““We bought the tools, employees use artificial intelligence
(AI) every day, and there is no breakthrough. Maybe we should measure in more
detail?” I have heard these sentences in more than one conversation with
managers over the past six months.
But they were not first uttered in 2026. An almost identical
complaint was repeated by factory owners about 130 years ago – having just
installed the most revolutionary technology of its time, the electric motor,
and seeing that productivity… had hardly budged.
Before electricity became established in industry, the heart
of a typical factory was a single steam engine: it turned a central shaft
installed throughout the building, and a labyrinth of leather belts led from it
to each machine tool. The machines were not lined up according to the work
flow, but the closer they were to the shaft, the more half of the energy was
lost in the friction of the belts, and if one belt broke, the entire factory
would come to a standstill.
Then came the electric motor—and the owners attached it… to
the same central shaft. The so-called group drive: a new technology, assembled
according to an old design. Economic historian Warren Devine, who has studied
this period in detail, summarizes it mercilessly: there was practically no
productivity jump. In 1900, electricity accounted for only about 10% of the
power of US factories.
It was not a more powerful motor that unlocked value, but a
different way of thinking: what if each machine had its own motor? When
machines no longer had to line up under a shaft, the factory could be arranged
according to the workflow—and thus the conveyor belt was born. By 1930,
electricity already accounted for about 80% of the power of factories.
Electricity began to create value not when factories changed their energy
source, but when they redesigned the factory itself to the new nature of
energy. It took forty years.
Now let’s look at how most companies are “using AI” today.
The employee sits in his usual environment and talks to the
AI as if it were a smarter assistant. In software teams, engineers try to
squeeze agents into the existing process - hoping that they will work the way
people would work. Each step is accelerated by a dozen percent, but the
“factory” itself - processes, team composition, work organization - has not
changed. It is a group drive, only the 2026 version.
And then the most dangerous part happens: the employee, not
seeing much difference, returns to old habits, and the manager, not seeing
results in the indicators, concludes - “AI is overrated, let's wait.” Both draw
a logical conclusion from their experience. And both are wrong, because they
tested not a new work design, but a big engine on old shafts.
The author of the comment leads a company of 200+ software
engineers, developing products for the Scandinavian and Dutch markets, is a
board member of two companies and the author of the training for managers “Code
is cheap. Leadership isn't.” He is currently conducting a survey of Lithuanian
software managers on the topic of agent engineering, and will present the
results on November 18 at the “Verslo žinios” conference “Business 2027”.
There is also the opposite side of the trap – managers who
saw the breakthrough and rushed to it. In May 2026, Meta laid off about 10% of
its employees, transferring some of them to AI teams, and the next month, at an
internal meeting, Zuckerberg admitted: the use of agents in programming did not
yield the expected results. If an organization that plans to invest up to 145
billion USD in AI infrastructure this year miscalculated, then anyone can. Ford
turned quality control over to AI systems, laid off experienced engineers—and
then hired back 350 veterans. Klarna, which replaced about 700 customer service
workers with AI, admitted it went too far and started hiring people again.
These cases are no exception: 55% of managers who laid off
employees because of AI now admit they were wrong. The numbers explain why. A
2026 study by Faros AI, which analyzed two years of work data from 22,000
engineers, records a real leap in productivity: work completed per engineer
increased by 66%. But the same study also shows the cost: errors increased by
54%, and the ratio of incidents to changes more than tripled. Velocity was
measured. Maturity was not.
This is what connects all costly mistakes: decisions about
people were made based on the first indicators of speed in a discipline in
which the organizations themselves were still new. This discipline has a name –
agentic engineering. Its essence: a person no longer writes code and performs
tasks himself, but orchestrates AI agents – defines the task, designs quality
checks and is responsible for the final result.
This is not “more AI inside the same process” – this is a
different process, redesigned around agents in the same way that an individual
drive redesigned a single-engine factory. I observe this change closely,
leading a company of 200+ engineers: within a few months, software development
was rewritten, and tasks that we entrusted to a person just last year can now
be performed by agents from start to finish.
What should an IT company or department manager do? Three
practices.
First – constantly ask the question and think: if this
product or process we were to create today from scratch using agents, would our
current problem even exist? It frees us from the boundaries of old processes
and changes the thinking model.
Second, at least one real experiment: not “10% of time for
everyone”, but a real work process redesigned from start to finish using
agents. There is a lot to learn from this.
Third, measure the team’s maturity in agent engineering, not
activity: not how many tools have been purchased and how much they are used,
but how much responsibility can be entrusted to agents while maintaining high
quality.
This period is special for Lithuania. Working in this area,
I see how far behind we are from what is happening in Silicon Valley. Factory
owners had four decades, the cloud computing revolution lasted about 25 years,
and the agent era is moving even faster, and the gap between companies is now
accumulating not in years, but in months. The electric revolution did not win
those who bought the engine first. The winners were those who redesigned the
factory first.
Comment author – Agnius Paradnikas, CEO of UAB “Visma Tech.”
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