“Mr. Westad, in your new book *The Coming Storm* (Klett-Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart 2026), you write that our world is unlike anything any of us has ever experienced. Could you explain that?
The starting point for this book was my frustration with comparisons between the present day and the Cold War. Such comparisons are not only simplistic and superficial but also incorrect. That is why I looked for other analogies, even though it was clear that none of them would be perfect. Our era bears a greater resemblance to the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For one thing, our world is multipolar: great powers and numerous regional powers compete within the same global capitalist economic system. This differs from the situation with the Soviet Union, which isolated itself from that system and sought to destroy it from the outside. For another, we are witnessing profound changes—economic, technological, and political—comparable in intensity and dynamism to those at the beginning of the 20th century.
After the Cold War, the USA was considered the undisputed superpower. You conclude that this position is now in question.
Much like Great Britain in the 19th century, the USA was undoubtedly the dominant great power in the late 20th and early 21st centuries—first within the bipolar system, where the Soviet Union was its chief rival, and then as the sole remaining superpower after the Cold War ended. However, US power has been eroding for a decade and a half. Not necessarily in military terms, but certainly economically. This mirrors what happened to Great Britain in the early 20th century.
The USA is squandering its position of superiority—just as Britain did back then—through unnecessary wars, unclear strategic priorities, and domestic social and economic decline. Other nations are seizing the opportunity to strengthen their own positions on the global stage.
What does this mean for everyone else?
This leads to a more complex and complicated world. Even in the pre-war period of 1914, many felt that the form of globalization existing at the time had brought them no benefit. Nationalism and populism were on the rise. Protectionism increased, tariffs were raised, and mistrust among the great powers grew. We see all of this today as well. The transition from an old world to a new one never proceeds smoothly. We must recognize the warning signs from history to avoid a situation where heightened tensions lead to war between great powers. I fear that is exactly where we are heading. If a crisis like the one in the summer of 1914 were to break out, we would not be capable of handling it. We are no better prepared than the decision-makers of that era.
The European Union, in particular, seems ill-prepared.
Europeans must finally take responsibility for their own defense. That means pursuing the path toward a common European defense—not in opposition to NATO, nor merely within the NATO alliance. There must be new forms of integrated defense planning. This concerns military operational readiness, weapon systems, and operational planning. Several Europeans have told me that this is not possible—that integrating 27 armies, and doing so rapidly, is impossible. Yet Europe has faced such challenges before. Back then, some claimed the European Coal and Steel Community was unthinkable, the single market a pipe dream, and the euro something that would never work. Driven by a sense of urgency, European integration mechanisms have proven their worth in crisis mode. The challenges are immense, but failing to tackle them now would be the greatest mistake the EU has made since its inception.
Recently, US President Donald Trump described NATO as a "paper tiger" and threatened to withdraw. Is the defense alliance dead?
Yes, in the form in which it was founded. It is facing the greatest challenge it has ever known. Gone are the days when NATO operated on the premise that the US would guarantee Europe's security under all circumstances. Deterrence capabilities are eroding because Trump is undermining the credibility of Article 5. Moreover, his aversion to NATO is destabilizing the international order. An American withdrawal from Europe would open the door to conflicts the likes of which the continent has not seen since 1945.
Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan recently challenged the notion of a multipolar world. He argued that the US has been "enabled to cast off previous constraints and exercise its power even more aggressively." Is he right?
Many American commentators argue that the US-Israeli attacks on Iran demonstrate that only the US possesses the capacity for such interventions and will indeed use that power. However, this course of action distracts from what the US should actually be focusing on: stabilizing the situation in Europe and East Asia through deterrence. A war with Iran weakens US power. Just because the United States attacks a much weaker adversary does not mean we are suddenly living in a unipolar world again. It merely demonstrates that dominant great powers, when under pressure, begin to lash out. It actually accelerates the decline of the former superpower.
The term "multipolar" is controversial, especially in the West. Could you clarify what you mean by it?
Great powers like China, Russia, and India are defining spheres of influence intended to align with their security interests—even if not all poles will be equally powerful. China’s call for a multipolar world—much like the American insistence on supremacy—reflects the hope that its own interests might shape a new world order. India aims to become the dominant power in South Asia. By 2050, it will still be a young nation with a population of 1.7 billion—25 percent larger than China’s much older population. That is the kind of thing that creates multipolarity.
Let’s return to your historical analogy. You compare the US to Great Britain and China to the Wilhelmine German Empire. Why?
Just like Germany before World War I, China is driven by a highly unhealthy mix of megalomania and fear in its pursuit of success on the international stage. Both China and the Wilhelmine Empire occupy—or occupied—central positions in two vital regions of the world: Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, both have experienced rapid economic growth. Such transformations often lead to instability. Not necessarily because of the behavior of rising powers, but rather due to the collective failure to integrate them into an international system that genuinely takes their interests and anxieties seriously. Established European powers—specifically Britain and France—failed to do this with regard to Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Just as we failed to integrate China into East Asia’s security architecture when we had the chance in the 1990s. By saying this, I do not intend to absolve Germany of responsibility for the war, nor do I mean to excuse China’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy in its region.
What are China’s objectives in this regard?
My impression is that the Chinese leadership seeks a certain degree of stability on the international stage, at least in the short term. I have met with military officials in Beijing, among others, and the realization is dawning on them that a war between great powers would be a catastrophe for both China and the world. The total number of people killed in conflicts between great powers during the century between 1815 and 1914 is lower than the number of casualties suffered at the Somme in the summer of 1916. Between July and November 1916, there were more than a million dead and wounded. We should be aware of this scale when discussing wars between great powers.
In 2017, political scientist Graham Allison coined the term "Thucydides Trap." His study found that out of 16 historical instances where a rising power challenged an established great power, twelve ended in war.
War between the US and China is no longer unthinkable. The conflict over Taiwan is somewhat akin to the conflicts over Alsace-Lorraine, Bosnia, and Belgium all rolled into one. For the Communist Party, China’s claim to Taiwan is a central component of its political identity—much like the claim to Alsace-Lorraine was for the French Third Republic in 1914, or the claim to Bosnia for the Serbian government. The US pursues a policy of "strategic ambiguity"—not unlike Britain’s alliance policy prior to 1914—which leaves open the question of whether it would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by the People's Republic. Furthermore, it continues to sell arms to Taiwan to maintain the island's self-defense capabilities.
What does this mean for the future?
The status quo consists of maintaining the framework that has long served to preserve peace. All parties to the conflict are aware of the Taiwan dilemma. However, the US, China, and representatives of political parties on the island are pulling in different directions. This makes the knot increasingly difficult to untangle. It is an explosive mix.
You analyze how fears, resentments, and nationalism can lead to violence. Where else in the world do you see the danger of major wars?
The greatest risk of further conflict lies in Southeast Asia. China and Japan are at odds over the Senkaku Islands north of Taiwan for years. For Vietnam and Indonesia, territorial disputes in the South China Sea play a central role in shaping their approach to security issues. Then there is the tense situation between North and South Korea, the situation in Tibet, and the prospect of a war in the Himalayas—which may sound highly unlikely, yet China and India are competing for influence in Asia there as well.
We live in an era where major powers and regional powers behave like gamblers. What can we learn from history to avoid being swept away by the geopolitical storm?
An important lesson from the world prior to 1914 is that regional conflicts left unresolved for long periods can become the powder kegs that ignite a global conflagration. When fears—of humiliation, defeat, or betrayal—and resentments mix with unresolved geopolitical issues, the risk of war rises. To avoid wars between great powers, we must strengthen international institutions that can help alleviate these fears and resentments. Yet, that is not what we are doing. Furthermore, we should try to put ourselves in the shoes of other national leaders. Before the outbreak of war in 1914, there was much talk but little understanding: in Great Britain, they failed to grasp Germany’s strategic motives; conversely, in Germany, there was a misunderstanding regarding how Great Britain viewed its role—not just in Europe, but in a global context. The conclusion is clear: we must do better.
Questions by Majd El-Safadi.” [1]
1. In der Thukydides-Falle. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 18 Apr 2026: 10.
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