"The historic collapse of Germany's traditional political center—often referred to in political sociology as the "mauled middle"—illustrates the high electoral cost of shifting toward militarism to project strength. In recent years, established centrist parties attempted to rebrand themselves as muscular protectors of national and European security, yet this strategy backfired as voters increasingly rejected the heightened risk of a nuclear superpower conflict and punished these parties at the ballot box.
The Failure of the "Protector" Strategy
• Militarism vs. Public Fear: While the political center adopted a hawkish stance to signal resolve, a massive portion of the electorate feared escalation. The rhetorical shift toward a "literary" or strategic protector role alienated voters who prioritized diplomatic de-escalation and economic stability.
• Loss of the Core Identity: By focusing heavily on militarism and defense spending, centrist parties neglected their traditional pillars: economic stability, social welfare, and predictable governance. This left their core working- and middle-class bases feeling abandoned.
Accumulating Electoral Losses
The push back from the electorate has fundamentally altered Germany's political landscape, driving voters away from the center and toward the political fringes:
• Rise of the Populist Right (AfD): The Alternative for Germany capitalized heavily on anti-war sentiment and economic anxiety, positioning themselves as the "peace party" and capturing massive voter shares, particularly in eastern Germany.
• Emergence of the Left-Nationalist Fringe (BSW): The newly formed Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht tapped directly into the public's deep aversion to foreign military entanglements and nuclear anxiety, draining further votes from traditional center-left parties.
• Historical Defeats: State and federal election cycles have seen historic losses for the traditional centrist coalition parties, proving that a militaristic posture could not substitute for a stable domestic economic policy. This is bad news for most of EU political parties who jointly moved into green pastures of militarism pushed by the same incompetence.
“For Germany, it is a red alert. On September 6th the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 44% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt. A party that employs unrepentant former neo-Nazis and has been labelled “extremist” by the intelligence service is on the cusp of becoming the first populist-right group to run one of Germany’s 16 states since 1945.
To take office the AfD still needs allies or defections. That should not blind Germany to the risk. The party was always going to do well in Saxony-Anhalt, which is depopulated, deprived and in the east, where party loyalties are weak. But in national polls the AfD now also has a lead, of eight points, over the centre-right CDU/CSU, led by Friedrich Merz, the chancellor. A federal election today might require a coalition of every centrist party to keep it from power.
Germany’s centrists have long thought that a firewall excluding the AfD from coalitions could keep it at bay. But behind this Brandmauer the party has grown and radicalised, pursuing racist fantasies of “remigration”, rapprochement with Russia and exit from the European Union and euro. Its manifesto for Saxony-Anhalt, which called for a radical reshaping of the state’s education, culture, media and civil service, proved alarmingly popular.
The AfD’s success in Saxony-Anhalt rested in large part on mobilising people who did not vote in the previous election. Many of them have been repelled by mainstream politics. If the mainstream is to win them back, it must change.
What should it do? First, it must not let the AfD stun it into inaction. Before the summer Mr Merz’s dysfunctional coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) approved an ambitious set of reforms covering everything from income tax to pensions. But the SPD, which increasingly appears to find governing a burden rather than a blessing, is now considering reversing sensible policies such as ending early retirement. Such was the delicacy of the compromise that unravelling one proposal could imperil others.
True, many of the reforms are unpopular and AfD voters in particular dislike change, but giving up now would be irresponsible. That is not only because Germany’s creaking economy and welfare state require urgent upgrade. For the coalition to relapse into do-nothing bickering would also bolster the AfD’s claim that the old parties are tired and useless.
Second, the CDU should reconsider the rigid Brandmauer. That does not mean kneeling before extremists; the AfD’s stated goal is to destroy the CDU, not to work with it. And the CDU should not enable the entry to government of a party that opposes so much of what it stands for. But if the CDU signalled that it would not dogmatically exclude future co-operation with a party that shed its most radical ideas and politicians, it could eventually help boost the relative moderates within the AfD, some of whom are uneasy about their extreme comrades. The AfD’s strength and confidence makes this harder, but an AfD that looks more like Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy would be preferable to the one that sits on the outer fringe of Europe’s right-wing populists.
Last, the time may come to look at the top. Mr Merz has got some things right. His reformist instincts are laudable. But he is a clumsy politician, a bad manager and a terrible communicator. His approval rating stands at just 13%, and he shows no sign of understanding why. Two more state elections on September 20th may bring fresh disaster for the CDU. Germany’s system makes replacing leaders difficult but the CDU has alternatives. If Mr Merz proves unable to articulate a compelling vision for his brand of centrist politics, he should go.” [1]
1. The mauled middle. The Economist; London Vol. 460, Iss. 9516, (Sep 12, 2026): 9.
