Things to Do: A Species In Space

 

“Becoming Martian

 

By Scott Solomon

 

MIT, 280 pages, $29.95

 

In March 1995 Valeri Polyakov, a Russian cosmonaut, returned to Earth after a record 14 consecutive months in space. Extended weightlessness generally wreaks havoc on the human body, often disrupting the space traveler's heartbeat, balance and hormone levels. Ailments like anemia, kidney stones and osteoporosis can arise as well, and most returning astronauts can barely walk under the sudden chains of gravity. Yet Polyakov determinedly strutted around for reporters and masked any discomfort with a grin. Then he made a triumphant announcement.

 

His trip, he said, proved that human beings can reach Mars.

 

Colonizing Mars is an obsession among certain space geeks. Elon Musk has made several grandstanding predictions about when he believes humankind will reach the red planet. But as Scott Solomon shows in "Becoming Martian: How Living in Space Will Change Our Bodies and Minds," bureaucrats and policy wonks are drawing up plans, too. "I was astonished," Mr. Solomon writes, "to see how extensive and serious the plans for human space exploration had become." These include everything from rocket blueprints to detailed nutrient-recycling programs involving flies, chickens and human waste.

 

Motivations for wanting to colonize Mars vary. Some crave adventure while others see the planet as a backup home in the event that Earth is rendered uninhabitable by an asteroid strike or runaway climate change. Still, Mr. Solomon, a biologist at Rice University, noticed important gaps in such conversations. "There wasn't much discussion," he writes, "about the long-term consequences" for human beings. How would colonizing Mars alter us psychologically and physiologically? "Becoming Martian" grapples with such questions.

 

It takes a while for Mr. Solomon to get to the answers. Early chapters include some well-worn tales (e.g., Darwin visiting the Galapagos) as well as saucy sections on sex in space (and why the National Aeronautics and Space Administration refuses to fund studies on it). And he spends a lot of time, possibly because it's the only aspect of the project for which data are available, on the stresses and consequences of weightlessness -- which astronauts would experience only on the way to and from Mars.

 

Once the book delves into Mars itself, it really starts to hum.

 

In brief, Mars is hostile to life in numerous ways.

 

The soil is packed with poisons, and massive dust storms obscure the sun for months. The atmosphere provides almost no oxygen, and while temperatures can reach 70 degrees F, that's only at the equator, at noon, in summer. (Temperatures of minus --100 degrees F are more common.) The weak atmosphere and magnetic field also allow carcinogenic cosmic radiation to pelt Mars's surface: One day spent outdoors there equals about two years of radiation exposure on Earth.

 

Perhaps most importantly, Mars has only around one-third of Earth's gravity, which would alter the development of almost every organ and tissue. Anyone born and raised on Mars would likely have lower bone density and weaker hearts. Their spines would curve less and their feet have less of an arch. The limited air and food would likely stunt their growth compared to earthlings, and their lungs and circulatory systems might struggle to deliver oxygen. Over generations, their skin might darken to block radiation damage as well.

 

And that's just the start. Those traveling to Mars from Earth would almost certainly be screened to limit the pathogens they carry along. Measles, malaria, influenza and dozens of other illnesses wouldn't exist there -- which sounds great. Except there's good evidence that a lack of exposure to microbes early in life can leave the immune system on a hair-trigger, meaning the first generations born on Mars would likely suffer from far more autoimmune diseases. Would that trade-off be worth it?

 

Psychological complications could arise as well. The harsh environment would confine people to domes or underground shelters, where boredom and isolation would be real dangers. The need for protective spacesuits outside such habitats would also cut off Mars inhabitants from nature. Natives of the red planet would never know the feel of the breeze lifting their hair or the sun warming their skin, and the lack of water would deprive them of the joy of splashing around in a pond or the surf. (When Scott Kelly returned home after 340 days on the International Space Station, the first thing he did was jump into his backyard pool. "I'll never take water for granted again," he later said.)

 

As Mr. Solomon notes, these issues raise serious ethical questions. Would it be fair to raise children in a place where they can never play outside? Equally troubling, some Mars enthusiasts insist that we should try to genetically engineer the first generation of visitors to make them less vulnerable to bone loss, heart weakness and other health problems -- permanently altering the human race.

 

There's also the question of whether humans on Mars will evolve into another species. After all, geographic isolation often drives speciation on Earth. Radiation on Mars, and the planet's different disease burden, would only speed up mutations there. Mr. Solomon estimates that significant steps toward speciation could arise within five to 10 generations. The irony would be acute: While many enthusiasts view Mars as a refuge to save humankind from disaster, its inhabitants could quickly become nonhuman.

 

Partly as a result of the moral quandaries, Mr. Solomon finishes his book far more ambivalent about colonizing Mars than he was at the outset. "Whether we choose to let evolution play out or guide the process ourselves," he concludes, "each generation born on Mars will be one step further on a path toward becoming something different -- toward becoming Martian."

 

---

 

Mr. Kean is the author of "Dinner With King Tut: How Rogue Archaeologists Are Re-creating the Sights, Sounds, Smells, and Tastes of Lost Civilizations."” [1]

 

1. A Species In Space. Kean, Sam.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 20 Feb 2026: A13. 

Kur mes dabar gyvename: krikščionybė Vakaruose nėra mirusi

 

 

„Iki momento, kuris buvo maždaug prieš 25 metus išsilavinę liberalai Europoje ir Šiaurės Amerikoje beveik negalvojo apie religiją. Jie buvo tikri, kaip ir Volteras, H. G. Wellsas ir daugelis kitų, kad krikščionybė ir pats religinis tikėjimas yra ant išnykimo ribos. Dar viena ar dvi kartos, ir jis išnyks.

 

2001 m. rugsėjo 11 d. sukrėtė šią nuomonę. Teroristiniai išpuoliai išaiškino skirtumą tarp, pasiskolinus Rogerio Scrutono žodžius, Vakarų ir likusios dalies – „Vakarai“ reiškia tautų, kurias nuo vėlyvosios antikos iki šių dienų formavo žydų ir krikščionių religijos, rinkinį.

 

Išaiškinimas nebuvo momentinis. Kurį laiką ekspertai kalbėjo apie poreikį islamo tautoms „nuosaikiai elgtis“ taip, kaip tariamai darė krikščionių tautos, o vadinamieji naujieji ateistai išgarsėjo islamistų smurtą priskirdami paties religinio impulso išraiškai.

 

Tačiau šios mintys vengė tiesos, kurią išaiškino rugsėjo 11-osios įvykiai. Pateikdami šią tiesą neigiama forma: mažiausiai krikščioniškos visuomenės taip pat yra mažiausiai atviros ir tolerantiškos – trumpai tariant, mažiausiai liberalios. Įsivaizduokite moralinį klausimą taip: jei kuris nors iš naujųjų ateistų būtų priverstas išvardyti 10 tautų, kuriose jis sutiktų gyventi nuolat, yra didelė tikimybė, kad visos 10 turėtų neišdildomus krikščioniško tikėjimo ir praktikos ženklus.

 

 

Iki septintojo dešimtmečio Vakarų, kaip negrįžtamai krikščioniškų, supratimas pamažu vėl iškilo. Šiuose puslapiuose jau minėjau buvusių ateistų ar agnostikų intelektualų, kurie pastaraisiais metais nustebino savo auditoriją pripažindami senovės ir nuolatinę Vakarų visuomenių priklausomybę nuo krikščioniškų koncepcijų ir vertybių, seką. Valstybės sekretorius Marco Rubio praėjusį savaitgalį sakydamas kalbą Miuncheno saugumo konferencijoje privertė Vakarų diplomatinį elitą apmąstyti šią priklausomybę.

 

 

Ponas Rubio teigė, kad Vakarai gali pasipriešinti „civilizacijų naikinimo jėgoms“ tik sustiprindami natūralią giminystę tarp JAV ir Europos. Ši draugystė, nors ir sustiprinta ekonominiais ryšiais, yra įsišaknijusi metafizikoje. Mes esame susiję, sakė ponas Rubio, „ne tik ekonomiškai, ne tik kariškai”.

 

Esame susiję dvasiškai ir kultūriškai.“ Europos naujakuriai „atvyko į mūsų krantus nešdamiesi savo protėvių prisiminimus, tradicijas ir krikščioniškąjį tikėjimą kaip šventą palikimą“.

 

Manau, kad ponas Rubio ar vienas iš jo kalbų rašytojų yra skaitęs G. K. Chestertono „Amžinąjį žmogų“. Skyriuje pavadinimu „Dievų ir demonų karas“ Chestertonas šaiposi iš minties, kad kareiviai kare kovoja dėl „abstrakčių“ ekonominių ar geopolitinių pranašumų. Jis galvoja apie H. G. Wellso „materialistinę“ istorijos sampratą.

 

Kareiviai kovoja, sako Chestertonas, nes jų reikalas susijęs su jų meile šeimai ir ištikimybe Dievui.

 

Nė vienas kareivis, rašo Chestertonas, mūšyje sau nesako: „Mano koja beveik nukris, bet aš eisiu tol, kol ji nukris; nes juk aš galėsiu naudotis visais privalumais, kuriuos suteiks mano vyriausybė, gavusi šilto vandens uostą Suomijos įlankoje.“

 

Taip, pone Rubio: „Esminis klausimas, į kurį turime atsakyti iš pat pradžių, yra tai, ką tiksliai mes giname, nes armijos nekovoja dėl abstrakcijų. Armijos kovoja už žmones; armijos kovoja už tautą. „Armijos kovoja už gyvenimo būdą.“

 

Už daugelio pono Rubio Miunchene pasakytų žodžių slypi jo įsitikinimas, kad JAV ir Europa turi bendrą priešininką – Kinijos komunistų partiją. Tie iš mūsų, kurie tikėjosi, kad Kinijos ekonominiai ryšiai su Vakarais paskatins jos lyderius atsisakyti savo pirmtakų totalitarinių svajonių, nenumatė, kokiais iškrypėliškais būdais agresyviai antireliginis režimas gali panaudoti ekonomines rinkas. Mes neįvertinome, kiek du didieji bibliniai tikėjimai, išaukštindami sąžiningumą ir darbštumą bei smerkdami vagystes, leido XVII amžiuje vystytis kapitalo ekonomikai. Pamiršome, kad judėjų ir krikščionių principai nėra vienodai paplitę visame pasaulyje.

 

Dauguma Amerikos liberalų ir kai kurie konservatoriai, vis dar tikintys filosofiškai „neutralia“ viešąja erdve, kalbas apie Ameriką kaip apie „krikščionišką tautą“ laiko bauginančiomis. „New York Times“ rašytojai „krikščioniškąjį nacionalizmą“ vadina taip, kaip Johnas Birchersas šeštajame dešimtmetyje kalbėjo apie komunistus.

 

Jų baimė yra nepagrįsta. Net Amerikos moralinės patologijos yra iškreiptos biblinių principų išraiškos. Įsitikinimas, kad vyras gali tapti moterimi, kilo iš krikščioniško nenoro griežtai elgtis su sumišusiais ir pažeidžiamais, net jei ši iliuzija prieštarauja konkretesniam bibliniam teiginiui: „Vyrą ir moterį jis sukūrė“.

 

Ameriką, kaip teisingai sako ponas Rubio, sukūrė krikščionių kolonistai. Jos Konstitucija ir įstatymai yra biblinės dvasios. Jos politika yra ir visada buvo amžinas ginčas dėl to, kurie krikščioniški principai taikomi kokiems klausimams ir kokiais būdais.

 

Kalbant apie Miuncheno kalbą, ponas Rubio pelnė Europos žymių asmenų ovacijas. Sekretoriaus žodžių dominavimas daugiausia buvo susijęs su jo pareiškimais apie draugystę su Amerika. Bet galbūt net jie supranta, kad krikščioniška moralinė perspektyva yra pasaulis, kuriame mes gyvename, judame ir esame.“ [1]

 

1. Unruly Republic: Christianity Isn't Dead in the West. Swaim, Barton.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 19 Feb 2026: A13.

Where Do We Live Now: Christianity Isn't Dead in the West

 

 

“Until about 25 years ago, educated liberals in Europe and North America barely thought about religion. They were sure, as Voltaire and H.G. Wells and many others had been, that Christianity, and religious belief itself, lay on the verge of extinction. Another generation or two and it would disappear.

 

Sept. 11, 2001, rattled that view. The terrorist attacks clarified the difference between, to borrow Roger Scruton's phrase, the West and the rest -- "the West" signifying a collection of nations shaped, from late antiquity to the present, by the Jewish and Christian religions.

 

The clarification wasn't instant. Pundits for a time spoke of the need for Islamic nations to "moderate" in the way that Christian nations supposedly had, and the so-called New Atheists found notoriety by categorizing Islamist violence as expressions of the religious impulse itself.

 

But these lines of thought avoided the truth made plain by 9/11. To put that truth in its negative form: The world's least Christianized societies are also the least open and tolerant -- in short, the least liberal. Think of the moral pickle this way: If any one of the New Atheists were made to list 10 nations in which he would agree to live permanently, there's a good chance all 10 would bear the indelible marks of Christian belief and practice.

 

The pre-1960s understanding of the West as irreversibly Christian has slowly re-emerged. I've noted elsewhere in these pages the succession of formerly atheist or agnostic intellectuals who in recent years have surprised their audiences by acknowledging Western societies' ancient and continuing dependence on Christian concepts and values. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in his address last weekend to the Munich Security Conference, forced the West's diplomatic elite to ponder that dependence.

 

Mr. Rubio contended that the West can counter "the forces of civilizational erasure" only by reinforcing the natural kinship between the U.S. and Europe. That friendship, though strengthened by economic ties, is rooted in metaphysics. We are connected, Mr. Rubio said, "not just economically, not just militarily.

 

 We are connected spiritually and we are connected culturally." European settlers "arrived on our shores carrying the memories and the traditions and the Christian faith of their ancestors as a sacred inheritance."

 

I have to think Mr. Rubio or one of his speechwriters has read G.K. Chesterton's "The Everlasting Man." In a chapter titled "The War of the Gods and Demons," Chesterton mocks the idea that soldiers in a war fight for "abstract" economic or geopolitical advantages. He is thinking of H.G. Wells's "materialist" view of history.

 

Soldiers fight, Chesterton says, because their cause is bound up with their affections for their family and fealty to their God.

 

No soldier, writes Chesterton, says to himself in battle: "My leg is nearly dropping off, but I shall go on till it drops; for after all I shall enjoy all the advantages of my government obtaining a warm-water port in the Gulf of Finland."

 

Just so, Mr. Rubio: "The fundamental question we must answer at the outset is what exactly are we defending, because armies do not fight for abstractions. Armies fight for a people; armies fight for a nation. Armies fight for a way of life."

 

Behind much of what Mr. Rubio said in Munich lies his belief that the U.S. and Europe have a common adversary in the Chinese Communist Party. Those of us who hoped that China's economic ties with the West would impel its leaders to abandon their predecessors' totalitarian dreams didn't anticipate the perverse uses to which an aggressively antireligious regime can put economic markets. We failed to appreciate the degree to which the two great biblical faiths, with their elevation of honesty and industry and censure of theft, enabled capital economies to develop in the 17th century. We forgot that Judeo-Christian principles aren't shared equally around the globe.

 

Most American liberals and some conservatives, still beholden to a credulous belief in a philosophically "neutral" public square, find talk of America as a "Christian nation" terrifying. Writers in the New York Times refer to "Christian nationalism" the way John Birchers in the 1950s talked about communists.

 

Their fear is amiss. Even America's moral pathologies are distorted outworkings of biblical principles. The belief that a man can become a woman was born of a Christian reluctance to deal harshly with the confused and vulnerable, even as that delusion runs afoul of a more concrete biblical assertion: "Male and female created he them."

 

America, as Mr. Rubio rightly says, was created by Christian settlers. Its Constitution and laws are biblical in spirit. Its politics is, and always has been, a perennial dispute over which Christian principles apply to what issues and in what ways.

 

As for the Munich speech, Mr. Rubio earned a standing ovation from European notables. Their approval of the secretary's words had mainly to do with his declarations of American friendship. But perhaps even they understand that the Christian moral outlook is the world in which we live and move and have our being.” [1]

 

1. Unruly Republic: Christianity Isn't Dead in the West. Swaim, Barton.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 19 Feb 2026: A13.

Dirbtinio intelekto programinę įrangą parduoti sunkiau, nei anksčiau --- Kai kurie pardavėjai teigia, kad potencialūs klientai užtrunka ilgiau, kol įvertina pirkinius

„Nežabotų išlaidų dirbtinio intelekto programinei įrangai aukso amžius gali būti praeityje, nes pardavėjai teigia, kad parduoti dabar daug sunkiau nei anksčiau.

 

Praėję metai buvo savotiška sėkmė pardavėjams, siūlantiems dirbtinio intelekto programas.

 

Paskatintos valdybos lygio įgaliojimų, įmonių FOMO ir agresyvios technologijų gigantų kampanijos apie pasaulį keičiančias dirbtinio intelekto agentų galimybes, įmonės noriai ir beprotiškai leido pinigus programinei įrangai – „Gartner“ duomenimis, iš viso apie 1,249 trilijono dolerių.

 

Alexas Levinas, dirbtiniu intelektu pagrįsto klientų aptarnavimo startuolio „Regal“ bendraįkūrėjas ir generalinis direktorius, teigė, kad iki šiol galėjo parduoti įmonę su viena demonstracine versija – reiškinį, kurį jis pavadino „šokiruojančiu“, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad didelėms įmonėms kartais gali prireikti vienerių ar dvejų metų, kad atliktų pirkimą. Praėjusiais metais Levinas teigė, kad sandorius jis sudarė vos per 60 ar 90 dienų.

 

Tai nebegalioja. Pardavėjai teigia, kad didelės įmonės tapo atsargesnės dėl to, ką perka. Jos ilgiau vertina sprendimus, įtraukia daugiau vidinių suinteresuotųjų šalių iš teisininkų ir finansų komandų ir daugiau dėmesio skiria finansinei grąžai, kurią gali gauti iš investicijų. Dėl stulbinančio dirbtinio intelekto inovacijų tempo – kaip ir neseniai paskelbti atnaujinimai apie „Anthropic“ atstovą Claude'ą – potencialūs klientai taip pat atsargiai vertina pardavimo įsipareigojimus.

 

„Buvo laikotarpis, kai pirmieji naudotojai labai greitai perėjo prie tikrai įdomių technologijų, ir šis procesas sulėtėjo“, – sakė Levinas. Pasak jo, įprastas pardavimo užbaigimo laikas dabar yra apie šešis mėnesius.

 

„Visi yra šiek tiek atsargesni“, – sakė Craigas Rothas, „Gartner“ viceprezidentas ir analitikas. „Manau, kad realybė jau atėjo.“

 

Pirmieji naudotojai, kurie praėjusiais metais skubėjo pradėti dirbtinio intelekto bandomuosius projektus ir net diegimus, dažnai atsitrenkė į kliūtis ir išmoko skaudžių pamokų. Tai nebūtinai nutiko todėl, kad technologija neveikė, bet todėl, kad jie suprato, jog neturi tinkamų apsauginių barjerų arba iki galo nesupranta verslo proceso, kurį bando automatizuoti, realybės, sakė Rothas. Svarbiausia, kad jiems buvo sunku išmatuoti. finansinė grąža. Ir tai, ką jie galėjo išmatuoti, nebuvo itin įspūdinga, sakė jis.

 

2025 m. balandžio mėn. paskelbtoje „Gartner“ apklausoje tik 11 % klientų aptarnavimo ir palaikymo vadovų teigė, kad generatyvinis dirbtinis intelektas pasiekė jų pagrindinį verslo tikslą – stulbinamai, nes klientų aptarnavimas tapo viena iš labiausiai išsivysčiusių technologijų diegimo sričių.

 

Įmonės neabejotinai toliau investuoja į dirbtinio intelekto įrankius. „Gartner“ tikisi, kad šiais metais išlaidos programinei įrangai išaugs 14,7 % ir sieks maždaug 1,434 trilijono dolerių. Tačiau dabar, kai įmonės yra pakankamai subrendusios, kad suprastų šias galimas kliūtis, jos skiria daugiau laiko vertinimui ir kritiškiau vertina galimus sprendimus, sakė Rothas.

 

„Apskritai, mes tapome daug drausmingesni, užtikrindami, kad suprantame konkretaus pirkimo rezultatą, o ne tik sekame ažiotažu“, – sakė Kyle'as Chu, telefonų priedų gamintojos „PopSockets“ vyresnysis verslo analitikos vadovas.

 

Kathy Kay, pasaulinės finansinių paslaugų įmonės „Principal Financial Group“ vyriausioji informacijos pareigūnė ir vykdomoji viceprezidentė, teigė, kad ji skiria laiko nuodugniai apgalvoti, ar konkretus tiekėjas apskritai bus ar bus naudingas. kelerius metus, „dėl ko įmonei, kuri kreipiasi į mus, gali susidaryti įspūdis, kad pardavimo ciklas yra ilgesnis“, – sakė ji.

 

Didelės technologijų įmonės, tokios kaip „Microsoft“ ir „Google“, kurios vis dažniau integruoja generatyvinius dirbtinio intelekto įrankius į esamus platesnius pasiūlymus, yra mažiau paveiktos. Tačiau mažesnėms įmonėms, kurių dirbtinio intelekto pasiūlymai yra jų raison d'etre, naujoji era turi privalumų ir trūkumų.

 

Gali būti sunkiau patekti vidun, bet kai tik tai padaroma, įmonės nori plačiau naudoti sprendimą ir gauti iš jo viską, ką gali.

 

---

 

Isabelle Bousquette rašo WSJ lyderystės instituto CIO žurnalui.“ [1]

 

1. AI Software Proves to Be Tougher Sell Than Before --- Some vendors say potential customers are taking longer to evaluate purchases. Bousquette, Isabelle.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 19 Feb 2026: B4.  

AI Software Proves to Be Tougher Sell Than Before --- Some vendors say potential customers are taking longer to evaluate purchases

“The golden age of unbridled spending on AI software might be behind us, as vendors say it's a lot harder to make a sale than it used to be.

 

Last year represented something of a boon era for vendors peddling AI apps.

 

 Spurred by board-level mandates, corporate FOMO and an aggressive campaign from tech giants about the world-changing capabilities of AI agents, enterprises were spending willingly and wildly -- an estimated total of more than $1.249 trillion in software, according to Gartner.

 

Alex Levin, co-founder and chief executive of AI-powered customer-service startup Regal, said until recently he could make an enterprise sale with a single demo -- a phenomenon he called "shocking," given how big companies can sometimes take one to two years to make a purchase. Last year, Levin said he was closing deals in as little as 60 or 90 days.

 

That isn't the case anymore. Vendors say big companies have become more cautious about what they buy. They are taking longer to evaluate solutions, involving more internal stakeholders from legal and finance teams, and placing more emphasis on the kind of financial returns they might get out of the investment. The breakneck pace of AI innovation -- like recent updates around Anthropic's Claude -- is also making potential customers wary of sales commitments.

 

"There was a period where the early adopters were moving very fast on really interesting technology and that piece has slowed down," Levin said. The typical time for completing a sale is now about six months, he said.

 

"Everyone is a bit more cautious," said Craig Roth, a vice president analyst at Gartner. "I think reality has set in."

 

Early adopters who rushed into AI pilots and even deployments last year often hit a wall and learned some hard lessons. It wasn't necessarily because the technology didn't work, but because they found they didn't have the right guardrails or didn't fully understand the reality of the business process they were trying to automate, Roth said. Critically, they found it was hard to measure financial returns. And what they could measure wasn't overwhelmingly impressive, he said.

 

In a Gartner survey released in April 2025, only 11% of customer service and support leaders said generative AI met their primary business objective -- striking, since customer service has emerged as one of the most mature areas for deploying the technology.

 

Businesses are certainly continuing to invest in AI tools. Gartner expects software spending to grow 14.7% this year to about $1.434 trillion. But now that businesses are mature enough to understand those potential roadblocks, they are taking longer to evaluate and being more critical of potential solutions, Roth said.

 

"Overall, we've gotten a lot more disciplined in making sure that we understand what the outcome of a specific purchase is, not just following the hype," said Kyle Chu, senior manager of Business Intelligence at phone-accessory maker PopSockets.

 

Kathy Kay, chief information officer and executive vice president of global financial services firm Principal Financial Group said she is taking her time to think deeply about whether a given vendor will even be around or be useful in a few years, "which could make it seem like the sales cycle is longer to a company calling on us," she said.

 

Big tech players like Microsoft and Google, which have increasingly moved to bundle generative AI tools into existing broader offerings, are less affected. But for smaller companies whose AI offerings are their raison d'etre, there are pros and cons of the new era.

 

It might be harder to get in the door, but once they do, they find enterprises want to use the solution more broadly, and get everything they can out of it.

 

---

 

Isabelle Bousquette writes for the WSJ Leadership Institute's CIO Journal.” [1]

 

1. AI Software Proves to Be Tougher Sell Than Before --- Some vendors say potential customers are taking longer to evaluate purchases. Bousquette, Isabelle.  Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y.. 19 Feb 2026: B4.