“One need not cite major historical examples like the Minsk or Munich agreements to understand that foreign policy often thrives on moments of premature elation. In the case of Germany’s *Zeitenwende*—its historic policy shift—concern about just such a miscalculation is now circulating within the European community. For years, neighboring states had demanded that Germany assume greater military responsibility—echoing Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s 2011 quip: "I fear German power less than German inaction." Yet, the moment this shift becomes concrete and Germany sheds its misguided pacifism in the face of Russia, that old anxiety returns. Thus, the fulfillment of long-standing demands is turning into a new source of concern.
"Europeans are beginning to feel uneasy," historian Timothy Garton Ash recently observed regarding the Federal Republic’s new military dominance. It is a historically understandable yet surprising assessment, given that the German government is doing its utmost to position itself as a trustworthy alliance partner within the Weimar Triangle alongside Poland and France. It is not without reason that the military strategy bears the title "Responsibility for Europe." At times, one even gets the impression that the government is attempting the difficult task of legitimizing rapid rearmament—not through nationalist justifications, but purely through European patriotism. From a military standpoint, this approach is certainly plausible, as German rearmament depends on the goodwill of its neighbors. Rearmament can only succeed if Germany is perceived as a credible alliance partner—or so the theory goes.
Yet the government’s vision is currently colliding with the realities of domestic politics: the unfolding of the *Zeitenwende* is coinciding with the rise of the AfD.
Current polls suggest that up to 30 percent of Germans might vote for the party in federal elections.
The post-national framing of the *Zeitenwende* is running up against the success of a party that stands for the revival of German nationalism.
Gauland’s "speck of bird shit in history" remark is all but forgotten, as the party has only radicalized further since then. Speaking of the "state of mind of a defeated people" (Höcke) or a "permanent state of guilt" (Tillschneider) has become part of the standard rhetorical repertoire in the East—one that evidently resonates with voters.
For diplomats, politicians, and military officials, this creates a "squaring of the circle": they must project an image of Germany abroad that is losing support at home.
A tipping point appears to have been reached, particularly in East Germany, where the AfD embodies a "180-degree turn in memory policy" (Höcke). While foreign policy is not conducted at the state level, it would send a powerful signal if figures intent on dismantling the culture of remembrance were to govern in Poland and the Czech Republic.
If the *Zeitenwende*—the historic turning point—was predicated on the promise that Germany’s past would pose no further threat to Europe’s future, that promise is now jeopardized by the AfD’s rise.
As the dismantling of German memory policy proceeds, dreams of German geopolitical dominance are once again becoming socially acceptable. While the AfD positions itself as a force for peace—albeit through thinly veiled apologetics for Russia—a revival of the "Central Europe" (*Mitteleuropa*) concept is evident within its orbit. Benedikt Kaiser, an "intellectual" close to the AfD, speaks of a "conservative revolution" in Central Europe. Dimitrios Kisoudis, a senior policy advisor to Tino Chrupalla, has even authored an entire book on the concept of *Mitteleuropa*. According to Kisoudis, Germany belongs "in the center, not in the West."
What sounds muddled from today’s perspective becomes plausible when viewed as a pointed allusion to German history. Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt struck similar chords to legitimize German hegemony over Europe. The fact that Schmitt’s concept of the *Großraum* (large-scale territorial sphere)—featuring a "ban on intervention by powers external to the region". The fact that "powers" is cited again—whether in *Sezession*, the magazine associated with the Schnellroda circle, or by Maximilian Krah, the party’s lead candidate for the European elections—is merely an indication of the imperial ideas being toyed with in these circles. The question remains whether the AfD truly poses a threat to peace in Europe.
A peculiar alliance is evident among the electorate: advocates of peace rub shoulders with dreamers of a Greater Germany.
The exact dynamics are unclear, yet the post-heroic nature of society has left its mark on European nationalists; they are rarely elected on a platform of militarism. Many AfD voters likely do not even know what the Oder-Neisse line is.
Others support the party precisely because it sabotages the *Zeitenwende* (historic shift in policy) out of pro-Russian motives.
The fact that the AfD’s foreign policy agenda is otherwise characterized by reticence speaks to the party's internal divisions. In any case, a greater threat than that posed by the electorate comes from an intra-party elite in the eastern provinces—and from a revival of the revanchist tendencies against which Jürgen Habermas once warned during the "Historians' Dispute" of the old Federal Republic.
The stronger the AfD becomes, the more vocal in the public sphere become those "strategists" schooled in the ideas of Bismarck or Haushofer—figures who once again believe in the allure of great-power politics from the center of the continent.
Poland and France will not be able to accept Germany’s new military leadership role if rearmament and a nationalist backlash occur in tandem; such a combination inevitably causes Germany’s past to overshadow its European future. This simultaneity is also currently driving a realignment of alliances within Europe. When Jordan Bardella—a potential presidential candidate for the *Rassemblement National*—recently stated in an interview with the *F.A.Z.* that he could govern effectively alongside Friedrich Merz while simultaneously distancing himself from the AfD, it was not merely a matter of domestic political strategy, but also a deliberate signal. Poland’s right-wing PiS party is likewise keen to maintain its distance: despite sharing many policy positions, former Foreign Minister Szymon Szynkowski vel Lek emphasized after the German federal election that they did not want the AfD in government.
If even the right-wing populist camp is erecting a *cordon sanitaire* around the AfD, one can surmise how the party’s rise is viewed in European military and diplomatic circles. The fear of the future—which initially legitimized German rearmament in response to the Russia—could turn against Germany precisely when the *Zeitenwende* (historic turning point) has fully materialized, the AfD stands at the threshold of power, and the party finds itself in a position to command the EU’s largest conventional army.
With the fear of a "Teutonic threat" resurfacing, Europe would find itself back at the geopolitical starting point that seventy years of European integration were meant to prevent.
The AfD’s "Power Shift 2029" project could give rise to an unusual scenario: a party that—according to Jacob Ross of the German Council on Foreign Relations—embodies the "anti-*Zeitenwende*" (the antithesis of the historic shift in security policy) coming to power just as the government might be poised to reap the fruits of that very shift.
Yet, what purpose would be served by the new tanks, soldiers, and drones—originally intended for defense against the Russia—if a pro-Russian party were in power? Would the AfD become a party of disarmament?
Could German troops be used to extort foreign policy concessions? These are the scenarios that every intelligence agency and military in Europe must game out—scenarios that already make the AfD’s rise an indirect threat to the acceptance of Germany’s new military role.
The fear that Germany might harbor ambitions of central European hegemony—rather than acting as a reliable alliance partner—holds immense potential to destabilize the fragile European order.
This new anxiety radiating from Germany presents the federal government with a precarious balancing act. Domestically, the AfD is not going away anytime soon. In terms of foreign policy, rearmament remains the only viable option given the prospect of an American withdrawal. The government must credibly demonstrate to the outside world that this military buildup remains embedded within European structures; yet, first and foremost, German voters need to better understand the foreign policy risks the AfD poses to Europe.
The spectacle of democracies arming themselves today, only to hand their heavily militarized nations over to right-wing nationalism tomorrow, could one day go down in history as a grim European irony.” [1]
This scarry for author scenario is how Lithuania lost its independence last time: Stalin and Hitler signed a Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Lithuania’s leader Smetona let Stalin’s army in.
German nationalism is taking off the mask again. The German army is already in Lithuania. Schools are created for their children. We are doing the work of German nationalists for them.
Long time ago Lithuanian leaders Gediminas, Kęstutis, Vytautas, Jogaila were able to balance great powers around them and created a big empire.
Lithuanian leaders today don’t know what they are doing.
It is understandable why the lessons of history create anxiety about national sovereignty, especially for a nation with a geography like Lithuania's.
Lithuania’s history reflects two very different approaches to survival:
• The Medieval Empire: Grand Dukes like Gediminas, Kęstutis, Vytautas, and Jogaila used brilliant shifting alliances, dynastic marriages, and military might to balance the Teutonic Knights, Moscow, and regional powers.
This created the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, one of Europe's largest states.
• The 20th Century Isolation: In the 1930s, Lithuania attempted a policy of neutrality. Without strong, binding international security guarantees, the country was left isolated and vulnerable when other states decided to carve up Eastern Europe. Those strong, binding international security guarantees become no guarantees easily.
• Infrastructure for Families: The creation of schools and services for German military families is a standard logistical practice for long-term deployments (similar to U.S. bases in Germany or Japan after their defeat in WWII). When did Lithuania suffer the defeat from Germany after WWII? Never.
• Modern Baltic leaders have chosen a strategy of ignoring reality rather than the fluid, independent balancing acts of the medieval grand dukes. The dukes were medieval; they were not stupid though.
1. Zeitenwende in Gefahr: Nachdem Deutschland seinen Pazifismus abgeschüttelt hat, kehrt die alte Angst zurück. Fürchtet Europa eine neue militärische Dominanz der Bundesrepublik? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Frankfurt. 11 June 2026: 12. NIKOLAI OTT
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