“Following the collapse of the FCAS fighter jet program, another Franco-German project is at risk of failure: for the past five years, Paris and Berlin have attempted to breathe life into the concept of a joint tank known as the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS).
With only moderate success. Moreover, the conflict in Ukraine has raised questions about whether heavy main battle tanks have any future on the battlefield at all. NATO planners and German generals consistently answer in the affirmative—though only if the tanks feature modified technology, effective anti-drone defenses, and digital connectivity.
A future Franco-German tank would offer several advantages beyond the symbolic bond between the two nations. Unlike in the past, neither France nor Germany will—or would want to—build 60-ton main battle tanks in the thousands on their own. During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr possessed around 2,000 such offensive vehicles, along with more than 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles.
Today, the Bundeswehr operates approximately 300 Leopard 2 tanks, comprising both older and upgraded models. Deliveries of modernized A8-version tanks are scheduled to begin in 2027, at a rate of about 35 units per year. At the end of the Cold War, France possessed around 1,000 older main battle tanks. Of the newer Leclerc tanks—introduced in the 1990s—only 150 to 200 are currently considered operational. No new main battle tanks have been built in France for nearly twenty years.
In contrast, Western estimates suggest that Russia plans to manufacture more than 1,000 units annually—combining the modernization of existing tanks with the production of the modern T-90M2 Ryvok-1—creating a massive asymmetry to which Europe currently has no counter.
Why, then, not unite the continent’s two largest economies in a joint project that ensure production capacity capable of ramping up deep into the European hinterland in the event of heightened tensions?
Weeks ago, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that there was likely no future for the tank project without the aircraft project. German defense policy expert Volker Mayer-Lay (CDU)—an outspoken opponent of FCAS—spoke at the time of inappropriate "strategic pressure" and an act "bordering on blackmail" to which Berlin and Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) should not yield.
The tank project has been struggling on its own merits for years; the contours of a joint weapon system are not even discernible yet. These are poor conditions for a shared primary weapon system, particularly given that Europe might actually have to prepare for Russia possessing the capability to attack NATO from 2029 onwards—a scenario Inspector General Carsten Breuer has described repeatedly. Although the funds to finance an expansion of tank units have been available—at least in Germany—since 2025, industry output remains low, and the sector is primarily preoccupied with the battle for contracts.
The formation of the KNDS corporate alliance ten years ago—merging Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and France’s Nexter—created a partnership for tank manufacturing that soon became mired in national friction and political mistrust. In May 2026, the German government announced its intention to acquire a 40 percent stake in KNDS, effectively becoming a state-owned tank manufacturer alongside the existing family-held share.
Amidst fierce disputes over specific production shares, the French side had previously attempted to gain the upper hand in this project as well, particularly regarding technology. Agreement could not even be reached on the future caliber of the main gun—whether the German preference for 130 millimeters or the French preference for 140 millimeters. At one point, there was talk of using two modular turret designs.
While Berlin was prepared to acknowledge France’s lead and initiative regarding the aircraft project to acknowledge FCAS, yet in return sought a clear leadership role in the tank project. Then came Rheinmetall—the expanding West German defense contractor—which grew increasingly vocal in its belief that it could lead the entire tank project itself, or alternatively, handle others alongside it.
After negotiations had dragged on without discernible progress until 2023, the two defense ministers—Boris Pistorius (SPD) and Sébastien Lecornu—attempted to drive the joint defense projects forward with great enthusiasm and Franco-German spirit. Pistorius traveled to Giverny, the French home of Monet, to meet his "cher ami" Sébastien, while Lecornu visited his German counterpart in his hometown of Osnabrück. On that occasion last summer, Pistorius once again emphasized what was driving him: "It is up to us, in difficult times, to find answers to the threats that endanger peace in Europe." France, for which he has a great fondness, "is and remains our important European ally." "Our first friend." The aim today is to further expand this cooperation and jointly generate new momentum.
Both sides had already emphasized this during the ceremonial—though largely inconsequential—signing of a letter of intent in Paris in January 2024. In early 2025, shortly before the federal election, Pistorius traveled to Paris once again; another declaration was signed, and a "shareholders' agreement" for a project company was even concluded. Lecornu welcomed Pistorius at the Hôtel des Invalides with military honors, and the German minister was appointed a Commander of the Legion of Honor by President Macron—a rare distinction.
Meanwhile, there is still no sign of the Franco-German main battle tank, which is slated for introduction in about fifteen years—a very late timeline. Rheinmetall, in particular, is vigorously pursuing a different path; rumors in Berlin suggest that the company, led by Armin Papperger, is actually obstructing the MGCS project in order to advance its own proprietary offerings and partnerships. After all, in a rather surprising move back in 2022, the Düsseldorf-based firm had unveiled what it marketed as a "radically new main battle tank concept."
The "Panther"—sharing its name with a Nazi-era vehicle—made an immediate impact; Hungary plans to build it jointly with Rheinmetall, and in the summer of 2024, the *Handelsblatt* reported that Italy intended to purchase 200 Panthers from the company. The total order volume, including the same firm's Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, amounts to approximately 20 billion euros.
In the autumn of that same year, Rheinmetall and the Italian defense company Leonardo established a new Rome-based joint venture tasked with producing main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for both the European and global markets. Papperger declared at the time: "We are creating a new heavyweight in European tank manufacturing."
For the Franco-German MGCS project, this was yet another piece of disastrous news. And worse still: dozens of the Panthers—which currently exist only as demonstration models—are reportedly scheduled to be ready as early as 2030—though it was stated years ago regarding the Franco-German project that the MGCS was intended to replace existing tank fleets only in the 2040s.
However, France’s Ministry of Defence has already earmarked funds for an interim solution; meanwhile, Germany has the option of the "Leopard 2 AX" project—a further evolution of the current German main battle tank—which could also be equipped with a new, long-range 130mm gun from Rheinmetall and other components originally planned for the MGCS.
Tanks have played a negligible role on Ukrainian battlefields; little has been heard of the German Leopards—including modern variants—since their handover. The 14 units of the modern A6 series, which a tank battalion from Augustdorf was required to relinquish, largely ended up as damaged or partially destroyed vehicles in a repair hangar in Lithuania. Little is known about any successes in engagements with Russian units—a stark contrast to the Iris-T air defense system, which was also supplied by Germany.
Thus, the necessity of a multi-billion-euro main battle tank project remains unproven, regardless of whether it stems from Franco-German cooperation or a national design. In any case, Paris and Berlin will have to address this issue in the coming weeks. Security experts, for their part, insist: "The Bundeswehr must buy what it needs, not what it is familiar with from the past." [A]
Why are the Russians building their tanks? Ask them. Tanks are of no use in Ukraine, since both Russia and Ukraine have access to Chinese drone and precise missile parts to build swarms of these things. Any protection is no use against swarms – they are too abundant to protect from them. Therefore, tanks have no use in Ukraine. The West has no access to Chinese rare earths containing drone and missile parts to scale production in militarily significant quantities. Even American airplanes get destroyed by Iranians. The Russians know all of this. Producing tanks, they can change the actions of the West who are left without defense against tanks. So, maybe, the Russians go ahead and produce tanks.
There are more ideas about it:
Main battle tanks have largely been forced into hiding or reduced roles due to the staggering proliferation of FPV (first-person-view) drones. Reports indicate that both Russian and Western-supplied Ukrainian tanks, including $10 million Leopard and Abrams platforms, frequently sit idle or only deploy during heavy rain and poor visibility when drones cannot fly.
However, despite massive losses and the absolute dominance of drone swarms, Russia continues to manufacture, pull from storage, and upgrade tanks. They do this not out of ignorance, but due to several brutal geopolitical, industrial, and tactical realities.
1. Drones Cannot Hold Ground
The foundational rule of land warfare remains unchanged: wars are won by soldiers occupying physical territory that the enemy can no longer contest. Drones can bleed an army white and destroy supply lines, but they cannot secure a trenchline or withstand incoming artillery fire. To physically advance across open terrain, infantry require mobile, direct-fire, heavily protected armored vehicles. Without tanks, infantry are forced to advance on foot or on light vehicles (like motorcycles), resulting in devastating casualty rates.
2. Adaptation and the Technological "Cat-and-Mouse" Game
Neither military accepts that tanks are permanently obsolete; instead, they view drone dominance as a problem to be solved. Russia has pivoted toward heavily redesigning its armored warfare strategy. This includes:
• Active Protection Systems (APS): Russia has begun fielding upgraded T-72B3A tanks equipped with the Arena-M system, explicitly designed to detect and shoot down incoming FPV drones in mid-air.
• The Satiation Strategy: While early tests of Arena-M showed it could be overwhelmed by massed Ukrainian drone swarms (which sometimes require 15 to 20 drones to destroy a single tank), the goal is to continuously iterate the technology until electronic jamming and physical interceptors match the threat.
3. Exploiting Western Supply Bottlenecks
The point about the West’s industrial limitations is a core driver of Russia’s long-term strategy. The Kremlin knows that Western militaries struggle with defense industrial scaling and supply chains. Russia has fully shifted its economy to a wartime footing, outproducing the West in artillery and heavily utilizing its deep Soviet-era armor reserves. By keeping pressure on the frontline with heavy armor, Russia forces Ukraine and the West to continuously expend high-tech, expensive air defense missiles and precision munitions to stop them, banking on Western political weariness and supply depletion.
4. Shifting Tactical Roles
When tanks do enter the battlefield now, they are rarely used in traditional, massed Blitzkrieg-style breakthroughs. Instead, Russia uses them as:
• Long-range, protected artillery firing from hidden positions.
• Heavy mine-clearers to forge paths for infantry.
• Mobile electronic warfare hubs covered in jammers and massive metal "turtle" cages designed to absorb or deflect drone strikes.
Ultimately, Russia might be betting that drone supremacy is a temporary phase of the war. By continuing to build tanks, they ensure they possess the necessary heavy iron to capitalize on breakthroughs if their electronic warfare can successfully blind Ukrainian drone networks.
A. Der Panzer fährt vor die Wand: Neben FCAS planten Deutschland und Frankreich auch einen Kampfpanzer. Doch auch dieses Projekt ist nun gefährdet. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 13 June 2026: 5. Von Peter Carstens, Berlin
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