Deep Rifts Leave U.S., Western Europe In a Tense Marriage

 

As long as the Western Europeans are spending their gazillions of euros on the American weapons of previous generations, economically they are friends to the Americans. Politically and ideologically they are enemies right now.

 

Based on reporting as of early 2026, the relationship between Western Europe and the United States has become increasingly transactional and strained, characterized by high-volume arms purchases alongside intense political, economic, and ideological friction.

    Arms Purchases ("Economic Friends"): European NATO members have dramatically increased defense spending, with the U.S. supplying a significant portion—reportedly 64% of imports between 2020 and 2024. As of late 2025, U.S. military sales to Europe surged, with Europe becoming the largest market for U.S. weapons, including F-35 fighter jets.

    Political/Ideological Divide ("Enemies"): Despite these purchases, political relations have deteriorated. In 2025-2026, the U.S. adopted a "nationalist" stance that views the EU as a potential rival. Some European perspectives, particularly in Germany and France, have described the U.S. administration as "openly hostile".

    Ideological Conflicts: The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and statements from leadership have been described as ideologically hostile to the current European trajectory, focusing on cultural nationalism, criticizing the EU, and praising "patriotic" (right-wing) parties.

    Strained Relations: The U.S. has threatened "big retaliation" if Europe attempts to dump U.S. assets, following tariff disputes and demands for greater burden-sharing. Meanwhile, some European countries, such as Denmark, have at times identified the U.S. as a security risk, signaling a major shift in trust.

 

In summary, Europe is heavily dependent on American military hardware (particularly for Ukraine) but is politically and ideologically opposed to the transactional, nationalist approach of the current U.S. administration, leading to a "frenemy" dynamic of forced cooperation.

 

Emotionally Western Europeans are behaving like babies, whose Daddy left them and went to parties:

 

“MUNICH -- Ask a European official who attended the weekend's Munich Security Conference about the state of the trans-Atlantic relationship, and you are likely to hear metaphors about dealing with a troubled, possibly abusive, spouse.

 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered a less pugnacious message when compared with last year's Munich conference. Back then, Vice President JD Vance launched a blistering attack on the governments of Europe's largest nations and embraced their far-right political opponents.

 

Rubio, by contrast, got a standing ovation after highlighting the importance of trans-Atlantic ties and common history and culture. Yet, though the Europeans and the Trump administration are on speaking terms once again, there are few illusions.

 

The deep fissure caused by January's crisis over Greenland has been papered over, but not fixed. What used to be an alliance of kindred souls is viewed by both sides today as a marriage of convenience, loveless and lacking basic trust.

 

"Now there is a new equation that you don't really know who is your friend and who is your ally," Kaja Kallas, the European Commission's head of foreign and security policy, said in an interview in Munich.

 

Ministers, lawmakers and military leaders who packed Munich's Bayerische Hof hotel over the weekend acknowledge that the common values that once bound Washington to its European allies aren't so common anymore. The focus of conversations has now shifted onto the bond that remains: hard security interests that are less susceptible to ideological rifts.

 

Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's undersecretary for policy, told the attendees in Munich that he isn't sure that the onetime "hosannas and shibboleths" about shared values between Europe and the U.S. are true, at least when it comes to his part of the political spectrum.

 

Yet, he added, "the deduction is not being 'hey let's pull out,' but rather let's ground our partnership in something more enduring and durable and real, like shared interests. We have a shared interest in a Europe that can defend NATO territory, and so I would recommend focusing on pragmatic nuts and bolts kind of stuff."

 

Highlighting the positive, many European officials noted that, ahead of Munich, Colby reaffirmed at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ministerial meeting in Brussels the enduring U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in Europe -- even as he insisted that European forces will be primarily responsible for the Continent's conventional defense. Colby also praised the strides that Germany and several other European allies have made in expanding their military capabilities over the past year.

 

"It was important after the discussions we had over the last couple of weeks to reaffirm that, on a fundamental level, we are allies, we are friends, we share the same history, our connections go deep in every direction, and it is acknowledged and appreciated that many countries in Europe are stepping up," Netherlands Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans said in an interview.

 

With Washington's focus on shared interests, the big question, of course, is the degree to which the U.S.'s security interests actually overlap with those of Europe today.

 

Seen from European capitals, the paramount security challenge is presented by the events in Ukraine. President Trump, by contrast, has repeatedly spoken of Russia as a source of great business opportunities and a possible hedge against China, with senior aides like Steve Witkoff denying any Russian threat to countries outside Ukraine.

 

Former Swedish foreign minister Tobias Billstrom said he found such attitudes disturbing. "The U.S. has some permanent interests, and we have to take that into account. But the U.S. has to accept that Russia is a European problem," he said. "What has worried me over the years, since the new administration came into place, is this constant downplay of Russia as a threat."

 

The word "Russia" wasn't even mentioned in Rubio's Munich speech, which warned instead about the perils of mass migration, unfettered trade and the "climate cult."

 

While Rubio said the fate of Europe will never be irrelevant to the U.S., he added that "we are prepared, if necessary, to do this alone." Many European officials took these words as a warning that Washington's commitment to European security was conditional on aligning with the Trump administration's ideology.

 

"Rubio's speech was JD without a beard," said Jeff Rathke, president of the American-German Institute in Washington. "It's a change of tonality without a change of policy." One European official described Rubio's Munich address as "a slap, but while wearing a silk glove."

 

"The worst lesson we could draw from this weekend is to say that 'I can cling to some love words that I heard in part of his speech' and push the snooze button," said France's minister of European affairs, Benjamin Haddad. Instead of fretting about Trump, he added, the Europeans must be stoic and "focus on what we can control: focus on rearmament, on the support for Ukraine, focus on competitiveness."

 

Trump's pressure on Ukraine to accept a peace deal on Russia's terms and surrender unconquered territory in the Donetsk region, something most European governments oppose, has been a source of trans-Atlantic tension for months.

 

With Trump portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an obstacle to peace, the issue could trigger another crisis in trans-Atlantic relations in coming weeks, many European leaders fear.

 

The lesson learned by these European governments from the previous crisis, over Trump's demand to annex Greenland, was that it pays to push back, hard. Several European nations in January sent troops to the island, which belongs to Denmark, and threatened to use their financial muscle to retaliate against the tariffs that Washington imposed in retribution.

 

Facing this coordinated response, Trump ended up withdrawing his tariffs and ruled out using force in Greenland.

 

"I definitely see that with all the strongmen, they respect strength and nothing else. So you have to either be strong or project strength. This is very clear. And if we are united, we are actually strong," said Kallas, the European Commission's foreign-affairs and security chief.

 

A former prime minister of Estonia, Kallas noted the inherent problem of separating values and interests.

 

"Our values are also our interests," she said. "The underlying values of democracy and human rights -- these are also the fundamentals for prosperity."” [1]

 

1. Deep Rifts Leave U.S., Europe In a Tense Marriage. Trofimov, Yaroslav.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 17 Feb 2026: A1.  

February 16th is a good opportunity to remember how far and where we have gone

 

Interwar Lithuania was a nationalist-fascist project. It is naive to believe that Smetona and other regime creators became fascists only after the anti-democratic coup. They were like that all the time.

 

Cunning actors from the lower classes used nationalist-fascist ideas to seize the country's wealth.

 

They took the land from the Poles and distributed it between themselves. They took away the businesses from the Jews, and, during Hitler's rule, those Jews were almost completely exterminated, with the help of the Germans. They introduced a cult of Smetona's personality following Hitler's example. They gave the lion's share of Lithuania's income to the pitiful army, impoverishing the people. Therefore, they had to flee Lithuania barefoot, wading through the border stream. Smetona became hated, the people did not allow him to leave the Motherland normally.

 

These arguments touch on the fundamental problems of the interwar period, but historians view this period through several different prisms.

 

Here are some facts and context for the topics mentioned here:

 

Nature of the regime: Although Antanas Smetona's rule after the 1926 coup was authoritarian, in today's Lithuanian historiography it is more often described as conservative authoritarianism than pure fascism. The Lithuanian Institute of History emphasizes that Smetona opposed radical Nazi ideas (e.g., in the Klaipėda region conflict) and did not have a mass party-militia, characteristic of Hitler or Mussolini, but with regard to Jews there was no difference between Lithuanian and German fascists.

 

Interwar period (1918–1940): The Lithuanian state pursued a policy of "Lithuanization of the economy" (promoting Lithuanian cooperatives and entrepreneurship). By the end of the 1930s, Jews controlled only about half of the country's trade and industry.

 

2. The Holocaust and German Occupation (1941–1944)

 

Mass extermination: During the years of Nazi German occupation, about 95% of Lithuanian Jews (about 190,000–195,000 people) were murdered.

 

This was one of the greatest tragedies in Europe in terms of the percentage of victims.

 

Local collaboration: The massacres were organized by Nazi operational groups (Einsatzgruppen), but local collaborators – the Lithuanian auxiliary police and other collaborators – also actively participated in them.

Public reaction: Although some residents participated in the crimes, others condemned the massacres or risked their lives to save Jews (Righteous Among the Nations).

 

More information about these tragic events can be found on the website of the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi Regime’s in Lithuania and in the studies of the Lithuanian Population Genocide and Resistance Research Center.

 

Land reform: 1922 The reform did indeed expropriate most of the landowners' (often Polish-speaking) lands, but the official goal was to provide land to landless peasants and create a Lithuanian middle class, and not simply to "distribute wealth" without a national-political basis. The Lithuanian National Museum writes more about this.

 

Economy and military: Lithuania allocated about 25 percent of the budget to defense, which was a huge burden. However, historical data from the Bank of Lithuania show that the litas was one of the most stable currencies, and agriculture recorded growth until the occupation.

 

Withdrawal: Smetona's run across the stream in June 1940 became a symbol of moral collapse for many contemporaries and later generations. Documents about this event can be found in the Central State Archives of Lithuania.

 

Today's Lithuanian press describes these events as a miracle, as the emergence of a phoenix from the ashes of the nation:

 

“February 16 is a good opportunity to remember how far we have come, how much progress has been achieved since the declaration of independence. On the eve of World War I, a neutral observer would have considered the Lithuanians to be one of the most backward ethnic groups in the European part of the Russian Empire.

 

The Lithuanian elite was bent, even the clergy did not consistently support national aspirations. According to the 1897 census, Lithuanians made up 11.5% of the urban population in Kaunas Governorate, 9.2% in Suwalki. Without cities, culture cannot flourish; you cannot build opera houses, museums, universities in the countryside, or establish editorial offices there. Cultural poverty was programmed.

 

Literacy was low, there were very few schools in Lithuania, and even fewer Lithuanian students. There was no sign that the situation would improve soon. will improve. On the eve of the First World War, so 30 years after the release of "Aušra", the Lithuanian school population was small, its national understanding was limited. In 1913, only 8 Lithuanian graduates graduated from six gymnasiums in Vilnius, and only 9 from Kaunas schools. Even in the most Lithuanian gymnasiums in Marijampolė and Palanga, Lithuanians made up only half of the students. The situation of Lithuanians was even sadder.

 

The people were becoming denationalized, Slavized, especially in the east. In the mid-19th century and the 19th century, 35 percent of the population of Vilnius province were Lithuanians, and by the end of the century the percentage of Lithuanians had halved. According to the 1897 census, there were only 17.57 percent Lithuanians. Denationalization did not stop and continued until the First World War, in 1909 there were only 12.9 percent Lithuanians. Lithuanians were disappearing not only in the east. And somewhere in central Lithuania the number of Polish speakers in the surrounding areas was growing, and a mixed Lithuanian-Polish population was spreading.

 

After seeing the power of the Russian and German armies, most Lithuanians found their own independent state an impossible goal. It was not clear whether they would be ruled by the Russians or the Germans. These doubts about the fate of Lithuania influenced the call for volunteers after February 16. In 1919, Lithuanian youth volunteered in the Lithuanian army in varying degrees. There was no shortage of volunteers in Užnemunė and Alytus. Elsewhere, indifference prevailed.

 

The Joniškėlis partisans, who formed the main unit opposing the Bolsheviks in Northern Lithuania in the first half of 1919, numbered only one and a half hundred men. One partisan later wrote that “not a single father forced his son to join the partisans,” although there were some who did not allow their children to take a horse.

 

The arc of history is neither predetermined nor incapable of sudden change and unexpected turn. Even the most astute observers may fail to notice and underestimate hidden processes that create conditions for hitherto unimaginable radical changes. Hegel was not mistaken in noting that the owl of Minerva flies only in the twilight.

 

The lack of state consciousness was disappearing very quickly. Having had the opportunity to taste even a brief taste of independence, the Lithuanian peasants succumbed to the spirit of patriotism. Just a year and a half after the first steps of establishing Lithuanian power, what seemed completely unrealistic became an extremely important matter. After L. Želigovskis took Vilnius, Lithuania was swept by spontaneous patriotism, mass rallies were held, resolutions were adopted, expressing the determination of Lithuanian society to sacrifice not only their property, but also their lives. The Polish advance into the depths of Lithuania was stopped.

 

The country's economy was slowly being restored, although a rather radical land reform played a positive role, taking land from Polish landlords and transferring it to Lithuanian peasants. Land reform did not occur in the Vilnius region occupied by the Poles, because you cannot take property and land from Poles in order to give them to Lithuanians, Guds, Tuteis and other foreigners.

 

Lithuania remained a poor agricultural country, its industry remained a stepchild. During the global economic recession that began in 1929, the demand and prices for agricultural products fell sharply, and so did farmers' incomes. Some small-land peasants went bankrupt and lost their farms. Lithuania managed to stabilize the situation without catastrophic consequences, but it remained one of the poorest countries in Europe, a kind of

 

provincial backwater, which unfortunately shared a border with Europe's greatest predators, who one after another crushed Lithuania.

 

Despite the government’s great efforts to win support and nurture pro-government scouts and riflemen (the activities of student futurists were banned), dissatisfaction with Smetona’s sclerotic rule grew from the right and the left. It was hoped that the popular army commander, General Stasys Raštikis, would persuade Smetona to step down and take over the country. But Raštikis was not a man of action; he was more of an observer of events than a determined seeker to steer them towards a desired conclusion.

 

It is easy to list the shortcomings of the years of independence, because there were quite a few. On the other hand, Lithuania’s starting position was so unfavorable that there was no reason to believe that the country would be crowned with victories and laurels. Life is not like H. C. Anderson’s optimistic fable, “The Ugly Duckling,” in which an ugly bird, after long trials, finally realizes that it is not a duck, but a beautiful swan.

 

The December 1926 coup buried democracy. There were more attempts to tighten the country's governance than to restore democracy. Voldemarin's supporters repeatedly tried to seize power. The armed forces, including the officers, were allocated a lot, perhaps even disproportionately large amounts of funds, but this yielded little benefit, and the occupation by the Soviet army was not resisted. Generals and officers passively watched the burial of independence, few of them participated in the partisan battles of the post-war years, and the role of ordinary riflemen in the resistance was proportionally larger and more significant.

 

It is easy to list the shortcomings of the years of independence, because there were quite a few of them. On the other hand, Lithuania's starting position was so unfavorable that there was no reason to believe that the country would be crowned with victories and laurels. Life is not like H. C. Anderson's optimistic fable, "The Ugly Duckling", in which an ugly bird, after long trials, finally realizes that it is not a duck, but a beautiful swan. Backward and oppressed countries often remain so, Africa and Asia are full of examples.

 

There was one very important and irreplaceable achievement of the first years of independence. Lithuanian culture and ethnic consciousness were consolidated, Slavization, becoming Poles, Guds or Russians was stopped forever. There will always be renegades eager to please their new masters, even to the point of being willing to give up the most important collective identities. While a conscious national identity based on statehood and self-government may be rejected or widely denied, forms of ethnic identity representation are deeper and more resistant.

 

For many people, abandoning them is not a realistic option, as it creates a deep void that needs to be filled, often with what has just been rejected.

 

The Act of February 16 is usually presented as the final and unchangeable choice to create an independent state. It was not. In 1918, Germany had already conquered vast areas of the Russian Empire, sought to finally defeat the French and British on the Western Front, and it would have been impossible to resist it. Although the Council of Lithuania had declared Lithuania independent, on July 11, 1918, it invited Ulrich von Urach to become the King of Lithuania, giving him the title of Mindaugas II. The intention was to create a constitutional monarchy, but Ulrich never arrived in Lithuania, and his coronation did not take place. On November 2, 1918, (After Germany clearly lost the war) The Lithuanian Council revoked the decision on the monarchy, finally choosing the path of the republic. February 16 was immortalized in the memory of the nation, conveniently and wisely forgetting the subsequent hesitation. Sometimes clarity and simplicity are more important than accuracy and context.”