Poland Just Sent an Ominous Signal to the World: Guest Essay

 

"It wasn’t a particularly memorable photograph. The image, which briefly circulated around the internet a few weeks ago, showed President Trump in the Oval Office beside Karol Nawrocki, a nationalist candidate in Poland’s presidential election. Mr. Nawrocki looked, frankly, a little star-struck — like a tourist who had managed to snap a picture with a celebrity. We could find no footage of a conversation, no record of an exchange. Just a photo of two men awkwardly giving thumbs-ups.

 

In hindsight, it was more important than it looked.

 

On Sunday MAGA won in Poland. After voters rejected Trumpist candidates in recent elections in Canada, Australia and Romania — enough to suggest an international anti-Trump bump — Polish voters went the other way. Mr. Nawrocki, a conservative historian and a former boxer, narrowly defeated Rafal Trzaskowski, the liberal mayor of Warsaw, who was backed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk in a runoff election.

 

Just two short years after electing Mr. Tusk, Poland has once again swung right. Like the U.S. election in 2024, it was a bruising reminder that populism is resilient and sticky, and that liberal democracy has yet to find a reliable formula to defeat it.

 

For Poland’s liberals, everything was on the line. In 2023 Mr. Tusk’s centrist party, Civic Platform, managed to unseat the far-right Law and Justice Party in parliamentary elections — but only just, in a coalition. Mr. Tusk promised to “chase away the darkness,” and Poland was cited as an example of a democratic comeback. The reality was more ambivalent: Law and Justice had won the most votes for any single party, and still had its ally Andrzej Duda as president. A party that had openly violated the constitution, subordinated the supreme court and turned the media into a tool of propaganda remained deeply embedded in Poland’s political architecture, a permanent challenge to liberal rule.

 

The Tusk government had to govern under the looming threat of Mr. Duda’s presidential vetoes as it attempted to reverse the effects of eight years of populist government. It had some successes: It started to restore the independence of the judiciary, which unlocked billions in postpandemic E.U. funds.

 

But many promises went unfulfilled, including liberalizing an abortion law, a key pillar of voter support. Even sympathetic voters grew frustrated.

 

In foreign policy, the stakes were existential. Poland, which shares a long land border with Ukraine, is on NATO’s frontier with Russia. The Tusk government increased domestic military spending to almost 5 percent of G.D.P. — the largest proportion of any NATO member, and over and above what Mr. Trump has insisted allies should be spending. It secured nuclear power technology from the United States and realigned its diplomacy toward Brussels. After almost a decade of acrimonious relations with the European Union, Mr. Tusk sought to cast Poland as a reliable European partner once more, summed up in another photo that made the rounds in May, in which Mr. Tusk was in Kyiv with Volodymyr Zelensky, the President of Ukraine, and the leaders of Britain, France and Germany. Poland looked like part of the spine of a new Europe.

 

Now the last two years in Poland, like Joe Biden’s four years as president after Mr. Trump’s first term in the United States, seem like little more than a liberal intermezzo in which some institutions were restored and some democratic norms reasserted. But voters’ deep dissatisfaction and polarization had not simply disappeared; what looked like a restoration was just a narrow opening — and one that may be closing now.

 

Mr. Nawrocki’s victory signals both a missed opportunity and the possibility of a new political reality. With little to lose, the new president is likely to more energetically oppose the government. He may refuse to sign the 2026 budget, for example, a move that under certain conditions would set the stage for early elections. Populists are betting on that scenario, and if parliamentary elections are held in early 2026, current polling suggests that Law and Justice and the far-right Confederation party could form a coalition.

 

Internationally, the trans-Atlantic populist alliance is tightening. It is hard to maintain an understanding of MAGA as straightforwardly isolationist unless one ignores the informal meetings, shared tactics and ideological feedback loops between populism on both sides of the ocean, as well as MAGA’s energetic interventions in European elections — unsuccessful in Germany and in Romania, and now successful in Poland. And these interventions will probably increase now that Mr. Nawrocki has demonstrated that people Mr. Trump endorses in photos can win in Europe.

 

In 2023, Poland — like the United States in 2020 — made it seem as if it was possible to return to an earlier status quo. If nothing else, at least now we know it will not be that easy. The liberal intermezzos in both countries have taught us that much.

 

Jaroslaw Kuisz is the author of “The New Politics of Poland: A Case of Post-Traumatic Sovereignty” and editor in chief of Kultura Liberalna, a Polish weekly. Karolina Wigura is a professor at the University of Warsaw. They are research associates at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies and senior fellows at the Center for Liberal Modernity in Berlin.” [1]

 

1. Poland Just Sent an Ominous Signal to the World: Guest Essay. Kuisz, Jaroslaw; Wigura, Karolina.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Jun 3, 2025

Ne tik pataisykite aukštąjį mokslą, jį perkurkite

„Akademinės institucijos mano, kad turi problemą ir kad jos vardas yra Donaldas Trumpas. Tačiau jis yra tik jų problemų pradžia. Sunkumai yra sisteminiai, ne tik teisiniai ar politiniai, ir tai reiškia, kad laikas persvarstyti, kaip turėtų atrodyti aukštasis mokslas.

 

Dabartiniai instituciniai veikėjai nėra pasirengę permąstyti aukštojo mokslo.

 

Universitetai ir kolegijos, puoselėję ir toleravę pilietinių teisių įstatymų pažeidimus, negali sau leisti atviros savistabos, kad tai nebūtų suprasta, kaip nusižengimų pripažinimas. Be to, juos kontroliuoja administratoriai, kurie paprastai neturi noro pripažinti žalos, kurią padarė aukštajam mokslui, jau nekalbant apie tai, ką reikėtų daryti su jų darbo vietomis.

 

Federalinė vyriausybė ne ką geriau iš naujo vertina aukštąjį mokslą. Ji sutelkia dėmesį į jai prieinamas priemones: antidiskriminacinių įstatymų vykdymą ir mokslo finansavimo mažinimą (nors mokslininkai paprastai nėra kaltininkai).

 

Universitetų ir kolegijų akademinės nesėkmės yra pakankamai akivaizdžios. Katedros paprastai skiria savo dėstytojus – taigi, kai katedra yra ideologiškai užvaldyta, ji linkus toliau krypti ta pačia kryptimi, neišvengiamai sukurdama mokymą ir tyrimus, kurie, vertinami, kaip visuma, yra šališki. Tada institucijos ugdo konformizmą, baudžia nesutinkančius ir taiko griežtas drausmines procedūras. Kitaip tariant, pastaruoju metu kilęs antisemitizmas neatsirado vakuume. Jis buvo puoselėjamas ideologinio užvaldymo ir selektyvaus taisyklių vykdymo metu. Tai yra didelės kliūtys tiesos siekimui.

 

 

Dalis problemos kyla iš vyriausybės. Dažnai sakoma, kad matome kairiųjų žygio per institucijas rezultatus. Tačiau vyriausybės politika, dažnai pagrįsta iškreiptomis pilietinių teisių įstatymų interpretacijomis, paspartino ideologinį ir administracinį dominavimą.

 

 

Kai Henrikas VIII 1536 m. panaikino vienuolynus, vienuoliai manė, kad pavojus kyla iš Henriko VIII, tačiau pagrindinė problema buvo Gutenbergo išrastas spausdinimo aparatas.

 

 

Panašiai, nors šiandien tiesioginė grėsmė kyla iš Trumpo administracijos, akademinės institucijos yra trapios, nes žinios dabar prieinamos per internetą ir dirbtinį intelektą. Siekdami subalansuotų tyrimų, net akademikai vis dažniau žvelgia už savo universitetų ribų.

 

 

Atėjo laikas nuodugniai persvarstyti aukštąjį mokslą – ne tik ištaisyti, bet ir jį atkurti.

 

Akademinės institucijos, jei turėtų pakankamai tvirtumo, galėtų pradėti taisytis. Kolegijos galėtų išvengti uždarų katedrų sukurtų kliūčių, perkeldamos lėšas į naujas, tarpdisciplinines katedras. Pavyzdžiui, kai politikos mokslų katedra yra abejinga istoriniams tyrimams, o istorijos katedra – politinių institucijų ir teorijos raidai, nauja katedra, jungianti abi šias katedras, būtų visiškai pagrįsta.

 

Kiti sprendimai slypi ne akademinėje bendruomenėje. Privatūs finansuotojai galėtų panaudoti interneto išteklius ir mokymąsi esamose klasėse bei jų mokymo programose: įsivaizduokite tinklalapius, kuriuose daugiausia dėmesio skiriama standartinei bakalauro literatūrai (pvz., puslapis apie „Puikybę ir prietarus“), su trumpais vaizdo pokalbiais tarp pirmaujančių mokslininkų ir intelektualiai provokuojančiais klausimais – kad studentai galėtų ištirti netikėtas savo skaitinių perspektyvas ir vėliau juos grąžinti į auditorijas. Tai daug pigiau, nei steigti naujus universitetus.

 

Kalbant apie federalinę vyriausybę, švietimas nėra ir neturėtų būti jos reguliavimo galioje. Federalinis finansavimas neišvengiamai susijęs su reguliavimo sąlygomis ir centralizuotos indoktrinacijos rizika. Taigi, jei norima išgelbėti švietimą, laikas persvarstyti federalinį finansavimą.

 

Jei aukštojo mokslo finansavimas vis dar bus federalinis, jį reikėtų sumažinti ir patobulinti. Iš federalinių lėšų penimos institucijos administratorių skaičių padidino labiau, nei profesorių. Studentų paskolų suma ir jų palūkanų normos turėtų būti atvirkščiai proporcingos administratorių ir dėstytojų santykiui. Nors sunku kiekybiškai įvertinti intelektualinį atvirumą, federalinės lėšos turėtų būti susietos su tokia tolerancija – tiek universiteto miestelyje, tiek samdant ir priimant studentus.

 

Federaliniu lygmeniu remiamos studentų paskolos studijoms kolegijoje turėtų būti skiriamos akademiškai linkusiems studentams, kurie skatina diskusijas klasėje, o ne tiems, kurie turėtų daugiau galimybių klestėti kitur, pavyzdžiui, kitose švietimo programose, pameistrystėje ar realiame pasaulyje. Ir koks yra federalinis interesas subsidijuoti daugiau teisininkų rengimo? Ne visos tyrimų sritys vienodai nusipelno federalinių lėšų.

 

Tai tik keli galimi patobulinimai; kiti galėtų būti nuodugnesni. Esmė ta, kad aukštojo mokslo problemos yra esminės, todėl joms reikia ne mažiau esminio pakartotinio įvertinimo.

 

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Ponas Hamburgeris dėsto Kolumbijos teisės mokykloje ir yra Naujojo pilietinių laisvių aljanso generalinis direktorius. Jis yra knygos „Švietimas yra kalba“ autorius.“ [1]

 

1. Don't Just Fix Higher Education, Reconstitute It. Hamburger, Philip.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 June 2025: A15. 

Don't Just Fix Higher Education, Reconstitute It

 

"Academic institutions think they have a problem and that its name is Donald Trump. But he's only the beginning of their problems. The difficulties are systemic, not only legal or political, and that means it's time to reconsider what higher education should look like.

 

The current institutional players are in no condition to rethink higher education.

 

Having cultivated and tolerated violations of civil-rights laws, universities and colleges can't afford candid introspection, lest it be understood as an admission of wrongdoing. They are controlled, moreover, by administrators who generally don't have the stomach to recognize the damage they've done to higher education, let alone what should be done with their jobs.

 

The federal government is no better at re-evaluating higher education. It's focusing on the tools available to it: enforcing antidiscrimination laws and defunding science (even though scientists aren't typically the culprits).

 

The academic failures of universities and colleges are obvious enough. Departments generally appoint their own faculty members -- so that once a department is ideologically captured, it tends to tilt further in the same direction, inevitably producing instruction and research that, considered as a whole, is slanted. Institutions then inculcate conformity, punish dissenters, and apply harsh disciplinary proceedings. Put another way, the recent antisemitism didn't develop in a vacuum. It was nurtured amid ideological capture and selective enforcement of the rules. These are substantial impediments to the pursuit of truth.

 

Part of the problem comes from government. It's often said that we're seeing the results of the left's march through the institutions. But government policies, often based on twisted interpretations of civil-rights laws, accelerated ideological and administrative dominance.

 

When Henry VIII dissolved the monasteries in 1536, the monks thought the danger came from Henry, but the underlying problem was Gutenberg's invention of the printing press.

 

Similarly, although today the immediate threat comes from the Trump administration, academic institutions are fragile because knowledge is now available through the internet and artificial intelligence. For balanced inquiry, even academics increasingly look outside their universities.

 

It's time for a thorough reconsideration of higher education -- not only to fix it, but to reconstitute it.

 

Academic institutions could, if they had sufficient fortitude, begin to repair themselves. Colleges could avoid the impediments created by closed-minded departments by shifting funds to new, interdisciplinary departments. Where a political science department is indifferent to historical inquiry and the history department is indifferent to the development of political institutions and theory, for instance, a new department straddling the two would be well justified.

 

Other solutions lie outside academia. Private funders could piggyback web resources and learning on existing classes and their curricula: Imagine webpages focused on standard undergraduate readings (say, a page on "Pride and Prejudice") with brief video conversations between leading scholars and intellectually provoking questions -- to help students explore unexpected perspectives on their readings and then bring them back into the classroom. That's much cheaper than starting new universities.

 

As for the federal government, education isn't, and shouldn't be, within its regulatory powers. Federal funding inevitably comes with regulatory conditions and the risk of centralized indoctrination. So if education is to be saved, it's time to reconsider the federal funding system.

 

If there is to be federal funding for higher education, it should be reduced and refined. Institutions fattened on federal funds have expanded the number of administrators more than professors. The amount of student loans and their interest rates should be inversely related to the ratio of administrators to faculty. Although it's difficult to quantify intellectual openness, federal funds should be linked to such tolerance, whether on campus or in hiring and admissions.

 

Federally backed student loans to attend college should go to academically inclined students who elevate classroom discussion, not those who would have a better chance of flourishing elsewhere, whether in other educational programs, apprenticeships or the real world. And what is the federal interest in subsidizing the production of more lawyers? Not all fields of inquiry are equally deserving of federal money.

 

These are just some potential improvements; others could be more thoroughgoing. The point is that the problems with higher education are fundamental, so they need an equally fundamental re-evaluation.

 

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Mr. Hamburger teaches at Columbia Law School and is CEO of the New Civil Liberties Alliance. He is the author of "Education Is Speech."” [1]

 

1. Don't Just Fix Higher Education, Reconstitute It. Hamburger, Philip.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 03 June 2025: A15.