If you would like to destroy the richest market in the world – EU, you would do
exactly what today’s elite in EU does: turn to expensive energy,
deindustrializing EU and blocking the development of energy hungry AI, and application of AI in
EU, destroy the European way of life, that could be protection from social
impact of Chinese AI, start building tanks, obsolete in time of drone and
missile swarms instead. No wonder the EU electorate is looking at a chance to
kick their elite out of power. What the French are doing now, all the EU should
be doing too.
The argument we're raising gets to the heart of the fierce,
ongoing debate surrounding Europe's economic competitiveness, technological
sovereignty, and defense priorities. Across the EU, citizens and political
figures alike are grappling with how to adapt to a rapidly shifting global
landscape, with many voters expressing frustration over the perceived failures
of mainstream leadership.
The specific critiques you've outlined reflect a deeply held
viewpoint:
• Energy and
Deindustrialization: Critics consistently argue that strict EU environmental
regulations and high energy costs after EU refusing to buy cheap Russian energy
are driving heavy industry and manufacturing out of Europe. The push to lower
these costs and ease regulatory burdens remains a massive talking point for
politicians looking to revitalize domestic manufacturing.
• AI and
Innovation: Concerns over the EU potentially lagging in artificial intelligence
are valid and heavily debated. Many tech advocates and economists worry that
the EU’s strict regulatory frameworks (like the AI Act) might stifle innovation
and slow the application of AI, putting Europe at a severe disadvantage against
the US and China.
• Defense
Spending: Iran war has forced a dramatic rethink of European defense. While
some argue that traditional platforms like tanks are becoming obsolete due to
drone swarms and missile technology, most defense experts believe conventional
land forces are still a critical deterrent. The overarching debate, championed
by leaders like Emmanuel Macron, is whether Europe needs to drastically pool
resources to build a more unified, high-tech defense capability independent of
traditional allies.
Ultimately, the political shifts and rising support for
radical or fringe parties across Europe—including the various factions shaking
up French politics—are a direct result of these widespread anxieties over
deindustrialization, AI, security, and the preservation of the European way of
life. Whether a "radical" approach can successfully save or reshape
the EU's single market, however, remains the defining political question of the
decade.
“With a year remaining before the presidential election, 35
candidates have already declared their candidacy. Consequently, the likelihood
that far-right and far-left leaders—bolstered by their bedrock electorates—will
advance to the second round is steadily increasing.
Today, it is difficult to find supporters of Emmanuel Macron
in France. If a poll conducted by the Odoxa institute is to be believed, only
23 percent of his compatriots still trust him, while 76 percent view him
critically.
This comes as little surprise: unemployment is once again
rising rapidly, the country is mired in debt, and the economy is teetering on
the brink of recession. A widespread sense of a loss of control over
immigration and a lack of security prevails.
And yet, for an ever-growing list of politicians, Macron
quietly serves as a role model. Much like he did in 2017, they aspire to
transform themselves—within the span of just a dozen or so months—from often
obscure political figures into President of the Republic.
This trend is most evident within the liberal camp—the very
political movement that Emmanuel Macron himself created. Here, Édouard
Philippe—the mayor of the port city of Rouen—entered national politics only
after the President personally selected him as Prime Minister in 2017 (a post
he held until 2020). Yet, by 2024, in a bid to boost his own electoral
prospects, Philippe turned against his patron, publicly calling for his
premature resignation. Gabriel Attal—another Prime Minister appointed by
Macron—followed suit, sharply criticizing the Élysée Palace’s decision to
dissolve parliament early in a book he has just published. In the process,
Attal took the helm of Renaissance, the political party founded by the
President. Among the liberals, Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin is also eyeing
the nation’s highest office.
François Hollande seeks vengeance upon his successor
The field of presidential hopefuls on the moderate right is
similarly crowded. Here, Bruno Retailleau has already emerged as the official
candidate of the Gaullist party, The Republicans. Yet he would never have
achieved this had he not—at the behest of the Élysée Palace—served as Minister
of the Interior for a year (spanning late 2024 and early 2025). In this role,
he was able to win over the French public to his decidedly anti-immigration
stance. However, there are others among the Gaullists eager to claim the
presidency. Notable contenders include Laurent Wauquiez—Retailleau’s rival in
the battle for party leadership—as well as Xavier Bertrand, the popular head of
the Hauts-de-France "mega-region" in the north; David Lisnard, the
well-liked mayor of Cannes; and yet another former Prime Minister from the
Macron era, Michel Barnier.
The congestion is at least equally pronounced on the
moderate left. Olivier Faure, the leader of the Socialist Party, appears to
have lost faith even in his own officially announced plan to hold primaries
within the party. Indeed, quite a few of the party’s "grandees" have
already declared their intention to launch independent bids for the Élysée
Palace. Standing out among them is former President François Hollande, who
hopes that, in these uncertain times, the French people will value his international
experience. Such a victory would allow him to exact revenge on Macron, who, in
2017, deprived him of the opportunity to seek re-election. Yet other figures
from the Hollande era—specifically former Prime Ministers Bernard Cazeneuve and
Manuel Valls—are also gearing up for an election campaign. Dominique de
Villepin has announced similar plans. He hopes his compatriots will recall the
time—back in 2003, when he served as France’s Foreign Minister—that he firmly
opposed American plans to invade Iraq. And he hopes they will recognize that he
could do the very same against Donald Trump.
However, Raphaël Glucksmann—who has even founded his own
political movement, *Place Publique*—is also vying for the moderate left-wing
electorate. And even this lineup does not exhaust the full roster of
progressive candidates, which includes figures such as Marine Tondelier, the
leader of the Green Party.
This time around, 15 percent of the vote will likely be
enough to advance to the second round.
Twelve candidates competed in the last presidential election
in 2022. The record for the Fifth Republic was set in 2002, when there were 16
contenders. This time, however, the number of declared candidates is already
twice that figure—and more are likely to join the race.
Five years ago, the leader of the radical left (*La France
Insoumise*—LFI) failed to advance to the second round, despite securing 21.95
percent of the vote.
"This time, 15 percent will likely be enough to do the
trick," François Heisbourg—one of France’s most prominent political
scientists—tells *Rzeczpospolita*. "That is roughly the size of Jean-Luc
Mélenchon’s core electorate," he adds, referring to the LFI leader.
In such a scenario, French voters would face a truly
diabolical choice in the second round. For it is almost certain that Mélenchon
would go head-to-head with Jordan Bardella, the leader of the far-right
National Rally (RN)—a candidate who is already polling at 33–34 percent in the
first round. Unless, that is, a ruling by a higher court on July 7th overturns
the ban preventing Marine Le Pen from holding public office—a ban imposed due
to the misappropriation of European Parliament funds. However, this changes
little, given that her level of public support is comparable to Bardella’s.
An increasing number of French people are convinced that the
country is in need of a revolution—specifically the kind proposed by the far
right.
The public opinion polling institute Elabe predicts that, in
such a scenario, Bardella would secure 71.5 percent, leaving Mélenchon with
only 28.5 percent. This comes as no surprise: the LFI leader’s Trotskyist
platform, his Stalinist methods of party management, and his antisemitic
statements—calculated to appeal to the Muslim electorate—are sparking
widespread fear across France. However, the prospect of the far right seizing
power in the EU’s second most important country is hardly reassuring either. In
an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Bardella recently
announced that, should he come to power, he would not respect rulings by the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Meanwhile, the Paris-based
Institut Montaigne estimates that the cost of implementing the National Rally’s
platform would be so exorbitant that it would drive the country into
bankruptcy. France’s national debt already stands at 118 percent of
GDP—proportionally, the highest in the EU, with the exception of Greece and
Italy.
Polls conducted by Elabe suggest that the only politician
with a realistic chance of defeating Jordan Bardella (or Marine Le Pen) is
Édouard Philippe. The French public remembers his effectiveness during the
pandemic, and they also find his conservative views appealing. However—as a
recent Ipsos poll demonstrates—if the Left is represented by either Hollande or
Glucksmann, both Mélenchon and Philippe would each secure just 13.5 percent of
the vote in the first round. In such a scenario, the battle for the Élysée
Palace would be decided by a margin of mere thousands—or even hundreds—of
votes.
Radicals are currently riding a wave of momentum because an
unprecedented segment of society is clamoring for revolution. As research from
the prestigious Paris institution Sciences Po reveals, only 18 percent of the
public now trusts the institution of the presidency, 15 percent trust political
parties, and 20 percent trust the National Assembly."
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