, this state of affairs could cause Moscow and Beijing to build up their arsenals too, resulting in an open-ended arms race.

Some argue that maintaining parity and assured destruction does not matter much, noting that China maintained a "minimal" nuclear deterrent of a few hundred weapons for decades. But when it comes to nuclear weapons, it seems Beijing has never been comfortable being a distant third to Russia and America. Others say that half of America's deployed nuclear weapons could be placed on submarines, which are exceedingly difficult to detect. But this assumes that America's submarines will remain undetectable over service lives lasting half a century, despite the proliferation of increasingly advanced detection technology. It also ignores the fact that, at any given moment, roughly half of American submarines may be in port where they are not stealthy sharks, but sitting ducks.

Although the shift from a bipolar to a tripolar nuclear system risks destabilising the fragile balance of power, we have at least some understanding of how things will change. Yet we are only in the early stages of thinking through the tripolar system's characteristics and their implications. A similar intellectual enterprise early in the bipolar era by some of the West's best strategic thinkers paid great dividends for America's security, and that of its allies. This kind of effort is needed now.

Fortunately there is time for this, as it will take the better part of a decade before China reaches the force levels of America and Russia. There is no need to rush pell-mell into new arms-control agreements or to expand America's arsenal. The first step is to understand the dynamics of a tripolar nuclear system and what they mean for security. Only then should America consider whether or not, for example, to sign a follow-on agreement to the New START treaty (the Russian-American deal limiting each side to 1,550 warheads) when it expires in 2026.

America should keep its options open and its powder dry. This means energetically pursuing the administration's plans to modernise the country's triad of nuclear delivery systems until America has a clearer picture of how best to ensure its security in a tripolar system. The modernisation programme, even in its most expensive years, would probably consume less than 7% of the defence budget.

Modernisation creates the possibility for serious negotiations with the Chinese and the Russians, who are already modernising their nuclear forces. They will have far less incentive to negotiate if America allows its triad to age into obsolescence.

Proceeding with triad modernisation will also enable America to expand its arsenal should China and Russia blow past the New START treaty's 1,550-warhead limit. Exercising this option will require a "warm" industrial base with active production lines. As the Pentagon is discovering after transferring large quantities of munitions to Ukraine, its inability to boost production to meet unanticipated needs risks compromising America's security, and that of its allies. Hence the importance of triad modernisation as the best way to hedge against an uncertain future.

Andrew Krepinevich is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, an American think-tank.” [1]

1. "Andrew Krepinevich on how China's nuclear ambitions will change deterrence." The Economist, 31 Jan. 2023, p. NA.