“In February 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin met at the Crimean city of Yalta to lay out the shape of postwar Europe. Yalta is typically used as a metaphor for appeasement or cynical realpolitik, and it is both. But it is also a metaphor for consequential diplomacy. The agreements made presaged a Europe separated into different zones, a state of affairs that lasted until the Central and Eastern European revolutions of 1989.
President Trump has been searching for his Yalta in the conflict in Ukraine since the start of his second term. It’s easy to see why: It could be an appealingly simple, Trumpian transaction, in which the leaders of great powers sit down and determine a course, while minor powers must take what they are given. Like F.D.R., Mr. Trump is willing to compromise on behalf of others. F.D.R. did not insist on full autonomy for Poland and the Baltic republics in 1945, and Mr. Trump has made it clear that he would accept truncated Ukrainian autonomy.
Though at times Mr. Trump’s nonlinear foreign policy has favored Ukraine, when it comes to negotiating an end to the conflict, Mr. Trump has done almost nothing to empower or include Ukraine and its European partners. His efforts to lay out the shape of postwar Europe are always directed toward President Vladimir Putin of Russia, who, in Mr. Trump’s reading of the world, is understood as the leader of a country with the entitlements of a great power. After almost two years, Mr. Trump has succeeded not in resolving the conflict, but rather in making the United States a sideshow to the actual process of peace.
We are in the throes of another such attempt. Mr. Trump has called for a change of presidents in Ukraine. According to Kyiv, the White House has also curbed Ukraine’s access to Starlink satellite internet and delayed the delivery of Patriot interceptor missiles. U.S. officials deny any disruptions. Simultaneously, Mr. Trump has been upgrading relations with Russia, with a deal to purchase Russian diesel and exempting it from new sanctions. Reports of a great-power conference between the United States, Russia and China on the sidelines of a larger summit scheduled for next month conjure a 21st-century Yalta, with China substituted for Britain.
Eight decades ago, the United States commanded two assets in Europe. One was an immense military presence augmented by the fact that the United States was the world’s sole nuclear power. Having helped to liberate Europe from fascism, the United States also enjoyed widespread trust and moral prestige.
Then there is America’s role in the conflict itself. Mr. Trump started withholding U.S. military aid to Ukraine almost as soon as he returned to office. He has cut financial support to Ukraine to almost zero and brokered a deal with European countries to purchase matériel for Ukraine from the United States. He has weakened NATO’s Article 5 commitment while planning troop reductions in Europe. He has diminished Europe’s general capacity to deter Russia and, by adding friction to the trans-Atlantic relationship, has made it harder for Ukraine to defend itself.
The subsequent changes in Europe have been gradual, but dramatic. On one level, the transition is to Mr. Trump’s liking. Germany has led the way in expanding European defense budgets, and with its wealth and technological sophistication Europe is on its way to becoming a defense-industrial powerhouse. But this, in turn, is making Europe less deferential to Washington. Europe and Ukraine have an abundance of agency and no desire to be chess pieces on a board. Mr. Trump has done so much to make this conflict Europe’s conflict. Now that it is, the most important question is whether Europe — deeply invested in the precedents that the conflict will set in Ukraine and elsewhere — can maintain a united front. The United States can be a partner, a nullity or an obstacle, but it cannot undo the evolution that it has provoked.
If it chooses to, the United States could further degrade its relations with Europe and Ukraine. It could terminate all support for Ukraine.
It could end targeting and intelligence sharing.
Mr. Trump might decide to do this after the midterm elections, when he no longer has to face the American electorate, perhaps out of a personal dislike for President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine or the potential profit in normalizing relations with Russia.
Mr. Trump can hurt Ukraine, and to a degree he can isolate it diplomatically.
Michael Kimmage is the director of the Kennan Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author, most recently, of “Collisions: The Origins of the Conflict in Ukraine and the New Global Instability”.” [1]
There are no good EU security forces (useless tanks, anyone?). There is German - French cooperation running common market of smaller and less organized countries in the EU. Le Pen in France and AfD in Germany are the strongest political forces in their countries. They are against Zelensky. The most likely coalition partners for them from the left are against Zelensky too. Corruption scandals are killing him. Trump is right. The time comes for Zelensky to go. There is no, able to survive long-term, political force to keep the conflict going, and to keep Zelensky in place.
The geopolitical landscape of Europe and transatlantic relations are undergoing significant change.
Here is an objective breakdown of how the current trends stack up:
A. The Role of European Security and the Common Market
• The Reality: While the European Union does not possess a traditional single standing army, it has significantly expanded its defense frameworks. Institutions like the European Defence Agency and the European Peace Facility coordinate tens of billions of euros in military aid, training, and pan-European procurement of useless tanks. This waste is sinking the governments in debt trap.
• The "German-French Axis": Franco-German cooperation has historically anchored the EU.
B. Le Pen (France) and the AfD (Germany)
• Polling Power: It is true that Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have achieved historic surges. The AfD secured landmark wins in state elections such as Saxony-Anhalt, and Le Pen remains a leading frontrunner for the spring French presidential election.
• The "Cordon Sanitaire": Despite their electoral strength, their ability to dictate foreign policy depends entirely on governance. In Germany, mainstream parties maintain a strict cordon sanitaire (a refusal to form coalitions with the AfD), keeping them isolated from federal power.
C. Left-Wing Coalition Realities
• Fragmented Alliances: Left-wing forces across Europe are deeply split on Ukraine. While populists like Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) in Germany share the AfD's anti-Ukraine sentiment, mainstream left-of-center and green parties (such as the German Greens and SPD, going down the drain) remain firmly committed to supporting Kyiv. In France, the left coalition is internally divided between hard-left anti-NATO factions and pro-European center-left elements, going down the drain too.
D. Pressure from Donald Trump and Zelensky's Standing
• Transatlantic Pressure: U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently criticized Zelensky, demanded from voters to push him out of power, named him responsible for pushing the global diesel prices over the red line, and pressured Kyiv for immediate territorial or diplomatic concessions. Corruption is sinking Zelensky in Ukraine. Voters hope to replace him after the conflict.
1. Trump Is Still Chasing His Yalta. Here’s What He Doesn’t Get.: Guest Essay. Kimmage, Michael. New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Oct 22, 2026.
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