"Maintaining the flow of oil is still crucial for the world
economy. But now the supply of semiconductors is also critical for commerce,
and war and peace.
When I first arrived in Taiwan as a college student in the
summer of 1973, there was no ambiguity whatsoever about the American role on
the island.
Over the previous two years, President Richard M. Nixon and
his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, had opened relations with the
People’s Republic of China in Beijing. But a short distance away in Taiwan,
which the People’s Republic considers a breakaway province, U.S. Air Force jets
soared overhead. There was a U.S. base right in Taipei, within walking distance
of my favorite bookstore.
After reading Chinese philosophy, I’d drop by the base
canteen for a fix of cheeseburgers, Coca-Cola and rock ’n’ roll. At night, the
local bars were often filled with hard-partying G.I.s, flown in from Vietnam
for rest and recreation.
As an American in Taipei, you understood in a visceral way
that you were living in an outpost of the American empire in Asia, protected by
the American military.
Now, while Taiwan remains a close ally, it is also protected
by something far more subtle — its absolutely central role in world markets.
The ‘silicon shield’
More specifically, Taiwan is a colossus in the global market
for semiconductors, the brains of modern electronics. Taiwan takes some comfort
in what its president, Tsai Ing-wen, calls its “silicon shield” — its mastery
of the manufacturing of the microchips that are as essential to the economy in
the 21st century as oil was 100 years ago.
Taiwan produces most of the world’s highest-tech silicon
chips — slivers the size of a fingernail, on which are embedded billions of
microscopic transistors. The very best chips are made — “fabricated” is the
term of art — at the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, which
may be the most important company that most people in the United States have
never heard of.
Taiwan Semiconductor is the most valuable company in Asia
and one of the dozen most valuable in the world, with a market capitalization
of more than $400 billion. If you invest in international stocks through a
broad, diversified mutual fund or exchange-traded fund, you probably own a
piece of it. I do, through several Vanguard index funds in my retirement
accounts.
It has been a splendid investment. Over the 20 years through
Wednesday, Taiwan Semiconductor returned 18.6 percent annually, including
dividends, FactSet data shows. That thrashed the S&P 500, with an annual
return of 10.3 percent, and Intel, the biggest American chip-maker, at 6.7 percent.
The magic of those chips
Taiwan Semiconductor isn’t a household name because it
doesn’t sell its products directly to consumers. But its own customers
certainly do. For a clue about the company’s commercial power, consider that
the microchips it makes for Apple are the core of every iPhone sold.
The iPhone 13 mini in my pocket, as well as the new iPhone
14 models introduced on Wednesday, is built around chips that were designed by
Apple in California; produced by Taiwan Semiconductor in Hsinchu, Taiwan; and
shipped for assembly on mainland China or perhaps, these days, in another
country.
China has made the production of its own state-of-the-art
silicon chips a national priority, but it has been unable to catch up with
Taiwan. The Biden administration is intent on making sure that it does not,
imposing restrictions on the export of the most advanced chips — and
chip-making equipment — to China. And with $50 billion from the new CHIPS and
Science Act, the administration is trying to shift some of the fabrication of
the best chips back to American shores.
As my colleague David Leonhardt put it: “The most advanced
category of mass-produced semiconductors — used in smartphones, military
technology and much more — is known as 5 nm. A single company in Taiwan, known
as TSMC, makes about 90 percent of them. U.S. factories make none.”
The structures etched on these microchips are vanishingly
small. “Nm” is short for nanometer. Read this slowly: A nanometer is a
millionth of a millimeter.
Chris Miller, a professor of international history at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, describes the
microchips coming out of Taiwan eloquently in his forthcoming book, “Chip War:
The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology.” He points out that the
coronavirus that began spreading around the planet in 2020 was only about 100
nanometers in diameter. The same year, Taiwan Semiconductor was etching shapes
less than half that size onto scores of millions of chips for Apple.
Back in the 20th century, I listened to ballgames on a
transistor radio. Now, I watch them on my phone and iPad, thanks, in part, to
the Apple A15 processor inside them, which contains 16 billion transistors, all
etched in Taiwan.
What’s more, modern weapons systems of all descriptions and
the world’s telecommunications infrastructure, plus applications in artificial
intelligence, self-driving vehicles and much more, depend on these exceedingly
complex chips.
As Dale C. Copeland, a professor of international relations
at the University of Virginia, writes in Foreign Affairs: “China now has some
capability to produce chips with transistors that are under 15 and even under
10 nanometers in size. But to stay on the cutting edge of technological
developments,” China needs chips “measuring under seven or under five
nanometers, which only Taiwan can mass-produce at a high level of quality.”
How long that tech gap can be sustained may be as important
a geopolitical question as the nuclear, ballistic and antiballistic puzzles of
the Cold War.
The origins of Taiwan’s success story are difficult to
explain in a nutshell, but I’ll try.
The Taiwan government wanted to develop a local Silicon
Valley in the 1980s, and had cheap land, ready capital and a highly educated
work force eager to work at much lower wages than companies in the United
States paid.
But it didn’t have the expertise until it brought in Morris
Chang, a Chinese-born U.S. tech veteran, who realized that manufacturing chips,
not designing them, would be Taiwan’s forte. Mr. Chang founded Taiwan
Semiconductor, and the rest is history.
Stock prices and the Pelosi visit
In a long Zoom conversation, Professor Copeland said a
nation’s military power had always been built on its economic strength.
“Cutting countries off from access to critical materials can
cause a war,” he said, “but calibrating access carefully might be able to
prevent one.”
In this sense, limiting trade in the most advanced
semiconductors is, at a bare minimum, provocative to China, which dearly needs
them. But permitting trade in “fairly advanced” semiconductors softens the blow
and can promote prosperity, Professor Copeland said. That is essentially what
the Biden administration is doing.
What is most important is “a country’s expectations of
future trade,” Professor Copeland said. If it is clear that China will be
better off with a steady flow of chips from Taiwan, he added, peace is likely
to prevail.
Taiwan is “the beating heart” of the global semiconductor
industry, Professor Miller says. But China’s military exercises, in response to
the Taiwan visit of Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House, illustrate how
vulnerable the global economy has become.
Were Taiwan’s semiconductor operations to be destroyed,
Professor Miller estimated, the total worldwide economic damage could easily
exceed the cost of the entire coronavirus pandemic.
“If you start looking at the role Taiwan plays in just about
every industry, which is tremendous and which everyone relies on, you have to
ask, ‘What could we produce without it if it were gone?’
“In Year 1, we would face tremendous disruptions across all
sectors of the economy. It would take years to recover and to replace that
capacity, if it were destroyed.”
That’s why I have been monitoring the share price of Taiwan
Semiconductor carefully. From Aug. 2, the date of Ms. Pelosi’s arrival in
Taiwan, through Thursday, the stock fell more than 5 percent. That’s not great,
but it isn’t a sign of the apocalypse.
The stock market seems unperturbed, but the situation is
dicey.
Central problems in the U.S.-China relationship have never
been resolved. Back in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972, which reopened
diplomatic relations, the two sides agreed that there is only “one China.”
Chinese leaders made it clear that “the Taiwan question is the crucial question
obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United
States,” and, 50 years later, it remains an enormous problem.
China would prefer to achieve reunification peacefully but
won’t rule out a military solution, if it comes to that. The United States
remains committed to protecting Taiwan, but it cannot prevent China from
degrading or destroying the semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the
island.
The Taiwan semiconductor industry’s extraordinary importance
in world commerce may be the only thing capable of providing that protection.
Ideology and nationalistic fervor have led to war in the
past, and Chinese leaders say the Taiwan question can’t be put off
indefinitely.
At the moment, though, just about everyone else is depending
on the power of the silicon shield."
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