“It is nonetheless unmistakable that conflict in Ukraine has seen rapid technological evolution: since 2024, thousands of drones—constantly being further refined—have been deployed daily by both sides.
The front line soon vanished, replaced by a "death zone" 30 to 50 kilometers deep where movement is barely possible.
Are we witnessing a revolution in warfare, or even a watershed moment in military history? There is much to suggest so: for the first time in over a century, the defense appears superior to the offense; we see no fight of movement, no major breakthrough battles that quickly decide the outcome. Russian soldiers are pushing Ukrainian troops westward, inch by inch. Is rapid armored warfare—once the pinnacle of conventional combat, perfected by the United States during the 1990–91 Gulf War—now a thing of the past?
History has repeatedly seen leaps in military technology. The introduction of muskets and artillery, for instance, fundamentally transformed warfare from the sixteenth century onwards. Some historians have even argued that these new weapons necessitated standing armies and organized arms industries, as well as the development of state bureaucracies and banking systems.
This new weaponry, the theory goes, drove the emergence of the pre-modern state. While this interpretation is now considered overly simplistic, there is no doubt that military technological innovations have profoundly influenced the state, society, and armed forces. However, this transformation unfolded at a snail's pace during the early modern period: it took centuries for rapid-fire muskets, powerful artillery, and—consequently—modern fortress construction to become established across Europe.
With the Industrial Revolution during the "long nineteenth century," the pace accelerated significantly. Machine guns and heavy artillery generated firepower on a scale previously unimaginable. For a long time, few were willing to accept that warfare required a complete rethink and that the defense now held the advantage over the offense. Consequently, despite new regulations introduced before 1914, efforts to instill tactical flexibility in the officer corps failed; many remained fixated on the glorious images of victorious charges from the war of 1870–71. By the time the Western Front stagnated in late 1914, 820,000 German soldiers had already been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.
The survivors learned how to wage this new kind of war—first the defensive tactics of trench warfare, and then, from the autumn of 1917 onwards, offensive operations as well. They also solved the era's greatest tactical challenge: achieving a breakthrough against heavily defended positions. In the span of just four years, the nature of warfare had undergone a fundamental transformation. And this was not limited to land operations; the submarine—a weapon whose practical utility was doubted by many before the First World War—revolutionized naval warfare.
The shift during the Second World War was equally dramatic. The airplane emerged as the dominant weapon in both land and naval warfare; without air superiority, no offensive could succeed. Bomber fleets turned the hinterland into a target, with devastating consequences for hundreds of thousands of civilians across Europe and Asia. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, and trucks accelerated the pace of land warfare. It was now possible not only to breach heavily defended positions but also to rapidly advance deep into enemy territory. This enabled the Wehrmacht to overrun Poland and France within a matter of weeks—a feat made possible by a good dozen motorized divisions.
During the Second World War, the Allies were initially slow to adapt, allowing the Wehrmacht to overrun vast swathes of Europe and extend its reign of terror. Once the Allies had finally adapted to German warfare—and the shock effect of the Wehrmacht’s rapid advances consequently failed to materialize—the German generals, in turn, failed to grasp that mass and firepower, rather than bold armored offensives, would decide the war.
How quickly are today’s armies learning from this new situation? Germany, for one, was caught off guard by drone warfare. During a decades-long slumber regarding security policy, every possible opportunity was missed—both politically and on the part of the military. The Bundeswehr had already encountered American high-tech warfare in Afghanistan, and some officers had pointed out the pivotal role of unmanned aerial vehicles; yet too many generals brushed such reports aside, showing no interest in battlefield innovation. At the same time, large segments of the political establishment refused to accept this new technological reality. In Israel and the United States, meanwhile this development had long been anticipated. The penny only dropped late in Germany. Start-ups like Stark and Helsing are now on the verge of securing contracts worth hundreds of millions of euros to supply kamikaze drones to the Bundeswehr. The Navy has announced plans to build a "drone fleet," and the first systems are already being delivered.
However, given that Russia deploys more than 10,000 drones daily—backed by the necessary logistics and training—the progress made by the Bundeswehr so far remains modest.
Culturally, large parts of the armed forces are still too heavily shaped by the past: by a long era of peace, by overseas deployments, or by memories of the Cold War. If the Bundeswehr were to go to war now, the picture would likely resemble that of 1914: some modern approaches in doctrine and equipment, and a few clever ideas within the staff, yet the new reality has not yet permeated the rank-and-file practice of soldiering. Admittedly, technological advances do not change everything overnight.
No drone can recapture territory; tanks, artillery, and—above all—"boots on the ground" are still required for that.
This is why the debate over conscription has resurfaced—and not just in Germany. Yet this does nothing to alter the immense pressure on European armed forces to adapt.
Countering drones is the most pressing issue in this regard. Most NATO nations are working feverishly to find a solution, aiming to create conditions that would allow ground forces to maneuver effectively in a real conflict and avoid a protracted war of attrition.
Success will only be possible if a mobile defense system capable of countering thousands of drones can be developed. As yet, there is no truly satisfactory solution for shielding friendly units with a protective "defense umbrella." While a great deal is currently being tested—ranging from anti-drone drones, jammers, and anti-aircraft tanks to lasers and even shotguns—the scale of the problem remains beyond technical control.
Europe’s ability to maintain a conventional deterrent depends on finding an effective solution. If this fails, the evolution of weapons technology in Ukraine could trigger a revolution on Western battlefields—one that works to Germany’s disadvantage. In a worst-case scenario, military history teaches us that rectifying these deficiencies would come at the cost of many lives.
Therefore, now more than ever, it is essential for policymakers and the military to align their words with their actions. The Chancellor has made a firm commitment: at the Munich Security Conference, he reiterated his pledge to transform the Bundeswehr into Europe’s strongest conventional army. In doing so, he has made this project a litmus test for his tenure.
Sönke Neitzel is Professor of Military History and the Cultural History of Violence at the University of Potsdam.” [1]
Germany is headed to have the weakest industry in Europe, industry which is now imploding (see convulsions of Volkswagen). Industry is the basis of military power. It seems that Chancellor Merz will have the weakest army in Europe, ruining West European welfare state (pension time from 70 years old, anybody?) in his path of building expensive obsolete tanks, facing cheap, high precision, Chinese drone and missile swarms.
The German industrial base is facing a critical juncture, with Volkswagen contemplating the unprecedented closure of four domestic factories and significant workforce reductions as it struggles to compete with American and Chinese competitors. This industrial strain has far-reaching implications for the broader European economy and defense strategies.
Industrial and Economic Realities
• The Volkswagen Crisis: Volkswagen is facing its deepest crisis yet, with reports indicating it may cut up to 100,000 jobs worldwide and close as many as four German plants. This restructuring reflects structural pressures from high domestic energy and labor costs, as well as lost market share to higher quality and lower-cost Chinese and American car manufacturers.
• Pension Reforms: To stabilize the welfare state amid an tank production surge, an expert commission backed by Chancellor Friedrich Merz has recommended a gradual increase in the retirement age to 70 by the early 2090s.
Defense and Geopolitical Strategy
• Military Upgrades: Chancellor Merz has committed to ambitious military reforms, aiming to build one of the strongest conventional armies in Europe. The Bundeswehr is expanding its infrastructure, setting up 40 new barracks, and targeting a force of 260,000 soldiers alongside 200,000 reservists by 2035.
• Adapting to Modern Warfare: The shift toward modern, agile defense technologies is at the forefront of the political debate. Across NATO, military planners are increasingly focused on addressing the threats posed by asymmetrical, low-cost drone swarms and high-precision missiles, prompting a reevaluation of traditional heavy armor procurement versus advanced electronic warfare (it doesn’t work for drones with fiber optics) and counter-unmanned systems, that are pure fantasy so far. Military planners just keep talking and wasting money.
1. Der Lehrmeister aller Dinge: Militärisch steht ein Wandel wie 1914 bevor. Und die Bundeswehr? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 26 Mar 2026: 9. Von Sönke Neitzel
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