What Can You Do After Outsourcing Your Industry from USA to China, and Waking Up to The Realization, That You Need More Ships? You Start Dreaming about the Ships

One person's dreams are another's source of income. Biden's dreams enriched incompetent labor unions. Trump's dreams allow major US companies to turn a profit. Yet, the situation remains at a standstill.

 

This situation illustrates the structural crisis in US shipbuilding caused by decades of deindustrialization. When manufacturing is relocated thousands of miles across the ocean and domestic capacity is dismantled, a sudden surge in demand for ships cannot be met simply through political promises or cash injections.

While politicians shift their rhetoric, the actual situation remains stalled due to several fundamental reasons:

Why is US shipbuilding at an impasse?

•           Loss of industrial base: The US no longer possesses the infrastructure for large-scale commercial shipbuilding. The global market is currently dominated by China (holding about 50–60% of the market), South Korea, and Japan. The US share of global commercial shipbuilding is less than 1%.

•           Catastrophic labor shortage: There is a lack of skilled welders, engineers, and shipbuilders. Even when multi-billion dollar orders are placed (for both military and civilian fleets), shipyards simply lack the workforce to carry out the construction. •         The Jones Act trap: Under this 1920 law, only U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-flagged vessels may transport goods between U.S. ports. Since building a ship in the U.S. costs four to five times more than in Asia, the domestic fleet is aging, and new shipbuilding is economically unviable for businesses.

Two different visions – the same result

Attempts by both political camps to address this issue usually result in subsidies for their respective interest groups rather than actual ships on the water:

Political approach    Key focus       Market outcome

Democratic (Biden) model  Subsidies linked to strict requirements regarding union labor and green energy (e.g., wind farm service vessels). Increases construction costs and bureaucracy; protects union privileges but fails to boost production efficiency.

Republican (Trump) model Tariffs on Chinese steel/ships, deregulation, and massive defense contracts for major U.S. corporations (General Dynamics, Huntington Ingalls). Corporations record massive profits from government contracts, yet a lack of competition leads to years-long project delays and cost overruns. Ultimately, the US finds itself in a vicious circle: buying ships from China has become a geopolitical taboo and a security threat, while building them domestically is too expensive, too slow, and hampered by labor shortages. Until fundamental reforms in education, vocational training, and industrial automation are undertaken, such "dreams" will remain nothing more than a part of political campaigns.

 

 

"The United States might be losing another war — one that could define the country’s security into the next century.

 

Military and commercial power are intertwined. Maritime power, in particular, has always played a crucial part in establishing and maintaining commercial power. America is learning this lesson the hard way.

 

For hundreds of years, the countries that have ruled the waves have ruled the world, as the 19th-century American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan put it.

 

In an age of drones, we can be forgiven for thinking this time has ended.

 

Yet today, more than 80 percent of global trade is still transported by ships. America has all but lost the ability to build them. A country that manufactured 5 percent of the world’s fleet by tonnage and that dominated the global maritime industry in the 1970s makes 0.2 percent of the world’s fleet by tonnage today.

 

How did we get here? During the Reagan era, U.S. policymakers decided to stop supporting commercial shipping, which quickly migrated to other countries like Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, the defense arm of the naval industry shrank after the post-Cold War defense cuts of the 1990s. At the same time, the Chinese decided to make shipbuilding and maritime industries a strategic priority, tripling production relative to the United States over the past two decades.

 

The Chinese now dominate in terms of sheer production capacity and their global market share of shipbuilding, thanks to decades of state support. In 2006, the government named shipbuilding as one of the seven strategic industries over which state-owned Chinese enterprises had to maintain control. By 2015, Beijing identified shipbuilding as one of 10 priority sectors through which China would dominate global commerce.

 

All this was happening as the United States was going in the opposite direction, outsourcing the building of not only ships but many other supply chains in industrial sectors. It was part of a grand bargain in which American capital flowed to China, and U.S. consumers got cheap goods in exchange. But all the while, American jobs, as well as supply chain resiliency and in some cases national security, were sacrificed.

 

Not only do the Chinese have more battleships, but the private-sector fleet it has built, which delivers the bulk of the world’s commercial goods, vastly outnumbers America’s. The United States today has fewer than 200 oceangoing vessels. The Chinese have 5,500. Does anyone doubt that the Chinese could best the United States in any kind of global maritime supply chain gambit, or, say, a military blockage around Taiwan?

 

This is particularly so given that commercial fleets are the way that the U.S. military gets most of its supplies delivered, even in wartime. If China were to pull back ships (as it pulled back P.P.E. supplies for health workers for a time during the pandemic), it could have huge economic and security implications for the United States (or any other nation that depends on Chinese commercial vessels).

 

Even in lieu of something that dramatic, maritime disruptions are becoming more and more commonplace. The Consultative Shipping Group, whose members represent more than a fifth of global trade by tonnage, recently said that the maritime blockages and supply chain disruptions in places like the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez and Panama Canals aren’t “episodic shocks” but a new normal in a world where ships and shipping routes have become globally contentious choke points.

 

No wonder countries like China and Russia are looking to exploit new, alternative routes that they can control — like the transpolar route across the Arctic Ocean, parts of which Russia claims control over. A Chinese company recently launched a weekly shipping route across the Arctic, cutting 40 days off the usual pathway.

 

Those two countries have around 60 icebreakers (which are necessary for safe passage in the High North) to America’s three in the Arctic.

 

That is one of the reasons the Trump administration is building more with the Finns, an idea that was born during Trump 1 and developed during the Biden administration (which saw a strategic opportunity to “friend shore” with NATO allies, including Finland and Canada). America needed more icebreakers to navigate an area that had become far more economically and strategically important than it used to be. Global warming has opened the possibility of new commercial channels through the High North as ice melts. The Russians are once again militarizing the Northern Sea Route (as they did during the Cold War), and many nations are in a race to map the region for natural gas and minerals. All of this requires icebreakers.

 

While the Biden administration put meat on the bones of the strategy, signing a memorandum of understanding on the sidelines of the NATO summit in 2024, it was President Trump who later inked the deal to build 11 icebreakers with the Finns during his second administration — all of which reflects the fact that shipbuilding has become a bipartisan industrial priority.

 

Defense hawks have long warned that while America might still have a lead in areas like nuclear submarines and the highest-tech maritime equipment, its lack of more nimble, dual use vessels that could be turned out more cheaply and quickly would be a huge disadvantage in a world in which supply chain resiliency and spheres of influence are more important. In maritime industries, as in so many others, there is no single global market anymore, but rather fleets owned by groups of countries and companies that might or might not work together in a pinch.

 

During the Biden administration, Jake Sullivan, then the national security adviser, declared that “ships are the new chips,” an area in which the United States should, working with allies, become more self-sufficient. While Mr. Trump has boasted about building a “golden fleet” of battleships, he’s also put a pause on trade remedies based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that would curb Chinese power in shipbuilding. During the U.S.-China summit in late September, the pause was extended until early 2027.

 

Despite the rhetoric, Mr. Trump is no China hawk. But there are many on both sides of the aisle in Congress who are more committed to rebuilding the U.S. maritime sector.

 

In April of 2025, Senators Todd Young, Republican of Indiana, and Mark Kelly, Democrat of Arizona, announced a push for the SHIPs for America Act, a bill that would revitalize America’s shipbuilding industries, putting more money into work force training, and a maritime security trust fund, which, like the national airport and highway trust funds, aims to create a pot of funds that don’t have to be reauthorized every year, making the long-term work of bolstering the maritime industries possible.

 

Congress may well punt on the talks until after the midterms, but shipbuilding will remain a big part of the political conversation — battleground states such as Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania are also big maritime industry states. And the weaponization of maritime choke points — by Iran, China, the Houthis and others — isn’t going away. There is little question that America needs to bolster its fleet at a time of rising conflict and global mercantilism.

 

As Trump’s shipbuilding adviser, the former naval officer Jerry Hendrix, wrote in a 2020 book, “Perhaps hearkening back to China’s late-19th-century collapse under pressure from imperial European powers,” Beijing has pursued a maritime strategy that “mirrored the pattern laid down centuries before by the Dutch and British East India Companies,” ruling the world’s supply chains in part by ruling the waves.

 

America has let go of its maritime edge at its own peril. But Congress has an opportunity to bring it back, slowly but surely, with an industrial policy that both right and left want. It’s an opportunity that shouldn’t be allowed to float away.

 

Rana Foroohar is the author of “Sea Change: America’s New Great Game in the Arctic Circle.”” [1]

 

1. A War America Could Win: Guest Essay. Foroohar, Rana.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Oct 7, 2026.

Kaip, Azijoje veikianti, šešėlinė ekonomika užtikrina Irano naftos tiekimą

“Įmonės ir toliau aptarnauja „šešėlinį“ Irano tanklaivių laivyną Malaizijos vandenyse, nepaisydamos Vašingtono grasinimų taikyti joms sankcijas.

 

Dėl sankcijų sąrašuose atsidūrusios Irano naftos Jeffrey Sohui, kurio darbas kartais nuveda į Pietų Kinijos jūros pakraštyje stovintį supertanklaivį, tenka susidurti su pavojinga konkurencija.

 

Jo laivas „Europe“ – 1 264 pėdų (apie 385 metrų) ilgio milžinas – yra toks didelis ir nepaslankus, kad nuolat stovi inkaravietėje prie pietvakarinės Malaizijos pakrantės ir naudojamas kaip plaukiojanti saugykla. Vieną neseniai buvusį trečiadienį prie jo buvo prisišvartavęs tanklaivis „Dubai Beauty“, per storas juodas žarnas pumpuojantis iš Omano atgabentą laivų kurą.

 

„Iki 4 000 metrinių tonų per valandą“, – sakė J. Sohas. Ore tvyrojo salstelėjęs, nemalonus naftos kvapas. „Tačiau perkrovimo procesas gali užtrukti iki 72 valandų.“

 

Toks kuro perkrovimas iš vieno laivo į kitą (angl. *ship-to-ship* arba STS) yra įprasta naftos pramonės praktika ir kasdienė J. Soho įmonės „Contemporary Logistics“, kurios klientų gretose yra tokie milžinai kaip „Chevron“, veiklos dalis. Tačiau pastaraisiais metais tokiais perkrovimo būdais naudojasi ir šešėlinis Irano laivynas: siekdamas apeiti JAV sankcijas, jis Malaizijos vandenyse neteisėtai gabena ir parduoda milijonus barelių Irano žaliavinės naftos.

 

Šešėlinio laivyno nelegalūs kroviniai užplūdo pasaulinę naftos rinką itin mažomis kainomis, taip mažindami kainas J. Soho klientams. Šio laivyno laivai – dažnai seni ir abejotinai apdrausti – įvykus avarijai kelia grėsmę padidinti draudimo įmokas visai pramonei. Be to, prieš kelerius metus vienas iš šio laivyno tanklaivių pasinaudojo jo įmonės saugykla kroviniui, kuris, kaip vėliau paaiškėjo, buvo Irano nafta, pristatyti.

 

„Labai lengva patekti į bėdą, pernelyg lengva būti demaskuotam, – sakė jis. – O šiais laikais, kai paminimi STS perkrovimai ir Malaizija, žmonės tave priskiria prie tų, kurie užsiima abejotina veikla.“ Ši nemaloni reputacija sulaukė JAV pareigūnų dėmesio, kurie dešimtmečius bandė sustabdyti Irano naftos srautus, persekiodami tamsiąją tanklaivių flotilę, taip pat jų operatorius ir finansininkus. Dabar, praėjus daugiau nei septyniems mėnesiams nuo karo su Iranu pradžios, Vašingtonas vis dažniau taikosi į kitą taikinį: jūrų paslaugų teikėjus tokiose šalyse kaip Malaizija ir Singapūras, kurie, jo teigimu, padeda Irano laivams.

 

„Šešėliniai laivynai negali funkcionuoti be jų“, – sakė Charlie Brownas, vyresnysis patarėjas „United Against Nuclear Iran“, gynimo grupėje, kuri seka Irano laivus.

 

Milijonai barelių Irano naftos praslydo per Hormūzo sąsiaurį prieš tai, kai Jungtinės Valstijos blokavo Irano uostus. Rugpjūtį iždo sekretorius Scottas Bessent paskelbė apie naujas griežtas sankcijas, kurios taip pat buvo nukreiptos į bendroves, kurios leido Irano tanklaiviams veikti, pavyzdžiui, laivų brokerius, degalų papildymo paslaugų teikėjus ir finansinius tarpininkus.

 

„Mes taikome nulinio nuotėkio principą“, – sakė p. Bessent.

 

JAV sankcijos gali būti itin žalingos užsienio įmonėms, nes jos negali atlikti sandorių doleriais, todėl negali mokėti tiekėjams ar atgauti doleriais denominuoto turto. Kitos įmonės ir net bankai jų vengs.

 

Vis dėlto Vašingtonas jau dešimtmečius nesėkmingai bando sustabdyti Irano naftos srautus, ir analitikai teigia, kad toli gražu neaišku, ar griežtesnės priemonės bus veiksmingesnės. „Kol kas šios pastangos, regis, neturėjo didelės įtakos Irano naftos srautams per šiuos tinklus“, – sakė Azerbaidžane gyvenantis Irano naftos prekybos ekspertas Dalga Khatinoglu.

 

Beveik visą šiandien eksportuojamą Irano naftą perka mažos Kinijos naftos perdirbimo gamyklos, vadinamos „arbatinukais“. Ir norėdami perduoti savo krovinį laivams, kurie jį ten išgabens, Irano tanklaiviai vis dažniau renkasi Malaizijos rytinėje išorinio uosto riboje (E.O.P.L.) – vandenyno plote, esančiame 45 mylių atstumu nuo rytinės Malaizijos Džohoro valstijos pakrantės.

 

Prekyba Irano nafta ir toliau klesti šioje teritorijoje, esančioje už Malaizijos teritorinių vandenų, vos už Malakos sąsiaurio – svarbaus laivybos kelio, jungiančio Artimųjų Rytų naftą su Rytų Azijos pirkėjais.

 

Nors ji yra platesnėje Malaizijos išskirtinėje ekonominėje zonoje jūroje, šalies valdžia retai imasi griežtų priemonių prekybai, teigdama, kad susiduria su jurisdikcijos iššūkiais ir praktiniais sunkumais stebint teritoriją.

 

Siekdami išvengti JAV valdžios institucijų aptikimo, laivai, vykdantys perkraunimus iš laivo į laivą, dažnai plaukioja su netikromis vėliavomis ir manipuliuoja savo atsakikliais – siųstuvais, kuriuos dideli laivai privalo naudoti visada pagal tarptautinę jūrų teisę, kad atskleistų savo buvimo vietą. Kai kurie taip pat uždažo laivų pavadinimus ir slepia kitus vaizdinius identifikatorius.

 

Tačiau net ir tamsiajam laivynui reikalingos tos pačios prekės ir paslaugos kaip ir kitiems laivams: įgulos reikmenys, remontas, kuras ir fenderiai – milžiniški plūduriuojantys balistiniai elementai, kurie neleidžia dviem tanklaiviams atsitrenkti vienas į kitą perkraunant kurą. O Džohoras, turintis du didelius uostus ir didelę jūrų pramonę, yra pilkosios rinkos, kuri mielai juos tiekia, namai.

 

Įmonės tai daro, nes darbas gerai apmokamas, nes, pasak vietos laivų aprūpinimo įmonės vadovo, pageidavusio likti anonimu dėl baimės sulaukti JAV sankcijų, už šias paslaugas mokama brangiau, dažniausiai – grynaisiais pinigais. Jo įmonė sutikdavo aptarnauti žinomus ar įtariamus Irano tanklaivius tik tuo atveju, jei galėdavo užtikrinti, kad neliks jokių įrašų, siejančių juos su šiuo sandoriu.

 

Ypač paklausūs yra vietos kapitonai, gerai išmanantys E.O.P.L. zonos sroves. Kadangi daugelis Irano laivų, siekdami išvengti aptikimo, krovinius iš vieno laivo į kitą (STS operacijos) perkelia jiems judant, šie kapitonai reikalingi kaip švartavimo specialistai, vairuojantys milžiniškus tanklaivius ir padedantys jiems tiksliai išsirikiuoti.

 

„Šioms operacijoms atlikti labai ieškoma Malaizijos, Singapūro ir Indonezijos kapitonų“, – teigė Eddie Effendi, švartavimo specialistas įmonėje, kuri specializuojasi būtent tokioje veikloje.

 

Jis sakė, kad jo įmonė visada atmeta Irano laivų (arba jų agentų) prašymus, kartais pateikiamus kartu su pasiūlymais atsiskaityti kriptovaliuta. Tačiau jis nestebi, kad kitus vilioja didesnio pelno perspektyva.

 

„E.O.P.L. zona tapo savotiška lygiagrečia ekonomika, – sakė jis. – Už locmanų paslaugas čia siūlomi geri pinigai.“

 

Malaizijoje verslui nėra draudžiama bendradarbiauti su Irano laivais, nes ši šalis nelaiko JAV sankcijų teisėtomis. Nors reaguodama į JAV spaudimą vietos valdžia kartais demonstruodavo griežtesnę poziciją Irano tanklaivių atžvilgiu, iš esmės į šią veiklą žiūrima pro pirštus.

 

Sprendimą, ar rizikuoti prarasti prieigą prie atsiskaitymų JAV doleriais sistemos, priima pačios įmonės, teigė buvęs Susisiekimo ministerijos Jūrų transporto departamento pareigūnas. Jis pridūrė, kad uostų, kuriuose veikia šios bendrovės, operatoriai taip pat nepritaria griežtesnei reguliavimo kontrolei. Šis buvęs pareigūnas, dabar dirbantis privačiame jūrų transporto sektoriuje, kalbėjo anonimiškai, baimindamasis pakenkti santykiams su minėtais uostais.

 

Nors Malaiziją su Vašingtonu sieja itin svarbūs ekonominiai ryšiai, ji taip pat palaiko draugiškus santykius su Iranu bei Kinija – didžiausia Irano naftos pirkėja. Malaizija, kurioje gyventojų daugumą sudaro musulmonai, jau seniai laikosi nesikišimo politikos ir yra viena garsiausių tarptautinių kritikių, smerkiančių karą Irane. Pekinas yra didžiausia jos prekybos partnerė.

 

„Malaizijos pozicija visiškai aiški. Ji draugiška visiems ir niekam nėra priešas“, – teigė Nazery Khalidas, jūrų transporto ekspertas ir kviestinis mokslininkas Malajos universiteto Pietryčių Azijos studijų katedroje. „Jai neturėtų būti primesta būtinybė rinktis vieną ar kitą pusę.“

 

Tačiau Vašingtonui vis labiau reikalaujant, kad šalys apsispręstų, mažai tikėtina, jog jo vykdomos griežtos priemonės sulauks didelio palaikymo tarp Malaizijos gyventojų, sakė Joshua Kurlantzickas, Užsienio santykių tarybos (angl. *Council on Foreign Relations*) vyresnysis bendradarbis, besispecializuojantis Pietryčių ir Pietų Azijos klausimais.

 

„JAV Malaizijoje yra itin nepopuliarios – tokia nuotaika vyrauja nuo pat karo Gazos Ruože pradžios“, – sakė jis. „Prasidėjus karui su Iranu, šis nepopuliarumas tik dar labiau išaugo.“

 

Tokias nuostatas palaiko ir jūrų transporto specialistai, pavyzdžiui, kapitonas Effendi; jis Irano laivų įgulas – kurių nariai dažnai net nėra iraniečiai – laiko kolegomis jūrininkais, tiesiog atliekančiais savo darbą. Jis abejoja, ar moralu atsisakyti teikti jiems tokias paslaugas kaip aprūpinimas gėlu vandeniu ar maistu.

 

„Tie laivuose dirbantys jūrininkai tiesiog stengiasi užsidirbti duonai savo šeimoms“, – sakė jis.

 

Skirtingai nei pačius naftos tanklaivius, kurie atidžiai stebimi naudojant palydovines nuotraukas, nustatyti aptarnaujančias įmones nėra taip paprasta. Viena iš priežasčių – atsargoms pristatyti naudojami mažesni laivai. „Palydovinėse nuotraukose jie atrodo vos kaip neryški dėmelė“, – sakė p. Brownas iš Irano laivus stebinčios grupės.

 

Įmonės taip pat dažnai slepiasi pasitelkdamos fiktyvias bendroves, teigė p. Sohas iš „Contemporary Logistics“. „Jos gali tiesiog įkurti kitą įmonę“, – sakė jis. „Jei pradedama taikyti sankcijas jūrų paslaugų teikėjams, šis procesas niekada nesibaigs.“

 

Būdamas laivo „Europe“ tiltelyje, jis stebėjo, kaip tolumoje esantys naftos tanklaiviai tyliai plaukia per Malakos sąsiaurį. Vandenynas yra milžiniška erdvė, kurioje apstu vietų pasislėpti nuo budrių žvilgsnių, sakė jis. Net jei Jungtinėms Valstijoms pavyktų pažaboti E.O.P.L. veiklą, Irano tanklaiviai gali tiesiog pakeisti dislokacijos vietą.

 

„Jie keliasi kitur – į Penangą ar Malaką. Krovinių perkrovimas vyksta ir Indonezijos vandenyse – ten, kur niekas jų nestebi, – sakė jis. – Tiesą sakant, jų yra visur.“” [1]

 

1. How a Shadow Economy in Asia Is Keeping Iranian Oil Flowing. Kim, Max.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Oct 7, 2026.

How a Shadow Economy in Asia Is Keeping Iranian Oil Flowing

 

“Companies continue to service a “dark fleet” of Iranian tankers in waters off Malaysia in spite of Washington’s threat to target them.

 

Blacklisted Iranian oil has long been a source of perilous competition for Jeffrey Soh, whose job sometimes takes him on a supertanker moored in a corner of the South China Sea.

 

His ship, the 1,264-foot-long Europe, is so cumbersomely large that it is semipermanently anchored for use as floating storage off the southwestern coast of Malaysia. On a recent Wednesday, a tanker named the Dubai Beauty was parked against it, pumping in marine fuel from Oman via thick, black hoses.

 

“Up to 4,000 metric tons per hour,” Mr. Soh said. The sickly sweet smell of oil hung in the air. “But a transfer can take up to 72 hours.”

 

These ship-to-ship, or S.T.S., transfers are a common practice in the petroleum industry, and a routine part of business for Mr. Soh’s firm, Contemporary Logistics, which has clients like Chevron. But in recent years, an Iranian shadow fleet has also used such transfers to illegally transport and sell millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil in the waters around Malaysia in evasion of American sanctions.

 

The shadow fleet’s illicit cargo has flooded the global oil market at heavy discounts, suppressing prices for Mr. Soh’s clients. Its vessels, which are often old and dubiously insured, threaten to raise premiums for the rest of the industry whenever they are involved in an accident. And a few years ago, one of its tankers used one of his company’s storage units to deliver what turned out to be Iranian oil.

 

“It’s very easy to get into trouble, too easy to get exposed,” he said. “And these days, if you say S.T.S. transfer and Malaysia, people group you with the dodgy ones.”

 

This unsavory reputation has invited scrutiny from U.S. officials, who for decades have tried to stanch the flow of Iranian oil by going after the dark fleet of tankers as well as their operators and financiers. Now, more than seven months into the war with Iran, Washington is increasingly taking aim at another target: maritime services providers in countries like Malaysia and Singapore, which it says are helping the Iranian vessels.

 

“The shadow fleets can’t function without them,” said Charlie Brown, a senior adviser to United Against Nuclear Iran, an advocacy group that tracks Iranian ships.

 

Millions of barrels of Iranian oil slipped through the Strait of Hormuz before the United States blockaded Iranian ports. In August, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced sweeping new sanctions that also targeted the companies that enabled the Iranian tankers, such as vessel brokers, bunkering service providers and financial intermediaries.

 

“We are enforcing a zero-leakage approach,” Mr. Bessent said.

 

U.S. sanctions can be debilitating for foreign companies by excluding them from dollar transactions, which can leave them unable to pay suppliers or retrieve dollar-denominated assets. Other businesses and even banks will shun them.

 

Still, Washington has been trying unsuccessfully to stop the flow of Iranian oil for decades, and analysts said it is far from clear whether the more extreme measures will do any better. “So far, those efforts do not appear to have had a significant impact on the flow of Iranian oil through these networks,” said Dalga Khatinoglu, an Azerbaijan-based expert on Iran’s oil trade.

 

Nearly all the Iranian oil that is exported today is bought by small Chinese refineries known as “teapots.” And to hand off their cargo to the vessels that will ship it there, Iranian tankers have increasingly congregated in the Malaysian Eastern Outer Port Limits, or E.O.P.L., a patch of ocean 45 miles off the eastern coast of the Malaysian state of Johor.

 

The trade in Iranian oil has continued to thrive in this area, which is located outside Malaysia’s territorial waters just past the Strait of Malacca, a critical shipping lane that connects Middle Eastern oil to East Asian buyers.

 

While it does lie within Malaysia’s more expansive offshore Exclusive Economic Zone, the nation’s authorities rarely clamp down on the trade, saying they face jurisdictional challenges and practical difficulties in policing the area.

 

To evade detection from U.S. authorities tracking them, vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers often operate under false flags and manipulate their transponders, a transmitter that large ships must use at all times under international maritime law to reveal their location. Some also paint over ship names and hide other visual identifiers.

 

But even the dark fleet requires the same goods and services as other ships: crew supplies, repairs, fuel and fenders — gigantic floating bobbers that stop two tankers from bumping into each other during a fuel transfer. And Johor, which has two major ports and an extensive maritime industry, is home to a gray market that is happy to supply them.

 

The companies do it because the work commands a premium and is often paid in cash, according to the manager of a local ship chandler who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of drawing American reprisals. His company only accepted work from known or suspected Iranian tankers if they could ensure no record tying them to the transaction would remain, he said.

 

Local captains who are familiar with the E.O.P.L.’s currents are in particularly high demand. Since many Iranian ships conduct S.T.S. transfers while still moving in order to avoid detection, they are needed to serve as mooring masters, piloting the massive tankers as they maneuver into precise alignment.

 

“Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian master mariners are highly sought for these operations,” said Eddie Effendi, a mooring master for a company that specializes in these operations.

 

He said his company always turns down the requests it gets from Iranian ships, which are sent via their agents and sometimes come with offers of payment in cryptocurrency. But he is not surprised to see others enticed by the prospect of bigger profits.

 

“The E.O.P.L. has become a parallel economy,” he said. “They’re being offered good money for pilotage services.”

 

It is not illegal for businesses to work with Iranian ships in Malaysia, which does not consider the U.S. sanctions to be legitimate. And though they have at times projected a tougher stance against Iranian tankers in response to pressure from the U.S., the local authorities have largely turned a blind eye.

 

It is up to the individual businesses to decide whether to take the risk of being cut off from the dollar system or not, said a former official in the Ministry of Transport’s maritime division, adding that operators of the ports where these companies do business also oppose more regulatory oversight. The former official, who now works in the private maritime sector, spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of jeopardizing their relationship with these ports.

 

Though it has critical economic ties with Washington, Malaysia also keeps friendly relations with Iran and China, the biggest buyer of Iranian oil. Malaysia, which is predominantly Muslim, has a longstanding policy of nonalignment, and has been one of the most vocal international critics of the war in Iran. Beijing is its biggest trading partner.

 

“Malaysia’s stand is crystal clear. It is a friend to everyone and an enemy to none,” said Nazery Khalid, a maritime expert and visiting fellow at Universiti Malaya’s department of Southeast Asian studies. “It should not be put in the position of having to choose sides.”

 

But as Washington increasingly demands that nations make such a choice, it is unlikely to find much support for its crackdown among Malaysians, said Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

“The U.S. is extremely unpopular in Malaysia, and has been since the beginning of the war in Gaza,” he said. “It has only gotten more unpopular in Malaysia since the Iran war.”

 

Such sentiments are shared among maritime professionals like Mr. Effendi, the captain, who sees the crews of Iranian vessels — who are often not Iranian themselves — as fellow mariners just trying to do their jobs. He questions whether it is moral to refuse them services like fresh water or food.

 

“Those seafarers onboard are just working to feed their families at home,” he said.

 

Unlike the oil tankers themselves, which are extensively monitored via satellite imagery, identifying the supporting companies is not so easy. For one, they use smaller boats to deliver supplies. “In satellite imagery, they’re barely a smudge,” said Mr. Brown of the group that tracks Iranian ships.

 

The companies also often hide themselves by using shell companies, said Mr. Soh of Contemporary Logistics. “They can just start another company,” he said. “Once you start sanctioning marine service providers, it will never end.”

 

On the bridge of the Europe, he watched distant oil tankers silently glide down the Strait of Malacca. The ocean was a vast place with plenty of space to escape watchful eyes, he said. Even if the United States does succeed in cracking down on the E.O.P.L., the Iranian tankers can just relocate.

 

“They’re moving elsewhere to Penang or Malacca. There are also transfers in Indonesian waters, wherever the eyes are not looking at them,” he said. “They are, honestly, everywhere.”” [1]

 

1. How a Shadow Economy in Asia Is Keeping Iranian Oil Flowing. Kim, Max.  New York Times (Online) New York Times Company. Oct 7, 2026.