Mutually Automated Destruction - Swarms: The Escalating Global A.I. Arms Race

Industrial ability determines the size of drone and missile swarms. The West destroyed the industry in the West. No big swarms equals no military ability to conquer anything. See: Iran.

 

Industrial capacity is increasingly recognized as a critical determinant of swarm size, with current battlefield reports indicating that high-volume drone and missile production is reshaping military advantages in 2026. While the Western defense industrial base has historically optimized for small numbers of high-precision, expensive weapons, adversaries like Iran and Russia are utilizing mass production of lower-cost drones to overwhelm defenses.

 

Industrial Ability and Swarm Production

 

    Iran's Capabilities: Iran has developed a significant capability to produce drones, with reports suggesting potential output of up to 400 Shahed drones per day. These loitering munitions, along with missile barrages, are designed to saturate enemy air defenses.

    Russia's Shift: Russia has shifted resources toward a "drone tsunami" strategy for 2026, cutting back some missile production to maximize FPV drone production.

    Western Challenges: The US and Europe face challenges in producing small, cheap drones at scale, often relying on Chinese components. Western systems tend to be more sophisticated but less numerous and far more expensive, creating a potential "drone gap".

    Replicator Initiative: The Pentagon is trying to address this with its Replicator program, aimed at fielding large numbers of attritable autonomous systems, but faces limitations within its traditional defense procurement model.

 

Drone Warfare in 2026

 

    Impact on Strategy: Large-scale drone swarms are transforming warfare, making it difficult to defend against them, as demonstrated in recent studies of conflicts involving Iranian-backed forces.

    The Cost Argument: The high cost of Western-made interceptors (e.g., $4M per Patriot missile) compared to cheap drones means that defensive systems can be financially exhausted, a major factor in modern conflict dynamics.

    Counter-Swarm Technology: While Western nations are developing directed-energy weapons and AI-powered systems to counter these threats, the sheer volume of low-cost drones remains a major obstacle.

 

Industrial Trends

 

    European Rearmament: Europe is aggressively ramping up its defense industry, with factory space growing significantly, and plans in place for huge increases in ammunition and drone production for 2025–2026.

    Ukraine's Domestic Output: Ukraine is projected to have the capability to produce a significant volume of drones and missiles by 2026, aiming for millions of FPV drones, based on Chinese supply chain.

 

While Iran and Russia currently excel in the sheer volume of low-cost drone production, the West is actively working to accelerate its own mass-production capabilities, though it faces supply chain hurdles for components and materials like carbon fiber.

 

 

 

“At a military parade in Beijing in September, President Xi Jinping and his special guests, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, watched as Chinese forces showed off several models of drones that could autonomously fly alongside fighter jets into battle.

 

The demonstration of technological might immediately set off alarm bells in the United States. Pentagon officials concluded that America’s program for unmanned combat drones was lagging China’s, according to three U.S. defense and intelligence officials. Russia, too, was thought to be ahead in building facilities that could produce advanced drones, said the officials, who were not authorized to speak publicly on military capabilities.

 

U.S. officials pushed domestic defense companies to step up. Last month, Anduril, a defense technology start-up in California, began manufacturing A.I.-backed, self-flying drones that appeared similar to the ones shown in China. Production at a factory outside Columbus, Ohio, started three months ahead of schedule, part of an effort to close the gap with China, one defense official said.

 

China’s military display and the U.S. countermove were part of an escalating global arms race over A.I.-backed autonomous weapons and defense systems. Designed to operate by themselves using A.I., the technology reduces the need for human intervention in decisions like when to hit a moving target or defend against an attack.

 

In recent years, many nations have quietly engaged in a contest of one-upmanship over these arsenals, including drones that identify and strike targets without human command, self-flying fighter jets that coordinate attacks at speeds and altitudes that few human pilots can reach, and central systems run by A.I. that analyze intelligence to recommend airstrike targets quickly.

 

The United States and China, the world’s largest military powers, are at the center of the competition. But the race has widened. Russia and Ukraine, now in their fifth year of conflict, are looking for every technological advantage. India, Israel, Iran and others are investing in military A.I., while France, Germany, Britain and Poland are rearming amid doubts about the Trump administration’s commitment to NATO.

 

Each nation is aiming to amass the most advanced technological stockpile in case they need to fight drone against drone and algorithm against algorithm in ways that people cannot match, defense and intelligence officials said.

 

Russia, China and the United States are all building A.I. arms as a deterrent and for “mutually assured destruction,” Palmer Luckey, Anduril’s founder, said in an interview in February.

 

The buildup has been compared to the dawn of the nuclear age in the 1940s, when the atomic bomb’s destructive power forced rival nations into an uneasy standoff, leading to more than four decades of nuclear weapons brinkmanship.

 

But while the implications of nuclear weapons are well understood, A.I.’s military capabilities are just beginning to be known. The technology — which does not need to pause, eat, drink or sleep — is set to upend warfare by making battles faster and more unpredictable, officials said.

 

Exactly which nation is furthest ahead is unclear. Many programs are in a research and development phase, and budgets are classified. Operatives from China, the United States and Russia watch one another’s factory lines, military displays and weapons deals to deduce what the other is doing, intelligence officials said.

 

China and Russia are experimenting with letting A.I. make battlefield decisions on its own, two U.S. officials said. China is developing systems for dozens of autonomous drones to coordinate attacks without human input, while Russia is building Lancet drones that can circle in the sky and autonomously pick targets, they said.

 

Even as the specifics of the technologies remain veiled, the intentions are clear.

 

In 2017, Mr. Putin declared that whoever leads in A.I. “will become the ruler of the world.”

 

Mr. Xi said in 2024 that technology would be the “main battleground” of geopolitical competition. In January, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed all branches of the U.S. military to adopt A.I., saying they needed to “accelerate like hell.”

 

Billions of dollars are being poured into the efforts. The Pentagon requested more than $13 billion for autonomous systems in its latest budget, and has spent billions more over the past decade, though the total is difficult to track because A.I. funding has been spread across many programs.

 

China, which some researchers said was spending amounts comparable to those of the United States, has used financial incentives to spur private industry to build A.I. capabilities. Russia has invested in drone and autonomy-related programs, analysts said, using the conflict in Ukraine to test and refine them on the battlefield.

 

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said China had proposed international frameworks for governing military A.I. and called for “a prudent and responsible attitude” toward its development.

 

The Pentagon and Russia’s Ministry of Defense did not respond to requests for comment.

 

The dynamics may resemble the Cold War, but experts cautioned that the A.I. era was different. Start-ups and investors now play a role in the military and are as critical as universities and governments. A.I. technology is becoming widely available, opening the door for countries from Turkey to Pakistan to develop new capabilities. What’s emerging is a grinding innovation race without any obvious endpoint.

 

Ethical questions about ceding life-or-death choices to machines are being overtaken by the rush to build. The only major accord on A.I. weaponry between China and the United States was reached in 2024, a nonbinding pledge to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons. Other countries, like Russia, have made no commitments.

 

Some argued that A.I.’s impact would be bigger than any arms race.

 

“A.I. is a general-purpose technology like electricity. And we don’t talk about an electricity arms race,” said Michael Horowitz, a former Pentagon official involved in autonomous weapons development. “To the extent A.I. is transforming our military, it’s the way that electricity or computers or the airplane did.”

 

The Buildup Begins

 

In 2016 at an air show in the southern Chinese city of Zhuhai, a Chinese supplier flew 67 drones in unison. An animated film separately showed the drones destroying a missile launcher, a demonstration of their capabilities.

 

Russia, too, was building its drone arsenal. In 2014, its military planners set a goal of making 30 percent of its combat power autonomous by 2025. By 2018, the Russian military was testing an unmanned armed vehicle in Syria. It underscored Moscow’s ambitions.

 

In Washington, Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, who had previously worked in intelligence at the Defense Department, was assessing whether A.I. could solve a more immediate problem. The U.S. military was collecting so much data — drone footage, satellite imagery, intercepted signals — that nobody could make sense of it all.

 

“There was nothing in any of the research labs in the military that were capable of generating results in less than a couple of years,” General Shanahan said. “We had a problem we could not solve without A.I.”

 

In 2017, General Shanahan helped create Project Maven, a Defense Department effort for the military to incorporate A.I. into its systems. One aim was to work with Silicon Valley to build software to swiftly process images like drone footage for intelligence purposes. Google was tapped to help.

 

But the project quickly ran into hurdles. The Pentagon’s procurement system, built around legacy contractors and long timelines, slowed things down.

 

When word spread inside Google about Project Maven, employees also protested, saying a company that had once pledged “Don’t be evil” should not help identify targets for drone strikes. Google eventually backed away from the project.

 

In 2019, Palantir, a data analytics company co-founded by the tech investor Peter Thiel, took over Maven. New defense tech start-ups like Anduril also emerged, supplying the federal government with A.I.-backed sensor towers along the southern U.S. border.

 

In China, Beijing pushed commercial tech companies toward defense partnerships in a strategy called “civil-military fusion.” Private firms were drawn into military procurement, joint research and other work with defense institutions. Companies working on drones and unmanned boats found growing military demand for their technologies.

 

Events in Ukraine in 2022 turned theory into reality.

 

Outgunned, outspent and outnumbered, Ukraine held off Russia with an improvised arsenal of cheap technology. Hobbyist racing drones were used to attack Russian positions on the front lines, eventually becoming more lethal than artillery and, in some cases, gaining autonomous capabilities. Remote-controlled boats kept Russia’s Black Sea fleet pinned down.

 

Russia adapted as well. Its Lancet drone, which was initially piloted by humans, has incorporated autonomous targeting features.

 

“The four years of brutality on the battlefield in Ukraine has served as a laboratory for the world,” said Mr. Horowitz, the former Pentagon official.

 

In recent months, Ukraine began sharing its troves of battlefield data with Palantir and other firms so A.I. systems can better learn to fight wars.

 

Across Europe, where governments are aiming to diminish their reliance on the American military, the lessons from Ukraine resounded. In February, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Poland said they would develop a joint air defense system to guard against drones.

 

China also advanced. At the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow, Norinco, one of the country’s main defense manufacturers, revealed multiple weapons with A.I. capabilities. One of its systems showed an entire brigade, including armored vehicles and drones, which were controlled and operated by A.I.

 

Another craft, unveiled by the state-run Aviation Industry Corporation of China, was a 16-ton jet-powered drone designed to serve as a flying aircraft carrier that could deploy dozens of smaller drones midflight.

 

‘Left Click, Right Click’

 

A week after American and Israeli forces struck Iran in February, a senior Pentagon official gave a glimpse into what computerized warfare now looks like at a conference livestreamed by Palantir.

 

A satellite feed showed a warehouse. With the click of a mouse, an officer selected a row of white trucks parked outside to target in real time. In seconds, the A.I. software suggested a weapon, calculated fuel and ammunition needs, weighed the cost and generated a strike plan.

 

It was the present-day version of Project Maven, which General Shanahan had started and was now run by Palantir and powered by commercial A.I. The system analyzed intelligence from various sources, generated target lists ranked by priority and recommended weapons, all but eliminating the lag between identifying a target and destroying it.

 

Embedded with a military version of Claude, the chatbot made by the A.I. firm Anthropic, Maven helped generate thousands of targets in the opening weeks of the Iran campaign, a pace that Adm. Brad Cooper, the head of U.S. Central Command, attributed in part to “advanced A.I. tools.”

 

Cameron Stanley, the Defense Department’s chief digital and artificial intelligence officer, who spoke at Palantir’s conference, said that what Maven was doing was “revolutionary.” Human involvement amounted to “left click, right click, left click,” he said.

 

The claims about Maven’s abilities might be overstated and much of the American advantage came from the scale of data flowing in and the skills of the people using it, said Emelia Probasco, a senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

 

“It’s not rocket science,” she said. “I suspect that China already has something like it.”

 

In a recent report analyzing thousands of People’s Liberation Army procurement documents, Ms. Probasco found that China was building systems that mirrored American ones. In one case, China was trying to replicate the Joint Fires Network, an American program set up to link sensors and weapons globally so a drone on one side of the world could cue a strike from the other.

 

In some areas, China clearly leads. Its manufacturing dominance means it can produce autonomous weapons at a scale the Pentagon cannot match.

 

Inside the Trump administration, the push for A.I. weapons has taken on an almost evangelical fervor. Last month, the Pentagon labeled Anthropic a security risk, partly because the company wanted to limit its technology’s use for automated weapons.

 

“We will win the A.I. race,” Jacob Helberg, the under secretary of state for economic affairs, said last month at the Hill & Valley Forum, an annual conference in Washington, which he co-founded to bridge Silicon Valley and the government.

 

At the conference, tech executives, investors and government officials cheered speakers who called for tech companies to give the military unfettered access to A.I.

 

Anduril’s Mr. Luckey argued that the A.I. arms buildup might prevent major wars. The logic mirrored the Cold War: If both sides knew what the machines could do, neither would risk finding out.

 

“Conflicts between superpowers will similarly deteriorate if you can build the things that deter warfare effectively enough,” he said.

 

Yet deterrence assumes rationality, while A.I. weapons are designed to move faster than human reason. In exercises dating to 2020, researchers explored how autonomous systems could accelerate escalation and erode human control — with some alarming results.

 

In one scenario, a system operated by the United States and Japan responded to a missile launch from North Korea by autonomously firing an unexpected counterattack.

 

“The speed of autonomous systems led to inadvertent escalation,” said the report by analysts at RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization that works with the military.

 

General Shanahan, who retired from the military in 2020 and is now a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank, said the race he had helped start kept him up at night. Governments must set clear boundaries before the technology outruns their control, he said.

 

“There is a risk of an escalatory spiral where we’re in danger of fielding untested, unsafe and unproven systems if we’re not careful, because we each feel like the other side is hiding something from us,” he said.” [1]

 

1. Mutually Automated Destruction: The Escalating Global A.I. Arms Race. Frenkel, Sheera; Mozur, Paul; Satariano, Adam.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 12, 2026.

Dronų, raketų ir mažų laivų viršenybė šiandienos kare: keturi būdai, kaip Irano karas silpnina Ameriką

„Kai prezidentas Trumpas vasario 28 d. užpuolė Iraną, jo sprendimą pavadinome neapgalvotu. Jis pradėjo karą negavęs Kongreso pritarimo ar daugumos sąjungininkų paramos. Jis pateikė Amerikos žmonėms silpnus ir prieštaringus pateisinimus. Jis nepaaiškino, kodėl šis naivus bandymas pakeisti režimą baigsis geriau nei ankstesni Jungtinių Valstijų bandymai Irake, Afganistane ir kitur.

 

Per šešias savaites nuo to laiko jo karo neapgalvotumas dar labiau išryškėjo. Jis paniekino kruopštų karinį planavimą ir veikė vadovaudamasis nuojauta ir norais. Po to, kai Izraelio ministras pirmininkas Benjaminas Netanyahu numatė ponui Trumpui, kad išpuoliai įkvėps visuotinį sukilimą Irane, CŽV direktorius atkirto, kad ši mintis yra „farsas“, pranešė „The Times“. Ponas Trumpas vis dėlto tęsė savo veiksmus. Jis buvo toks įsitikinęs, kad nesudarė jokio plano atsakyti į akivaizdų Iranui prieinamą atsakomąjį žingsnį: sukelti naftos kainų šuolį blokuojant Hormūzo sąsiaurį. Jis taip pat nesukūrė įmanomos strategijos, kaip pašalinti praturtintą uraną, kurį Iranas gali panaudoti savo branduolinei programai atkurti.

 

Praėjusią savaitę jis slinko nuo neteisėtų ir amoralių grasinimų sunaikinti Irano civilizaciją iki paskutinės minutės paliaubų, kurios pasiekia tik nedaugelį jo paskelbtų karo tikslų. Iranas ir toliau nepaiso pagrindinės susitarimo dalies ir blokuoja didžiąją dalį eismo per Hormūzo sąsiaurį. Pono Trumpo neatsakingumas pastatė Jungtines Valstijas ant žeminančio strateginio pralaimėjimo slenksčio.

 

Kaip jau pabrėžėme, Irano režimas nenusipelno užuojautos. Jis dešimtmečius engė savo žmones ir rėmė terorizmą kitur. O dabartinis karas kartu su birželio mėnesio Jungtinių Valstijų ir Izraelio išpuoliais bei kitomis Izraelio operacijomis nuo 2023 m. labai susilpnino Iraną. Jo karinis jūrų laivynas, oro pajėgos ir oro gynyba buvo susilpninti, o branduolinė programa buvo sužlugdyta. Jo žudikiškas regioninių sąjungininkų tinklas, įskaitant „Hamas“, „Hezbollah“ ir žlugusią Sirijos vyriausybę, buvo sugriautas.

 

Tačiau šios sėkmės negali užmaskuoti būdų, kaip karas susilpnino Jungtines Valstijas. Mes suskaičiuojame keturis pagrindinius Amerikos nacionalinių interesų trūkumus, kurie yra tiesioginiai... pono Trumpo neatsargumo rezultatas. Šios nesėkmės taip pat silpnina pasaulinę demokratiją, kai Kinija, Rusija ir žmonės kitur jau jautėsi įsidrąsinę.

 

Labiausiai juntamas smūgis Jungtinėms Valstijoms ir pasauliui yra padidėjusi Irano įtaka pasaulio ekonomikai, ginklu pavertus Hormūzo sąsiaurį. Apie 20 procentų pasaulio naftos ir suskystintų gamtinių dujų teka per sąsiaurį, esantį šalia Irano pietinio kranto.

 

Prieš karą Irano vadovai baiminosi, kad eismo blokavimas paskatins naujas ekonomines sankcijas ir karinį išpuolį. Kai išpuolis vis tiek įvyko, Iranas uždarė sąsiaurį beveik visam eismui, išskyrus savo laivus.

 

Ši politika yra nebrangi, nes daugiausia susijusi su grėsme, būtent, kad dronas, raketa ar mažas laivas gali susprogdinti tanklaivį.

 

Priverstinis sąsiaurio atidarymas, priešingai, pareikalautų didžiulės karinės operacijos, kurioje galėtų dalyvauti sausumos pajėgos ir užsitęsusi okupacija.

 

Pono Trumpo nenumatymas dėl sąsiaurio atskleidžia akivaizdų nekompetenciją. Dviejų savaičių paliaubos negrąžina status quo. nes Iranas vis dar riboja eismą ir grasino įvesti mokesčius kaip galutinio taikos susitarimo dalį. Karas parodė Irano vadovams, kad vandens kelio kontrolė yra reali galimybė. Galiausiai kitos šalys greičiausiai sukurs alternatyvas, įskaitant vamzdynus, tačiau šiems sprendimams prireiks laiko. Kol kas atrodo, kad Iranas įgijo diplomatinę įtaką, apie kurią galėjo tik pasvajoti prieš šešias savaites. Vienintelis akivaizdus būdas pakeisti situaciją būtų pasaulinė koalicija, reikalaujanti sąsiaurio atidarymo – tokia koalicija, kuriai vadovauti ponas Trumpas akivaizdžiai netinkamas.

 

 

Antras smūgis susijęs su Amerikos karine padėtimi visame pasaulyje. Šis karas kartu su neseniai JAV suteikta pagalba Ukrainai, Izraeliui ir kitiems sąjungininkams sudegino didelę dalį kai kurių ginklų atsargų, tokių kaip „Tomahawk“ raketos ir „Patriot“ naikintuvai (kurie gali numušti kitas raketas). Ekspertai mano, kad Pentagonas vien kare prieš Iraną panaudojo daugiau nei ketvirtadalį savo „Tomahawk“ raketų. Atsargų grąžinimas iki ankstesnio dydžio užtruks metus, o Jungtinėms Valstijoms teks priimti sunkius sprendimus dėl to, kur išlaikyti savo karinę galią. Tuo tarpu. Pentagonas jau atitraukė raketinę gynybą iš Pietų Korėjos.

 

Karas taip pat atskleidė, kad JAV kariuomenė yra pažeidžiama naujų karo būdų. Amerika panaudojo milijardų dolerių vertės aukštųjų technologijų amunicijos, kad sunaikintų tradicines Irano oro ir jūrų pajėgas, o Teheranas naudojo pigius, vienkartinius dronus, kad sustabdytų eismą per Hormūzo sąsiaurį ir smogtų taikiniams regione. Pasaulis matė, kaip šalis, kuri išleidžia šimtadalį to, ką JAV skiria JAV kariuomenei, gali siekti, kad konfliktas būtų ilgesnis. Tai primena apie neatidėliotiną būtinybę reformuoti Amerikos kariuomenę.

 

Trečia didelė karo kaina – Amerikos sąjungininkams. Japonija, Pietų Korėja, Australija, Kanada ir didžioji dalis Vakarų Europos atsisakė remti Jungtines Valstijas šiame kare – nenuostabu, atsižvelgiant į tai, kaip su jomis elgėsi ponas Trumpas. Kai jis pareikalavo jų pagalbos atveriant Hormūzo sąsiaurį, dauguma sąjungininkių atsisakė. Šios šalys liks sąjungininkėmis svarbiais aspektais, tačiau jos aiškiai pasakė, kad nebelaiko Jungtinių Valstijų patikimu draugu. Jos stengiasi kurti tvirtesnius santykius viena su kita, kad ateityje galėtų geriau atsispirti Vašingtonui. „Turbūt didžiausia ilgalaikė žala Jungtinėms Valstijoms dėl Irano karo bus jų santykiuose su sąjungininkais visame pasaulyje“, – trečiadienį rašė Danielis Bymanas iš Vašingtono Strateginių ir tarptautinių studijų centro.

 

Padėtis Artimuosiuose Rytuose yra subtilesnė. Irano sprendimas karo metu pulti savo arabų kaimynus gali priartinti šias šalis prie Jungtinių Valstijų. Tačiau ši perspektyva neaiški. Saudo Arabija ir kitos Persijos įlankos šalys patyrė ekonominę žalą dėl karo ir jaučiasi apleistos dėl pono Trumpo paliaubų. Pastarosios šešios savaitės suteikė joms pagrindo suabejoti jo sprendimais ir jų interesų supratimu.

 

Ketvirta nesėkmė – Amerikos moralinis autoritetas. Nepaisant visų šios šalies trūkumų, ji išlieka švyturiu daugeliui pasaulio gyventojų. Kai apklausų organizatoriai klausia žmonių, kur jie persikeltų, jei galėtų, Jungtinės Valstijos nuolat yra pirmasis atsakymas. Amerikos patrauklumas kyla ne tik iš jos klestėjimo, bet ir iš laisvės bei demokratinių vertybių. Ponas Trumpas kenkė šioms vertybėms per visą savo politinę karjerą ir galbūt niekada labiau nei pastarąją savaitę, kai jis kėlė pasibjaurėtinus grasinimus sunaikinti Irano civilizaciją. Jo gynybos sekretorius Pete'as Hegsethas pasakė virtinę kruvinų pastabų, įskaitant grasinimą „nepalikti jokio gailestingumo, jokio gailestingumo mūsų priešams“.

 

Tai būtų karo nusikaltimai. Ponai Trumpas ir ponas Hegsethas priėmė žiaurų požiūrį į ginkluotus konfliktus, kurį Jungtinės Valstijos pirmavo pasaulyje atmesdamos po Antrojo pasaulinio karo. Taip elgdamiesi jie pakenkė Amerikos pasaulinės lyderystės pamatams, kuri teigia, kad žmogaus orumas yra argumento už laisvesnį ir atviresnį pasaulį centre.

 

Mūsų redakcijos kolegija jau seniai priešinasi pono Trumpo požiūriui į politiką ir valdymą. Vis dėlto mes nesidžiaugiame jo nesėkmėmis per pastarąsias šešias savaites. Visų pirma, Irane, Izraelyje, Saudo Arabijoje, Katare, Jungtiniuose Arabų Emyratuose ir kitur buvo mirčių, sužalojimų ir sunaikinimo. Kare žuvo mažiausiai 13 JAV karių.

 

Taip pat klaida, jei bet kuris amerikietis, įskaitant pono Trumpo kritikus, palaiko šios šalies žlugimą. Mes visi esame suinteresuoti tauta, kuriai jis vadovauja. Taip pat ir likęs laisvasis pasaulis. Nėra kitų demokratijų, turinčių ekonominę ir karinę galią, kad galėtų pasipriešinti Kinijai ir Rusijai. Kai Amerika yra silpnesnė ir skurdesnė, kaip šis karas, jie gauna naudos.

 

Geriausia viltis dabar gali skambėti naiviai, bet ji išlieka teisinga. Ponas Trumpas pagaliau turėtų pripažinti savo impulsyvaus, savarankiško požiūrio nekompetenciją. Jis turėtų įtraukti Kongresą ir prašyti Amerikos sąjungininkų pagalbos, kad sumažintų savo karo žalą.“ [1]

 

Vienintelė galima Amerikos sąjungininkų pagalba būtų pasirengimas įsiveržti į Iraną sausumoje ir patirti masines mirtis bepiločių orlaivių ir raketų kare. Niekas nenorėjo mirti. Tam nėra jokios galimybės.

 

 

 

1. Four Ways Trump’s War Is Weakening America: The Editorial Board. New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 12, 2026.

Drone, Missile, and Small Boat Rule in Today’s War: Four Ways Iran War Is Weakening America

 “When President Trump attacked Iran on Feb. 28, we called his decision reckless. He went to war without seeking congressional approval or the support of most allies. He offered thin and contradictory justifications to the American people. He failed to explain why this naïve attempt at regime change would end better than earlier attempts by the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

 

In the six weeks since, the recklessness of his war has become clearer yet. He has disdained careful military planning and acted on gut instinct and wishfulness. After Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel predicted to Mr. Trump that the attacks would inspire a popular uprising in Iran, the director of the C.I.A. countered that the notion was “farcical,” The Times reported. Mr. Trump proceeded nonetheless. He was so confident that he assembled no plan to respond to an obvious countermove available to Iran: causing a spike in oil prices by blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Nor did he develop a feasible strategy for securing the enriched uranium that Iran can use to rebuild its nuclear program.

 

Last week he careened from illegal and immoral threats about erasing Iranian civilization to a last-minute cease-fire that accomplishes few of his announced war aims. Iran continues to defy a central part of the deal and block most traffic from crossing the Strait of Hormuz. Mr. Trump’s irresponsibility has left the United States on the cusp of a humiliating strategic defeat.

 

As we have emphasized, Iran’s regime deserves no sympathy. It has spent decades oppressing its people and sponsoring terrorism elsewhere. And the current war, combined with the June attacks by the United States and Israel and other Israeli operations since 2023, weakened Iran in important ways. Its navy, air force and air defenses have been degraded, and its nuclear program has been set back. Its murderous network of regional allies — including Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria’s fallen government — has been eroded.

 

Yet these successes cannot mask the ways in which the war has weakened the United States. We count four main setbacks for America’s national interests that are the direct result of Mr. Trump’s carelessness. These setbacks likewise weaken global democracy when China, Russia and people elsewhere were already feeling emboldened.

 

The most tangible blow to the United States and the world is the increased influence that Iran has secured over the global economy by weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz. About 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas flows through the strait, which is next to Iran’s southern shore.

 

Before the war, Iran’s leaders feared that blocking traffic would invite new economic sanctions and a military attack. Once the attack happened anyway, Iran closed the strait to nearly all traffic except its own ships.

 

The policy is inexpensive because it mostly involves a threat, namely that a drone, missile or small boat may blow up a tanker.

 

Forcibly reopening the strait, by contrast, would require an enormous military operation potentially including ground troops and an extended occupation.

 

Mr. Trump’s lack of foresight about the strait reveals glaring incompetence. The two-week cease-fire does not bring back the status quo because Iran is still limiting traffic and has threatened to impose tolls as part of a final peace deal. The war has shown Iran’s leaders that controlling the waterway is a real possibility. Eventually, other countries are likely to develop alternatives, including pipelines, but those solutions will take time. For now, Iran appears to have won diplomatic leverage that it could have only dreamed of six weeks ago. The only apparent way to change the situation would be for a global coalition to demand the strait’s reopening — the sort of coalition that Mr. Trump is distinctly unsuited to lead.

 

The second setback is to America’s military standing around the world. This war, together with recent U.S. assistance to Ukraine, Israel and other allies, has burned through a substantial portion of the stockpile of some weapons, such as Tomahawk missiles and Patriot interceptors (which can shoot down other missiles). Experts believe the Pentagon used more than one-quarter of its Tomahawk missiles just in the war against Iran. Returning the stockpile to its previous size will take years, and the United States will have to make tough choices about where to maintain its military strength in the meantime. Already, the Pentagon has pulled missile defenses from South Korea.

 

The war has also revealed that the U.S. military is vulnerable to new ways of warfare. America used billions of dollars’ worth of high-tech munitions to destroy Iran’s traditional air and naval forces, while Tehran used cheap, disposable drones to halt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and hit targets in the region. The world saw how a country that spends one-hundredth of what the United States does on its military can seek to outlast it in a conflict. It is a reminder of the urgent need to reform America’s military.

 

The war’s third big cost is to America’s alliances. Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and most of Western Europe refused to support the United States in this war — unsurprisingly, given Mr. Trump’s treatment of them. When he demanded their help in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, most allies declined. These countries will remain allies in important ways, but they have made clear that they no longer consider the United States a reliable friend. They are working to build stronger relationships with one another so that they can better resist Washington in the future. “Perhaps the greatest long-term damage to the United States from the Iran war will be in its relationships with allies around the world,” Daniel Byman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington wrote on Wednesday.

 

The situation in the Middle East is more nuanced. Iran’s decision to attack its Arab neighbors during the war may draw those countries closer to the United States. But that prospect is uncertain. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries have been damaged economically by the war and feel abandoned by Mr. Trump’s cease-fire. The past six weeks have given them reason to question his judgment and his understanding of their interests.

 

The fourth setback is to America’s moral authority. For all the flaws of this country, it remains a beacon to many around the world. When pollsters ask people where they would move if they could, the United States is consistently the runaway No. 1 answer. America’s appeal stems not only from its prosperity but also from its freedom and democratic values. Mr. Trump has undercut those values for his entire political career and perhaps never more than in the past week, when he made odious threats to erase Iranian civilization. His secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, made a series of bloodthirsty remarks, including a threat to offer “no quarter, no mercy for our enemies.”

 

Those would be war crimes. Mr. Trump and Mr. Hegseth have embraced a brutal approach to armed conflict that the United States led the world in rejecting after World War II. By doing so, they have undermined the foundations of America’s global leadership, which claims to place human dignity at the center of an argument for a freer and more open world.

 

Our editorial board has long opposed Mr. Trump’s approach to politics and governing. Yet we take no pleasure in his failures over the past six weeks. For one thing, there have been deaths, injuries and destruction, in Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere. At least 13 U.S. service members have died in the war.

 

It is also a mistake for any Americans, including Mr. Trump’s critics, to root for this country to fail. We all have a stake in the nation that he leads. So does the rest of the free world. There are no other democracies with the economic and military strength to counter China and Russia. When America is weaker and poorer, as this war has made us, they benefit.

 

The best hope now may sound naïve, but it remains true. Mr. Trump should at long last recognize the ineptitude of his impulsive, go-it-alone approach. He should involve Congress and seek help from America’s allies to minimize the damage from his war.” [1]

 

The only possible help from America’s allies would be readiness to invade Iran on the ground and suffer massive deaths in drone and missile war.  Nobody wanted to die. There is no chance of that.

 

1. Four Ways Trump’s War Is Weakening America: The Editorial Board. New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 12, 2026.

Pagrindinis smūgis, kurį Netanyahu ir Trumpas gauna iš Irano dronų ir raketų: nesitikėkite, kad dyzelino ir benzino kainos greitai kris

Naujausi pranešimai rodo, kad Benjaminas Netanyahu ir Donaldas Trumpas nepasiekė tikrų karinių laimėjimų prieš Iraną, todėl dyzelino ir benzino kainos artimiausiu metu, greičiausiai, nekris dėl gilių energetikos infrastruktūros pažeidimų ir tebesitęsiančios sumaišties Hormūzo sąsiauryje.

Energetinis „smūgis“ ir kainų dinamika

 

Nepaisant balandžio 7 d. paskelbtų paliaubų, kurios trumpam numušė naftos kainas apie 13 %, realybė degalinėse išlieka įtempta:

 

    Hormūzo sąsiaurio blokada: Nors D. Trumpas ragina nedelsiant atidaryti šį svarbų vandens kelią, Iranas, kaip pranešama, jį užminavo arba bando apmokestinti praplaukiančius laivus, todėl tiekimo grandinės lieka sutrikusios. Per šį sąsiaurį keliauja apie 20 % pasaulio naftos.

 

    Sunaikinta infrastruktūra: Irano dronų smūgiai į Saudo Arabijos („Ras Tanura“) ir Kataro („Ras Laffan“) energetikos objektus padarė ilgalaikę žalą. Ekspertai teigia, kad šiems objektams atstatyti prireiks ne mėnesių, o metų.

 

    Kainų šuolis: Nuo karo pradžios vasario 28 d. „Brent“ rūšies naftos kaina šoktelėjo nuo maždaug 73 USD iki daugiau nei 100–120 USD už barelį piko metu. Kai kurie analitikai neatmeta, kad kaina gali pasiekti ir 200 USD, jei stabilumas nebus atkurtas.

 

Netanyahu ir Trumpo pozicijos

 

    D. Trumpas siekia greitos „pergalės“ ir bando spausti Iraną atidaryti laivybos kelius, baimindamasis, kad kylančios kuro kainos JAV (pasiekusios virš 3,80 USD už galoną) pakenks jo politiniam įvaizdžiui.

    B. Netanyahu fokusuojasi į mistinį Irano karinių pajėgumų ir branduolinės programos „sutriuškinimą“, net jei tai reikalauja tęsti nestabilumą regione.

    Trintis tarp lyderių: Pranešama apie įtampą tarp abiejų lyderių po to, kai Izraelio smūgis į Irano „South Pars“ dujų telkinį dar labiau supurtė rinkas, nors D. Trumpas prašė vengti tokių taikinių.

 

Šiuo metu rinka išlieka itin jautri bet kokioms žinioms iš Artimųjų Rytų, o analitikai iš Goldman Sachs ir J.P. Morgan prognozuoja, kad aukšta infliacija ir energetinis šokas lydės visus 2026 metus.

 

„Antradienio vakarą prezidento Trumpo paskelbtas paliaubas entuziastingai sutiko naftos prekiautojai, kurie greitai sumažino žaliavinės naftos ateities sandorių kainas žemiau 100 USD už barelį. Tačiau nesitikėkite, kad benzino kainos smarkiai kris, nes bombardavimas galėjo būti sustojęs.

 

Šiandien užsienyje prieinama nafta gali kainuoti beveik 150 USD už barelį.

 

Iranas tvirtina, kad kol kas tanklaiviai, plaukiantys per Hormūzo sąsiaurį, turi toliau siekti jo pritarimo. Dar svarbiau, kalbant apie kainas, Irano vadovai aiškiai pasakė, kad laivybos eismas, greičiausiai, išliks gerokai mažesnis už prieškarinį lygį.

 

Tai pratęs sutrikimus, dėl kurių kovo mėnesį benzino kainos visoje šalyje pakilo virš 4 USD už galoną. Jei kainos išliks tokiame lygyje, mano skaičiavimais, Amerikos šeimos kasmet už benziną mokės vidutiniškai daugiau nei 1000 USD daugiau, o tai yra didelės papildomos išlaidos šeimoms, kurios jau ir taip sunkiai įperka, ir potencialiai įtakingas veiksnys rudenį vyksiančiuose vidurio kadencijos rinkimuose. 21,2 proc. Kovo mėnesį padidėjusios benzino kainos padėjo padidinti metinį infliacijos lygį iki 3,3 procento, teigia Darbo statistikos biuras.

 

Bendras dabartinio kainų šoko ir jo pasekmių poveikis JAV ekonomikai nebus toks didelis, kaip aštuntojo ir devintojo dešimtmečių sutrikimų, nes Jungtinės Valstijos tapo tokia didelė naftos gamintoja. Mūsų ekonomika per dešimtmečius taip pat tapo daug efektyvesnė energijos vartojimo srityje. Tačiau tai nėra didelė paguoda vartotojams, kurie vis daugiau savo disponuojamų pinigų išleidžia važiuodami į darbą ar apsipirkdami.

 

Naftos rinka vis dar susiduria su geopolitiniais, logistiniais ir ekonominiais iššūkiais. Prieš karą per Hormūzo sąsiaurį kasdien tekėdavo apie 20 milijonų barelių žalios naftos ir rafinuotų produktų. Tai sudaro apie 20 procentų pasaulinės pasiūlos, todėl tai yra didžiausias tiekimo sutrikimas pasaulinės naftos rinkos istorijoje, pranokstantis OPEC naftos embargą, Sueco krizę ir ankstesnius Persijos įlankos karus.

 

Šių prarastų atsargų artimiausiu metu nebus lengva atkurti. Vis dar vyksta konfliktas, taip pat: Ukrainos išpuoliai gali dar labiau apriboti Rusijos naftos eksportą ir išlaikyti spaudimą kainoms.

 

Net ir geriausiu atveju, šešių savaičių tiekimo kliūtis nuo Irano karo pradžios vasario 28 d. ir ilgos laivybos kelionės reiškia, kad susidursime su ilgu prisitaikymo laikotarpiu, kol kainos normalizuosis. Taip pat nepamirškite, kad „normalumas“ buvo iš naujo apibrėžtas. Dabar gyvename pasaulyje, kuris atrodo daug pavojingesnis nei tas, kuris egzistavo vasario 27 d.

 

Šios užsitęsusios grėsmės naftos prekybai reiškia, kad rizikos priemoka greičiausiai išliks. Naftos tanklaivių savininkai mokės daug daugiau už draudimą. Tiek, kiek karo metu buvo apgadinti naftos ir gamtinių dujų įrenginiai regione, įskaitant Irano išpuolius prieš įrenginius Saudo Arabijoje, Kuveite ir kitur po paliaubų paskelbimo, tiekimas gali išlikti mažesnis nei prieškarinis lygis, kol bus baigtas remontas.

 

Tai taip pat palaiko spaudimą kainoms aukštyn. Ir akivaizdu, kad bet koks kovų atsinaujinimas ar tolesnis srautų per sąsiaurį nutraukimas greitai grąžins mus į ten, kur buvome.

 

Ponas Trumpas teisingai pastebėjo, kad Jungtinės Valstijos yra didžiausia naftos gamintoja pasaulyje ir kad mes eksportuojame daugiau nei importuojame. Tai nesustabdė degalų kainų kilimo, nes nafta yra pasaulinė rinka, o kainos atspindi platesnį vaizdą. Irano sąsiaurio uždarymas greičiausiai paveikė Azijos šalis, nes būtent ten yra skirta dauguma Persijos įlankos išteklių. Tačiau šioms šalims desperatiškai ieškant kitų tiekimo šaltinių, šis sutrikimas ir su juo susijusios didesnės kainos pasiekė ir mūsų krantus.

 

 

Nors benzino kaina kilo, dyzelino ir reaktyvinio kuro kainos kilo dar sparčiau – dyzelino kaina artėja prie 5,70 USD už galoną. Maždaug ketvirtadalį Persijos įlankos naftos eksporto sudaro rafinuoti produktai, tokie kaip dyzelinas, todėl šio tiekimo praradimas padidino daugelio rafinuotų produktų kainas gerokai daugiau nei tik padidėjo žaliavinės naftos kainos.

 

 

Šios papildomos išlaidos atsispindi visame, kas gabenama po šalį, todėl JAV pašto tarnyba, „Amazon“, „FedEx“ ir UPS pareiškė, kad jos taiko degalų priemokas. Įmonės, kurios gamybos procese naudoja naftą, taip pat moka. Taip pat ir ūkininkai, kurie perka dyzeliną ir importuojamas trąšas, pagamintas naudojant gamtines dujas.

 

Keista, bet Amerikos naftos gamintojai, regis, nesistengia didinti pasiūlos, kad kompensuotų tiekimo sutrikimus Artimuosiuose Rytuose. Neseniai Dalaso federalinio rezervo banko atlikta apklausa rodo, kad mažiau nei ketvirtadalis jo rajone veikiančių bendrovių planuoja šiais metais gerokai padidinti gręžimo apimtis. (Tačiau tos, kurios nori padidinti gręžimo apimtis, daugiausia yra mažesnės bendrovės.) Galbūt naftos gamintojai Permės baseine Amerikos pietvakariuose džiaugsis pelno padidėjimu, kol nebus daugiau aiškumo dėl naftos gamintojų Artimuosiuose Rytuose ir aukštesnių kainų tvarumas.

 

Bandymas paaiškinti, kodėl naftos kainos keitėsi arba keitėsi pagal lūkesčius, visada yra kvailio užduotis. Rinka yra neįskaitoma – ir siaubinga kainų judėjimo prognozuotoja. Tačiau vienas dalykas, kurį žinome, yra tai, kad negalime atsiriboti nuo pasaulinės rinkos.

 

Amerikos šeimoms ir įmonėms tai reiškia, kad jei kas nors nutiks bet kur, naftos kainos kils visur.

 

Ponas Finley yra energetikos ir pasaulinės naftos bendradarbis Rice universiteto Beikerio institute. Anksčiau jis buvo vyresnysis JAV ekonomistas BP ir analitikas CŽV.“ [1]

 

1. Don’t Expect Gas Prices to Go Down Anytime Soon: Guest Essay. Finley, Mark.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Apr 12, 2026.