Drone and missile swarms are critical to Iran’s defense,
serving as a cornerstone of its asymmetric military strategy designed to
overwhelm advanced, expensive air defense systems with high-volume, low-cost
"kamikaze" drones. These systems create a durable, scalable deterrent
by exhausting enemy defenses and threatening regional infrastructure,
representing the "crown jewels" of Iranian military capability.
Key aspects of Iran's swarm strategy:
Cost Imbalance
Strategy: Iran uses cheap drones ($30,000 range) to force adversaries to expend
far more expensive missiles ($3 million range) to intercept them, creating a
sustainable, asymmetric economic war.
Saturation
Doctrine: By launching vast, simultaneous waves of drones and missiles, Iran
aims to overwhelm, or "saturate," sophisticated radar and defense
networks like the Patriot system, forcing gaps in protection.
Persistence &
Intelligence: Drones are used not just for destruction but as a long-term
"pressure architecture," enabling surveillance, intelligence
gathering, and consistent threats against regional rivals and U.S. bases.
Strategic
Escalation Control: Swarms allow Iran to strike deep into enemy territory with
plausible deniability or low risk of immediate catastrophic casualty, keeping
escalation risks under control.
Key Systems: The
Shahed series of loitering munitions is critical, with developments focusing on
increased range and autonomous intelligence-sharing capabilities, aiming to
move from mere mass to, potentially, intelligence-driven AI swarm tactics.
This approach allows a militarily weaker adversary to create
a "math problem" for defenders, forcing the need for cheaper defenses
like lasers to counter the constant volume, say analysts like retired Vice Adm.
Kevin Donegan on WFIN.
“The US-Israeli conflict with Iran began with mutual missile
strikes, but it has gradually evolved into a different phase. Tehran is
systematically conducting drone strikes against targets in Israel and the
Persian Gulf states, aiming to deplete their costly air defense systems. In
response, the US has also begun utilizing expendable drones to strike targets
within Iran.
Iran’s Military Capabilities
• The 12-day war with Israel in 2025 significantly depleted
Iran’s missile arsenal. Prior to that conflict, Iran possessed approximately
3,000 cruise and ballistic missiles; however, hundreds of them were either
launched toward Israel or destroyed by Israel while still on the ground. It is
believed that, since that time, Iran has worked intensively to replenish its
losses, bringing its missile count back up to 2,500. However, a substantial
portion of this inventory consists of short-range missiles incapable of
reaching Israel (the distance between the two capitals is approximately 1,500
km).
• Nevertheless, this arsenal has now proven to be in high
demand. Iran has expanded its strike zone and begun launching attacks against
Persian Gulf nations located within a 500-km radius. For these operations, Iran
has deployed Shahab-1 and Shahab-2, Fateh-110, Fateh-313, and Quds-1 missiles.
Against Israel, however, Iran is utilizing a limited stockpile of medium-range
missiles, such as the Khorramshahr, Kheibarshekan, Emad, and Qadr.
A significant new development has been the deployment of the
super-heavy solid-fuel Sejjil missile—which, as recently as last year, was
still merely a prospective development—as well as the Fattah-2 hypersonic
missile.
• Nevertheless, the current military campaign is
characterized by a relatively low rate of missile usage on Iran’s part. Taking
the UAE as an example, it can be noted that while on the first day [at the
outset] of the conflict, Iran launched over 130 missiles at them; however, by
the very next day, that number had dropped to just 28. In all subsequent days,
the UAE Ministry of Defense noted that fewer than 20 missiles were directed
toward their territory. One possible reason for this could be an insufficient
supply of missiles to sustain launches at the same intensity observed in June
2025.
• However, this shift may also be linked to a change in
Iran's tactics—specifically, a strategy focused primarily on using drones to
strike air defense systems and radar installations in the Persian Gulf states,
as well as to deplete the air defense assets of the U.S. armed forces. It is
hypothesized that, following this preparatory phase, Iran would be positioned
to utilize its remaining missile stockpile with greater effectiveness.
• Indeed, Tehran has been actively deploying Shahed drones,
maintaining a consistent launch volume day after day. These drones have proven
particularly effective in strikes against targets located in close proximity to
Iran. While their effectiveness against Israel was extremely low due to the
significant distances involved, the Persian Gulf states have increasingly come
under attack from them. Moreover, Iran possesses the capability to launch
drones from multiple directions simultaneously, thereby complicating defensive
efforts; in contrast, drones directed at Israel typically followed a single,
predictable trajectory.
• A potential new development in Iran's strategy could
involve the use of submarine-launched missiles. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) has asserted that it intends to employ these munitions in the
coming days. Although these missiles are relatively slow—reaching speeds of
only up to 100 meters per second (roughly half the speed of most cruise
missiles)—determining the precise time and location of their launch would be
significantly more difficult, thereby ensuring the element of surprise.
U.S. Military Capabilities
• On the U.S. side, Tomahawk missiles have emerged as the
primary strike asset employed against targets within Iranian territory. With a
range of up to 1,600 kilometers, these missiles are launched from destroyers
operating in the Arabian Sea, enabling them to reach targets across the entire
expanse of the Islamic Republic. Tomahawks inflict significant damage on Iran's
military infrastructure; however, their numbers are severely limited. Current
plans indicate that throughout 2026, the U.S. will procure a mere 57 new
missiles—a quantity entirely disproportionate to the scale of the ongoing
conflict.
Steady Drop: How the U.S. Is Employing Bombers in the War
Against Iran
Strategic aviation has the potential to inflict severe
damage on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, yet it is unlikely to emerge
as the decisive factor for victory.
• The U.S. has also deployed the new PrSM ballistic missile
against Iran, demonstrating its launch from a wheeled launcher platform
typically utilized for the HIMARS multiple rocket launch system and ATACMS
missiles. The PrSM boasts a range of up to 500 km, while its ongoing
development aims to double that range and enable launches from surface vessels.
Another key advantage is that each launcher pod accommodates two such missiles.
The conflict with Iran could propel the PrSM to the forefront of its class,
potentially replacing the ATACMS.
• Another American innovation involves the deployment of
expendable LUCAS drones—unmanned aerial vehicles similar in specifications and
purpose to the Shahed drones. Their primary advantage lies in their low cost
(the letter "L" in the name stands for "Low-Cost"); the
production cost for a single unit is $35,000, whereas a single Tomahawk missile
costs $1.6 million. In addition to these drones U.S. air forces are also
utilizing their established fleet of MQ-9 Reaper drones.
• The U.S. holds a significant aerial advantage over Iran.
They have deployed their full complement of advanced air assets, including B-2
bombers, which executed round-trip missions from the U.S. to drop bunker-buster
bombs on fortified underground missile bases. Among their fighter assets, F-35s
and F/A-18s have been deployed—aircraft capable of striking both aerial and
ground targets. In addition to these, a wide array of specialized aircraft are
being utilized to perform functions such as reconnaissance, patrol, aerial
refueling, electronic warfare, communications relay, and airborne early warning
and control.
• Conversely, the U.S. faces a vulnerability in the realm of
air and missile defense. The Patriot and THAAD systems—which are also widely
utilized by nations in the Persian Gulf region—have proven too costly to employ
for intercepting Iranian drones. Consequently, these systems are prioritized
for use against Iranian ballistic missiles, leaving the issue of drone defense
largely unresolved. The U.S. currently lacks a comprehensive network of
interceptor drones capable of protecting its ships and military bases—let alone
its allies in the Middle East. Washington is attempting to address this issue
by redeploying Patriot and THAAD interceptor missiles from South Korea;
however, this measure will not prevent a severe shortage of interceptors should
the conflict become protracted and Iran retain its capacity to manufacture new
missiles and drones.
Israel’s Military Capabilities
• Israel, for its part, relies primarily on its own
indigenous air defense assets, although it does also possess U.S.-made THAAD
systems. Jordan—across whose airspace Iranian missiles frequently pass—also
operates these systems. However, the primary emphasis of Israel’s air defense
strategy is placed on the "David’s Sling" system, which was designed
specifically to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles. Its Arrow 2 and
Arrow 3 interceptors strike missiles both within and above the atmosphere. The
renowned Iron Dome system is designed to counter artillery and short-range
rockets; however, in the context of the current conflict, the threat these pose
to Israel is not as pressing. Nevertheless, Iron Dome proves inadequate in the
face of massive barrages or when medium-to-long-range missiles are employed: in
the former case, the system lacks the capacity to intercept every incoming
target, while in the latter, a different tier of missile defense is required.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assert that the
interception rate for Iranian missiles is comparable to figures from the
previous year. However—much like with the United States—the overall
effectiveness of Israel’s air defenses is entirely contingent upon its
available stockpile of interceptors. Although Iran has diverted a portion of
its munitions toward Persian Gulf nations during the current conflict, Israel
continues to sustain strikes—including those from cluster-warhead missiles,
which possess a wide area of effect.
• At the same time, the IDF has acknowledged that the
"Iron Beam" laser defense system is not currently being utilized to
counter the ongoing Iranian attacks. In the past, military sources had reported
that this system had been placed on active operational duty and had even
participated in intercepting drones launched from Lebanon. Yet, for the time
being, Israel continues to rely on conventional air defense assets—despite the
growing risk of depleting its existing stockpiles.”
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