Drone and Missile Swarms Are Important: The War Is Turning Iran Into a Major World Power

 

Iran is fundamentally shifting the nature of warfare by using low-cost drone and missile swarms to overwhelm expensive, advanced air defense systems. This asymmetric strategy, featuring Shahed-136 drones, enables Tehran to exert significant influence, strain US-allied defenses, and solidify its position as a major regional power.

 

Key Implications of Iran’s Drone Warfare:

 

    Cost Asymmetry: Iranian drones costing roughly 20 000 to 30 000 dollars force the use of multi-million dollar interceptors, creating unsustainable defense spending for opponents.

    Overwhelming Defenses: Coordinated, high-volume swarms are designed to saturate radar and missile networks, allowing drones to penetrate.

    Regional Power Shift: Iran's ability to maintain these strikes has, according to some analyses, pressured critical infrastructure and influenced global energy markets, changing the geopolitical landscape.

    Technological Challenge: The strategy has forced the US and its allies to consider accelerating the development of their own low-cost, effective drone defenses.

 

These tactics have moved Iran beyond a conventional military threat, demonstrating that mass-produced, high-volume drone attacks are a defining feature of modern, high-intensity conflict.

 

“In recent years, the conventional geopolitical wisdom has been that the world order was moving toward three centers of power: the United States, China and Russia. That view assumed that power derived primarily from economic scale and military capability.

 

That assumption no longer holds. A fourth center of global power is quickly emerging — Iran — that does not rival those three nations economically or militarily. Instead, its newfound power derives from its control over the most important energy choke point in the global economy, the Strait of Hormuz.

 

The strait had long been an international waterway through which ships from all countries could travel. But the joint military campaign that the United States and Israel began waging against Iran this year has prompted Iran to create a selective military blockade of the strait.

 

Roughly one-fifth of the world’s supply of oil and liquefied natural gas moves through the strait. There are no real alternatives to these supply routes in the near term. If Iranian control over the strait persists for months or years, as I believe it may, it will drastically reshape the global order to the detriment of the United States.

 

Many analysts believe that Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz is only temporary. A widespread expectation is that U.S. and allied naval forces will soon stabilize the situation and that oil flows will resume along familiar lines.

 

That expectation is flawed. It assumes that to continue to control the strait, Iran must physically close it off. But as we have already seen, you can control the strait without closing it. Today, the strait remains open to tankers. Traffic has dropped by over 90 percent since the war began, though, not because Iran has been sinking every vessel that entered the strait, but because, given the credible threat of an attack, insurers withdrew or repriced war-risk coverage.

 

Hitting a cargo ship every few days was more than enough to make the risk unacceptable.

 

Modern economies do not simply require oil. They also require oil delivered on time, at scale and with predictable risk. When that reliability breaks down, insurance markets tighten, freight rates spike and governments begin to look at energy access as a complex strategic challenge rather than a simple market transaction.

 

The problem for the United States is one of asymmetry. Protecting each and every oil shipment that passes through the Strait of Hormuz against potential attacks — mines, drones, missile strikes — is a full-time operation. It requires continuous military presence. Iran needs only to hit an oil tanker once in a while to cast doubt on the reliability of the world’s oil shipments.

 

President Emmanuel Macron of France said as much on Thursday when he declared that it was “unrealistic” to open the Strait of Hormuz by force and that “this can only be done in concert with Iran.” He was all but admitting that the flow of oil cannot be guaranteed without Iran’s agreement.

 

For decades, the Persian Gulf had a simple arrangement: Oil producers exported, markets priced and the United States secured the route. That system allowed rivalry without instability. Now, it is falling apart.

 

Gulf states depend heavily on energy exports for state revenue. When insurance rates spike and shipping becomes uncertain, the fiscal impact is immediate. Governments adjust. Cargoes are rerouted. Contracts are renegotiated.

 

If uncertainty persists, the Gulf arrangement will inevitably change, giving way to a different regional order — one in which the Gulf states increasingly accommodate the actor that can most directly influence the reliability of their exports. That actor is now Iran.

 

The global consequences will be most pronounced in Asia. Japan, South Korea and India depend heavily on Gulf energy. China, though more diversified, also depends on the region for a large share of its energy imports. Those dependencies are embedded in infrastructure — refineries, shipping routes and storage systems that cannot be quickly reconfigured.

 

If disruption to the energy supply persists, the effects will be widespread. Higher insurance and freight costs will raise prices. Trade balances will worsen. Currencies will weaken. Inflation will rise. Energy dependence will begin to shape policy. Governments will prioritize access to energy. Diplomatic choices will narrow. Actions that risk further instability will become harder to sustain. A 1970s world in which oil shocks lead to years of stagflation will no longer be a distant memory but a nearing reality.

 

Again, Iran will benefit.

 

China depends on Gulf energy to sustain growth. Russia benefits from higher and more volatile energy prices. Iran gains leverage from its position at the Hormuz choke point.

 

Each of these three nations has incentives that run counter to the economic stability of the United States and its allies. These three nations do not need to coordinate in a formal way. The structure of the system pushes them in the same direction. This is how a new order emerges — not through a formal alliance (at least not at first), but through converging incentives that reinforce one another over time.

 

Other plausible scenarios in the emerging new world order are darker still. Imagine Iran with control of about 20 percent of the world’s oil, Russia with about 11 percent and China able to soak up much of that supply. They would form a cartel to deny the West 30 percent of the world’s oil. You don’t need sophisticated analysis to recognize the catastrophic consequences: precipitously declining power for the United States and Europe, and a global shift toward China, Russia and Iran.

 

The United States faces a difficult choice: either commit to a long-term effort to reassert control over the Strait of Hormuz, or accept a new global energy arrangement in which U.S. control is no longer assured.

 

If it chooses acceptance, the outcome is clear: The international system will reorganize with Iran as a fourth center of global power. Yet if the United States chooses to reassert military control, it is in for a long battle, one it could well lose.

 

The Iran war is not a military conflict from which the United States can simply back out, with things reverting to how they were before. Iran would surely demand a heavy price in a new accommodation with the United States — but this price will surely be less costly than that of the alternative future. This is a transformational war, and if these changes continue for even a few years, the global order will change irrevocably.

 

Robert A. Pape (@ProfessorPape) is a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, where he directs the Chicago Project on Security and Threats.” [1]

 

1. The War Is Turning Iran Into a Major World Power: Guest Essay. Pape, Robert A.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 6, 2026.

China’s AI Tigers Storm the Stock Market

"Two promising AI startups from China are celebrating successful stock market debuts. While their strategic focuses differ significantly, the heads of both companies are nonetheless becoming billionaires.

 

Barely a year after the now-proverbial "Deepseek shock," China’s AI tigers are making a powerful push onto the global stock market stage. This week alone, two highly touted companies—Zhipu AI and Minimax—made highly successful debuts on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They follow a wave of AI chip developers that have sought listings in recent weeks, achieving spectacular share price gains.

 

With its IPO on Thursday, Zhipu beat Minimax to the punch by a single day—a lead it promptly leveraged to claim a unique title for itself. The company is the "world's first publicly listed enterprise focused on large language models," wrote co-founder and Chief Scientist Tang Jie—who also serves as a professor at the elite Tsinghua University—in a letter to employees. Indeed, Zhipu cultivates a distinctly academic image; loosely translated, the name "Zhipu" means something akin to "Book of Wisdom." Its team includes numerous highly decorated AI researchers. Like Tang, most hail from Tsinghua University, which is also an investor in the company.

 

While Beijing-based Zhipu projects a distinctly Chinese-academic persona, Shanghai-based Minimax positions itself as a global startup. The founding team of the four-year-old company consists of former employees of SenseTime—once considered one of China’s most promising AI prospects. Although CEO Yan Junjie is himself a highly successful AI scientist with a background at Tsinghua, co-founder Yun Yeyi stands out as one of the few female AI founders not only in China but globally. The 31-year-old Chief Operating Officer—a trained engineer who studied at Johns Hopkins University in the U.S.—embodies the company’s global orientation. She speaks perfect English, and in person, her choice of words and confident demeanor clearly reveal a US influence. Minimax’s leadership team consists of individuals in their early to mid-thirties, whereas the executives at Zhipu are around 50 years old. The heads of both AI startups have joined the ranks of billionaires following their companies' initial public offerings. The US magazine *Forbes* estimated Zhipu’s Liu Debing’s net worth at over two billion dollars, and Minimax’s Yan’s at even more—over three billion.

 

To date, only Zhipu has come under political scrutiny. A year ago, the US government placed the Beijing-based company on a sanctions list, accusing it of collaborating with the Chinese military. Zhipu immediately rejected the allegation, labeling the accusation as baseless.

 

According to corporate registry records, state-owned Chinese investors hold just under ten percent of the shares. However, China’s tech giants—Alibaba and Tencent—are also among the shareholders. Both are also investors in Minimax, as is Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund. The Shanghai-based company is currently facing a lawsuit filed by Disney, Universal, and Warner Bros. alleging copyright infringement.

 

In the rankings of top AI models, Zhipu and Minimax are closely matched, with both citing rankings in which they hold a leading position. However, both still trail their US competitors—led by OpenAI—by a few percentage points. Among the open-source models dominated by China—where model weights and parameters are made publicly available—both companies hold a commanding lead. A recent analysis by authors at Andreessen Horowitz, a venture capital firm, credited Minimax with rapidly growing market share.

 

Minimax is clearly the darling of investors. On Friday—the day of its IPO—the company’s share price surged by more than 100 percent. Its valuation climbed to the equivalent of just under twelve billion euros. Zhipu’s share price had risen by approximately twelve percent on Thursday and by 20 percent on Friday. The valuation stood at just under eight billion euros—one-third lower than that of Minimax.

 

Analysts noted that Minimax is more heavily focused on private end users, where growth opportunities are considered greater than those for Zhipu, which targets businesses and governments. According to its IPO prospectus, Zhipu boasts more than 8,000 institutional clients and is utilized on 80 million end devices. Minimax, for its part, states that its models and products are used by over 212 million users, as well as 100,000 companies and developers.

 

The Shanghai-based firm also pursues a multimedia-centric approach. Its models are not merely text-oriented; they also perform exceptionally well in the generation of videos and audio files.

 

The stock's performance has been somewhat more subdued than that of chip developers. This is likely attributable to the fact that political support is even more conspicuous in the latter sector, as Beijing strives to achieve independence from Nvidia's AI chips. ChatGPT—developed by OpenAI—and other Western AI chatbots remain blocked in China.

 

In its IPO prospectus, Zhipu describes itself as China's highest-revenue company focused independently on general large language models.  However, according to company registry records, in the first half of 2025, Zhipu generated a loss of 2.4 billion yuan (290 million euros) against a revenue of 190 million yuan (approximately 23 million euros)—meaning it is operating at a massive deficit.

 

Zhipu’s phrasing appears designed to exclude Minimax, which posted a revenue of 53 million dollars (approximately 46 million euros) in the first nine months of 2025. However, Minimax’s loss—exceeding 500 million dollars (440 million euros)—outstrips Zhipu’s by an equally wide margin. Both Zhipu and Minimax announced plans to invest the proceeds from their IPOs primarily into further research and development. Minimax raised just over 600 million dollars, while Zhipu brought in slightly more than 550 million dollars.

 

The Zhipu team is roughly two-thirds larger than Minimax’s. As of last summer, Zhipu counted more than 650 developers among its ranks; according to company registry records, it currently employs just under 650 staff members subject to social security contributions. Minimax, by contrast, has 385 employees—approximately one-quarter of whom are not involved in development but rather handle sales or management. (See commentary on page 28.)” [1]

 

1. Chinas KI-Tiger stürmen an die Börse. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 10 Jan 2026: 27  Von Gustav Theile, Shanghai

Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto tigrai šturmuoja akcijų rinką

“Du perspektyvūs dirbtinio intelekto startuoliai iš Kinijos švenčia sėkmingus IPO. Jų tikslai labai skiriasi, tačiau abiejų bendrovių generaliniai direktoriai turėtų tapti milijardieriais.

 

Praėjus beveik metams po legendinio „Deepseek“ šoko, Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto tigrai daro galingą žingsnį į pasaulinę akcijų rinką. Vien šią savaitę dvi labai vertinamos bendrovės – „Zhipu AI“ ir „Minimax“ – sėkmingai paskelbė savo akcijas Honkongo vertybinių popierių biržoje. Jos seka po daugelio dirbtinio intelekto lustų kūrėjų, kurie pastarosiomis savaitėmis paskelbė savo akcijas viešai ir pasiekė įspūdingų akcijų kainų šuolių.

 

Ketvirtadienį su savo IPO „Zhipu“ aplenkė „Minimax“ ir pasinaudojo proga išsikovoti titulą. „Esame pirmoji pasaulyje viešai kotiruojama bendrovė, orientuota į didelius kalbų modelius“, – laiške darbuotojams rašė bendraįkūrėjas ir vyriausiasis mokslininkas Tang Jie, kuris taip pat yra elitinio Tsinghua universiteto profesorius. „Zhipu“ save pristato kaip labai akademinę bendrovę. Laisvas „Zhipu“ vertimas yra „Išminties knyga“. Komandą sudaro keli labai apdovanoti dirbtinio intelekto tyrėjai. Dauguma, kaip ir Tangas, yra kilę iš Tsinghua universiteto, kuris taip pat yra investuotojas.

 

Nors Pekine įsikūrusi „Zhipu“ išlaiko ryškų kinų akademinį įvaizdį, Šanchajuje įsikūrusi „Minimax“ save laiko pasauliniu startuoliu. Ketverius metus gyvuojančios įmonės įkūrėjų komandą sudaro buvę kadaise perspektyvios Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto įmonės „Sensetime“ darbuotojai. Generalinis direktorius Yan Junjie taip pat yra labai sėkmingas dirbtinio intelekto mokslininkas, kilęs iš Tsinghua universiteto, tačiau bendraįkūrėja Yun Yeyi yra viena iš nedaugelio moterų dirbtinio intelekto įkūrėjų Kinijoje ir iš tikrųjų visame pasaulyje. 31 metų vyriausioji operacijų direktorė ir apmokyta inžinierė studijavo Johnso Hopkinso universitete JAV ir įkūnija įmonės pasaulinį požiūrį. Ji puikiai kalba angliškai, o gyvai jos žodyne ir užtikrintame elgesyje akivaizdi JAV įtaka. „Minimax“ vadovų komandai yra apie 30 metų, o „Zhipu“ vadovams – apie 50 metų. Abiejų dirbtinio intelekto startuolių vadovai pakilo į milijardierių gretas per savo IPO. JAV žurnalas „Forbes“ įvertino „Zhipu“ įkūrėją Liu Debingą daugiau nei dviem milijardais dolerių, o „Minimax“ įkūrėją Yaną – daugiau nei trimis milijardais dolerių.

 

Iki šiol tik „Zhipu“ sulaukė politikų dėmesio. Prieš metus JAV vyriausybė įtraukė Pekine įsikūrusią bendrovę į sankcijų sąrašą, apkaltindama ją bendradarbiavimu su Kinijos kariuomene. „Zhipu“ nedelsdama paneigė šį kaltinimą, pavadindama jį nepagrįstu.

 

Remiantis įmonių registru, Kinijos valstybės investuotojai valdo kiek mažiau nei dešimtadalį akcijų. Tačiau tarp akcininkų taip pat yra Kinijos technologijų gigantai „Alibaba“ ir „Tencent“. Abi bendrovės taip pat investavo į „Minimax“, kaip ir Abu Dabio valstybinis turto fondas. Šanchajuje įsikūrusi bendrovė šiuo metu kovoja su „Disney“, „Universal“ ir „Warner Bros.“ ieškiniu dėl autorių teisių pažeidimo.

 

Geriausių dirbtinio intelekto modelių reitinguose „Zhipu“ ir „Minimax“ yra lygiavertės, abi bendrovės užima aukščiausias vietas. Tačiau abi bendrovės keliais procentiniais punktais atsilieka nuo savo JAV konkurentų atvirojo kodo sektoriuje. Tarp Kinijos dominuojamų atvirojo kodo modelių, kurių svoriai ir parametrai yra viešai prieinami, abi bendrovės yra tarp lyderių. Neseniai rizikos kapitalo įmonės „Andreessen Horowitz“ autorių atliktas tyrimas patvirtino sparčiai augančią „Minimax“ rinkos dalį.

 

„Minimax“ yra akivaizdus investuotojų favoritas. Penktadienį, IPO dieną, jos akcijų kaina šoktelėjo daugiau nei 100 procentų. Jos vertė pakilo iki beveik dvylikos milijardų eurų. Ketvirtadienį „Zhipu“ akcijų kaina pakilo maždaug dvylika procentų, o penktadienį – 20 procentų. Jos vertė buvo kiek mažesnė nei aštuoni milijardai eurų, trečdaliu mažiau nei „Minimax“.

 

Analitikai teigė, kad „Minimax“ labiau orientuojasi į privačius galutinius vartotojus, o tai turi didesnį augimo potencialą nei „Zhipu“, kuri orientuojasi į verslą ir vyriausybes. Remiantis jos prospektu, „Zhipu“ turi daugiau nei 8000 institucinių klientų ir yra naudojama 80 milijonų įrenginių. „Minimax“ teigia, kad jos modelius ir produktus naudoja daugiau nei 212 milijonų vartotojų ir 100 000 įmonių bei kūrėjų.

 

Šanchajuje įsikūrusi, bendrovė „Minimax“  taip pat taiko multimedijos požiūrį. Jos modeliai skirti ne tik tekstui, bet ir labai gerai veikia, kuriant vaizdo įrašus bei balso failus.

 

Akcijų kainos augimas yra kiek silpnesnis, nei lustų kūrėjų. Tai greičiausiai lemia akivaizdesnis politinis palaikymas, nes Pekinas siekia tapti nepriklausomas nuo „Nvidia“ dirbtinio intelekto lustų. Kinijoje blokuojami „OpenAI“ sukurti „ChatGPT“ ir kiti Vakarų dirbtinio intelekto pokalbių robotai.

 

Savo prospekte „Zhipu“ save apibūdina kaip daugiausiai pajamų gaunančią Kinijos bendrovę, nepriklausomą ir orientuotą į bendrus, didelio masto kalbų modelius. Tačiau, remiantis įmonių registro duomenimis, 2025 m. pirmąjį pusmetį „Zhipu“ patyrė 2,4 mlrd. juanių (290 mln. eurų) nuostolį, o pajamos siekė 190 mln. juanių (maždaug 23 mln. eurų), todėl ji buvo labai nuostolinga.

 

Atrodo, kad „Zhipu“ formuluotė skirta neįtraukti „Minimax“, kurios pajamos per pirmuosius devynis 2025 m. mėnesius siekė 53 mln. dolerių (maždaug 46 mln. eurų). Tačiau jos nuostolis, viršijantis 500 mln. dolerių (440 mln. eurų), gerokai viršija „Zhipu“ nuostolius. Tiek „Zhipu“, tiek „Minimax“ paskelbė, kad iš savo IPO gautas lėšas daugiausia investuos į tolesnius tyrimus. „Minimax“ pritraukė kiek daugiau nei 600 mln. dolerių, o „Zhipu“ – kiek daugiau nei 550 mln. dolerių.

 

„Zhipu“ komanda yra maždaug dviem trečdaliais didesnė nei „Minimax“. „Zhipu“ vasarą turėjo daugiau nei 650 kūrėjų ir, remiantis įmonių registro duomenimis, turi beveik 650 darbuotojų, kuriems taikomi socialinio draudimo įmokos. „Minimax“ turi 385 darbuotojus, iš kurių maždaug ketvirtadalis nedirba kūrimo srityje, o dirba pardavimų ar valdymo srityje. (Žr. komentarą 28 puslapyje.)“ [1]

 

1. Chinas KI-Tiger stürmen an die Börse. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 10 Jan 2026: 27  Von Gustav Theile, Shanghai

Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto dividendai

„Naujieji metai prasideda panašiai kaip ir seni – Kinija pademonstruoja savo galią dirbtinio intelekto srityje. Primename, kad prieš metus „Deepseek“ sukrėtė akcijų rinkas visame pasaulyje. Šį kartą Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto gigantai „Zhipu AI“ ir „Minimax“, sėkmingai atlikę IPO, demonstruoja, ką gali pasiūlyti Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto aplinka. Abi bendrovės yra mažos, patiria didelių nuostolių, o jų modeliai vis dar keliais procentiniais punktais atsilieka nuo savo konkurentų Amerikoje. Tačiau jos demonstruoja Kinijos dirbtinio intelekto ekosistemos gylį ir plotį. Gylį, nes yra apie dešimt dėmesio vertų bendrovių, kurios kuria savo dirbtinio intelekto modelius ir ryžtasi konkuruoti su JAV. Plotį, nes nors bendrovės iš tolo gali atrodyti panašios, atidžiau pažvelgus, išryškėja labai skirtingi požiūriai, ypač jų įmonių kultūroje.

 

„Zhipu“, įsikūrusi Pekine, atrodo akademinė, su valstybe susijusi ir aiškiai kiniška, o „Minimax“ iš Šanchajaus yra labiau kosmopolitiška ir modernesnė.“

 

Taip pat yra įprasti įtariamieji, pavyzdžiui, milžiniškos korporacijos „Alibaba“ ir „Baidu“ arba itin savitas turtingo dirbtinio intelekto puristo projektas „Deepseek“.

 

Šios įmonės konkuruoja dėl talentų, investuotojų ir klientų, naudodamos įvairius vadovavimo stilius, kultūras ir verslo modelius. Būtent šis platumas skatina konkurenciją ir apibrėžia ekosistemą. Be JAV, Kinija yra vienintelė šalis, kuri gali iš tikrųjų teigti turinti tokią dirbtinio intelekto ekosistemą.

 

Europa turi keletą perspektyvių įmonių, tokių kaip „Mistral“ iš Prancūzijos, bet neturi ekosistemos. Tam yra daug priežasčių. Jos, be abejo, slypi Kinijos izoliacionistiniame požiūryje, kuris, ne tik cenzūros dėka, neleidžia užsienio tiekėjams, tokiems kaip „ChatGPT“, patekti į šalį.

 

Tačiau jos taip pat slypi tame, kas kartais vadinama „inžinerijos dividendu“. Šalis tiesiog parengia daug daugiau inžinierių ir labai gabių dirbtinio intelekto tyrėjų, nei bet kuri kita pasaulio šalis. Šie asmenys įkūrė įmones, iš kurių kai kurios vėliau tapo dirbtinio intelekto milžinėmis." [1]

 

1. Chinas KI-Dividende. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 10 Jan 2026: 28. Von Gustav Theile

China’s AI Dividend

“The new year begins much like the last one—namely, with a Chinese demonstration of strength in the field of artificial intelligence. As a reminder: a year ago, Deepseek sent shockwaves through stock markets around the globe. This time, it is the Chinese AI ‘tigers’—Zhipu AI and Minimax—that are showcasing the capabilities of China’s AI landscape through successful IPOs. Both companies are small, are incurring heavy losses, and—in terms of their models—still lag a few percentage points behind their American competitors. Yet they serve as proof of the sheer depth and breadth that the Chinese AI ecosystem has to offer. Depth, because there are roughly a dozen noteworthy companies developing their own AI models and plunging into direct competition with rivals from the U.S. Breadth, because while these companies may appear similar from a distance, closer inspection reveals that they pursue very different approaches—particularly regarding their corporate cultures.

 

Zhipu—fittingly based in Beijing—comes across as academic, close to the state, and distinctly Chinese; Minimax, based in Shanghai, is more cosmopolitan and modern.

 

Then there are the usual suspects: corporate giants like Alibaba and Baidu, or the highly idiosyncratic Deepseek project—the brainchild of a wealthy AI purist.

 

These companies compete for talent, investors, and customers through a mix of distinct leadership styles, cultures, and business models. It is precisely this breadth that fosters competition and serves as the defining characteristic of a true ecosystem. Alongside the U.S., China is the only country that can legitimately claim to possess such an AI ecosystem.

 

Europe has its individual bright spots—such as Mistral from France—but it lacks a true ecosystem. The reasons for this are manifold. They certainly stem, in part, from China’s insularity—a stance that, not least through censorship, effectively bars foreign providers like ChatGPT from entering the market.

 

However, they also lie in what is sometimes referred to as the ‘engineering dividend.’ Quite simply, the country produces a vastly disproportionate number of engineers and highly gifted researchers for artificial intelligence than any other country in the world. These individuals found the companies—some of which later rise to become AI tigers.” [1]

 

1. Chinas KI-Dividende. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 10 Jan 2026: 28. Von Gustav Theile

Gardener shares how to grow beautiful vegetables: there are two ways

“Growing your own seedlings is the main stage of every gardener’s work, because the quality of young plants determines the future harvest.

 

An experienced gardener has been successfully applying two main methods for many years – sowing seeds in special home cassettes and using outdoor greenhouses. Each of these methods has its own technological features, but both allow you to grow strong seedlings that are adapted to the conditions of open ground. Growing seedlings in an outdoor greenhouse Many gardeners choose the outdoor greenhouse method, because it requires less time for transplanting, and the plants harden off naturally in such conditions.

 

The greenhouse structure usually consists of metal hoops covered with polyethylene film, which maintains the required temperature and prevents moisture loss. Preparation begins with the formation of a nutritious substrate: a bucket of garden soil is mixed with a bucket of rotted humus and a scoop of ash is added. The resulting mixture must be sifted through a sieve to make it loose and homogeneous. Sowing in a greenhouse usually takes place in mid-April, approximately on the 10th or 11th day. Before starting work, the soil should be treated with a means of weevils, which often enter the plot. Seeds are sown loosely, separating different tomato varieties with wooden boards for convenience. The sowing is poured with prepared soil (up to a 4-centimeter layer) and carefully watered with warm water. Under such conditions, cabbage sprouts first, followed by tomatoes, and peppers need more time to germinate. Growing seedlings in cassettes For those who want to get an early harvest, the ideal option is to grow seedlings in cassettes at home. This cycle begins much earlier: peppers and eggplants are sown at the end of February, and tomatoes - in the first half of March.

 

Before planting, the seeds are carefully checked for germination and disinfected in a solution of soda, potassium permanganate or hydrogen peroxide. After soaking for two hours The seeds remaining at the bottom are drained to a loose state so that they can be conveniently placed in the cassette compartments. When sowing in cassettes, purchased soil is used. It is poured in a small layer, moistened, and one seed is placed in each compartment. The seeds are sprinkled with soil without pressing it, and the cassette is covered with cling film, creating a mini-greenhouse effect. The containers are kept in a warm place until the first sprouts appear. Then the film is removed, and the plants are moved to a sunny windowsill.

 

An important part of this method is picking tomatoes into larger containers when 4 true leaves appear. This promotes the development of a strong root system.

 

Meanwhile, picking peppers is not recommended, because this crop is extremely sensitive to root damage. Planting and caring for seedlings in open ground Seedlings are usually moved to the garden after May 22, when the risk of night frosts has finally disappeared. After Half an hour before removing the plants from the greenhouse, they must be watered abundantly so that the earthen lump does not decompose and the roots are not injured.

 

Planting is carried out in prepared holes with water, maintaining a distance of 40-50 centimeters between plants.

Tomatoes can be planted one or two in one hole, and peppers are planted strictly one by one, carefully pressing the ground around the stem with your hands.

 

Further care requires a special watering regime - the plants are not watered for the first two weeks, allowing them to take root well. Later, tomatoes should be watered once a week, and cabbage and peppers - every other day.

 

To protect against late blight, a mixture of water, whey and iodine is used, which is sprayed on the bushes.

 

If whiteflies appear on cabbage, it is advisable to use specialized store-bought preparations, since folk methods against this pest are often ineffective. 

 

Source: tsn.ua"

 

Daržininkė pasidalijo, kaip užsiauginti gražias daržoves: yra du būdai

 “Savo daigų auginimas yra pagrindinis kiekvieno daržininko darbo etapas, nes būtent nuo jaunų augalų kokybės priklauso būsimas derlius.

 

Patyrusi daržininkė jau daugelį metų sėkmingai taiko du pagrindinius metodus – sėklų sėją į specialias namų kasetes ir lauko šiltlysvių naudojimą. Kiekvienas šių būdų turi savo technologinių ypatumų, tačiau abu leidžia išauginti tvirtus, prie atviro grunto sąlygų prisitaikiusius sodinukus. Daigų auginimas lauko šiltnamyje Daugelis sodininkų renkasi lauko šiltnamio metodą, nes jis reikalauja mažiau laiko persodinimui, o augalai tokiomis sąlygomis užsigrūdina natūraliai.

 

Šiltnamio konstrukciją paprastai sudaro metaliniai lankai, dengti polietileno plėvele, kuri palaiko reikiamą temperatūrą ir apsaugo nuo drėgmės praradimo. Pasiruošimas prasideda nuo maistingo substrato formavimo: sumaišomas kibiras daržo žemės su kibiru perpuvusio humuso ir pridedamas samtis pelenų. Gautas mišinys būtinai persijojamas per rėtį, kad būtų purus ir vienalytis. Sėja šiltlyvėje paprastai vyksta balandžio viduryje, orientaciniai 10 arba 11 dieną. Prieš pradedant darbus, žemę reikėtų apdoroti priemone nuo kurklių, kurie dažnai patenka į sklypą. Sėklos sėjamos laisvai, skirtingas pomidorų veisles patogumo dėlei atskiriant medinėmis lentelėmis. Sėja užpilama paruoštu gruntu (iki 4 centimetrų sluoksniu) ir atsargiai palaistoma šiltu vandeniu. Tokiomis sąlygomis pirmieji sudygsta kopūstai, po jų pasirodo pomidorai, o paprikoms sudygti reikia daugiau laiko. Sodinukų auginimas kasetėse Norintiems sulaukti ankstyvo derliaus, idealus variantas yra sodinukų auginimas kasetėse namų sąlygomis. Šis ciklas prasideda gerokai anksčiau: paprikos ir baklažanai sėjami vasario pabaigoje, o pomidorai – pirmoje kovo pusėje.

 

Prieš sodinimą sėklos kruopščiai patikrinamos dėl daigumo ir dezinfekuojamos sodos, kalio permanganato arba vandenilio peroksido tirpale. Po dviejų valandų mirkymo dugne likusios sėklos nusausinamos iki birumo, kad jas būtų patogu dėlioti į kasetės narelius. Sėjant į kasetes naudojamas pirktinis gruntas. Jis supilamas nedideliu sluoksniu, sudrėkinamas, o į kiekvieną narelį dedama po vieną sėklą. Sėklos užbarstomos žeme jos nespaudžiant, o kasetė uždengiama maistine plėvele, sukuriant mini šiltnamio efektą. Konteineriai laikomi šiltoje vietoje iki pirmųjų daigų pasirodymo. Tada plėvelė nuimama, o augalai perkeliami ant saulėtos palangės.

 

Svarbi šio metodo dalis – pomidorų pikiavimas į didesnius indus pasirodžius 4 tikriesiems lapeliams. Tai skatina stiprios šaknų sistemos vystymąsi.

 

Tuo tarpu paprikų pikiuoti nerekomenduojama, nes ši kultūra yra itin jautri šaknų pažeidimams. Sodinukų sodinimas ir priežiūra atvirame grunte Sodinukai į daržą paprastai perkeliami po gegužės 22 dienos, kai galutinai išnyksta naktinių šalnų pavojus. Likus pusvalandžiui iki augalų išėmimo iš šiltnamio, juos būtina gausiai palaistyti, kad žemės gniūžtė neiširtų ir nebūtų traumuojamos šaknys.

 

Sodinama į paruoštas duobutes su vandeniu, išlaikant 40–50 centimetrų atstumą tarp augalų.

Pomidorus galima sodinti po vieną arba po du į vieną duobę, o paprikos sodinamos griežtai po vieną, kruopščiai rankomis prispaudžiant žemę aplink stiebą.

 

Tolesnei priežiūrai reikia ypatingo laistymo režimo – pirmas dvi savaites augalai neliejami, leidžiant jiems gerai įsišaknyti. Vėliau pomidorus reikia laistyti kartą per savaitę, o kopūstus ir paprikas – kas antrą dieną.

 

Apsaugai nuo fitoftorozės naudojamas vandens, išrūgų ir jodo mišinys, kuriuo purškiami krūmai.

 

Jei ant kopūstų pasirodo baltasparniai, patariama naudoti specializuotus parduotuvinius preparatus, nes liaudiški metodai prieš šį kenkėją dažnai būna neefektyvūs.

 

Šaltinis: tsn.ua”