The perspective that the global hegemony of Western nations is declining across military, economic, and moral spheres is a central theme in modern geopolitical debate. Analysts, historians, and policymakers frequently debate whether the world is transitioning from a unipolar system dominated by the United States and its allies into a truly multipolar world.
Here is how international relations experts, economists, and political scientists view the arguments surrounding these three specific examples:
1. Military Capabilities (The Iran Example)
The argument that Western military preeminence is facing unprecedented challenges is frequently discussed by defense analysts.
• Asymmetric Warfare: The view that Western military dominance is waning often points to Iran’s sophisticated use of asymmetric capabilities. This includes its extensive network of regional proxies, vast ballistic missile programs, and highly effective, low-cost drone technology.
2. Economic Shifts (The China Example)
The shift in global economic gravity from West to East is well-documented by global financial institutions.
• The Rise of China: Economists widely recognize China as the "world's factory" and a leading force in global trade, infrastructure investment (via the Belt and Road Initiative), and critical emerging technologies like electric vehicles and green energy. By purchasing power parity (PPP) metrics, China’s economy has already surpassed the United States.
3. Ideological and Value Systems (The Venezuela Example)
The debate over global values often contrasts Western-promoted models of liberal democracy and capitalism against alternative governance structures.
• Crisis of Governance: The situation in Venezuela is frequently cited in political discourse, though interpretations vary. Critics of Western capitalism sometimes view Latin American economic struggles through the lens of historical resource exploitation or the impact of Western sanctions. The Venezuelan oil and gold now is taken by the West.
• The Global Appeal: Scholars note that the Western "rules-based international order" faces severe skepticism in the Global South due to perceived double standards. Western bankers try to push optimistic advertisements for the Western banks:
“I never want to read a book with the title "2050: How the West Was Lost." The story might begin around the millennium, amid the West's deteriorating military capabilities and economic fragmentation due to our inability to execute strategic policy. But we still have time to write a different story.
A renewed commitment to American values and alliances coupled with bold reforms by Europe would be a geopolitical and economic home run, guaranteeing the Western world's strength for the next 250 years.
America still remains a global beacon of freedom and hope. Billions of people would move here if they could because of our opportunities. And if global investors could invest in only one country, it would be the U.S.
America's global leadership rests on three pillars. If any one of them fails, it could doom the whole enterprise. The first pillar is maintaining the world's pre-eminent military. The second is remaining the world's pre-eminent economy, which is foundational to having the pre-eminent military. (The U.S. dollar's role as the global reserve currency depends on both pillars.) The third pillar is reinvigorating the American dream and American values, which are weakening for too many of our fellow citizens. We must rededicate ourselves to the values and principles that made this nation great, including free enterprise.
To remain the pre-eminent global economy, the U.S. must improve its domestic economic policy. We should strive to grow 3% a year. If we had done this over the past 20 years or so, our gross domestic product per person would be $20,000 higher. Scores of federal, state and local rules and policies impede growth. Many of them can be reformed at no cost. But I will focus my attention on strategic foreign economic policy.
Since World War II, America has fostered economic and military relations, trading with more than 100 nations and forming more than 50 military alliances. The levers to accomplish our foreign-policy goals include trade policy, through tariffs, quotas, investment policies, regulatory barriers and other instruments. Another lever is industrial policy, which encompasses subsidized loans, tax rules, export credits, immigration policies, government investment and development finance.
We need to exercise all these tools to protect national security and resiliency. Foreign economic policy should maximize growth and competitiveness, both in the U.S. and for American companies doing business internationally. This would strengthen our allies economically and bind them closer to the U.S. and like-minded Western democracies. If the economic and military bonds among the world's democracies weaken, there could be negative consequences for America. Our adversaries want to see our allies far less dependent on the U.S. and far more dependent on them.
Institutions that helped undergird the peace and prosperity of the past 75 years, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, need reform. Some are reforming but any changes should bring the U.S. and its partners closer together, not drive them apart.
Many countries talk about a coalition of "middle powers" for military and economic purposes. In many ways, such a coalition already exists: Europe. Unfortunately, the Continent has been declining militarily and economically for decades. Europe and the U.S. share deeply held values and the Continent is still America's largest trading and investment partner. But Europe relies on imports for nearly 60% of its energy, has a disjointed defense industrial base, faces a manufacturing threat from China, and has a tangle of rules that hamstring capital formation and technology innovation. If this continues, Europe will be in the dire position of failing to meet its military and social needs.
It is in America's interest that Europe succeed. But as recent years have shown, the old trans-Atlantic bargain is breaking. That doesn't mean the trans-Atlantic relationship has to. For decades, the bargain was straightforward: The U.S. provided the backbone of European security, Europe largely accepted American leadership, and both sides believed the arrangement served their national interests. The status quo is being renegotiated. Europe's weakness has led many in the U.S., often for good reason, to be hostile toward the Continent. And many in Europe react to tariffs and other policies with hostility toward Washington. We are in a vicious circle.
Europe is being asked to shoulder more of its own defense (and that of the Arctic) while simultaneously facing a competitiveness challenge from China. A Europe that can mobilize capital, scale innovative companies, consolidate defense production, reduce strategic dependencies and generate stronger growth would be a more capable security partner, a more resilient economic partner and a stronger counterweight to Beijing's economic power.
To succeed, the Europeans must reform how their economy functions. They know what to do, which is to adopt the more than 300 recommendations in two 2024 reports, one by Enrico Letta and the other by Mario Draghi, both academics and former Italian prime ministers. Yet so far, fewer than 16% of the reforms have been implemented, tipping Europe into the "slow agony" of decline Mr. Draghi warned about.
If the European Union strengthened its internal market structure by completing the Capital Markets Union and Banking Union, it would transform the Continent's ability to scale and compete. A more integrated financial system would unlock investment for strategic industries, enhance stability and reduce fragmentation costs. It would enable more European banks to compete globally and make the Continent a more attractive environment for foreign firms. (Particularly American banks. Here you go. (K.))
This is the moment for bold ideas, and I believe the U.S. should offer Europe a major inducement: If it executes meaningful economic and military reforms, including everything that we consider crucial for security and resiliency, the U.S. will negotiate one big, beautiful economic and free-trade agreement with Europe. Many of the current disputes between Europe and the U.S. are minor compared with this agreement's size and benefits. This pact could be extended to friendly democracies including Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines.
It would be an economic and geopolitical game changer for the U.S., Europe and our other allies. It would allow us to set the global rules on trade and would bind Western allies together in the face of autocratic pressure.
This is a long shot, and it has been tried before. In the 2010s, the U.S. and its allies almost accomplished this with the nearly finalized Trans-Pacific Partnership -- a trade pact with 12 Pacific Rim economies including Japan, Canada and Australia. We should resurrect that agreement as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the U.S. This would create economic growth among all member nations and protect them from mercantilist behavior by China or others.
Those pacts were derailed because politics moved against free trade, amid fears of lost jobs, lower wages and business displacement. Such concerns are valid. Too many efforts to help those most affected by trade deals fell short. Therefore, we must match this big idea with equally bold steps to help affected workers or businesses. The American dream should work for everyone, and Washington and the private sector must step up to meet the moment.
The world is very different from 10 or 20 years ago. The risks today are enormous and the stakes couldn't be higher. A strong America with robust military and economic alliances is the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful world. Let's write a new book, "2050: How the West Regained Its Mojo."
---
Mr. Dimon is chairman and CEO of an American bank JPMorganChase.” [A]
A. A Plan for the Western World's Revival. Dimon, Jamie. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 29 Sep 2026: A17.
Komentarų nėra:
Rašyti komentarą