The European Union's energy transition is caught in a difficult transitional phase where renewable generation is expanding, but total electrification remains too slow and over 80% of Europe's gas still relies on imports. Recent global disruptions have exposed this vulnerability, prompting aggressive new measures to accelerate the shift away from fossil fuels.
The friction between the EU's green ambitions and its persistent fossil fuel reliance centers on several key factors:
• Stagnant Electrification: Despite the expansion of green generation, electricity accounts for less than a quarter (roughly 23%) of final energy consumption, leaving the bulk of the economy reliant on traditional fuels.
• Import Dependence: While the EU has successfully slashed its reliance on cheap Russian pipeline gas, it remains highly dependent on expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG) and global oil markets. Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and elsewhere continue to heavily impact European household energy bills and business competitiveness.
• Infrastructure Bottlenecks: The transition has been significantly hampered by outdated grid infrastructure. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that roughly 600GW of completed green projects are currently stuck waiting to be connected to the grid.
Moving away from cheap Russian pipeline gas has created a high-cost energy landscape:
• Price Volatility: European buyers are heavily exposed to global spot markets. The U.S. is the primary LNG supplier, accounting for over half of all EU LNG imports, which remains the most expensive for European buyers.
• Global Supply Shocks: Disruptions in the Middle East—such as blockades at the Strait of Hormuz—have constrained global LNG trade, intensifying competition for supplies and spiking European price.
Western Europeans are themselves surprised by their own stupidity:
“At the turn of the century, EU nations imported 56 percent of the energy they required.
Since then, trillions of euros have been invested in renewable energy. Former FDP leader Christian Lindner once dubbed them "energies of freedom." Yet, despite all these investments, Europe has not achieved energy independence.
According to the latest figures from the Federal Statistical Office, the energy dependency of the 27 EU states stands at 57 percent of primary energy consumption.
How can this be?
The reason is not that primary energy consumption has risen; on the contrary, it has tended to decline across the EU. This is due to the more efficient use of fossil fuels, but above all to the increased share of renewable energy. After all, compared to coal, oil, and gas, energy losses are far lower when electricity is used. Drivers of internal combustion engine vehicles convert a significant portion of the consumed oil into heat, whereas an electric vehicle can convert much more of the input energy into actual movement. However, the relative inefficiency of internal combustion engines—for example—is irrelevant to primary energy consumption statistics; the calculation simply tallies the total quantity of energy sources required.
This leads to an initial explanation: Europe—including Germany—is not as far along in electrification as other nations that also possess relatively few domestic oil or gas reserves. Japan, for instance, has been pursuing rapid electrification for years, and China and South Korea are also placing greater emphasis on electricity within their energy mixes.
Europe, too, could reduce its reliance on fossil fuel imports by expanding wind power, solar energy, battery storage, and biomass—provided it also electrifies sectors where progress has proven difficult: industrial processes, transport, and the building sector, particularly heating systems.
For a long time, most European states saw little urgency in making such shifts, relying instead on cheap gas—primarily from Russia.
As the country became an increasingly unviable supplier of oil and gas following the events in Ukraine, Europe was forced to look for suppliers elsewhere.
However, there is another reason for the EU's energy dependency, beyond the rather sluggish pace of electrification: while renewable energy capacity has been and continues to be rapidly expanded across most EU states, the extraction of fossil fuels has declined significantly. According to the German Environment Agency, in 2024, approximately five percent of the natural gas and about two percent of the petroleum products consumed domestically came from German sources.
Across the EU, natural gas extraction today stands at only about a quarter of the volume recorded around the turn of the millennium. Coal production fell by roughly half during the same period. Significant production now exists only in Germany and Poland; the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece also continue to extract coal, albeit on a smaller scale.
There are significant differences in energy dependency among EU member states.
According to the Federal Statistical Office, Germany and 14 other EU states meet more than half of their energy needs through imports.
Estonia, by contrast, relies on energy imports for only five percent of its needs. While such dependencies were long viewed as a disadvantage in a globalized world, the resulting geopolitical vulnerability has once again become a central topic of debate in light of current conflicts. This has shifted the focus to the countries upon whose supplies Europe relies.
Unlike just a few years ago, Russia now plays only a minor role in this regard.
The United States and Norway have become key suppliers—not only of natural gas but also of crude oil.
Libya is also a major supplier of the latter; approximately 13 percent of crude oil imports came from the Middle East last year, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Dependence on individual nations is significantly higher for natural gas; recently, one-third of EU imports came from friendly Norway. A quarter was supplied by the USA, which has transformed into an energy exporter over the past few decades thanks to large-scale fracking. Washington is increasingly leveraging this position aggressively in negotiations with other nations. Pursuing the goal of American "energy dominance," the United States now links various trade policy issues—such as tariffs—to energy sales. The EU, too, has agreed to continue purchasing American natural gas, although the binding nature of this commitment remains unclear.
The think tank Strategic Perspectives recently analyzed from whom Europe still would need to purchase gas if it succeeded in electrifying roughly half of its economy by 2040. In that scenario, slightly increased European natural gas production, combined with imports from Great Britain and—above all—Norway, would meet demand.
There is considerable support for this among German energy companies that profit from electricity. Markus Krebber, the CEO of RWE, recently stated: "The more we electrify, the less we need to import fossil fuels. The less we import, the more resilient we become."
Regarding renewable energy, however, it is important to bear in mind that solar panels and batteries are currently manufactured primarily in China.
Green hydrogen is also viewed as a future import commodity. And in the case of nuclear power, uranium imports are necessary.
Europe remains dependent on fossil fuel imports—not least because its own domestic production is declining.” [1]
1. So abhängig wie vor der Energiewende: Der Ausbau der Erneuerbaren hilft der EU - die aktuelle fossile Krise trifft sie dennoch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 22 Apr 2026: 8. Von Lukas Fuhr
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